Changing Party Systems, Socio-Economic Cleavages and Nationalism in Northern Europe, 1956-2017

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This study draws on a rich set of pre- and post-electoral surveys to explore the changing relationship between party support and electoral socio-economic cleavages in Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, and Iceland from the mid-twentieth century until the present. I document that the decline of their particularly strong class cleavages coincides with the emergence of multi-elite party systems, in line with most Western democracies. While in the 1950s-1960s the lowest-educated and lowest-income voters were more left-wing, since the 1970s-1980s the vote for the left has gradually become associated with the highest-educated voters, who have drifted apart from the more right-wing economic elites. I also investigate how this transformation relates to the rise of populism and nationalism over the recent decades. Despite historical, cultural, and political links, the Nordic countries’ transition towards a multi-elite party system has happened at different speeds, offering interesting insights on the specificities of the national trajectories.

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**Keywords:** social cleavage, income inequality, political history, nationalism.

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Introduction

This study aims to analyze the changing relationship between party support and electoral socio-economic cleavages in Northern Europe. It builds upon Piketty (2018) work on the emergence of a "multiple-elite" party system in France, US and UK, and on recent studies exploiting post-electoral surveys to analyze the long-run evolution of political cleavages and the interconnections with socio-economic inequalities in a growing number of countries, such as India (Banerjee, Gethin and Piketty, 2018), South Africa (Gethin, 2020), Germany (Piketty and Kosse, 2020), Isreal (Berman, 2020).

How have political cleavages developed in some of the world’s oldest and most egalitarian democracies? Have Nordic countries also transitioned towards a multi-elite party system as most Western democracies? How have the deeply rooted trails of long-lasting nationalistic ideas changed the party system over the course of the century? I answer these questions using pre- and post-electoral surveys for Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Finland and Iceland from mid-twentieth century until the present.

The Nordic countries have been described as unusually stable and well-functioning multi-party political systems with highly developed welfare systems. The five countries also have strong historical (e.g., geography), cultural (e.g., language) and political (e.g., their parties encompass the five old parties from the classic Nordic five-party model) links. Nonetheless, they do not have the same historic pre-conditions, economic resources, foreign policy positions and in recent decades their party systems have evolved differently. These differences have been recently found to largely explain why Nordic countries are distinctly dissimilar in voter alignment and their political systems.

All Nordic countries except from Iceland have a stronger class-based party system than the rest of Western democracies, but it has weakened over time. I confirm the existence of these strong class cleavages and document that their decline coincides with the recent emergence of a multi-elite cleavage structure in line with what has already been documented for most Western democracies. In the 1950s-1960s, Nordic countries had a class-based system, as the left-wing vote (socialist-labour-democratic) was associated with the lowest-educated
and lowest-income voters, while upper and middle classes used to vote for other parties or coalitions. Since the 1970s-1980s, the vote for the left has gradually become associated with the highest-educated voters, as the lowest-educated vote less for the left and the highest-educated are now more left-wing.

Nonetheless, the path towards a multi-elite party system has happened at different speeds in Northern Europe. It has been faster in Norway and Denmark, where the traditional left (socialist-labour-democratic) has lost the support of the lowest-educated in benefit of the right and the far-right, whereas the new left (greens-other left) has attracted the vote of the highest-educated. In contrast, in Sweden and Finland the reversal of the education cleavage has been less pronounced, as the traditional left (socialist-labour-democratic) has managed to keep a larger share of the class-based electorate. In Sweden, the persistent hegemony of the class-based Social Democratic Party has prevented the emergence of a clear multi-elite party system, despite the strong support to the Left Party among the highest-educated. In Finland, the delay is largely due to the foundation of the Left Alliance in the early 1990s, a competing new left party closely linked to the Soviet Union that, contrary to the Greens, it attracts the lower class’ vote. The exception is Iceland, which did not develop a strong class-based party system and has had a very stable multi-elite party system since the late 1970s.

This structural evolution can contribute to explain the rise of populism and nationalism, as the lowest-educated and the lowest-income earners might feel abandoned. In Norway and Denmark, the anti-immigration Progress Party emerged already in the 1970s as an anti-tax party, differently from the True Finns that, founded two decades later as successors of the Agrarian Party, were in favor of a more progressive taxation. The Swedish exceptionalism myth vanished with the success of the far-right Sweden Democrats in the 2010s, whereas in Iceland the renewed political line of the Progressive Party prevented the new far-right nationalist parties from emerging. The increasing migration towards Northern Europe has led to the implementation of tighter immigration policies that have favoured the emergence of a religious cleavage according to which Muslim voters are more left-wing, in line with what has been found in the rest of Western countries.

I also document non-negligible disparities across the five countries in their gender, sector and rural-urban cleavages that on top of the differences in the development of voter alignment along class, education and income confirm the absence of a representative Nordic voter.
Chapter 1: Norway

1.1 Party System and Election Results, 1957-2017

The Norwegian constitution signed in 1814 transformed Norway from an absolute into a constitutional monarchy. However, it was not until 1898 and 1913 that universal male and female suffrage, respectively, were established. The Norwegian multi-party system has been long dominated by the Labour Party (DNA), the largest party since 1927 in the Norwegian Parliament (the Storting). Because of its undisputed power until the mid-1960s, Norway performed as a “one-party dominant” system during this period (Sartori, 2005). The DNA led uninterruptedly single-party majority governments from 1945 until 1961, followed by alternating coalitions and minority governments. In particular, in 1965 a center-right coalition government constituted by the Conservative, the Liberal, the Centre and the Christian Democratic Party took power.

The strong support of Labour to join the European Community (EC) weakened its hegemony: the electorate’s rejection of the membership in the Referendum of 1972 was followed by a loss of about 11.2 percentage points of votes in the 1973 Storting election (Figure 1.1). Such loss did not come together with an increase in support for the right. The main winner of the Labour Party’s defeat was an anti-European Community faction that got divided from Labour during its pro-membership campaign and joined the Communists and the Socialist People’s Party in the Socialist Electoral Alliance. In line with the “Rightist Wave” of the 1980s across Europe, the Norwegian electorate made a shift towards the right during this period (Lafferty, 1990). The Conservative Party formed its own minority government in 1981 with 31.7 percent of the votes and took part in a coalition government with the Christian Democratic Party and the Centre Party in 1983.

On the eve of the second EU-membership referendum, divergent ideological positions within the center-right coalition allowed the Labour to come back to power. At the same time, the anti-immigration Progress Party was gaining support among the right-wing electorate, surpassing the Conservatives in the 1997, 2005 and 2009 parliamentary elections. From 2005 to 2013, the country was governed by the Red-Green Coalition, an alliance of the
Labour, the Centre and the Socialist Left Party, where the agrarian Centre represented the environmentalist ideology.

In what follows, I will study the changing relationship between party support and socio-economic characteristics using Norwegian post-electoral surveys for all general elections held between 1957 and 2017\textsuperscript{1}. The Norwegian Labour Party and the Socialist Left Alliance are classified as left-wing parties, the right-wing group is composed of the Conservative Party, the Progress Party and the Christian Democrats. Because of their centrist position, the Liberal Party and the Centre Party are not included neither in the left nor in the right.

Figure 1.1: Election results in Norway, 1957-2017

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{election_results.png}
\caption{Election results in Norway, 1957-2017}
\end{figure}

\textit{Source}: author’s computations using official election results.

\textit{Note}: the figure shows the share of votes received by selected groups of Norwegian political parties in general elections between 1957 and 2017.

1.2 The Decline of The Labour Party and The Emergence of The Multi-Elite Party System

The increased fragmentation of the Norwegian political system has come together with a transformation of political attitudes. Figure 1.2 shows the evolution of the difference in left vote between both tertiary graduates and non-tertiary graduates and top 10 percent

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{attitudes.png}
\caption{Evolution of the difference in left vote}
\end{figure}

\textsuperscript{1}All post-electoral surveys used belong to the Norwegian Electoral Study: see appendix Table AD1.
and bottom 90 percent earners, after control.\(^2\) Whereas in 1957 the difference between the share of tertiary-educated and non-tertiary-educated voters voting left fell by almost 30 percentage points, this difference has become positive reaching more than 3 points in the 2010s. In contrast, the difference between the share of top 10 percent and bottom 90 percent earners voting left remains negative over the entire period. The divergence between the highest-educated voters and the top income earners reveals that Norway has also moved towards a multi-elite party system, as it has been documented for the majority of Western democracies.

Figure 1.2: Vote for the left among the highest-educated and top income earners in Norway

Source: author’s computations using Norwegian electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the evolution of the voting pattern among the tertiary educated and the top 10% earners voting for the left-wing parties, after controls.

To shed light on the drivers of this transformation, we can further decompose the electorate by educational attainment and consider specific parties. Between the 1960s and 1990s, the relationship between educational attainment and left-vote was monotonically downward sloping (see Appendix Figure AB1). The reversal in the 2000s was mainly driven by the substantial reduction in the support for the Labour Party among the lowest-educated voters and exacerbated by a simultaneous increase in the share of tertiary-educated voters

\(^2\)See appendix Figure AB18 for the difference between the top 10 percent and the bottom 90 percent educated voting left.
supporting it (Figure 1.3). Despite this reduction, the Labour is however still supported by a larger share of primary-educated voters than of university graduates. In particular, since the 1990s the Labour Party has competed with the Progress Party in the political representation of the primary educated, whose support for the latter has increased from 11 percent in 1989-1997 to 27 percent in the 2000s, dropping by 7 percentage points over the last decade. This reduction coincides with an increase in the share of primary-educated voters supporting the Conservative Party, signaling a clear shift of the lowest-educated towards the right in recent decades. The Socialist Left Party has also contributed to the reversal of the education cleavage, as it has counted on the support of highest-educated voters since its debut in 1973 as the Socialist Electoral League. This finding is common to the majority of Western countries, where the New Left parties have gained the support of the high-educated segment of the electorate.

Figure 1.3: Decomposition of the vote for the left among tertiary-educated voters in Norway

Source: author’s computation using Norwegian electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of tertiary educated voters and the share of other voters voting for the main left-wing parties, after controls.

The transformation of the education cleavage has not come together with a reversal in the income cleavage. In particular, the share of left-wing vote has remained quite flat across the income distribution up to the 90th percentile over the 1957-2017 period, above which the share of votes for the left-wing parties sharply decreases, as high-income voters are more right-wing. The analysis for specific right-wing parties documents a greater support for the Conservative rather than the Progress Party, which registers a higher share of voters

Refer to the Appendix A, starting from Figure AC1 for the party-specific analysis.
among bottom income earners (see Appendix Figures AB2, AB3, AC12 and AC16).

### 1.3 The Declining Class Cleavage and the Emergence of Other Socio-Economic Cleavages

One of Norway's most important political cleavages is perceived social class. From the 1950s until the 1990s, nearly 70 percent of the working class voted for the left, contrary to the 30 percent left-wing vote share of the rest of classes (Figure 1.4). Since the 2000s, the strong Norwegian class cleavage has weakened due to the reduction in the support for the left by the working class and to the simultaneous increase in the left vote by the middle and upper classes (Knutsen 2001). The decline in class polarization is mainly explained by the weakening of class identity and the consequent electoral mobility, which is stronger in Norway than in the rest of Nordic countries (Worre 1980).

Figure 1.4: Vote for the left by perceived social class in Norway

![Vote for the left by perceived social class](image)

*Source*: author’s computations using Norwegian electoral surveys.

*Note*: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by self-perceived social class.

The decrease in the importance of the class cleavage has coincided with the emergence of the Norwegian multi-elite party system. In fact, class was so relevant to explain party choice that it shifted the education gradient up on average from -24 to -9 until the 1990s. With the shrinking of class polarization from the 2000s, the sensitivity of the education gradient to the inclusion of class as a control has become negligible (Appendix Figure AB25).
Over the 1980s, another interesting transformation has characterized the Norwegian political scenario. The country has experienced a strong reversal of the traditional gender cleavage, according to which women were more right-wing. The political science literature has extensively focused on gender differences in electoral behavior and party preference, highlighting the emergence of a “modern gender gap” according to which women have become more left-wing than men (Inglehart and Norris [2000]). Figure 1.5 corroborates this fact by plotting the difference between the fraction of women and the fraction of men voting for left-wing parties over the whole period 1957-2017. Whereas this difference was -4 percentage points between 1957-1965, it has risen in absolute value over time, reaching 0 in the 1980s and nearly 10 percentage points since the 2000s. The gender gap is more pronounced in Norway than in France and Germany, where it is close to zero (Piketty [2018], Piketty and Kosse [2020]).

Figure 1.5: Vote for the left among women and the role of sector in Norway

Source: Source: author’s computations using Norwegian electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of women and the share of men voting for left-wing parties, before and after controlling for other variables.

One of the features recognized by the literature as relevant to explain the voting gender gap was women’s greater involvement in the religious sphere. Existing literature has emphasized the importance of religiosity and moral values in the modern history of Norway (Listhaug [1985]). These values have been represented in the Storting by the Christian
People’s Party, which has historically relied on a greater support among women. Such arguments explain why women voted systematically more for right-wing parties between 1957-1981. However, in contrast to France, controlling for religiosity does not affect the voting pattern in Norway, suggesting that there are other factors behind the reversal of the traditional gender cleavage. I find, indeed, that the modern gender cleavage is largely explained by the expansion of women’s employment in the public sector, confirming pre-existing findings in the literature (Knutsen 2001). The gradual increase in the share of public-employed voters has come together with a decline of private employees’ support for the left and a slight increase in the share of left-wing public employees, leading also to the emergence of a sectoral cleavage (see Appendix Figures AB11 and AB24).

1.4 Progress Party’s Anti-immigration Platform and the Religious Cleavage

The roots of the Norwegian nationalism date back to its fight for the construction of a national identity, separated from the neighbouring countries. However, immigration was not perceived as an issue until the 1970s, when the number of immigrant workers started to increase (Bergmann 2016).

The anti-immigration Progress Party was founded in 1973 as a no-tax party and gained the support of the lowest-educated and the lowest-income voters, as observed in other Western democracies. Although it only captured a restricted share of votes in the 1970s, mainly attracting young voters from disadvantaged socio-economic backgrounds, the 1987 first and the 2000s later represent turning points in the Progress Party’s electoral success (see Appendix Figures AC15 to AC18). Over time the focus of the party’s political debate has moved from labor immigration and the increasing number of foreign workers in the country to the threat of Muslim immigrants to the Western culture and values (Fangen and Vaage 2018).

These positions have certainly played a crucial role in the determination of a religious cleavage leading Muslims to vote more for left-wing parties. Figure 1.6 shows that more than 70 percent of Muslims have voted for the main left-wing parties over the period 2013-2017. The majority of them (59 percent) have supported the Labour Party, whereas the vote share to the Labour Party among Catholics, Protestants or atheists does not even surpass 30 percent (See Appendix Table AD2). As in the case of France (Piketty 2018), a

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4 See Appendix Figures AC19 and AC27 for the voting support by gender respectively for the Christian Democrats and the main left-wing parties.

5 The Muslim vote is only available for the last decade (2013-2017). These results need to be interpreted with caution, as the percentage of Muslim electors in our sample is quite small.
new religious cleavage therefore seems to have emerged in Norway.

Figure 1.6: Vote for the left by religious affiliation in Norway, 2013-2017

Source: author’s computations using Norwegian electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the shares of votes received by the left-wing parties by religious affiliation over the last decade.
Chapter 2: Denmark

2.1 Political System and Election Results, 1960-2019

Denmark’s path towards democracy was marked by two pivotal events: the adoption of the Constitutional Act in 1849, which stipulated the end of the absolute monarchy, and the 1915 first election held under universal suffrage. The Constitution’s revision of 1953 introduced the unicameral Danish Parliament (the Folketing) and a proportional representation system, which highly influenced the following governments’ structure, making it difficult for one party to obtain the absolute majority. Danish political history is thus characterized by the predominance of minority coalitions. The 1950s were a period of relative political stability, due to the balance of power between the three biggest parties, the Social Democratic Party, the conservative-liberal Venstre and the Conservative People’s Party, and the three smallest parties, the Social Liberals, the Communist Party and the Justice Party.

A first deviation that led to a left-right polarization happened in the 1960 election when the Justice Party lost all its seats, while the Socialist People’s Party, founded by former members of the Communist Party, entered in the Folketing along with the Independents on the right-wing side of the political spectrum (Stehouwer and Borre 1969). Until 1973, the governments were mainly constituted by the Social Democratic Party, sometimes in coalition with the Social Liberal Party on the left, and by the Venstre-Conservative coalition on the right, also in some cases with the support of the Social Liberal Party.

The 1973 election has been defined as the “landslide election”, which brought upheavals to the Danish multi-party system (Green-Pedersen 2001). The number of elected parties doubled, and the far-right Progress Party entered in the Parliament for the first time with 15.9 percent of votes, becoming the second party of the country. With only 12.3 percent of votes, the Venstre formed a minority coalition, together with the main right-wing parties, above all the Conservative and the Progress Party, and the Social Liberal Party. Although the majority of the traditional parties registered losses, the hardest hit from the landslide election was for the Social Democratic Party. The Social Democrats were historically the largest political force in the Folketing obtaining around 40 percent of the votes until 1964,
after which the share of votes started to decrease reaching 25.6 percent in 1973. In 1975, they entered back in the government and remained in power until 1982. However, the Social Democrats’ weakened position made it necessary to get support from the right-wing bloc to rule.

In 1978, the Social Democratic Party tried an unsuccessful cross-bloc cooperation with the Venstre, which came to an end only one year later. The coalition had to deal with the consequences of a dramatic economic crisis initiated with the first oil shock in 1973 and with the difficulty of getting the proposed policies approved, since the support by the non-socialist coalition was essential. In 1982, a center-right minority government constituted by the Conservative People’s Party and the Venstre, along with the Centre Democrats and the Christian Democrats, came to power and remained until 1988. Between 1988 and 1990, the Conservative People’s Party and the Venstre formed another government coalition with the Social Liberal Party.

During this same period the Social Democratic Party took positions closer to the center to attract them in a future coalition. In 1993, they succeeded and formed a coalition government with the Centre Democrats, the Social Liberal Party and the Christian Democrats. The Socialist People’s Party, that used to present itself as an alternative to the left of the Social Democratic Party, also changed its position towards the center with the aim of eventually cooperating with the Social Democratic Party. This strategy cost the party a large loss of support during the 1990s to the benefit of the Red-Green Alliance, the most left-wing party in the Folketing. On the extreme right of the political spectrum, the 1990s also witnessed the gradual decline of the Progress Party and the birth of the anti-immigration Danish People’s Party in 1995. In the 2015 election, the latter became the second party in the country, supporting a Liberal minority government along with the Conservatives and the Liberal Alliance.

In what follows, I will study the changing relationship between party support and socio-economic characteristics using Danish post-electoral surveys covering all general elections held between 1960-2015. For the sake of simplicity and following the existing literature, the Social Liberal Party has been classified as a left-wing party, despite its center-orientation that led it to support both right-wing and left-wing governments.

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1. All post-electoral surveys used belong to the Danish National Archives: see Appendix Table BD1. Notice that the information about the 1960 to 1968 elections have been inferred through retrospective survey’s questions.
2. The same approach is followed, for instance, by Bengtsson et al. (2013a).
2.2 Towards a Multi-Elite Party System

The transformation and the increased fragmentation of the Danish political system have favored the emergence of a multi-elite party system. The difference in left vote between the share of tertiary educated and non-tertiary educated after controls was equal to -15 percentage points in 1960-68, after which it gradually increased until reaching 5 percentage points over the last decade. Such difference is particularly sensitive to the inclusion of age as a control, since it shifts the line downwards during the 1980s (see Appendix Figures BB12 and BB21). The importance of age may be driven by the dissatisfaction with the labor market policies implemented by the center-right coalition to face the high youth unemployment rate in the aftermath of the oil crisis.

In contrast, the difference in left vote between the top 10 percent and bottom 90 percent earners is negative over the whole 1960-2015 period and the flat trend at around -12 percentage points is preserved also after the inclusion of controls. As in the case of Norway, the share of left-wing vote by income percentile starts falling from the 90th percentile, confirming a stronger support of right-wing parties among the richest segment of the electorate (see Appendix Figures BB2 to BB4). While the Conservative Party has always been supported by the highest-income voters and the emerging Danish People’s Party by the...
lower socio-economic classes, the Venstre registered the majority of votes among bottom income earners until the 1980s, before a reversal that aligned it with the conservative right (see Appendix Figures BC17, BC22 and BC23).

Figure 2.2: Vote for the left among the highest-educated and top income earners in Denmark

Source: author’s computations using Danish post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the evolution of the voting pattern among the tertiary educated voters and the top 10% earners voting for the left-wing parties, after controls.

The analysis of the evolution of electoral support for specific education groups and left-wing parties provides interesting insights on the drivers of the educational reversal. The change in voting behavior was mainly driven by the joint influence of the Socialist People’s Party and the Social Liberals on the higher-educated, reinforced by the emergence of the Red-Green Alliance in the 1990s. The educational cleavage is less marked when we exclude the contribution of the Social Liberal Party, which has counted on the support of the highest-educated since the 1960s. However, the reduction in the support for the Social Democratic Party among the lowest-educated plays a minor role in the determination of the reversal: as for the Norwegian Labour Party, the Danish Social Democrats still rely on a majority of primary-educated voters. However, while in 1990-98 they had a vote share of 43 percent, this share fell to nearly 30 percent in the following decades. The decline
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coincides with the rise of the confidence in the Danish People’s Party among the lowest-educated and lowest-income voters (see Appendix Figures BC36 to BC39). These results are in line with Stubager (2013), who classifies the parties on a libertarian-authoritarian dimension to document the existence of an educational cleavage in Denmark and the same party-specific voting patterns described.

2.3 Class, Sector and Other Socio-Economic Cleavages

Denmark is also characterized for having a strong class cleavage. From the 1960s until the 1990s, the working class vote share to the left was larger than 80 percent, contrary to the 40 percent share of the rest of classes. Over the last decade, class polarization has almost vanished, due to both a sharp decline in the vote for the left by the working class and to an increasing support among the new middle class (Figure 2.3). As in the case of Norway, the educational gradient is sensitive to the inclusion of perceived social class, confirming the importance of the class cleavage (see Appendix Figure BB24).

Figure 2.3: Vote for the left by perceived social class in Denmark

Source: author’s computations using Danish post-electoral surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by perceived social class. Notice that information about class is not available in 2001-2007.

Apart from education, income and class, Denmark stands out among the Nordic countries for having a particularly strong sector cleavage (see Appendix Figures BB9 and BB25). While during the 1960s and 1970s there were no significant differences in left-vote between the share of Danish public and private employees, starting from the 1980s, there has been a sharp decline in the percentage of private sector employees voting for the left. This transformation coincides with the deterioration of the private sector confidence towards
the Social Democratic Party when dealing with the economic and political crisis of the 1980s. The Venstre-Conservative governments at the time attracted part of this lost vote share by openly promoting a process of privatization of the public sector and the reduction of corporate taxation (Andersen et al., 1996).

Figure 2.4: Vote for the left among public employees in Denmark

Source: author’s computations using Danish post-electoral surveys.  
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of public employees and the share of other voters voting left-wing parties, before and after controlling for other variables.

The employment sector seems to be playing a crucial role also to explain the modern gender cleavage, as its inclusion as a control in the regression of the difference between women and men voting left shifts the curve downward and makes the gender gap coefficient not statistically significant after the 1980s (Figure 2.5). Denmark has indeed experienced a large rise in female labor force participation and a larger fraction of this rise was captured by the public sector, as the share of women employed in this sector has increased from 44 to 59 percent over the 1960-2015 period (see Figure BA3 in the Appendix). Contrary to Norway, Denmark did not have a traditional gender cleavage prior to the 1980s. This can be explained by a weaker influence of the religious component. This hypothesis is corroborated by the marginal role played by the Christian Democrats in the Danish political context. The party was founded only in 1970 and, despite a slightly higher fraction of women voting for the party in the 1960s and the 1970s, the overall vote share was too low to generate the traditional gender cleavage.
Denmark is also characterized by a persistent urban-rural cleavage towards the right, which is an expression of the enduring influence of the Venstre in the rural areas of the country (see Appendix Figures BB6 and BB19).

**Figure 2.5: Vote for the left among women in Denmark**

![Graph showing vote for the left among women in Denmark](image)

*Source: author's computations using Danish post-electoral surveys.*

*Note:* the figure shows the difference between the share of women and the share of men voting for left-wing parties, before and after controlling for other variables.

### 2.4 Attitudes towards Immigration and the Rise of the Danish People’s Party

The success of the Danish People’s Party from the mid-1990s reveals the importance of the immigration issue in the Danish society. The anti-immigration rhetoric was first introduced in the Parliament by the Progress Party in the 1970s, even though at that time its main focus was the abolition of the income tax and the reduction of bureaucracy. With the increase in the number of asylum seekers, immigration started to become a heated topic in the public and political debate. After the dissolution of the coalition with the Social Liberal Party in 1993, the Conservative Party and the Venstre embraced the Progress Party’s platform, tightening their position towards immigration (Green-Pedersen and Odmalm, 2008).

The anti-immigration stance was reinforced by the emergence of the Danish People’s Party that considered immigration as a threat to national identity and burdensome for the Danish welfare state. I investigated to what extent these issues were perceived as urgent among the public opinion looking at the surveys’ questions related to voters’ attitudes towards...
immigrants and refugees. In 1998, the year of the Danish People’s Party’s debut in the Parliament, almost 60 percent of the individuals interviewed believed that immigration was a topic of great or decisive importance and the 46.2 percent stated that too much public resources were invested in refugees’ aid.

The terrorist attacks of 2001 eroded the distances between the anti-immigration party and the mainstream political parties, that until that moment accused the anti-Muslims position of the Danish People’s Party (Bergmann, 2016). Over time, the attention of the public opinion has moved towards Muslims and Islam. In 2007, while 34 percent of respondents saw general immigration as a menace, 47 percent expressed their concern about the interaction between Muslims and the Danish culture, aiming at the implementation of a tighter national immigration policy. Table 2 shows that the support for the Danish People’s Party has further increased in 2011-15 and confirms that the composition of the party’s electorate is aligned with the other anti-immigration parties across Europe, since it has mainly attracted voters from disadvantaged backgrounds.

Table 2: The structure of political cleavages in Denmark, 2011-2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Share of votes received (%)</th>
<th>Social Democratic Party</th>
<th>Socialist People’s Party</th>
<th>Red-Green</th>
<th>Social Liberal Party</th>
<th>Conservative Party</th>
<th>Venstre</th>
<th>Danish People’s Party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tertiary</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bottom 50%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle 40%</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top 10%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-40</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-60</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60+</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sector</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private/Mixed</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Location</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: author’s computations using Danish post electoral surveys. Notes: the table shows the average share of votes received by the Social Democratic Party, the Social Liberal Party, the Socialist People’s Party, the Red-Green Alliance, the Conservative, the Venstre and the Danish People’s Party by selected individual characteristics over the 2011-2015 period.
Chapter 3: Sweden

3.1 The Swedish Five-Party System and Election Results, 1956-2018

Sweden has been a parliamentary democracy since 1917 and universal suffrage was introduced soon after in 1921. The Swedish political system has been considered as a prototype of the Scandinavian five-party system. While in Norway and Denmark the first deviations from the model already happened during the 1970s and especially with the 1973 “earthquake” elections, the Swedish Parliament (the Riksdag) hosted the five traditional parties until 1987. These parties were grouped in two opposed blocs, the left-wing one led by the Social Democratic Party with the support of the Left Party, successor of the Communist Party of Sweden, and the bourgeois bloc, constituted by the conservative Moderate Party, the Liberal People’s Party and the agrarian Centre Party.

Over the course of the 20th century, the Social Democratic Party has been the largest party in the Riksdag. In particular, it has been in power for more than 60 years between 1932 and 2006, obtaining about 40 percent of votes at the Parliamentary elections, with two peaks of 54 percent in 1940 and 50 percent in 1968. Although most Swedish governments have been minority governments as in Denmark, the political supremacy of the Social Democratic Party has led to less political instability. Until the 1970s, the Swedish “moderate pluralism” tended towards a “one-party dominant” system, given that the Social Democratic predominance was flanked by the weakness of a non-compact right-wing bloc (Sartori 2005).

The 1970s were a decade of significant institutional changes, such as the adoption of a unicameral Parliament in 1970 and the promulgation of the 1974 Constitution, which transferred the full legislative power to the Parliament. At the same time, it was also the decade that witnessed the first setback of the Social Democrats’ dominance. In 1976, the Centre Party, the Liberal People’s Party and the Moderate Party formed the first coalition government in 44 years, although the Social Democrats gained 42.7 percent of the votes.
The latter came back to power in 1982, after six years in opposition. Moreover, since 1979 the Moderate Party became the second party in the Parliament, surpassing the Liberals and the Centre Party.

Figure 3.1: Election results in Sweden, 1956-2018

This turmoil was only an anticipation of the transformation that the Swedish political system was going to experience. Until 1985, the stable five-party model persisted, mainly due to the 4 percent vote share threshold that parties need to reach to gain seats in the Riksdag (Figure 3.1). The environmentalist Green Party, founded after the 1980's nuclear power referendum and inspired by the subsequent anti-nuclear movements, entered the Parliament in 1988. However, in 1991 it failed to meet the 4 percent threshold and had to wait until the following election to be represented again in the Parliament. The year 1991 is considered as a minor “earthquake” election [Aylott, 1995]. Two new parties managed to gain representation in the Riksdag, the Christian Democrats and the right-wing New Democracy. Meanwhile, the old Social Democratic Party obtained the lowest result since 1928 receiving only 37.7 percent of votes. The Moderate Party formed a minority government with the support of the Liberal and the Centre Party, along with the Christian Democrats.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by selected groups of Swedish political parties in general elections between 1956 and 2018.

Source: author’s computations using official election results.
The new government had the difficult task to deal with the financial crisis that hit the country at the beginning of the 1990s. The conservative government implemented liberal reforms, privatizing publicly owned firms, cutting corporate and capital taxes, as well as public spending, and designing programs to reduce inflation and budget deficits. While in 1994 the Social Democrats regained the lost consensus, the same cannot be said for the following election four years later. The party lost more than 10 percentage points, whereas the Left Party experienced an impressive increase in support, becoming the third party in the Parliament. This outcome was certainly an expression of voters’ dissatisfaction by the austerity policies implemented by the Social Democratic Party, but it was also linked to the Left Party anti-EU position in the referendum of 1995, as well as to its fights to defend the welfare state and to the gradual detachment from the communist ideology. However, the leftist support for the Social Democrats cost them a reduction in the share of votes by almost 6 percentage points in 2006.

The 2010’s election represents a real turning point in Swedish political history. On the left-wing side, the Social Democrats, the Left Party and the Greens created for the first time a red-green coalition. On the right-wing side, the far-right anti-immigration party, the Sweden Democrats, entered for the first time in the Riksdag with 5.7 percent of votes. The appearance of this party on the political scene can be considered the missing piece to establish the end of the Swedish “exceptionalism”. In what follows, I will analyze the evolution of the relationship between voting behavior and socio-economic characteristics using Swedish pre/post-electoral surveys for all general elections held between 1956-2014.

### 3.2 The Paths towards a Multi-Elite Party System

The long persistence of the traditional party system has undoubtedly affected the evolution of voting patterns in Sweden. The delay in the political upheavals with respect to Norway and Denmark is reflected, above all, in the analysis of the education cleavage. While the difference in left vote between the top 10 and the bottom 90 percent earners is stable and negative as in the rest of Nordic countries, the same alignment does not occur for education (Figure 3.2). The negative gap in left vote between tertiary and non-tertiary-educated voters presents an upward trend but approaches zero only in the 2010-2014 elections. This suggests that Sweden has experienced the same transition as Norway and Denmark towards a multi-elite system, but at a lower speed.

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2All surveys used up to 2011 belong to the Swedish National Data Service. For the 2014’s election we have used the survey included in the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (CSES) (Table CD1 in the Appendix.)
Figure 3.2: Vote for the left among the highest-educated and top income earners in Sweden

The stability in the income cleavage between top and bottom earners is largely due to the persistent support of top earners to the Moderate and the Liberal People’s Party across all the period of analysis. The Sweden Democrats, instead, appeal to the low-income segment of the electorate (see Appendix Figures CC10, CC14 and CC23). The Swedish surveys make it possible to further explore the “rich-poor” dimension, providing information about the wealth of the voters for some decades. The evolution of left vote by wealth group presents a downward and monotonic trend, with the bottom 50 percent voting more for the left, followed by the bottom 40 and finally by the top 10 percent.

The delayed path towards the reversal of the educational cleavage can be better understood by further analyzing the voting patterns by educational attainment and party. The share of left-wing tertiary educated voters has increased over time, reaching 44 percent in 2010-2014. However, the left has also managed to retain the majority of primary educated voters over the entire period. The share of primary educated voters was around 60 percent over the whole period and it has only fallen to 50 percent in the last decade, thus reducing the difference in the share of left-wing primary and tertiary educated (see Appendix Figure

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3For the income cleavage, see Figures CB3, CB4 and CB23 in the Appendix. For wealth, see Figure CB6. Notice: wealth dimension is not further explored because of the lack of exhaustive information about the nature of this variable.
Although the shift among the lowest-educated towards the right has been weaker than in Norway and Denmark, the decomposition of the vote by party reveals many similarities that may contribute to closing this gap. In this regard, the Left Party first and the Green Party later have captured the support of the highest-educated since their debut in the political arena, as documented for other Western democracies. On the right-wing spectrum, the Liberal People’s Party and the Moderate Party rely on a majority of tertiary educated voters, even though the Moderates have gained more support among the low-educated voters over the last decade. Moreover, in line with their twin parties around Europe, the far-right Sweden Democrats have exerted a strong attraction on the lower socio-economic classes that, until the 2000s, had favoured the Social Democratic Party. Indeed, the fraction of primary educated voting for the Social Democrats fell by 20 percentage points from 2002-2006 to 2010-2014, the decade of the far-right party success. This competition between the Sweden Democrats and the Social Democratic Party in the representation of the most disadvantaged classes is extremely similar to one documented for the Norwegian and the Danish contexts (see Appendix Figures CC25 to CC28). The recent dynamics suggest that, if the Sweden Democrats’ continue absorbing the lowest-educated vote, the education gradient is likely to become positive over the next decade. Sweden would be then more aligned with the multi-elite party systems in most Nordic and Western democracies.

3.3 Social Class, Unionization and Other Socio-economic Cleavages

The social class cleavage is of remarkable importance in the Swedish context. Between the 1950s and the 1990s, more than the 70 percent of working class members used to vote for the left, as opposed to the 30 percent of middle class voters. Starting from the 2000s, the decrease in this share along with a slight increase in the fraction of left-wing voters belonging to the middle class has modestly undermined class polarization (Figure 3.3).

The relevance of social class can be confirmed when analyzing its contribution to the evolution of the educational cleavage. The inclusion of social class leads to an impressive upward shift of the education gradient which only seems to disappear in the last decade. This persistence can be explained by the Swedish Social Democrats’ primacy in attracting the working class consensus until the early 2000s (see Appendix Figure CB27).
FIGURE 3.3: VOTE FOR THE LEFT BY PERCEIVED SOCIAL CLASS IN SWEDEN

The strength of the Swedish class cleavage allows one to explore another interesting aspect, that is the strong connection between union membership and voting behavior. The union members’ tendency to be more left-wing documented also for the other Nordic countries is particularly pronounced in Sweden (see Appendix Figures CB8 and CB23). Indeed, the Swedish Trade Union Confederation, the working class confederation, has been strongly tied to the Social Democratic Party (Bengtsson et al., 2013b).

Apart from education, income, class, and union, Sweden is also characterized by a rural-urban cleavage which has weakened over the last decade, mainly due to a decline in urban left-vote (see Appendix Figures CB7 and CB24). Voters from the rural areas have, indeed, disproportionately supported the agrarian Centre Party, flanked in the 2010s by the Sweden Democrats.

Also, the mechanisms behind the emergence of a modern gender cleavage, statistically significant only in the 1980, deserve to be further explored. First, the traditional gender cleavage shrinks to zero already in the 1960s, meaning that in Sweden, as in Denmark, women were not more conservative than men. Second, while the introduction of religiosity does not have any relevant effects, controlling for the employment sector makes the modern gender cleavage disappear. Overall, this evidence suggests that the gender cleavage is almost entirely explained by the increasing share of women employed in the public sector (see Appendix Figure CC30). The expansion of the welfare state has accentuated the

 SOURCE: author’s computations using Swedish electoral surveys.

 NOTE: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by self-perceived social class.
public-private divide, with private employees voting less for the left, as observed in Norway and Denmark (see Appendix Figures CB10 and CB26). Although this result is in line with the previous countries, the party-specific dynamics present some peculiarities. In contrast to the Norwegian and Danish contexts, the share of women voting for the Social Democrats has decreased over time and the gender gradient has become negative. In the most recent decade, the Left Party has lost the support of women to the benefit of the Greens, who have prioritized on their political agenda not only environmental issues, but also the fight for women empowerment and women’s rights.

![Figure 3.4: Vote for the left among women in Sweden](image)

**Source:** author’s computations using Swedish electoral surveys.

**Note:** the figure shows the difference between the share of women and the share of men voting for left-wing parties, before and after controlling for other variables. The information about religiosity and sector is not available respectively in the 1970s and in the 1960s.

### 3.4 The Sweden Democrats and the End of Swedish “ Exceptionalism”

The absence of an extreme-right party at the end of the 1990s and the accommodating immigration policies have long led the public and academic opinion to consider Sweden as an exceptional model of refugees’ reception. This peculiar feature of the Swedish context differentiates it from the rest of Nordic countries, despite the similarities among their party systems.
We exploit the information conveyed by the electoral surveys about voters’ attitude towards immigration. Already in the 1980s and 1990s, the respondents were concerned about the increasing number of asylum seekers. More precisely, in 1994, 21 percent of the interviewees argued that the phenomenon was highly worrying. In 2002, 47 percent was in favor of stricter controls at the borders. In contrast to Denmark, these attitudes towards immigration have not translated into political changes, as political parties have not brought this issue at the center of their political agenda (Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup, 2008).

Nonetheless, the Swedish exceptional model vanished with the emergence of the Sweden Democrats. The party worked on the renewal of its reputation because of its well-known ties with neo-Nazi movements and in 2010 managed to enter in the Parliament. With their anti-immigration rhetoric and the rejection of a multicultural society, they gained the support of the young, low-income and low-educated voters (Table 3). The Sweden Democrats have managed to politicize for the first time the immigration issue in Sweden.

Table 3: The structure of political cleavages in Sweden, 2010-2014

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Share of votes received (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social Democrats</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tertiary</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Income</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bottom 50%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle 40%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top 10%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gender</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Age</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-40</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-60</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60+</td>
<td>34%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sector</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private/Mixed</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Religion</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: author’s computations using Swedish electoral surveys.
Notes: the table shows the average share of votes received by the Social Democratic Party, the Left Party, the Green Party, the Alliance Coalition (Conservatives, Liberals, Centrists, Christian Democrats) and the Sweden Democrats by selected individual characteristics over the 2010-2014 period.
Chapter 4: Finland

4.1 Finnish Multi-Party System and Election Results, 1972-2019

The Finnish independence was recognized in 1917, after 500 years under Swedish rule and a century of Russian annexation. In 1918, Finland entered a Civil War with the Bolshevik-leaning Red Guards, supported by the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, fighting against the White Guard, supported by the German Empire, with the eventual military victory of the latter. After a brief attempt to establish a kingdom, the country became a republic. Nevertheless, the construction of a democratic system started already in 1906, with the establishment of universal suffrage.

From the aftermath of the Second World War, the Finnish Parliament (the Eduskunta) has been dominated by the four biggest political parties: the Social Democratic Party, the Agrarian League/Centre Party, the liberal-conservative National Coalition Party, and the Finnish People’s Democratic League. The latter reunited the left-wing forces of the country and under the lead of the Communist Party of Finland it reached the largest support in the 1958 election with 23.2 percent of votes.

The party system has always been highly fragmented and none of the parties has ever occupied a dominant position, contrary to what has been documented for Norway and Sweden. Thus, the biggest parties have only surpassed the threshold of 25 percent of vote share in the Parliamentary elections in a few cases. The failure to achieve a majority of seats has certainly influenced the government formation and its subsequent stability. From the late 1940s to the end of the 1960s, the country witnessed the succession of almost twenty different governments. Moreover, while the other Northern countries were mainly characterized by the alternance of opposite blocs, in Finland cross-blocs coalitions have been the most frequent solution. Another peculiarity of the Finnish political system was the influence exercised by the head of the State during the process of government formation. For instance, in 1987 his influence culminated in the formation of a coalition between the
Social Democrats and the National Coalition Party (Mattila and Raunio 2002).

The 1990s were marked by a sequence of important events that led to a larger political fragmentation. The country went through a severe financial crisis and the unemployment rate rose from 3 to 17 percent during the first half of the decade. In 1991, the Centre Party, which had mediated between the left and right since the post-war period, formed a centre-right government with the National Coalition Party. They proposed austerity policies aimed at reducing public services and the provisions of the welfare state built during the 1960s by the Social Democrats and the left-wing parties (Kiander et al. 2004). The unpopularity of the centre-right government benefited the Social Democratic Party who took power in the following elections, with 28.3 percent of votes. In the 1995 election a five-party coalition was constituted by the Social Democrats, the National Coalition Party, the Swedish People’s Party, the Green League and the Left Alliance, the successor of the Finnish People’s Democratic League. Four years later, a constitutional reform limited the role of the Head of the State in favor of the Parliament, who has been since then entitled to elect the Prime Minister.

Despite the political fragmentation, until the mid-2000s the Social Democratic Party, the Centre Party, the National Coalition Party achieved the highest vote shares, around 20 percent each. However, the 2011 election represents a turning point in the Finnish political scenario. The far-right True Finns, founded in 1995, became the third party in the Eduskunta, with 19.1 percent of votes, preceded by the Social Democratic Party and the National Coalition Party. The success of the extreme-right party did not stop in 2011. In the following election, it surpassed the Social Democratic Party and took part in the centre-right coalition government, along with the Centre Party and the conservatives.

In what follows, I will analyze the changing relationship between party support and socio-economic characteristics using Finnish post-electoral surveys for all general elections held between 1972-2015. Figure 4.1 shows the election results of the main political parties over the period of interest. The Social Democrats, the Left Alliance, and the Greens are included among the left-wing parties, whereas the Finnish Rural Party, the National Coalition Party and the True Finns among the right. The Centre Party does not belong to none of these two categories, and the analysis related to this party will be carried out separately.

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1All post-electoral surveys used belong to the Finnish Electoral Study and Finnish Voter Barometers: see Appendix Table DD1.
4.2 Education, Income and the One-Elite Party System

The relationship between the voting behavior and the educational outcomes in Finland shares more similarities with the Swedish scenario, than with the Norwegian and the Danish context. The expansion of educational attainment and the substantial changes in the structure of the electorate have come together with slower variations in political attitudes over time.

Figure 4.2 shows the evolution of the difference in left vote between tertiary educated and non-tertiary educated voters, together with the divergence between top 10 percent and bottom 90 percent earners, after controls. While the top income earners are more right-wing over the whole period, the highest-educated have gradually become more left-wing. Nonetheless, the increase has not been large enough to generate the same reversal in the education gradient as in the case of Norway or Denmark. The difference between tertiary and non-tertiary educated voters has remained negative over the entire period, even though it has increased in absolute value, approaching nearly -3 percent in the 2011-2015, after controls. The education gradient is very robust, as it is barely sensitive to the introduction of controls.

The distribution of the vote for left-wing parties across the income distribution is flat until the upper tail over the whole period (see Appendix Figure DB3 and DB4). In contrast,
the distribution of left vote by educational level is downward sloping and monotonic, with the primary educated voting systematically more for the left than the secondary, and even more than the tertiary. The share of low-educated left voters remained quite stable at around 50 percent until the 2000s, after which it fell to 39 percent. The share of left-wing tertiary educated has gradually increased, from 21 percent in the 1970s to 32 percent in the 2010s (see Appendix Figure DB1). Hence, the gradual increase in the education gradient is due to a decline in the left vote among the primary educated and the rise among the tertiary educated, as in the case of Norway, Denmark and Sweden.

Figure 4.2: Vote for the left among the highest-educated and top income earners in Finland

Source: author’s computations using Finnish electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the evolution of the voting pattern among the tertiary educated and the top 10% earners voting for the left-wing parties, after controls.

The replication of the analysis for the main left-wing political parties reveals interesting insights about the underlying mechanisms. The Social Democratic Party counts since the 1970s on a majority of low-educated voters. The Greens, as in Sweden, are mainly supported by the intellectual elites since their debut in the political scene in the 1980s. In line with the rest of Northern countries, the environmentalist ideology has been one of the main drivers of the intellectual elites towards the left. The singularity of Finland is represented by the evolution of the support for the Left Alliance. While parties located to the left of the Social Democrats have generally appealed more to the highest-educated, in Finland this started to happen only over the most recent decade. Until the end of the 1980s, the Finnish People’s Democratic League used to attract the segment of the
electorate with primary education and as a consequence, it was the main representative of the working class in the Eduskunta (see Appendix Figures DC5 and DC6).

With its dissolution and the advent of its successor, the Left Alliance, we still observe a majority of the lowest-educated voters among the party’s electorate during the second half of the 1990s. This peculiarity of Finland might be largely explained by the close cooperation of the left with the Soviet system since the Finnish Civil War. For instance, the Left Alliance defines itself as a red-green party, where green refers to environmental issues, while red stands for the tradition of the workers’ movement, but also, in a broader sense, the demand for social justice (Daiber et al., 2012). However, its cooperation with the Social Democrats, as well as its rapprochement to the neo-liberal wave led to a loss of credibility and a decline in the support for the party, especially among the lowest-educated. The red component in the definition of the Left Alliance might be behind the strong and persistent identification of the lowest-educated with the party. These voting patterns could thus explain the weaker education gradient that has prevented Finland from moving to a multi-elite party system, contrary to the rest of Nordic countries.

On the right-wing side, the National Coalition Party has always obtained higher support among tertiary educated and high-income voters, as it has also been documented for the traditional conservative parties in Western Europe. In addition, the difference between tertiary and non-tertiary educated voters of the party has further increased over the last decade, due to an additional decline in the share of primary educated supporting the National Coalition Party. This suggests that the far-right True Finns Party has managed to capture a part of the already exiguous share of low-educated and low-income supporting the Conservatives (see Appendix Figures DC10, DC14 and DC24 to DC27). If the True Finns continue to attract the lowest-educated vote, the education gradient is likely to become positive over the next decade and Finland would complete its transition towards a multi-elite party system.
4.3 The Importance of Class and Other Socio-Economic Cleavages

In line with Norway, Denmark and Sweden, Finland also presents a persistent and strong class cleavage (Knutsen 2010). The Finnish electoral surveys do not include the question on perceived subjective class in every election, so that I have used as proxy occupational class. Figure 4.3 shows that workers are clearly more left-wing than any other occupation throughout the whole period, but the vote share has declined from 66 to 39 percent between the 1970s and the 2010s. The importance of occupational class can also be seen in that it is the only control variable that strongly affects the education gradient, shifting the curve upwards (see Appendix Figure DB24).

Figure 4.3: Vote for the left by occupation class in Finland

Source: author’s computations using Finnish electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by occupational class. The entrepreneur or self-employed class is not present in the first decade.

Apart from education, income and class the other important political divide is the region of residence. Voters in Southern Finland are disproportionately more left-wing than in Central or Northern Finland. The regional cleavage is strongly correlated with the urban-rural and the occupational class cleavage, as most urban areas and workers are in Southern Finland.

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2 Figure D5 in the Appendix shows the strong Finnish class cleavage for the available decades (1980s, 1990s and 2000s).
During the 1970s Finland had a traditional gender cleavage, highly statistically significant; then, the country has experienced the emergence of a modest “green” modern gender cleavage. During the 1970s women used to vote more for the National Coalition and the Centre Party. Over time the support for the National Coalition Party has vanished and for the Centre Party has declined. This lost vote shares have been almost entirely captured by the Greens, who have promoted both an ecological and feminist ideology. The Left Alliance has also started to count on a greater consensus among women over the last decade. Hence, contrary to the rest of Nordic countries, the modern gender cleavage has only emerged due to the Greens and the Left Alliance and not to the Social Democrats (See Appendix Figures DC28 and DC29).
4.4 The Finnish Nationalism and the Peculiar Profile of the True Finns

Finland was a homogeneous country with a low level of immigration, so that right-wing nationalist populist politics were not prominent around the mid-twentieth century. Nonetheless, agrarian populism had been present in Finnish politics ever since the beginning of the 1960s. The Finnish Rural Party (SMP) was founded in 1959 to defend the interests of rural Finnish, who felt alienated in the fast-moving post-war society, against the urban elite (Arter 2010). The SMP’s obtained the greatest electoral support in the 1970s and early 1980s, when the party won approximately a tenth of the vote each time. The SMP then started to have financial difficulties and it was succeeded in 1995 by a new nationalist populist party, the True Finns.

The True Finns managed to gain seats in the Parliament, although the peak of its success was reached after the 2007 election. The party diverges from the analogous political organizations in the other Nordic countries in several aspects. First, it has operated on a more moderate profile and its origins are not from neo-Nazi movements, as the Sweden Democrats. Along with the less aggressive narrative, the True Finns also differ from the
Danish and Norwegian model in their view of the economy. The Danish and the Norwegian Progress Party were founded as no-tax parties, whereas the True Finns advocated the necessity of progressive taxation and the re-introduction of a wealth tax. This position has created uncertainty about its classification in the left-right political spectrum.

However, when it comes to the immigration issue, the party realigns with the other far-right anti-immigration parties across Europe, rejecting multiculturalism, asking for a reduction of asylum seekers and emphasizing the burden of migration influx on the Finnish welfare state at the expense of the Finnish population. The re-alignment with the emerging far-right parties is corroborated by the analysis of the parties electorate characteristics in the most recent decade (Table 4). The True Finns mainly attract rural, low-educated and low-income voters.

Table 4: The structure of political cleavages in Finland, 2011-2015

| Source | author’s computations using Finnish electoral surveys. 
| Notes | the table shows the average share of votes received by the Social Democratic Party, the Left Alliance, the Green League, the Centre Party, the Finns Party and the National Coalition Party by selected individual characteristics over the 2011-2015 period. |
Chapter 5: Iceland

5.1 Icelandic Party System and Election Results, 1978-2017

After centuries of Danish rule, Iceland was recognized as a fully sovereign state in 1918 and joined Denmark in a personal union under the Danish Kingdom. While universal suffrage was already achieved in 1920, Iceland did not become an independent republic until 1944.

The Icelandic political scenario has revolved since then around four political parties: the centre-left Social Democratic Alliance, which is the result of the merger between the existing left-wing parties in 2005 (Social Democratic Party, the People’s Alliance, the Women’s List and National Awakening); the left-wing socialist and eurosceptic Left-Green Movement, founded in 1999 due to the disagreement about the formation of a broader left-wing alliance; the right-wing Independence Party, that was born in 1929 after the unification of the Conservative and Liberal Party and the Progressive Party, a centre-right agrarian party founded in 1916.

The Independence Party has long been the largest party in the Icelandic Parliament (the Althing), obtaining the largest number of seats in the Parliament since 1942, when the introduction of a proportional electoral system led to the loss of majority by the Progressive Party. Before 2009, left and center-left parties represented a weaker force in the Parliament, with no party achieving the majority. Nevertheless, the Social Democrats and the People’s Party took part in government cabinets led by the Independence and the Progressive Party.

The financial crisis of 2008 caused a political upheaval, leading to the end of the relative stability that had characterized the Icelandic political landscape over the 20th century. In October 2008, the three major banks of Iceland went bankrupt and the financial system collapsed. The IMF intervened with a $2.1 billion bailout program. The breakout of protests came short after. From October 2008 to January 2009, Icelandic citizens took part in the largest protests in the history of the country, calling for the resignation of the Independence Party’s government and forcing the government to hold early elections. The financial crisis was thus a watershed point in Icelandic politics, marked by the end of the
right-wing predominance in the country and the transition to a more fractionalized party system.

In the elections of April 2009, the first left-wing coalition in the history of Iceland came into office with 51.5 percent of votes. The new coalition formed by the Social Democratic Alliance (SD) and the Left-Green Movement (L-G) had to deal with the daunting task of the economic recovery. By 2013, the unemployment rate fell below 5 percent, but this was not enough to guarantee a new victory of the left-wing coalition. The 2013 elections led to a huge defeat of the governing parties with losses of 16.9 (SD) and 10.8 (L-G) percentage points. The centre-right opposition benefited from the unpopular austerity policies put in place by the government and regained the majority in Parliament. In the 2013 elections, there was also a shift towards new political parties. Along with the four traditional parties, six new political parties were represented for the first time in the Parliament.

In 2016, the Progressive Party’s new Prime Minister Gunnlaugsson was forced to resign, due to his involvement in the Panama Papers’ scandal. The Progressive Party was defeated in the anticipated elections of October 2016 and the Independence Party became the largest party. On the left-wing side, Social Democrats lost seats in favour of the Left-Green Movement. Moreover, three emerging parties (the Pirate Party, the Bright Future and the Reform Party) obtained 32 percent of votes. The last two parties joined the Independentists in the formation of a government coalition which lasted less than one year, due to another scandal related to the Bright Future’s leader.

In the anticipated elections of October 2017, the Independence Party, the Left-Green Movement and the Progressive Party got the majority of votes. With the aim of restoring political stability, all three formed a large left-right coalition led by the Left-Green’s leader, Katrín Jakobsdóttir.

Figure 5.1 shows the electoral results for the main political parties over the 1978-2017 period. The Women’s Alliance, the People’s Party, the Social Democratic Party constitute the main left-wing party along with the Left-Green Movement. The Independence and the Progressive Party, instead, are classified on the right-wing side of the party system. The emerging Pirate Party is excluded from the left-right classification, as they consider themselves an anti-system political organization. In what follows, we will study the changing relationship between voting behavior and socio-economic characteristics using post-electoral surveys for all the parliamentary elections held between 1978 and 2017.

1Source: Statistics Iceland
Figure 5.1: Election results in Iceland, 1978-2017

Source: author’s computations using official election results.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by selected groups of Icelandic political parties in general elections between 1978 and 2017. Voting information for the 1978 election are inferred through retrospective survey’s questions.

5.2 The Stability of the Multi-Elite Party System

Iceland has experienced an implosion of new parties in recent decades, in line with the rest of Western democracies. Nonetheless, the country is singular in that the income and education gradients have been very stable since the 1980s, moving in parallel trends but with opposite signs (Figure 5.2). While the difference between the share of the top 10 percent and the bottom 90 percent left-wing earners moves from almost -4 percentage points in the late 1980s to -6 points during the last decade, the gap in left vote between tertiary educated and non-tertiary educated evolved from about 6 to 5 percentage points over the same period. Contrary to the rest of Nordic countries, a multi-elite party system has not recently emerged in the Icelandic political scenario, as already in the 1980s the highest-educated were more supportive of left-wing parties.
Figure 5.2: Vote for the left among the highest-educated and top income earners in Iceland

Source: author’s computations using Icelandic post electoral surveys.

Note: the figure shows the evolution of the voting pattern among the tertiary educated and the top 10% earners voting for the left-wing parties, after controls the information about voters’ income is not available in 1983.

To better understand the stability in the education cleavage in Iceland, I investigate the variation in left vote by educational attainment (primary, secondary, tertiary) and party. From 1978 to 2013, left-wing parties have steadily obtained about 50 percent of the tertiary educated vote, a share that fell to 35 percent in the last election (see Appendix Figure EB1). Whereas the Socialists and Social Democrats count on the support of the highest-educated since the 1970s, they represent the lowest-educated in the other Nordic countries. The education gradient has barely changed from the 1970s, given that the decline in the highest-educated vote to the Social Democratic Alliance during the 2000s has been largely captured by the Left-Green Movement since its debut in the mid-1990s, in line with the New Left parties that emerged across Europe. The Independence Party has also captured a fraction of the highest-educated vote from the Social Democratic Alliance since the 2000s, but to a much lower extent than the Left-Green Movement. Hence, the shift in the vote among the highest-educated from the predecessors of the Social Democratic Alliance towards the Left-Green Movement is clearly behind the stability in the Icelandic education gradient.

The Progressive Party, instead, has relied on a majority of the lowest-educated among its electorate since the 1980s. The Pirate Party also attracted slightly more the primary
educated in 2013, but such advantage faded in the 2017. Its success in the 2010s among
different socio-economic groups represents another major differentiation with respect to
the other Northern European countries, where the dissatisfaction with the political es-
tablishment among the lowest-educated and bottom earners benefited the emergence of
far-right nationalist parties. The Pirate Party, instead, promoting the enhancement of
civil rights, direct democracy, right to privacy and to self-determination, approaches the
left-wing side of the political spectrum. Thus, the stability of the education gradient may
be further explained by the influence that the Progressive Party, the formerly agrarian
party, has retained in the rural and poorer areas of the country and by the absence of a
strong far-right party capturing the vote of the lowest-educated (Figure 5.3). The educa-
tion gradient weakens but still remains positive when controlling for for region of residence
(i.e., rural Icelanders vote strongly for the agrarian Progressive party) and age (i.e., the
young vote strongly for the Socialists and Social Democrats) until the 1990s and income
(i.e, top income earners vote strongly for the right) over the whole period.

Figure 5.3: Decomposition of the vote among tertiary-educated voters in Iceland

Source: author’s computations using official election results.
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of tertiary-educated voters and the share
of other voters voting for the main political parties, after controls.

To better understand the stability in the income cleavage in Iceland, it is also very useful
to decompose the vote by income group (i.e., bottom 50 percent, middle 40 percent and
top 10 percent) and party. The Independence Party presents a strong and persistent pos-
itive income gradient and the rest of parties do not have a clear gradient except from the
Left-Green Movement (see Appendix Figures FEC2, FEC6, FEC10, FEC14, and FEC18).
The few bottom earners that used to vote for the Socialists and Social Democrats until the
1990s, have shifted their vote towards the Left-Green Movement, who has disproportionately attracted the vote among the young bottom income earners. Overall, these results are in line with Önnudóttir and Harðarson (2018), who argue that the strengthening of party sympathy after the financial crisis reflects why the Icelandic political cleavage system has remained intact, despite the recent change in the bond between voters and parties.

5.3 The Weak Class Cleavage, the Persistence of the Urban-Rural Divergence and Other Socio-Economic Cleavages

The existence of an early multi-elite party system in Iceland might be due to the absence of a strong class cleavage and a party that historically attracted disproportionately more the lowest-educated and bottom earners. The weak class cleavage in Iceland is in stark contrast with the rest of Nordic countries, that happen to have very strong class cleavages as compared to other Western Europe countries (Knutsen 2010). The Icelandic electoral surveys do not include the question on perceived subjective class, so that I have used occupational class as proxy. Figure 5.4 confirms the absence of a pronounced class cleavage in Iceland, as workers are not substantially more left-wing than lower managerial or professional employees.

Figure 5.4: Vote for the left by occupation class in Iceland

Source: author’s computations using Icelandic post-electoral surveys.

Note: The figure shows the share of votes for the left-wing parties by occupation class.
Apart from the education and income cleavages, Iceland presents other important socio-economic cleavages, in particular a strong and persistent rural cleavage towards the right. Voters and MPs in the peripheral areas in Iceland have been in general more supportive of economic development of the agricultural areas and less willing to reduce the level of road and tunnel construction in rural areas (Westminster 2000). Moreover, the MPs from the periphery have been more willing to protect communities and municipalities in peripheral areas which are struggling to hold on to their industries and inhabitants (Kristinsson 1999). The party that has better represented the interests of rural areas has been the agrarian Progressive Party. Although its importance in the periphery has weakened over time, in the last 2016-2017 elections the share of votes obtained in rural areas doubled the share of votes in urban areas (Table 5). The importance of the Progressive Party largely explains why the difference between the share of rural and urban left-wing voters has fluctuated between -12 and -2 percent from the late 1970s to the 2010s (see Appendix Figure EB24).

Figure 5.5: Vote for the left among rural areas’ voters in Iceland

Source: Author’s computation using Icelandic post-electoral surveys.

Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of voters in rural areas and share of voters in urban areas voting for left-wing parties, before and after controlling for other variables.

Note that the urban-rural cleavage can be also considered as a center-periphery cleavage, as I can consider as urban area the capital area and as rural area the rest of the country, since this variable was the only one available throughout the whole period of analysis. The share of voter population residing in the capital area was 63 percent in 2016 (Statistics Iceland 2017b), with the remainder of the voters being scattered around the country in smaller towns, villages and rural areas.
The other main traditional cleavage that has been emphasized in the Icelandic context is an economic left-right cleavage, which concerns national issues regarding the extent to which the government should interfere with the economy and the size of the welfare system (Hardarson 1994). There is currently a debate on whether the traditional left-right cleavage is less important than it once was in terms of explaining both the electoral behaviour of voters and it has been put forward that other ideological cleavages, such as a liberal-authoritarian cleavage, a multicultural vs. socially-conservative cleavage or an environmentalist cleavage have either replaced or supplemented the traditional left-right cleavage (Rosset et al. 2016; Bengtsson et al. 2013a).

As in the rest of Nordic countries, I have also identified a strong and persistent public sector cleavage towards the left that came together with the expansion of the welfare system (see Appendix Figure EB20). Moreover, I also document a strong age cleavage until the 1990s driven by a strong support among young voters to the predecessors of the Social Democratic Alliance and among old voters to the Independence Party (see Appendix Figure EB23).

Finally, we assist to the emergence of a modern gender cleavage since the 1980s (Figure 5.6). Women’s tendency to be more left-wing has been mainly driven by the Social Democratic Alliance until the break out of the financial crisis, after which the decline in the confidence among women for the Social Democrats has been compensated by the increasing support for the left-wing feminist and environmentalist Left-Green Movement. The gender gap reached its peak already in the 1987-1991 due to the strong women support towards the Women’s Alliance. After the success at the beginning of the twentieth century, the Icelandic women’s lists re-emerged in the 1980s, with the aim of fighting for gender equality and for women representation in the political system, as the country was lagging behind the other Northern countries in this aspect (see Appendix Figures EC23 and EC25). With the exception of age and gender, the main socio-economic political cleavages have remained nearly intact since the late 1970s in Iceland.
5.4 Icelandic Nationalism and the Role of the Progressive and the Pirate Party

Contrary to the rest of Nordic countries, Iceland currently lacks a strong extreme-right wing party. However, this peculiarity should not be interpreted as a manifestation of a weaker nationalist feeling, but as a deep rooting of post-colonial nationalism within the main traditional parties. Since gaining full independence in 1944, Icelanders have faced the dilemma between emphasis on self-rule and thus isolationism in foreign relations, on the one hand, and, on the other, participation in international relations in order to support its claim for recognition as a European partner (Bergmann, 2016). Hence, political parties have also split along these lines to attract either internationalists (Social Democratic Party, Social Democratic Alliance) and isolationists (Progressive Party, Independence Party, People’s Party, Left-Green Movement). In the 2016-2017 elections, while 22 percent of voters to the Social Democratic Alliance were pro-Europeanism, only 3 percent were against. In contrast, 35 and 13 percent of voters to the Independence and Progressive Party were against, contrary to the 9 and 5 percent that were in favor (Table 5).
Since the onset of the financial crisis, a completely renewed leadership was initiated by the traditional Progressive Party. The old agrarian party took a hard stance against foreign creditors, international institutions and introduced an anti-Muslim rhetoric, which until then had been absent in the country, as there is no significant Muslim minority in Iceland. The Progressive Party thus moved closer to populist parties in Western Europe. It was the first such party in the Nordics to head a government, forming a coalition with the mainstream previously hegemonic right-of-centre conservative Independence Party in 2013.

Looking at the characteristics of its electorate reveals that the Progressive Party’s main supporters are rural, low-income and low-educated voters, characteristics that are much in line with the profiles of the nationalist parties across Europe. These facts suggest that the new political line followed by the Progressive Party has partly filled the gap occupied in the rest of Nordic and Western countries by the far-right and explain the very little support received by the two new far-right nationalist parties: the Iceland National Front founded in 2016 and the Freedom Party founded in 2017.

In Iceland the only successful party that emerged due to the deterioration of the voters’ confidence for the mainstream parties after the financial crisis and the Panama Papers’ scandal is the Pirate Party. This party is distant from the spreading xenophobic and anti-immigration rhetoric of far-right parties in the rest of Nordic and Western countries and it appeals young urban voters with low-income. Instead, the Pirate Party does not attract disproportionately more the lowest-educated, as it is the case of the new far-right parties in Western democracies (Table 5). Hence, the hegemony of the Progressive Party and its populist shift are clearly behind the absence of a strong new far-right party in Iceland.
Table 5: The structure of political cleavages in Iceland, 2016-2017

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Share of votes received (%)</th>
<th>Social Democratic Alliance</th>
<th>Left-Green Movement</th>
<th>Pirate Party</th>
<th>Progressive Party</th>
<th>Independence Party</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Education</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tertiary</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bottom 50%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>21%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle 40%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>15%</td>
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<td>Top 10%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
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<td><strong>Gender</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>23%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Men</td>
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<td>12%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
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<td>21%</td>
<td>13%</td>
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<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-60</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>60+</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>31%</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Location</strong></td>
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<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urban</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sector</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Private/Mixed</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public</td>
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<td>14%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>EU Membership</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Against</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro</td>
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<td>18%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Religion</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>27%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>13%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Catholic</td>
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<td>30%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Author’s computation using Icelandic post-electoral surveys.

**Notes:** the table shows the average share of votes received by the Social Democratic Alliance, the Left-Green Movement, the Pirate Party, the Bright Future, the Reform Party and the Independent Party the by selected individual characteristics over the 2016-2017 period.
Methodological Note

This section aims to provide some insights on the research design that lies behind the presented results. From the choice of data sources to the implementation of the empirical strategy, I have strictly followed Piketty (2018).

For all the five countries I have relied on pre- and post-electoral surveys, which are particularly suitable to explore the evolution of the mechanisms behind electoral behavior. Indeed, they allow to directly link voters’ political preferences with their socio-economic characteristics, such as education, income, wealth, religious affiliation, social and occupation class, and so on. They also provide a means to analyse voters’ attitudes and reactions towards country-specific events, from the Icelandic financial crisis, to the referendum for the European Communities membership, to the dissatisfaction with the welfare or immigration policies.

One possible drawback when dealing with survey data is the bias that may emerge because of the misreporting of the actual vote for a certain party. In this case, the shares of votes obtained from the surveys do not match with the official election results, providing a distort picture of the evolution of voting behavior. In order to deal with this issue, the sample weights are re-scaled following the formula below:

\[ \hat{w} = w \frac{v}{v_{\text{svy}}} \]

where \( w \) is the original sample weight, \( v \) the official vote share registered for a given political party, and \( v_{\text{svy}} \) the proportion of interviewees declaring to vote for that specific party (Gethin, 2020; Piketty and Kosse, 2020).

The majority of results presented in the previous chapters derive from the estimation of the following Linear Probability Model:

\[ v_{it} = \alpha + \beta_i x_{it} + \varepsilon_{it} \]
where the dependent variable $v_{it}$ takes the value 1 if the individual has voted for a given party or party group (i.e. left, right, center) and 0 otherwise. In the case in which $v_{it}$ takes 1 if the individual votes left, $\hat{\beta}$ simply captures the differences (expressed in percentage points) in left-vote among voters belonging to different socio-economic categories represented by several binary variables $x_{it}$.

Among the rich set of variables included in the analysis, income deserves particular attention. Since the variable is usually available already in brackets, the deciles reported in analysis are an approximation obtained through the expansion of the datasets and a reweighing procedure of the observations which relies on the assumption that voting patterns are constant within brackets (Piketty 2018). To provide an example, I apply the detailed methodological explanation in Banerjee et al. (2019) to the income variable in Denmark in 1970. The lower bracket covers the 6% of the population, whereas the second lowest bracket covers individuals between the 6th and the 15th percentile. Thus, the bottom 10% income earners is approximated by taking the weighted average between the share of individuals belonging to the first bracket voting for a given party and the share of individuals voting for the same party within the second bracket. The first category belongs to the bottom 10% and thus has a weight of 1, the second, instead, has a weight equal to $\frac{0.06}{0.15-0.06} = 0.55$. The same procedure is adopted also for education to take into account the expansion in educational attainment when studying the education cleavage.
Conclusion

The aim of this study was to explore the long-run evolution of the relationship between the structure of political cleavages and socio-economic inequality in Northern Europe. The analysis has been conducted using pre- and post-electoral surveys for Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, and Iceland over the 1956-2017 period.

The main result is that these countries, long described as exceptionally stable from a political perspective, have experienced a transition from a strong class-based system to a multi-elite party system. Starting from the economic crisis of the 1970s, the adoption of the neo-liberal ideology and the swing towards market values have drifted the traditional center-left apart from the working class. This has represented an opportunity for the emerging populist right-wing parties to capture the growing dissatisfaction of this chunk of the electorate. It is important to underline that this transformation has varied with the specificities of their party systems and their political history.

While the reversal of the education cleavage has been faster in Norway and Denmark, in Sweden and Finland the traditional left has managed to retain a larger share of the class-based electorate, preventing the emergence of a clear multi-elite party system. The exception is Iceland, which did not develop a strong class-based party system and has had a very stable multi-elite cleavage structure since the late 1970s.

Finally, although all of them are characterized by a strong sectoral cleavage deeply linked with the rise of a modern gender cleavage, and by a persistent urban-rural cleavage, I have documented non-negligible variations in their magnitude and their driving mechanisms that, on top of the differences in the development of voter alignment along class, education and income, confirm the absence of a representative Nordic voter.

The analysis could be further enriched by updating the series and looking at the most recent post-electoral surveys, especially for Sweden and Finland. Whether their stronger class-based systems imply a slower transition or whether they prevent the multi-elite party system to emerge is an open question that new data sources can help to answer.
Appendix

Appendix A: Norway

Figure AA1 - Election results by groups in Norway, 1957-2017

Source: author's computations using official election results.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by selected groups of Norwegian political parties in general elections between 1957 and 2017.

Figure AA2 - The evolution of education in Norway

Source: author's computations using Norwegian post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the distribution of education levels of the Norwegian adult population and its evolution over time since 1957.
Figure AA3 - The evolution of public sector employment by gender in Norway

Source: author's computations using Norwegian post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the distribution of public sector employment by gender of the Norwegian adult population and its evolution over time since 1957.

Figure AB1 - Vote for the left by education level in Norway

Source: author's computations using Norwegian post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by education level.
Figure AB2 - Vote for the left by income decile in Norway (bars)

Source: author's computations using Norwegian post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by income decile.

Figure AB3 - Vote for the left by income decile in Norway (lines)

Source: author's computations using Norwegian post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by income decile.
Figure AB4 - Vote for the left by income group in Norway

Source: author's computations using Norwegian post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by income group.

Figure AB5 - Vote for the left by church attendance in Norway

Source: author's computations using Norwegian post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by church attendance.
Figure AB6 - Vote for the left by religious affiliation in Norway

Source: author's computations using Norwegian post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by religious affiliation.

Figure AB8 - Vote for the left by location in Norway

Source: author's computations Norwegian post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by rural-urban location.
Figure AB9 - Vote for the left by region of residence in Norway

Source: author's computations using Norwegian post-electoral surveys.  
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by region of residence.

Figure AB10 - Vote for the left by gender in Norway

Source: author's computations using Norwegian post-electoral surveys.  
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by gender.
Figure AB11 - Vote for the left by sector of employment in Norway

Source: author's computations using Norwegian post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by employment sector.

Figure AB12 - Vote for the left by marital status in Norway

Source: author's computations using Norwegian post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by marital status.
Figure AB13 - Vote for the left by age group in Norway

Source: author's computations using Norwegian post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by age group.

Figure AB14 - Vote for the left by employment status in Norway

Source: author's computations using Norwegian post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by employment status.
Figure AB15 - Vote the left by union membership in Norway

![Bar chart showing vote distribution by union membership status in Norway from 1957-65 to 2013-17.]

Source: author's computations using Norwegian post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by union membership status.

Figure AB16 - Vote for the left among the highest educated and top income earners in Norway, after controls

![Line chart showing the difference in voting patterns among the top 10% educated and the top 10% earners.]

Source: author's computations using Norwegian post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the evolution of the voting pattern among the top 10% educated and the top 10% earners voting for the left-wing parties, after controls.
Figure AB17 - Vote for the left among tertiary educated in Norway

Source: author's computations using Norwegian post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of tertiary educated voters and the share of other voters voting for left-wing parties, before and after controlling for other variables.

Figure AB18 - Vote for the left among higher educated voters in Norway

Source: author's computations using Norwegian post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of top 10% educated voters and the share of other voters voting for left-wing parties, before and after controlling for other variables.
Figure AB19 - Vote for the left among primary educated voters in Norway

Difference between (% of primary educ.) and (% of other voters) voting left
- After controlling for income
- After controlling for income, gender, age, marital status, employment status, region, union membership

Source: author's computations using Norwegian post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of primary educated voters and the share of other voters voting for left-wing parties, before and after controlling for other variables.

Figure AB20 - Vote for the left among top 10% earners in Norway

Difference between (% of top 10% earners) and (% of other voters) voting left
- After controlling for education
- After controlling for education, gender, age, marital status, employment status, region, union membership

Source: author's computations using Norwegian post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of top 10% earners and the share of other voters voting for left parties, before and after controlling for other variables.
Figure AB22 - Vote for the left among union members in Norway

Source: author’s computations using Norwegian post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of union members and the share of other voters voting for left-wing parties, before and after controlling for other variables.

Figure AB23 - Vote for the left among young voters in Norway

Source: author’s computations using Norwegian post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of voters aged 20-39 and the share of voters older than 40 voting for left-wing parties, before and after controlling for other variables.
Figure AB24 - Vote for the left among public sector workers in Norway

Source: author's computations using Norwegian post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of public sector workers and the share of other voters voting for left-wing parties, before and after controlling for other variables.

Figure AB25 - Vote for the left among tertiary educated and the role of class in Norway

Source: author's computations using Norwegian post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of tertiary educated voters and the share of other voters voting for left-wing parties, before and after controlling for social class and other variables.
Figure AC1 - Vote for the Labour Party by education level in Norway

Source: author's computations using Norwegian post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Labour Party by education level.

Figure AC2 - Vote for the Labour Party by income group in Norway

Source: author's computations using Norwegian post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Labour Party by income group.
Figure AC3 - Vote for the Labour Party by gender in Norway

Source: author's computations using Norwegian post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Labour Party by gender.

Figure AC4 - Vote for the Labour Party by age group in Norway

Source: author's computations using Norwegian post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figures shows the share of votes received by the Labour Party by age group.
Figure AC5 - Vote for the Labour Party by sector in Norway

- **Source**: author's computations using Norwegian post-electoral surveys.
- **Note**: the figures shows the share of votes received by the Labour Party by sector.

Figure AC6 - Vote for the Socialist Left Party by education level in Norway

- **Source**: author's computations using Norwegian post-electoral surveys.
- **Note**: the figure shows the share of votes received by Socialist Left Party by education level.
Figure AC7 - Vote for the Socialist Left Party by income group in Norway

Source: author's computations using Norwegian post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Socialist Left Party by income group.

Figure AC8 - Vote for the Socialist Left Party by gender in Norway

Source: author's computations using Norwegian post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Socialist Left Party by gender.
**Figure AC9 - Vote for the Socialist Left Party by age group in Norway**

- **Source:** author's computations using Norwegian post-electoral surveys.
- **Note:** the figure shows the share of votes received by the Socialist Left Party by age group.

**Figure AC10 - Vote for the Socialist Left Party by sector in Norway**

- **Source:** author's computations using Norwegian post-electoral surveys.
- **Note:** the figure shows the share of votes received by the Socialist Left Party by sector.
Figure AC11 - Vote for the Conservative Party by education level in Norway

Source: author's computations using Norwegian post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Conservative Party by education level.

Figure AC12 - Vote for the Conservative Party by income group in Norway

Source: author's computations using Norwegian post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Conservative Party by income group.
Figure AC13 - Vote for the Conservative Party by age group in Norway

Source: author’s computations using Norwegian political-attitudes surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Conservative Party by age group.

Figure AC14 - Vote for the Conservative Party by gender in Norway

Source: author’s computations using Norwegian post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Conservative Party by gender.
Figure AC15 - Vote for the Progress Party by education level in Norway

Source: author's computations using Norwegian post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Progress Party by education level.

Figure AC16 - Vote for the Progress Party by income group in Norway

Source: author's computations using Norwegian post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Progress Party by income group.
Figure AC17 - Vote for the Progress Party by gender in Norway

Source: author's computations using Norwegian post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Progress Party by gender.

Figure AC18 - Vote for the Progress Party by age group in Norway

Source: author's computations using Norwegian post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Progress Party by age group.
Figure AC19 - Vote for the Christian Democratic Party by gender in Norway

Source: author’s computations using Norwegian post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Christian Democratic Party by gender.

Figure AC20 - Vote for the Centre Party by educational level in Norway

Source: author’s computations using Norwegian post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Centre Party by educational level.
Figure AC21 - Vote for the Centre Party by income group in Norway

Source: author's computations using Norwegian post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Centre Party by income group.

Figure AC22 - Vote for the Centre Party by gender in Norway

Source: author's computations using Norwegian post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Centre Party by gender.
Figure AC23 - Decomposition of the vote for the left among primary educated in Norway

Source: author's computations using Norwegian post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of primary educated voters and the share of other voters voting for left-wing parties, after controlling for other variables.

Figure AC25 - Decomposition of the vote for the right among primary educated in Norway

Source: author's computations using Norwegian post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of primary educated voters and the share of other voters voting for right-wing parties, after controlling for other variables.
Figure AC26 - Decomposition of the vote for the right among tertiary educated in Norway

Source: author's computations using Norwegian post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of tertiary educated voters and the share of other voters voting for right-wing parties, after controlling for other variables.

Figure AC27 - Decomposition of the vote for the left among women in Norway

Source: author's computations using Norwegian post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of women and the share of men voting for the main left-wing parties, after controlling for other variables.
### Table AD1 - Survey data sources in Norway

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Survey Source</th>
<th>Sample size</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>Norwegian Election Study NSD 1544</td>
<td>1544</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>Norwegian Election Study NSD 1623</td>
<td>1623</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>Norwegian Election Study NSD 1595</td>
<td>1595</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>Norwegian Election Study NSD 2662</td>
<td>2662</td>
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<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>Norwegian Election Study NSD 1730</td>
<td>1730</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Norwegian Election Study NSD 1596</td>
<td>1596</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>1993</td>
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<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>Norwegian Election Study NSD 2055</td>
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<td>2001</td>
<td>Norwegian Election Study NSD 2341</td>
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<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>Norwegian Election Study NSD 1882</td>
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<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>Norwegian Election Study NSD 1986</td>
<td>1986</td>
</tr>
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</table>

**Source:** Author’s elaboration.

**Note:** The table shows the surveys used in the chapter, the source from which these surveys can be obtained, and the sample size of each survey.

### Table AD2 - The structure of political cleavages in Norway, 2013-2017

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<td><strong>Education</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Primary</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
<td>1.3%</td>
<td>2.5%</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Secondary</td>
<td>27.0%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>2.9%</td>
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<td>4.0%</td>
<td>11.0%</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tertiary</td>
<td>27.0%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>30.0%</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
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<td><strong>Income</strong></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Bottom 50%</td>
<td>28.0%</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
<td>15.0%</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
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<td>Middle 40%</td>
<td>30.0%</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>30.0%</td>
<td>11.0%</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Top 10%</td>
<td>20.0%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
<td>46.0%</td>
<td>11.0%</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
<td>1.0%</td>
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<td><strong>Gender</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Women</td>
<td>30.0%</td>
<td>9.0%</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>27.0%</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Men</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
<td>31.0%</td>
<td>16.0%</td>
<td>8.0%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
<td>5.0%</td>
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<td><strong>Age</strong></td>
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<td>20-40</td>
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<td>25.0%</td>
<td>12.0%</td>
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<td>40-60</td>
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<td>2.0%</td>
<td>33.0%</td>
<td>12.0%</td>
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<td>60+</td>
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<td>1.0%</td>
<td>27.0%</td>
<td>15.0%</td>
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<td>8.0%</td>
<td>4.0%</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Religion</strong></td>
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<td>No religion</td>
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<td>7.0%</td>
<td>18.0%</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
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<td>3.0%</td>
<td>7.0%</td>
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<td>Catholic</td>
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<td>4.0%</td>
<td>10.0%</td>
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<td>Protestant</td>
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<td>4.0%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>31.0%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other</td>
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<td>17.0%</td>
<td>6.0%</td>
<td>2.0%</td>
<td>25.0%</td>
<td>9.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Author’s computations using Norwegian post-electoral surveys.

**Notes:** The table shows the average share of votes received by the Labour Party, the Socialist left, the Conservative Party, the Progress Party, the Green Party, the Centre Party and the Liberal Party by selected individual characteristics over the 2013-2017 period.
Appendix B: Denmark

Figure BA1 - Election results by groups in Denmark, 1960-2019

Source: author's computations using official election results.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by selected groups of Danish political parties in general elections between 1960 and 2019. For simplicity, the right-wing parties include also the Christian Democrats and the Centre Democrats despite their more centrist positions. Parties with other political orientation and with a share of votes below 3% are not included in the graph.

Figure BA2 - The evolution of employment sector in Denmark

Source: author's computations using Danish post-electoral surveys.

Note: the figure shows the distribution of employment sector (public vs private) of the Danish adult population and its evolution over time since the 1960s.
Figure BA3 - The evolution of public sector employment by gender in Denmark

Source: author's computations using Danish post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the distribution of public sector employment by gender of the Danish adult population and its evolution over time since the 1960s.

Figure BA4 - The evolution of education in Denmark

Source: author's computations using Danish post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the distribution of education levels of the Danish adult population and its evolution over time since the 1960s.
Figure BB1 - Vote for left by education level in Denmark

Source: author's computations using Danish post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by education level.

Figure BB2 - Vote for the left by income decile in Denmark (bars)

Source: author's computations using Danish post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by income decile.
Figure BB3 - Vote for the left by income decile in Denmark (lines)

Source: author's computations using Danish post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by income decile.

Figure BB4 - Vote for the left by income group in Denmark

Source: author's computations using Danish post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by income group.
Figure BB5 - Vote the left by union membership in Denmark

Source: author's computations using Danish post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by union membership status.

Figure BB6 - Vote for the left by location in Denmark

Source: author's computations Danish post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by rural-urban location.
Figure BB7 - Vote for the left by region of residence in Denmark

Source: author's computations Danish post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by region of residence.

Figure BB8 - Vote for the left by gender in Denmark

Source: author's computations using Danish post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by gender.
Figure BB9 - Vote for the left by sector of employment in Denmark

Source: author's computations using Danish post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by employment sector.

Figure BB10 - Vote for the left by marital status in Denmark

Source: author's computations using Danish post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by marital status.
Figure BB11 - Vote for the left by home ownership status in Denmark

Source: author's computations using Danish post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by home ownership status.

Figure BB12 - Vote for the left by age group in Denmark

Source: author's computations using Danish post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by age group.
Figure BB13 - Vote for the left by employment status in Denmark

Source: author's computations using Danish post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by employment status.

Figure BB14 - Vote for the left among intellectual and economic elites in Denmark, after controls

Source: author's computations using Danish post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the evolution of the voting pattern among the top 10% educated and the top 10% earners voting for the left-wing parties, after controls.
**Figure BB15 - Vote for the left among tertiary educated in Denmark**

Difference between (% of tertiary educ.) and (% of other voters) voting left

- After controlling for income
- After controlling for income, gender, age, marital status, employment status, home ownership, region

Source: author’s computations using Danish post-electoral surveys.

Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of tertiary educated voters and the share of other voters voting for left-wing parties, before and after controlling for other variables.

---

**Figure BB16 - Vote for the left among higher educated voters in Denmark**

Difference between (% of top 10% educ.) and (% of other voters) voting left

- After controlling for income
- After controlling for income, gender, age, marital status, employment status, home ownership, region

Source: author’s computations using Danish post-electoral surveys.

Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of top 10% educated voters and the share of other voters voting for left-wing parties, before and after controlling for other variables.
Figure BB17 - Vote for the left among primary educated voters in Denmark

Source: author's computations using Danish post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of primary educated voters and the share of other voters voting for left-wing parties, before and after controlling for other variables.

Figure BB18 - Vote for the left among top 10% earners in Denmark

Source: author's computations using Danish post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of top 10% earners and the share of other voters voting for left parties, before and after controlling for other variables.
Figure BB19 - Vote for the left among rural areas in Denmark

Source: author’s computations using Danish post-electoral surveys.

Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of rural areas and the share of urban areas voting for left-wing parties, before and after controlling for other variables.

Figure BB20 - Vote for the left among the home owners in Denmark

Source: author’s computations using Danish post-electoral surveys.

Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of home owners and the share of home renters voting for left-wing parties, before and after controlling for other variables.
Figure BB21 - Vote for the left among young voters in Denmark

Source: author's computations using Danish post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of voters aged 20-39 and the share of voters older than 40 voting for left-wing parties, before and after controlling for other variables.

Figure BB22 - Vote for the left among unions' members in Denmark

Source: author's computations using Danish post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of union members and the share of other voters voting left-wing parties, before and after controlling for other variables.
Figure BB24 - Vote for the left among tertiary educated and the role of class in Denmark

Source: author's computations using Danish post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of tertiary educated voters and the share of other voters voting for left-wing parties, before and after controlling for class and other variables.

Figure BC1 - Vote for the Social Democratic Party by education level in Denmark

Source: author's computations using Danish post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Social Democratic Party by education level.
Figure BC2 - Vote for the Social Democratic Party by income group in Denmark

Source: author's computations using Danish post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Social Democratic Party by income group.

Figure BC3 - Vote for the Social Democratic Party by gender in Denmark

Source: author's computations using Danish post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Social Democratic Party by gender.
Figure BC3 - Vote for the Social Democratic Party by gender in Denmark

Source: author's computations using Danish post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Social Democratic Party by gender.

Figure BC4 - Vote for the Social Democratic Party by age group in Denmark

Source: author's computations using Danish post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Social Democratic Party by age group.
Figure BC5 - Vote for the Social Democratic Party by sector in Denmark

Source: author's computations using Danish post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Social Democratic Party by sector.

Figure BC6 - Vote for the Social Liberal Party by education level in Denmark

Source: authors' computations using Danish post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Socialist Liberal Party by education level.
Figure BC8 - Vote for the Social Liberal Party by gender in Denmark

Source: author's computations using Danish post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Socialist Liberal Party by gender.

Figure BC9 - Vote for The Social Liberal Party by age group in Denmark

Source: author's computations using Danish post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Socialist Liberal Party by age group.
Figure BC10 - Vote for the Social Liberal Party by sector in Denmark

Source: author’s computations using Danish post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Socialist Liberal Party by sector.

Figure BC11 - Vote the Socialist People’s Party by education level in Denmark

Source: author’s computations using Danish post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Socialist People’s Party by education level.
Figure BC12 - Vote for the Socialist People's Party by income group in Denmark

Source: author's computations Danish post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Socialist People's Party by income group.

Figure BC13 - Vote for the Socialist People's Party by age group in Denmark

Source: author's computations using Danish post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Socialist People's Party by age group.
Figure BC14 - Vote for the Socialist People’s Party by gender in Denmark

Source: author’s computations using Danish post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Socialist People’s Party by gender.

Figure BC15 - Vote for the Socialist People’s Party by sector in Denmark

Source: author’s computations using Danish post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Socialist People’s Party by sector.
Figure BC16 - Vote for the Danish People's Party by education level in Denmark

Source: author's computations using Danish post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Danish People's Party by education level.

Figure BC17 - Vote for the Danish People's Party by income group in Denmark

Source: author's computations using Danish post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Danish People's Party by income group.
Figure BC18 - Vote for the Danish People's Party by gender in Denmark

Source: author's computations using Danish post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Danish People's Party by gender.

Figure BC19 - Vote for the Danish People's Party by age group in Denmark

Source: author's computations using Danish post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Danish People's Party by age group.
Figure BC20 - Vote for the Danish People’s Party by sector in Denmark

Source: author's computations using Danish post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Danish People's Party by sector.

Figure BC21 - Vote for Conservative Party by education level in Denmark

Source: author's computations using Danish post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Conservative Party by education level.
Figure BC22 - Vote for the Conservative Party by income group in Denmark

Source: author's computations using Danish post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Conservative Party by income group.

Figure BC23 - Vote for the Conservative Party by gender in Denmark

Source: author's computations using Danish post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Conservative/Liberal Party by gender.
Figure BC24 - Vote for the Conservative Party by age group in Denmark

Source: author’s computations using Danish post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Conservative Party by age group.

Figure BC25 - Vote for the Conservative Party by sector in Denmark

Source: author’s computations using Danish post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Conservative Party by sector.
Figure BC26 - Vote for the Red-Green Alliance by education level in Denmark

Source: author's computations using Danish post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Red-Green Alliance by education level.

Figure BC27 - Vote for the Red-Green Alliance by income group in Denmark

Source: author's computations using Danish post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Red-Green Alliance by income group.
Figure BC28 - Vote for the Red-Green Alliance by gender in Denmark

Source: author's computations using Danish post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Red-Green Alliance by gender.

Figure BC29 - Vote for the Red-Green Alliance by age group in Denmark

Source: author's computations using Danish post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Red-Green Alliance by age group.
Figure BC30 - Vote for the Red-Green Alliance by sector in Denmark

Source: author's computations using Danish post electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Red-Green Alliance by sector.

Figure BC31 - Vote for the Venstre by education level in Denmark

Source: author's computations using Danish post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Venstre by education level.
Figure BC32 - Vote for the Venstre by income group in Denmark

Source: author's computations using Danish post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Venstre by income group.

Figure BC33 - Vote for the Venstre by gender in Denmark

Source: author's computations using Danish post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Venstre by gender.
Figure BC34 - Vote for the Venstre by age group in Denmark

Source: author's computations using Danish post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Venstre by age group.

Figure BC35 - Vote for the Venstre by sector in Denmark

Source: author's computations using Danish post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Venstre by sector.
Figure BC36 - Decomposition of the vote for the left among primary educated voters in Denmark

Source: author's computations using Danish post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of primary educated voters and the share of other voters voting for the main left-wing parties, after controls. Given its peculiar ideological position, the Social Liberal Party is represented with a dashed line.

Figure BC37 - Decomposition of the vote for the left among tertiary educated voters in Denmark

Source: author's computations using Danish post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of tertiary educated voters and the share of other voters voting for the main left-wing parties, after controls. Given its peculiar ideological position, the Social Liberal Party is represented with a dashed line.
**Figure BC37 - Decomposition of the vote for the left among tertiary educated voters in Denmark**

- All left-wing parties
- Social Democratic Party
- Socialist People's Party
- Red-Green Alliance
- Social Liberal Party

**Source**: author's computations using Danish post-electoral surveys.

**Note**: the figure shows the difference between the share of tertiary educated voters and the share of other voters voting for the main left-wing parties, after controls. Given its peculiar ideological position, the Social Liberal Party is represented with a dashed line.

**Figure BC39 - Decomposition of the vote for the right among tertiary educated voters in Denmark**

- All right-wing parties
- Conservative People's Party
- Danish People's Party
- Venstre

**Source**: author's computations using Danish post-electoral surveys.

**Note**: the figure shows the difference between the share of tertiary educated voters and the share of other voters voting for the main right-wing parties, after controls.
Figure BC40 - Decomposition of the vote for the left among women in Denmark

Source: author's computations using Danish post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of women and the share of men voting for the main left-wing parties, after controls. Given its peculiar ideological position, the Social Liberal Party is represented with a dashed line.

Figure BC41 - Decomposition of the vote for left among public sector employees in Denmark

Source: author's computations using Danish post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of public sector employees and the share of other voters voting for the main left-wing parties, after controls. Given its peculiar ideological position, the Social Liberal Party is represented with a dashed line.
Figure BC42 - Decomposition of the vote for left among women employed in the public sector in Denmark

Source: author's computations using Danish post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share women employed in the public sector and the share of other voters employed in the public sector voting for the main left-wing parties, after controls. Given its peculiar ideological position, the Social Liberal Party is represented with a dashed line.

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Source: author's elaboration.
Note: the table shows the surveys used in the chapter, the source from which these surveys can be obtained, and the sample size of each survey. Data for the 1960's have been obtained from the vote preference expressed in 1971 relative to previous elections.
Appendix C: Sweden

Figure CA1 - Election results by groups in Sweden, 1956-2018

Source: author's computations using official election results.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by selected groups of Swedish political parties in general elections between 1956 and 2018. Parties with other political orientation and with a share of votes below 2% are not included in the graph.
Figure CB2 - Vote for left by education group in Sweden

Source: author's computations using Swedish electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by education group.

Figure CB3 - Vote for the left by income decile in Sweden (bars)

Source: author's computations using Swedish electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by income decile.
Figure CB4 - Vote for the left by income decile in Sweden (lines)

Source: author's computations using Swedish electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by income decile.

Figure CB5 - Vote for the left by income group in Sweden

Source: author's computations using Swedish electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by income group.
Figure CB6 - Vote for the left by wealth group in Sweden

Source: author's computations using Swedish electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by wealth group.

Figure CB7 - Vote the left by union membership in Sweden

Source: author's computations using Swedish electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by union membership status.
Figure CB8 - Vote for the left by location in Sweden

Source: author's computations Swedish electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by rural-urban location.

Figure CB9 - Vote for the left by gender in Sweden

Source: author's computations using Swedish electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by gender.
Figure CB10 - Vote for the left by sector of employment in Sweden

Source: author's computations using Swedish electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by employment sector.

Figure CB11 - Vote for the left by marital status in Sweden

Source: author's computations using Swedish electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by marital status.
Figure CB12 - Vote for the left by home status in Sweden

Source: author's computations using Swedish electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by home ownership status.

Figure CB13 - Vote for the left by age group in Sweden

Source: author's computations using Swedish electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by age group.
**Figure CB14 - Vote for the left by employment status in Sweden**

- **Employed public**
- **Employed private**
- **Unemployed/Inactive**

Source: author's computations using Swedish electoral surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by employment status.

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**Figure CB15 - Vote for the left by church attendance in Sweden**

- **Less than monthly**
- **Weekly or more**
- **Never**
- **Monthly or more**

Source: author's computations using Swedish electoral surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by church attendance.
Figure CB16 - Vote for the left by religious affiliation in Sweden

Source: author's computations using Swedish electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by religious affiliation.

Figure CB17 - Vote for the left among the highest-educated and the top income earners in Sweden, after controls

Source: author's computations using Swedish electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the evolution of the vote for the left-wing parties among the share of top 10% educated voters and the share of top 10% earners, after controls.
Figure CB18 - Vote for the left among tertiary educated in Sweden

Source: author's computations using Swedish electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of tertiary educated voters and the share of other voters voting for left-wing parties, before and after controlling for other variables.

Figure CB19 - Vote for the left among higher educated voters in Sweden

Source: author's computations using Swedish electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of top 10% educated voters and the share of other voters voting for left-wing parties, before and after controlling for other variables.
Figure CB20 - Vote for the left among primary educated voters in Sweden

Source: author's computations using Swedish electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of primary educated voters and the share of other voters voting for left-wing parties, before and after controlling for other variables.

Figure CB21 - Vote for the left among top 10% earners in Sweden

Source: author's computations using Swedish electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of top 10% earners and the share of other voters voting for left parties, before and after controlling for other variables.
Figure CB23 - Vote for the left among rural areas in Sweden

Source: author's computations using Swedish electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of rural areas and the share of urban areas voting for left-wing parties, before and after controlling for other variables.

Figure CB24 - Vote for the left among union members in Sweden

Source: author's computations using Swedish electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of union members and the share of other voters voting for left-wing parties, before and after controlling for other variables.
Figure CB25 - Vote for the left among young voters in Sweden

Source: author's computations using Swedish electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of voters aged 20-39 and the share of voters older than 40 voting for left-wing parties, before and after controlling for other variables.

Figure CB26 - Vote for the left among public sector employees in Sweden

Source: author's computations using Swedish electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of public employees and the share of private employees voting for the left-wing parties, before and after controls.
Figure CB27 - Vote for the left among tertiary educated and the role of class in Sweden

Source: author's computations using Swedish electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of tertiary educated voters and the share of other voters voting for left-wing parties, before and after controlling for social class and other variables.

Figure CC1 - Vote for the Social Democratic Party by education level in Sweden

Source: author's computations using Swedish electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Social Democratic Party by education level.
Figure CC2 - Vote for the Social Democratic Party by income group in Sweden

Source: author's computations using Swedish electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Social Democratic Party by income group.

Figure CC3 - Vote for the Social Democratic Party by gender in Sweden

Source: author's computations using Swedish electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Social Democratic Party by gender.
Figure CC4 - Vote for the Social Democratic Party by age group in Sweden

Source: author's computations using Swedish electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Social Democratic Party age group.

Figure CC5 - Vote for the Left Party by education level in Sweden

Source: author's computations using Swedish electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Left Party by education level.
Figure CC6 - Vote for the Left Party by income group in Sweden

Source: author’s computations using Swedish electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Left Party by income group.

Figure CC7 - Vote for the Left Party by gender in Sweden

Source: author’s computations using Swedish electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Left Party by gender.
Figure CC8 - Vote for the Left Party by age group in Sweden

Source: author's computations using Swedish electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Left Party by age group.

Figure CC9 - Vote for the Moderate Party by education level in Sweden

Source: author's computations using Swedish electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Moderate Party by education level.
Figure CC10 - Vote for the Moderate Party by income group in Sweden

Source: author's computations using Swedish electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Moderate Party by income group.

Figure CC11 - Vote for the Moderate Party by gender in Sweden

Source: author's computations using Swedish electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Moderate Party coalition by gender.
Figure CC12 - Vote for the Moderate Party by age group in Sweden

Source: author's computations using Swedish electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Moderate Party age group.

Figure CC13 - Vote for the Sweden Democrats by education level in Sweden

Source: author's computations using Swedish electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Sweden Democrats by education level.
Figure CC14 - Vote for the Sweden Democrats by income group in Sweden

Source: author's computations using Swedish electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Sweden Democrats by income group.

Figure CC15 - Vote for the Sweden Democrats by gender in Sweden

Source: author's computations using Swedish electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Sweden Democrats by gender.
Figure CC16 - Vote for the Sweden Democrats by age group in Sweden

Source: author's computations using Swedish electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Sweden Democrats by age group.

Figure CC17 - Vote for the Green Party by educational level in Sweden

Source: author's computations using Swedish electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Green Party by educational level.
Figure CC18 - Vote for the Green Party by age group in Sweden

Source: author's computations using Swedish electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Green Party by age group.

Figure CC19 - Vote for the Green Party by income group in Sweden

Source: author's computations using Swedish electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Green Party by income group.
Figure CC20 - Vote for the Green Party by gender in Sweden

Source: author's computations using Swedish electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Green Party coalition by gender.

Figure CC21 - Vote for the Liberal People's Party by educational level in Sweden

Source: author's computations using Swedish electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Liberal People's Party by educational level.
Figure CC22 - Vote for the Liberal People’s Party by age group in Sweden

Source: author’s computations using Swedish electoral surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Liberal People’s Party by age group.

Figure CC23 - Vote for the Liberal People’s Party by income group in Sweden

Source: author’s computations using Swedish electoral surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Liberal People’s Party by income group.
**Figure CC26 - Decomposition of the vote for the left among tertiary educated in Sweden**

**Source:** author's computations using Swedish electoral surveys.

**Note:** the figure shows the difference between the share of tertiary educated voters and the share of other voters voting for the main left-wing parties, after controlling for other variables.

---

**Figure CC27 - Decomposition of the vote for the right among primary educated in Sweden**

**Source:** author's computations using Swedish electoral surveys.

**Note:** the figure shows the difference between the share of primary educated voters and the share of other voters voting for the main right-wing parties, after controlling for other variables.
Figure CC28 - Decomposition of the vote for the right among tertiary educated in Sweden

All right-wing parties
Moderate Party
Sweden Democrats
Liberal People's Party

Source: author's computations using Swedish electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of tertiary educated voters and the share of other voters voting for the main right-wing parties, after controlling for other variables.

Figure CC29 - Decomposition of the vote for the left among women in Sweden

All left-wing parties
Social Democratic Party
Left Party
Green Party

Source: author's computations using Swedish electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of women and the share of men voting for the main left-wing parties, after controlling for other variables.
Figure CC30 - Decomposition of the vote for the left among women employed in the public sector in Sweden

Source: author's computations using Swedish electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of women employed in the public sector and other voters (women employed in the private sector and men employed in private and public sector) voting for the main left-wing parties, after controlling for other variables.

Table CD1 - Survey data sources in Sweden

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Source: author's elaboration.
Note: the table shows the surveys used in the chapter, the source from which these surveys can be obtained, and the sample size of each survey.
Appendix D: Finland

**Figure DA1 - Election results by groups in Finland, 1972-2019**

- Centre-left/left-wing parties (Social Democratic Party, Left Alliance, Other left)
- Centre-right/right-wing parties (National Coalition Party, True Finns, Other right)
- Other parties and Centre Party

*Source*: author's computations using official election results.

*Note*: the figure shows the share of votes received by selected groups of Finnish political parties in general elections between 1972 and 2019.

**Figure DA2 - The evolution of education in Finland**

*Source*: author's computations using Finnish electoral surveys.

*Note*: the figure shows the distribution of education levels of the Finnish adult population and its evolution over time since the 1960s.
Figure DA3 - The distribution of region of residence in Finland

Source: author's computations using Finnish electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the distribution of region of residence in Finnish adult population and its evolution over time since the 19s.

Figure DB1 - Vote for left by education level in Finland

Source: author's computations using Finnish electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by education level.
Figure DB2 - Vote for the left by education group in Finland

Source: author's computations using Finnish electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by education group.

Figure DB3 - Vote for the left by income decile in Finland (bars)

Source: author's computations using Finnish electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by income decile.
Figure DB4 - Vote for the left by income decile in Finland (lines)

Source: author's computations using Finnish electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by income decile.

Figure DB5 - Vote for the left by income group in Finland

Source: author's computations using Finnish electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by income group.
Figure DB6 - Vote the left by union membership in Finland

Source: author's computations using Finnish electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by union membership status.

Figure DB7 - Vote for the left by location in Finland

Source: author's computations using Finnish electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by rural-urban location.
Figure DB9 - Vote for the left by gender in Finland

Source: author's computations using Finnish electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by gender.

Figure DB10 - Vote for the left by perceived social class in Finland

Source: author's computations using Finnish electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by perceived social class.
Figure DB11 - Vote for the left by marital status in Finland

Source: author's computations using Finnish electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by marital status.

Figure DB12 - Vote for the left by home status in Finland

Source: author's computations using Finnish electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by home ownership status.
Figure DB13 - Vote for the left by age group in Finland

Source: author's computations using Finnish electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by age group.

Figure DB14 - Vote for the left by employment status in Finland

Source: author's computations using Finnish electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by employment status.
Figure DB15 - Vote for the left among the highest-educated and the top income earners in Finland, after controls

- Difference between (% of top 10%) and (% of bottom 90%) educated voting left, after controlling for income, age, gender, employment status, region
- Difference between (% of top 10%) and (% bottom 90%) earners voting left, after controlling for education, age, gender, employment status, region

Source: author’s computations using Finnish electoral surveys.

Note: the figure shows the evolution of the voting pattern among the top 10% educated and the 10% of earners voting for left-wing parties, after controlling for other variables.

Figure DB16 - Vote for the left among tertiary educated in Finland

- Difference between (% of tertiary educ.) and (% of other voters) voting left
- After controlling for income
- After controlling for income, gender, age, employment status, region, union membership

Source: author’s computations using Finnish electoral surveys.

Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of tertiary educated voters and the share of other voters voting for left-wing parties, before and after controlling for other variables.
Figure DB17 - Vote for the left among higher educated voters in Finland

Source: author's computations using Finnish electoral surveys.  
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of top 10% educated voters and the share of other voters voting for left-wing parties, before and after controlling for other variables.

Figure DB18 - Vote for the left among primary educated voters in Finland

Source: author's computations using Finnish electoral surveys.  
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of primary educated voters and the share of other voters voting for left-wing parties, before and after controlling for other variables.
**Figure DB19 - Vote for the left among top 10% earners in Finland**

Source: author's computations using Finnish electoral surveys.

Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of top 10% earners and the share of other voters voting for left parties, before and after controlling for other variables.

**Figure DB21 - Vote for the left among union members in Finland**

Source: author's computations using Finnish electoral surveys.

Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of union members and the share of other voters voting for left-wing parties, before and after controlling for other variables.
Figure DB22 - Vote for the left among young voters in Finland

Difference between (% of aged 20-39) and (% of other voters) voting left

- After controlling for income and education
- After controlling for income, education, gender, employment status, region

Source: author's computations using Finnish electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of voters aged 20-39 and the share of voters older than 40 voting for left-wing parties, before and after controlling for other variables.

Figure DB23 - Vote for the left among public employees in Finland

Difference between (% of public employees) and (% of private employees) voting left

- After controlling for income, education, gender, region

Source: author's computations using Finnish electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of public and private employees voting for left-wing parties, before and after controlling for other variables.
Figure DB24 - Vote for the left among tertiary educated and the role of occupation in Finland

Source: author's computations using Finnish electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of tertiary educated voters and the share of other voters voting for left-wing parties, before and after controlling for other variables.

Figure DC1 - Vote for the Social Democratic Party by education level in Finland

Source: author's computations using Finnish electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Social Democratic Party by education level.
Figure DC2 - Vote for the Social Democratic Party by income group in Finland

Source: author's computations using Finnish electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Social Democratic Party by income group.

Figure DC3 - Vote for the Social Democratic Party by gender in Finland

Source: author's computations using Finnish electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Social Democratic Party by gender.
Figure DC4 - Vote for the Social Democratic Party by age group in Finland

Source: author's computations using Finnish electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Social Democratic Party by age group.

Figure DC5 - Vote for the FPDL/Left Alliance by education level in Finland

Source: author's computations using Finnish electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Finnish People's Democratic League/Left Alliance by education level.
**Figure DC6 - Vote for the FPDL/Left Alliance by income group in Finland**

Source: author's computations using Finnish electoral surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Finnish People's Democratic League/Left Alliance by income group.

**Figure DC7 - Vote for the FPDL/Left Alliance by gender in Finland**

Source: author's computations using Finnish electoral surveys.

Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Finnish People's Democratic League/Left Alliance by gender.
Figure DC8 - Vote for the FPDL/Left Alliance by age group in Finland

Source: author's computations using Finnish electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Finnish People's Democratic League/Left Alliance by age group.

Figure DC9 - Vote for National Coalition Party by education level in Finland

Source: author's computations using Finnish electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the National Coalition Party by education level.
Figure DC10 - Vote for the National Coalition Party by income group in Finland

Source: author's computations using Finnish electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the National Coalition Party by income group.

Figure DC11 - Vote for National Coalition Party by gender in Finland

Source: author's computations using Finnish electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the National Coalition Party by gender.
Figure DC12 - Vote for the National Coalition Party by age group in Finland

Source: author's computations using Finnish electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the National Coalition Party by age group.

Figure DC13 - Vote for the True Finns by education level in Finland

Source: author's computations using Finnish electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the True Finns by education level.
Figure DC14 - Vote for the True Finns by income group in Finland

Source: author's computations using Finnish electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the True Finns by income group.

Figure DC15 - Vote for the True Finns by gender in Finland

Source: author's computations using Finnish electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the True Finns by gender.
Figure DC16 - Vote for the True Finns by age group in Finland

Source: author's computations using Finnish electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the True Finns by age group.

Figure DC17 - Vote for the True Finns by location in Finland

Source: author's computations using Finnish electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the True Finns by location.
Figure DC18 - Vote for the Centre Party by education level in Finland

Source: author's computations using Finnish electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Centre Party by education level.

Figure DC19 - Vote for the Centre Party by income group in Finland

Source: author's computations using Finnish electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Centre Party by income group.
Figure DC20 - Vote for the Centre Party by gender in Finland

Source: author's computations using Finnish electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Centre Party by gender.

Figure DC21 - Vote for the Centre Party by age group in Finland

Source: author's computations using Finnish electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Centre Party by age group.
Figure DC22 - Vote for the Green League by education level in Finland

Source: author's computations using Finnish electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Green League by education level.

Figure DC23 - Vote for the Green League by gender in Finland

Source: author's computations using Finnish electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Green League by gender.
Figure DC24 - Decomposition of the vote for the left among primary educated in Finland

Source: author's computations using Finnish electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of primary educated and other voters voting for the main left-wing parties, after controlling for other variables.

Figure DC25 - Decomposition of the vote for the left among tertiary educated in Finland

Source: author's computations using Finnish electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of tertiary educated and other voters voting for the main left-wing parties, after controlling for other variables.
Figure DC26 - Decomposition of the vote for the right among primary educated in Finland

Figure DC27 - Decomposition of the vote for the right among tertiary educated in Finland

Source: author's computations using Finnish electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of primary educated and other voters voting for the main left-wing parties, after controlling for other variables.
Figure DC28 - Decomposition of the vote for the left among women in Finland

Source: author's computations using Finnish electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of women and men for the main left-wing parties, after controlling for other variables.

Figure DC29 - Decomposition of the vote for the right among women in Finland

Source: author's computations using Finnish electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of women and men for the main right-wing parties, after controlling for other variables. The line for the Centre Party is dashed since it does not belong to the right-wing parties.
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<th>Sample size</th>
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Source: author's elaboration.

Note: the table shows the surveys used in the chapter, the source from which these surveys can be obtained, and the sample size of each survey.
Appendix E: Iceland

Figure EA2 - The evolution of education in Iceland

Source: authors’ computations using Icelandic post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the distribution of education levels of the Icelandic adult population and its evolution over time since 1978.
Figure EB1 - Vote for left by education level in Iceland

Source: author's computations using Icelandic post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by education level.

Figure EB2 - Vote for the left by income decile in Iceland (bars)

Source: author's computations using Icelandic post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by income decile.
Figure EB3 - Vote for the left by income decile in Iceland (lines)

Source: author's computations using Icelandic post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by income decile.

Figure EB4 - Vote for the left by income group in Iceland

Source: author's computations using Icelandic post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by income group.
Figure EB5 - Vote for the left by church attendance in Iceland

Source: author's computations using Icelandic post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by church attendance.

Figure EB6 - Vote the left by union membership in Iceland

Source: author's computations using Icelandic post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by union membership status.
Figure EB7 - Vote for the left by location in Iceland

Source: author's computations using Icelandic post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by rural-urban location.

Figure EB8 - Vote for the left by region of residence in Iceland

Source: author's computations using Icelandic post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by region of residence.
Figure EB9 - Vote for the left by gender in Iceland

Source: author's computations using Icelandic post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by gender.

Figure EB10 - Vote for the left by sector of employment in Iceland

Source: author's computations using Icelandic post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by employment sector.
Figure EB11 - Vote for the left by marital status in Iceland

Source: author's computations using Icelandic post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by marital status.

Figure EB12 - Vote for the left by home ownership status in Iceland

Source: author's computations using Icelandic post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by home ownership status.
Figure EB13 - Vote for the left by age group in Iceland

Source: author's computations using Icelandic post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by age group.

Figure EB14 - Vote for the left by employment status in Iceland

Source: author's computations using Icelandic post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by employment status.
Figure EB15 - Vote for the left by religious affiliation in Iceland

Source: author’s computations using Icelandic post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by left-wing parties by religious affiliation.

Figure EB16 - Vote for the left among the highest-educated and top earners in Iceland, after controls

Source: author’s computations using Icelandic post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the evolution of the voting pattern among the top 10% educated and the share of top 10% earners voting for left-wing parties, after controls.
Figure EB17 - Vote for the left among tertiary educated in Iceland

**Source**: author’s computations using Icelandic post-electoral surveys.

**Note**: the figure shows the difference between the share of tertiary educated voters and the share of other voters voting for left-wing parties, before and after controlling for other variables.

Figure EB18 - Vote for the left among higher educated voters in Iceland

**Source**: author’s computations using Icelandic post-electoral surveys.

**Note**: the figure shows the difference between the share of top 10% educated voters and the share of other voters voting for left-wing parties, before and after controlling for other variables.
Figure EB19 - Vote for the left among primary educated voters in Iceland

Source: author's computations using Icelandic post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of primary educated voters and the share of other voters voting for left-wing parties, before and after controlling for other variables.

Figure EB20 - Vote for the left among public sector workers in Iceland

Source: author's computations using Icelandic post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of public sector workers and the share of other voters voting for left-wing parties, before and after controlling for other variables.
Figure EB21 - Vote for the left among top 10% earners in Iceland

Source: author’s computations using Icelandic post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of top 10% earners and the share of other voters voting for left parties, before and after controlling for other variables.

Figure EB23 - Vote for the left among young voters in Iceland

Source: author’s computations using Icelandic post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of voters aged 20-39 and the share of voters older than 40 voting for left-wing parties, before and after controlling for other variables.
Figure EC1 - Vote for the Social Democratic Alliance by education level in Iceland

Source: author's computations using Icelandic post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Social Democratic Alliance by education level.

Figure EC2 - Vote for the Social Democratic Alliance by income group in Iceland

Source: author's computations using Icelandic post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Social Democratic Alliance by income group.
Figure EC3 - Vote for the Social Democratic Alliance by gender in Iceland

Source: author's computations using Icelandic post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Social Democratic Alliance by gender.

Figure EC4 - Vote for the Social Democratic Alliance by age group in Iceland

Source: author's computations using Icelandic post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Social Democratic Alliance by age group.
Figure EC5 - Vote for the Left-Green Movement by education level in Iceland

Source: author’s computations using Icelandic post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by Left-Green Movement by education level.

Figure EC6 - Vote for the Left-Green Movement by income group in Iceland

Source: author’s computations using Icelandic post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Left-Green Movement by income group.
Figure EC7 - Vote for the Left-Green Movement by gender in Iceland

Source: author's computations using Icelandic post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Left-Green Movement by gender.

Figure EC8 - Vote for the Left-Green Movement by age group in Iceland

Source: author's computations using Icelandic post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Left-Green Movement by age group.
Figure EC9 - Vote the Pirate Party by education level in Iceland

Source: author's computations using Icelandic post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Pirate Party by education level.

Figure EC10 - Vote for the Pirate Party by income group in Iceland

Source: author's computations using Icelandic post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Pirate Party by income group.
Figure EC11 - Vote for the Pirate Party by age group in Iceland

Source: author’s computations using Icelandic post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Pirate Party by age group.

Figure EC12 - Vote for the Pirate Party by gender in Iceland

Source: author’s computations using Icelandic post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Pirate Party by gender.
Figure EC13 - Vote for the Progressive Party by education level in Iceland

Source: author's computations using Icelandic post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Progressive Party by education level.

Figure EC14 - Vote for the Progressive Party by income group in Iceland

Source: author's computations using Icelandic post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Progressive Party by income group.
Figure EC15 - Vote for the Progressive Party by gender in Iceland

Source: author's computations using Icelandic post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Progressive Party by gender.

Figure EC16 - Vote for the Progressive Party by age group in Iceland

Source: author's computations using Icelandic post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Progressive Party by age group.
Figure EC17 - Vote for the Independence Party by education level in Iceland

Source: author's computations using Icelandic post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Independence Party by educational level.

Figure EC18 - Vote for the Independence Party by income group in Iceland

Source: author's computations using Icelandic post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Independence Party by income group.
Figure EC19 - Vote for the Independence Party by gender in Iceland

Source: author's computations using Icelandic post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Independence Party by gender.

Figure EC20 - Vote for the Independence Party by age group in Iceland

Source: author's computations using Icelandic post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Independence Party by age group.
Figure EC21 - Vote for Women’s Alliance by education level in Iceland

Source: author's computations using Icelandic post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Women's Alliance by educational level.

Figure EC22 - Vote for Women's Alliance by income group in Iceland

Source: author's computations using Icelandic post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Women's Alliance by income group.
Figure EC23 - Vote for Women's Alliance by gender in Iceland

Source: author's computations using Icelandic post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the share of votes received by the Women's Alliance by gender.

Figure EC24 - Decomposition of the vote for the left among women in Iceland

Source: author's computations using Icelandic post-electoral surveys.
Note: the figure shows the difference between the share of women and the share of men voting for the main left-wing parties and for the Pirate Party, after controlling for other variables.
Table ED1 - Survey data sources in Iceland

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<th>Year</th>
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<th>Source</th>
<th>Sample size</th>
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<td>1003</td>
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<td>2073</td>
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**Source**: author’s elaboration.

**Note**: the table shows the surveys used in the chapter, the source from which these surveys can be obtained, and the sample size of each survey.
Table ED2 - The structure of political cleavages in Iceland, 2016-2017

<table>
<thead>
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<th>Share of votes received (%)</th>
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<th>Left-Green Movement</th>
<th>Pirate Party</th>
<th>Progressive Party</th>
<th>Independence Party</th>
<th>Reform Party</th>
<th>Bright Future</th>
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<td>Primary</td>
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<td>16%</td>
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**Source**: Author's computations using Icelandic post-electoral surveys.

**Notes**: The table shows the average share of votes received by the Social Democratic Alliance, the Left-Green Movement, the Pirate Party, the Bright Future, the Reform Party, and the Independent Party by selected individual characteristics over the 2016-2017 period.
Bibliography


