Inequality Regimes: A Global History
Thomas Piketty
NYU, Spring 2020

Lecture 7: Social inequality and party systems in historical perspective: Europe, US, India
(check on line for updated version)
Roadmap of the lecture

• Beyond left and right: the dimensions of political conflict
• The electoral left: from workers’ party to the party of the educated
• The reversal of the education cleavage: the case of France
• Political conflict: education, income, property and identity
• Borders and property: the four-way electorate in France
• Changing political cleavages in the United States
• Changing political cleavages in the United Kingdom
• The cleavage about Europe and globalization
• The reversal of the education cleavage in Western democracies
• The rise of social-nativism in post-communist Eastern Europe
• The social-nativist trap: lessons from Europe and the US
• Changing political cleavages and class conflict in India & Brasil
• Social-federalism vs social-nativism
Beyond left and right: the dimensions of political conflict

• Main lesson from lectures 1-6: political and ideological changes play a crucial role in the process of socio-economic development & the evolution of inequality structures. Successful economic development requires a minimal consensus about the level & structure of social inequality.

• Therefore it is critical to better understand changing political attitudes and beliefs systems about inequality, the fair economy & the just society

• It is relatively easier to study beliefs systems in electoral democracies, in the sense that these beliefs systems translate into recorded voting attitudes

• Key question: what forms do the various political parties & coalitions take in different societies and historical periods, and how do they relate to inequality and redistribution? What are the different dimensions of political conflict and how do they change over time?

Was there something unique in 1950-1980 left-right party system & why?
On-going comparative research program using post-electoral surveys:


More countries are currently being studied

Unfortunately, there exists no post-electoral survey before the 1940s-1950s. In order to study longer time periods, one needs to use other data sources: local-level election results matched with local-level census & fiscal data.
• « Standard » view of the left-right party system:
  - political conflict is about redistribution between social classes
  - lower socioeconomic groups vote for the left, higher groups vote for the right

• Pb: this « standard » view may apply to certain societies and historical periods (e.g. 1950-1980 in Western electoral democracies), but it is certainly not universal.

• First, the different dimensions of socioeconomic cleavages (education, income, wealth, etc.) may not always be aligned. E.g. they were aligned in 1950-1980, but in 1990-2020 we observe the rise of a « multiple elites » system: educational elite now votes for the left, while wealth elite keeps voting for the right (though less and less so) (Brahmin Left vs Merchant Right)

• Next, other dimensions of social cleavages, in particular in relation to ethnic or religious identity and foreign origins, can play a central role, in a way that can vary a lot across societies and over time.
Social cleavages & political conflict in France 1955-2020

- Difference between % vote for left parties among the top 10% education voters and the bottom 90% education voters (after controls)
- Difference between % vote for left parties among the top 10% income voters and the bottom 90% income voters (after controls)
- Difference between % vote for left parties among the top 10% wealth voters and the bottom 90% wealth voters (after controls)

**Interpretation.** In the 1950-1970 period, the vote for left-wing parties (socialists-communists-radicals-greens) was associated to voters with the lowest education degrees and the lowest levels of income and wealth; in the 1990-2010 period, it became associated to the voters with the highest education degrees. **Note:** fine lines indicate 90% confidence intervals. **Sources and series:** see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 14.1).
The electoral left: from workers’ party to the party of the educated

- Key transformation over the 1950-2020 period: a complete reversal of the education cleavage.
- I.e. in 1950-1970 period, the less educated voters vote more for the « left » than the more educated. In the 1990-2020 period, it is the opposite.
- Very gradual change happening in all Western electoral democracies over the 1980-2020 period (in particular US, UK, France), in spite of the many historical differences in party systems
- At the same time, one observes in recent decades a fall in electoral participation among lower socioeconomic groups
Electoral left in Europe and the U.S. 1945-2020: from the workers' party to the party of the highly educated

Interpretation. In the 1950-1970 period, the vote for the democrats in the U.S., left-wing parties (socialists-communists-radicals-greeens) in France and the labour party in Britain was associated to voters with the lowest education; in the 1990-2010 period, it became associated to the voters with the highest education degrees. Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 14.2).
The evolution of voter turnout 1945-2020

Interpretation. Voter turnout has been relatively stable around 80%-85% in French presidential elections since 1965 (with however a small fall to 75% in 2017). The fall has been much stronger in legislative elections, which was around 80% until the 1970s, and was less than 50% in 2017. Electoral participation dropped in Britain before rising again since 2010. In the U.S., it has generally fluctuated around 50%-60%. Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 14.7).
Voter turnout & social cleavages 1945-2020

- **U.S.**: difference between % electoral participation among the 50% highest income voters and the 50% lowest income voters
- **France**: same difference
- **Britain**: same difference

**Interpretation**: During the 1950-1980 period, electoral participation in France and Britain was at most 2%-3% higher among the 50% highest income voters than among the 50% lowest income voters. This gap rose significantly since the 1980s and reached 10%-12% in the 2010s, thereby approaching the levels historically observed in the U.S. **Sources and series**: piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 14.8).
• Why did lower socioeconomic groups stop voting for the « left »?
• US-centered explanation: « poor white flight » away from the Democrats following the Civil Rights movement. I.e. the poor racists abandoned the left.
• Problem with this explanation: the same gradual evolution happened in Europe, even though there was no Civil Rights movement in the 1960s.
• Potentially more convincing: « left » parties gradually changed their policy platform & abandoned lower socioeconomic groups. Or, to put it in a more positive way, they were unable to adjust their platform to economic changes.
• Large and persistent inequalities in access to education. With the rise of higher education, left parties became the party of the highly educated. Possible explanation: it was easier to design an egalitarian education platform at the time of primary & secondary education than with higher education.
• Decline in tax progressivity and redistribution since 1980s-1990s: tax competition, lack of international coordination and financial transparency.
• Rise of post-colonial identity-based conflict & xenophobic right in Europe & US since 1980s-1990s reinforced the evolution but was not the primary factor.
The reversal of the education cleavage: the case of France

• Very robust finding
• True both for presidential and legislative elections
• True all along the primary-secondary-higher education hierarchy
• True before and after controls for other variables: age, gender, income, wealth, etc.
Presidential elections in France, 1965-2012

- Left (candidate supported by socialist party (PS) and other left-wing parties)
- Right (candidate supported by the gaullist party and other right-wing parties)

Interpretation. The scores obtained during the second rounds left-right of French presidential elections reported here are the following: 1965 (De Gaulle 55%, Mitterrand 45%), 1974 (Giscard 51%, Mitterrand 49%), 1981 (Mitterrand 52%, Giscard 48%), 1988 (Mitterrand 54%, Chirac 46%), 1995 (Chirac 53%, Jospin 47%), 2007 (Sarkozy 53%, Royal 47%), 2012 (Hollande 52%, Sarkozy 48%). Other second rounds (opposing the right, the center and the extreme-right) were not reported here: 1969 (Pompidou 58%, Poher 42%), 2002 (Chirac 82%, Le Pen 18%), 2017 (Macron 66%, Le Pen 34%). Sources and series: see piketty.pse. ens.fr/ideology (figure 14.6).
Interpretation. The scores obtained by left-wing parties (all parties from the center-left, left and extreme-left) and right-wing parties (all parties from center-right, right and extreme-right combined) have oscillated between 40% and 58% of the votes in the first rounds of legislative elections conducted in France over the 1945-2017 period. Note: the score obtained by the LREM-MODEM coalition in 2017 (32% of votes) was divided 50-50 between center-left and center-right (see figures 14.4-14.5). Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 14.3)
The electoral left in France 1945-2017

**Interpretation.** The score obtained by left-wing parties (socialistes, communistes, radicals, greens and other parties from the center-left, left and extreme-left) has oscillated between 40% and 57% of the votes in the first rounds of legislative elections conducted in France over the 1945-2017 period. **Note:** the score obtained by the LREM-MODEM coalition in 2017 (32% of votes) was divided 50:50 between center-left and center-right.

**Sources and series:** see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 14.4).
The electoral right in France (1945-2017)

Interpretation. The score obtained by right-wing parties (all parties from the center-right, right and extreme-right combined) varied between 40% and 58% of the votes in the first rounds of legislative elections conducted in France over the 1945-2017 period. Note: the score obtained by the LREM-MODEM coalition in 2017 (32% of votes) was divided 50-50 between center-left and center-right. Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 14.5).
Interpretation. In the 1956 legislative elections, 57% of voters with a primary education or less (certificat d'études primaires) (i.e. 72% of the electorate at the time) voted for left-wing parties (socialists-communists-radicals), vs. 50% of voters with secondary diplomas (23% of the electorate) and 37% of voters with higher education diplomas (5% of the electorate). In the 2012 presidential elections, the education cleavage was totally reversed: the left-wing candidate obtained 58% of the vote in the second round among voters with higher education diplomas, vs 47% of the vote among voters with primary education only. 

Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 14.9).
The reversal of the education cleavage, France 1956-2017

Interpretation: During the 1950s and 1960s, the vote for left-wing parties (socialists-communists-radicals-greens) was highest among voters with no degree (except primary education degrees), then fell among secondary and higher education degree holders. In the 2000s and 2010s, the pattern is completely reversed. Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 14.10).
The left and education in France 1955-2020

Interpretation. In 1956, left-wing parties (socialists-communists-radicals) obtained a score that was 17 points lower among higher education graduates than among non-higher education graduates; in 2012, this score was 8 points higher among higher education graduates. Controlling for other variables does not affect the trend (only the level). Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 14.11).
Political conflict: education, income, property and identity

• Unlike high education groups (which have turned to the left), high wealth groups have kept voting for the right (though less and less so). High income groups are between the two: human capital and financial capital have opposite effects and are not fully correlated.

• New cleavages based upon ethnic-religious identity and foreign origins have started to play a more important role since the 1980s-1990s
Political conflict and income, France 1958-2012

Interpretation. In 1978, left-wing parties (socialists-communists-radicals-greens) obtained 46% of the vote among bottom 10% income voters, 38% among top 10% income voters and 17% among top 1% income voters. Generally speaking, the left vote profile is relatively flat among the bottom 90% income voters, and strongly decreasing among top 10% income voters, especially at the beginning of the period. Note: D1 refers to the 10% lowest incomes, D2 to the next 10%,..., and D10 to the 10% highest incomes. Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 14.12).
Interpretation. In 1978, left-wing parties (socialists-communists-radicals-greens) obtained 69% of the vote among bottom 10% wealth voters, 23% among top 10% wealth voters and 13% among top 1% wealth voters. Generally speaking, the left vote profile with respect to wealth is sharply declining (much more strongly than with respect to income), especially at the beginning of the period. Note: D1 refers to the 10% lowest wealth holders, D2 to the next 10%,..., and D10 to the 10% highest wealth holders. Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology. (figure 14.13)
Social cleavages & political conflict in France 1955-2020

- Difference between % vote for left parties among the top 10% education voters and the bottom 90% education voters (after controls)
- Difference between % vote for left parties among the top 10% income voters and the bottom 90% income voters (after controls)
- Difference between % vote for left parties among the top 10% wealth voters and the bottom 90% wealth voters (after controls)

Interpretation: In the 1950-1970 period, the vote for left-wing parties (socialists-communists-radicals-greens) was associated to voters with the lowest education degrees and the lowest levels of income and wealth; in the 1990-2010 period, it became associated to the voters with the highest education degrees. Note: fine lines indicate 90% confidence intervals. Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 14.1).
Political attitudes and origins: France 2007-2012

Interpretation. In 2012, the socialist candidate received 49% of the vote among voters with no foreign origin (no foreign grand-parent), 49% of the vote among voters with European foreign origin (in practice mostly Spain, Italy, Portugal) and 77% of the vote among voters with extra-European foreign origins (in practice mostly North Africa and Subsaharan Africa). Sources and series, see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 14.18).
The religious structure of the electorate, France 1967-2017

Interpretation: Between 1967 and 2017, the proportion of the electorate reporting to be practicing Catholic (going to the church at least once per month) dropped from 25% to 6%. Non-practicing Catholics dropped from 66% to 49%, those reporting no religion increased from 6% to 36%, other religions (protestantism, judaism, buddhism, etc., except islam) from 3% to 4%, and Muslims from less than 1% to about 5% of the electorate. Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 14.14).
Political conflict and catholicism: France 1967-2017

Interpretation. Self-reported practicing and non-practicing catholic voters have always voted less strongly for left-wing parties than voters reporting no religion, but the gap has reduced over time. Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 14.15).
**Political conflict & religious diversity: France 1967-1997**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Practicing Catholics</th>
<th>Non-practicing Catholics</th>
<th>Other Religion</th>
<th>No Religion</th>
<th>Muslims</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1978</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>66%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Interpretation.** Self-reported Muslim voters vote significantly more for left-wing parties than voters with no religion beginning in 1997. Before 1988, Muslims were classified with other religions (protestantism, Judaism, Buddhism, Hinduism, etc.), and made less than 1% of the electorate. **Sources and series:** see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 14.16).
Political conflict & religious diversity: France 2002-2017

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Practicing catholics</th>
<th>Non-practicing catholics</th>
<th>Other religion</th>
<th>No religion</th>
<th>Muslims</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Interpretation. About 80%-90% of self-reported muslim voters vote for left-wing parties in all elections in France since the 1990s. Before 1988, muslims were classified with other religions (protestantism, judaism, buddhisms, hinduism, etc.), and made less than 1% of the electorate. Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 14.17).
Borders and property: the four-way electorate in France

• The current political conflict in France can be summarized with two main dimensions: support or hostility to redistribution between rich and poor, and support or hostility to migrants.

• I.e. conflict about wealth vs conflict about borders.

• The striking point is that these two dimensions have little correlation in the distribution of voters preferences, so that in effect the electorate is divided between four quarters of comparable size.

• → very unstable situation (as exemplified by first round of presidential election 2017: very tight race between four candidates)

• Future evolution will depend on which of the two dimensions will appear to matter the most: if redistribution is considered to be impossible (e.g. due to tax competition), then the conflict will be mostly about borders
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>All voters</th>
<th>Melenchon/Hamon (vote &quot;egalitarian-internationalist&quot;)</th>
<th>Macron (vote &quot;inegalitarian-internationalist&quot;)</th>
<th>Fillon (vote &quot;inegalitarian-nativist&quot;)</th>
<th>Le Pen/Dupont-Aignan (vote &quot;egalitarian-nativist&quot;)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Presidential election 2017 (1st round)</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;There are too many migrants in France&quot; (% agree)</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;In order to achieve social justice, one should take to the rich and give to the poor&quot; (% agree)</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher education graduates (%)</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monthly income &gt; 4000€ (%)</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home owners (%)</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Interpretation.** In 2017, 28% of first-round voters voted for Melenchon-Hamon; 32% of them considered that there are too many migrants in France (vs 56% on average among all voters) and 67% that we should take from the rich and give to the poor (vs 51% on average). In that sense this electorate is ideologically "egalitarian-internationalist", while the Macron electorate is "inegalitarian-internationalist" (pro-migrants, pro-rich), the Fillon electorate "inegalitarian-nativist" (anti-migrants, pro-rich) and the Le Pen/Dupont Aignan electorate "egalitarian-nativist" (anti-migrants, pro-poor). Note: the votes for Arthaud/Poujou (2%) and Asselineau/Cheminade/Lassale (2%) were added to Melenchon/Hamon and Fillon. Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (table 14.1).
Borders and property: the four-way ideological divide in France

**Interpretation.** In 2017, 21% of voters can be classified as "internationalists-egalitarians" (they consider that there are not too many migrants and that inequalities between the rich and the poor ought to be reduced); 26% as "nativists-inegalitarians" (they consider that there are too many migrants and that there is no need to reduce the inequalities between the rich and the poor); 23% as "internationalists-inegalitarians" (pro-migrants, pro-rich) and 30% as "nativists-egalitarians" (anti-migrants, pro-poor). **Sources and series:** see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 14.19).
Changing political cleavages in the United States

• Unlike France, US formally has a two-party system: Democrats vs Republicans (partly due to electoral system)

• But in practice each party is also divided by major conflicts about redistribution (some Dems are strongly pro-redistribution, some not) & migration/ethnicity (some Reps are strongly anti-minority, some not)

• In the end, the general evolution of the structure of political conflict in recent decades bears a lot of similarity with that of France, including the unstablility of the four-way electorate
Presidential elections in the U.S. 1948-2016

Interpretation. The scores obtained by democratic and republican parties candidates in presidential elections conducted in the U.S. between 1948 and 2016 have generally varied between 40% and 60% of the vote (popular vote, all States combined). The scores obtained by other candidates have generally been relatively small (less than 10% of the vote), with the exception of Wallace in 1968 (14%) and Porot in 1992 and 1996 (20% and 10%). Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 15.1).
Democratic vote by diploma in the U.S. 1948-2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Primary</th>
<th>Secondary</th>
<th>Higher education (BA)</th>
<th>High (MA)</th>
<th>High (PhD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>31%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Interpretation. In 1948, the democratic candidate (Truman) obtained 62% of the vote among voters with primary education (no high school diploma) (63% of the electorate at the time) and 26% among voters with advanced higher education diplomas (1% of the electorate). In 2016, the democratic candidate (Clinton) obtained 45% of the vote among voters with secondary education (56% of the electorate) and 75% among those holding a PhD (2% of the electorate). Like in France, we see a full reversal of the educational cleavage between 1948 and 2016. Note: BA: bachelor degree or equivalent, MA: master & other advanced degrees (law/medical school), PhD: doctorate. Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 15.2)
The Democratic vote and education: U.S. 1948-2016

**Interpretation.** In 1948, the democratic candidate obtained a score that was 20 points smaller among college graduates than among college graduates; in 2016, this score is 14 points higher among college graduates. Controlling for other variables ("other things equal") does not affect the trend (only the levels). **Sources and series.** see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 15.3).
Democratic vote in the U.S. 1948-2016: from the workers' party to the party of the highly educated

**Interpretation:** In 1948, the democratic candidate obtained a score that was 21 points smaller among the top 10% highest-education voters than among the remaining 90%; in 2016, this score is 23 points higher among the top 10% highest-education voters. Controlling for other variables ("other things equal") does not affect the trend (only the levels). Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 15.4).
Political conflict and income: U.S. 1948-2016

Interpretation: In 1964, the democratic candidate obtained 69% of the votes among the voters with the 10% lowest incomes, 37% of the vote among those with the top 10% highest incomes and 22% among top 1% income holders. Generally speaking, the profile of democratic vote is declining with respect to income, especially at the beginning of the period. In 2016, for the first time, the profile is reversed: 59% of the top income decile voters support the democratic candidate. Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 15.5).
Social cleavages and political conflict: U.S. 1948-2016

- Difference between % vote democrat among top 10% education voters and bottom 90% education voters (after controls)
- Difference between % vote democrat among top 10% income voters and bottom 90% education voters (after controls)
- Difference between % vote democrat among top wealth voters and bottom wealth voters (after controls)

**Interpretation.** During the 1950-1970 period, the democratic vote was associated to voters with the lowest levels of education and the lowest levels of income and wealth. In the 1980-2010 period it became associated to the voters with the highest diplomas. In the 2010-2020 period, it is maybe close to become associated with the highest income and wealth voters. **Sources and series:** see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 15.6).
Interpretation: In 2016, the democratic candidate obtained 37% of the vote among white voters (70% of the electorate), 89% of the vote among black voters (11% of the electorate) and 64% of the vote among Latinos and other non-whites (10% of the electorate, including 18% for Latinos). In 1972, the democratic candidate obtained 32% of the vote among whites (69% of the electorate), 82% among blacks (10% of the electorate) and 64% among Latinos and other categories (1% of the electorate). Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 15.7)
Political conflict and racial cleavage: U.S. 1948-2016

**Interpretation.** In 1948, the democratic vote was 11 points higher among black and other minority voters (9% of the electorate) than among white voters (91% of the electorate). In 2016, the democratic vote was 39 points higher among black and other minority voters (30%) of the electorate than among white voters (70% of the electorate). Taking into account control variables has a limited impact on this gap.

**Sources and series:** see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 15.8)
Political conflict and origins: France & the US

- No foreign origin (France); Whites (U.S.)
- European foreign origins (France); Latinos (U.S.)
- Extra-European foreign origins (France); Blacks (U.S.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>France 2012</th>
<th>Etats-Unis 2016</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No foreign origin</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European foreign origins</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extra-European foreign</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>origin</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

% vote democrat (US) or socialist (France)

Interpretation: In 2012, the socialist candidate in the second round of the French presidential election obtained 49% of the vote among voters with no foreign origin (no reported foreign grand-parent) and among voters with European foreign origins (in practice mostly Spain, Italy, Portugal) and 77% of the vote among voters with extra-European foreign origins (in practice mostly North Africa and Subsaharan Africa). In 2016, the democratic candidate at the U.S. presidential election obtained 37% of the vote among white voters, 64% among Latinos and other minority voters and 89% among black voters. Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 15.9).
Changing political cleavages in the United Kingdom

• Despite the UK, US and French party systems, it is striking to see relatively similar evolutions in all three countries.

• This expresses the fact that Western electoral democracies have gone through comparable challenges and limitations: large & persistent educational inequalities (higher education challenge); tax competition & globalization; post-communist hyper-capitalism; post-colonial.

• But there are also UK specificities: shifts in Labour party leadership; rising role of the conflict over Brexit.
Legislative elections in Britain 1945-2017

**Interpretation.** In the 1945 legislative elections, the Labour party obtained 48% of the vote and the Conservatives 36% of the vote (hence a total of 84% of the vote for the two main parties). In the 2017 legislative elections, the Conservatives obtained 42% of the vote, and the Labour party 40% of the vote (hence a total of 82%). **Note.** Liberals/Lib-Dem: Liberals, Liberals-democrats, SDP Alliance. SNP: Scottish National Party. UKIP: UK Independence Party. Other parties include green and regionalist parties. **Sources and series:** see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 15.10).
Interpretation. In 1955, the Labour party obtained a score that was 26 points lower among college graduates than among non-college graduates; in 2017, the score of the Labour party was 6 points higher among college graduates. Taking into account control variables does not affect the trend (only the level). Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 15.11).
From the workers’ party to the party of the highly educated: the Labour vote, 1955-2017

Interpretation. In 1955, the Labour party obtained a score that was 25 points lower among top 10% highest-education voters than among bottom 90% lowest-education voters; in 2017, the score of the Labour party was 13 points higher among top 10% education voters. Taking into account control variables does not affect the trend (only the level). Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 15.12).
The electoral left in Europe & the US, 1945-2020: from the workers' party to the party of the highly educated

- **U.S.:** difference among % Democratic vote among top 10% highest-education voters and bottom 90% lowest-education voters
- **France:** same difference with % vote for left-wing parties
- **Britain:** same difference with % vote for labour party

**Interpretation:** During the 1950-1970 period, the vote for the democratic party in the U.S., left-wing parties in France (socialists-communists-radicals-greens) in France and the labour party in Britain was associated with the voters with the lowest educational diplomas; in the 1990-2010 period became associated with the voters with the highest education diplomas. The British evolution is slightly lagging behind the French and U.S. evolutions but goes in the same direction. **Sources and series:** see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 15.13)
Political conflict and income: Britain 1955-2017

Interpretation. The profile of the vote for the Labour party as a function of income decile has generally been strongly decreasing, particularly at the level of the 10% highest incomes, and especially from the 1950s to the 1980s. Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 15.14).
Interpretation: The labour vote was associated during the 1950-1980 period to the voters with the highest diplomas and levels of income and wealth; since the 1990s, it became associated to the highest education degrees. Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 15.15).
Social cleavages and political conflict: U.S. 1948-2016

Interpretation. During the 1950-1970 period, the democratic vote was associated to voters with the lowest levels of education and the lowest levels of income and wealth. In the 1980-2010 period it became associated to the voters with the highest diplomas. In the 2010-2020 period, it is maybe close to become associated with the highest income and wealth voters. Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 15.6).
Political conflict & religious diversity: Britain 1964-2017

Interpretation. In 2017, the Labour party obtained 39% of the vote among self-reported Christian voters (Anglicans, other Protestants, Catholics), 56% among voters reporting other religions (Judaism, Hinduism, etc., except Islam), 54% among voters with no religion and 96% among self-reported Muslim voters. Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 15.16).
Political conflict & ethnic categories, Britain 1979-2017

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Whites</th>
<th>Africans-Caribbeans</th>
<th>Indians-Pakistanis</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>98%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>96%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Interpretation. In 2017, the Labour party obtained 44% of the vote among voters describing themselves as "Whites", 81% among "Africans-Caribbeans", 82% among "Indians-Pakistanis-Bengaladeshis" and 63% among "others" ("Chinese", "Arabs", etc.). In 2017, 5% of the electorate refused to answer the ethnic question, and 77% among them voted Labour. Sources and series: piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 15.17).
The cleavage about Europe and globalization

• In the UK, but also in France and in most European countries, the conflict about European integration has played a more & more important role in recent decades

• Referendum about Europe in UK 2016 and in France 1992 & 2005: in all cases, only top socioeconomic deciles support European Union

• Conflict about EU cuts across « standard » left-right lines because it is a transnational conflict that is both about redistribution between rich and poor (EU and the free mobility of capital and goods and services are perceived to favour the most mobile and wealthiest economic actors) and about borders, identity and migration (EU membership implies free labor mobility)

• Without some fundamental changes to EU functioning and some form of « social-federalism » (common social policies to reduce inequalities: tax justice, education, wages, environment, etc.), it is difficult to see why this will change
The European cleavage in Britain: the Brexit referendum in 2016

**Interpretation.** In the 2016 referendum over Brexit (victory of Leave with 52%), one observes a very strong social cleavage of the vote: the top deciles of income, education and wealth vote strongly for Remain, while bottom deciles vote for Leave.

**Note:** D1 refers to the bottom 10% (either for income, education or wealth), D2 for the next 10%, etc., and D10 for the top 10%.

**Sources and series:** see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 15.18).
The European cleavage in France: the referenda of 1992 and 2005

Interpretation. In the 1992 referendum over the Maastricht treaty ("yes" won with 51%) as well as in the 2005 referendum on the European constitutional treaty ("yes" lost with 45%), one observes a very strong social cleavage: top deciles of income, educational degrees and wealth vote strongly for the "yes", while bottom deciles vote for the "no". Note. D1 represents the bottom 10% (for the distribution of income, education or wealth), D2 the next 10%, ..., and D10 the top 10%. Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 14.20)
The reversal of education cleavage in Western democracies

• The reversal of the education cleavage happened not only in France, the US and in the UK, but also in all other developed countries: Germany, Sweden, Norway, Italy, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Netherlands, etc.

• Main explanations:

• Large and persistent educational inequalities

• Widespread perception that lower socioeconomic groups were gradually abandoned by ruling parties (captured by the winners of globalization)

• Post-communist disillusionment against any form of internationalist socialism

• Post-colonial identity conflict exploited by xenophobic right

→ rise of « social-nativism » : « the only way to protect socially disadvantaged natives is to protect borders and to fight migration, & certainly not to make false promises about universal solidarity, internationalism and socialism »
The reversal of the education cleavage, 1950-2020: U.S., France, Britain, Germany, Sweden, Norway

Interpretation. During the 1950-1970 period, the vote for the democratic party in the U.S. and for the various left-wing parties in Europe (labour, social-democrats, socialists, communists, greens, etc.) was stronger among the voters with the lowest education levels; in the period 2000-2020, it has become associated with the voters with the highest diplomas. The trend happens later in Nordic Europe, but follows the same direction. Note: *1950-59* includes elections conducted between 1950 and 1959, etc. Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 16.1).
Political cleavage and education, 1960-2020:
Italy, Holland, Switzerland, Canada, Australia, New-Zealand

Interpretation. During the 1960-1980 period, the vote for left-wing parties (labour, social-democrats, socialists, communists, radicals, greens, etc.) was associated to the voters with the lowest education levels; in the period 2000-2020, it has become associated to those with the highest diplomas. This general evolution happened in the U.S. and in Europe, as well as in Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Note: "1960-69" includes elections conducted between 1960 and 1969, "1970-79" those conducted from 1970 to 1979, etc. Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 16.2).
The rise of social-nativism in post-communist Eastern Europe

• For obvious reasons, post-communist disillusionment is particularly strong in Eastern Europe

• In many cases, former communist parties (turned social-democrats) took command of privatization during 1990s before falling into corruption scandals and/or voter disappointment during 2000s

• Typical example: Poland. Social-democrats (SLD) have almost entirely disappeared, so that the political conflict is now between PO (Civic Platform) (liberals-conservatives, pro-business, pro-EU) and PiS (Law and Justice) (nationalists-conservatives, anti-migrants, anti-EU) (=social-nativists)

• The PiS has been very good at portraying itself as pro-poor (creation of large family benefits in addition to strong anti-migrant and nationalist stance), and has been to win two consecutive elections in 2015 and 2019
**Political conflict and income: Poland 2001-2015**

Interpretation: Between the elections of 2001 and 2015, the vote for PO (Civic platform) (liberals-conservatives) became strongly associated with voters with the highest income, while the vote for PiS (Law and justice) (nationalists-conservatives) became concentrated among voters with the lowest incomes. Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 16.3).
Political conflict and education: Poland 2001-2015

**Interpretation.** Between the elections of 2001 and 2015, the vote for PO (Civic platform) (liberals-conservatives) became associated to voters with the highest education levels, while the vote for PiS (Law and justice) (nationalists-conservatives) became concentrated among voters with the lowest diplomas. **Sources and series:** see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 164).
The social-nativist trap: lessons from Europe and the US

• Can the social-nativist parties in Europe become social-democratic parties in the long run, like the Democratic party in the US in the 20c?

• First, it is important to remember that this transition took a very long time in the US, and that it involved enormous human damages.

• I.e. between the 1870s and the 1950s, Southern Democrats enforced very strict racial segregation, encouraged KKK & the lynching of blacks, etc.

• Do we want Poland’s PiS, French National Front or Italian Liga to conduct violent policies against migrants & their descendants for many decades before finally turning to Civil Rights policies, like US Democrats in the 1960s?
Next, given the level of postcommunist desillusionment in early 21c, and also the magnitude of international tax competition to attract investment (which requires extensive international cooperation to be defeated), it is very unlikely that 21c social-nativist parties would turn to become New Deal parties with large tax progressivity and anti-inequality policies.

- PiS in Poland: redistribution via lump-sum family benefits, but nothing on progressive taxation or workers rights
- Lega in Italy: anti-elitist discourse to justify strong stance against migrants, but very elitist (or nihilist) economic policy: repeal of progressive income tax
- FN/RN in France: used to advocate the repeal of the income tax (1980s); if they were in power they would probably exacerbate tax dumping
- Trump in the US: very strong stance against migrants, Latinos, etc., but continuation of the Reagan tax cut agenda
• Catalonia and the separatist trap

• Given the high level of tax competition of Europe, it is tempting for every country or region to benefit from trade integration while at the same time benefiting from being a tax haven and attracting other country’s tax bases. I.e. in the absence of federal taxes, there is clear incentive for high-income regions to become independant countries within Europe.

• Typical exemple: Catalonia. **The higher the level of income, the stronger the support for regional autonomy or independance.**

• Of course the fiscal motive is not the only reason behind the independantist movement: there are also cultural and linguistic motives, and there are left republican groups promoting independance.

• But it is clear that the debate would look very different if high-income taxpayers from Catalonia would keep paying the same income taxes to EU whether or not they obtain independance (e.g. like California in the US).
Catalan regionalism and income, 2008-2016

Interpretation: In 2008, 47% of Catalan voters belonging to the bottom 50% incomes supported greater regional autonomy or a self-determination referendum (both answers were added), vs 64% among the voters with the next 40% incomes and 74% among the top 10% income voters.

Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 16.5).
Catalan regionalism and education, 2008-2016

Interpretation. In 2008, 44% of Catalan voters with no diploma (except primary education level) supported greater regional autonomy or a self-determination referendum (both answers were added), vs 60% among the voters with secondary degrees and 74% among those with higher education diplomas. Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 18.6).
Changing political cleavages and class conflict in India & Brasil

• It is critical to look at the political economy of redistribution in electoral democracies outside the West

• First, the breakdown of the left-right class-based party system observed in the West between 1950-1980 and 1990-2020 may not hold in other parts of the world. E.g. in India or Brasil, one observes a move toward a more class-based party system since the 1980s-1990s (to some extent, and despite adverse international trends making redistributive policies hard to conduct). I.e. different political strategies and coalitions can make difference.

• Next, the structure of class-based vs identity-based conflict can take various forms and ought to be analyzed in a comparative spirit. E.g. anti-Muslim cleavages play a key role in India and are in a way closer to the European identity-based conflicts than to the US racial divide.
India’s party system. INC (Congress) was the independance party and used to be the dominant catch-all party.

Beginning in the 1980s-1990s, the BJP (nationalist Hindu party) built its strategy against the Muslim minority and against the extension of the quota system from SC-ST (Scheduled Castes, Schedules Tribes) to OBC (other backward classes, including Muslims)

As a consequence, BJP has developed as an upper-caste, upper-class party, while Congress and left parties (socialist or low-caste parties like BSP) attract both the votes of the poor Muslims & the poor Hindus ≠ Western democracies, where poor minority & poor majority voters generally do not vote for the same parties

This illustrates the role of institutions & ideology to build coalitions

Legislative elections in India (Lok Sabha), 1962-2014

Interpretation: In the 2014 legislative elections, the Congress party (INC, Indian National Congress) and its allied parties (center) obtained 34% of the vote (including 19% for INC alone), the BJP (Hindus nationalists) and its allied parties (right) 37% of the vote, the left and center-left parties (SP, BSP, CPU, etc.) 16% of the vote and other parties 13% of the vote. Note: in the 1977 elections (post-emergency), the Janata Dal included all opponents to INC (from left and right), and it classified here with "other parties". Sources and series: see Piketty psae ens fr ideological (figure 16.7).
BJP vote by caste and religion: India 1962-2014

Muslims  SC/ST (lower castes)  OBC  Other FC (upper castes)  Brahmins

Vote BJP (and allies) as a function of caste and religion.

Interpretation: In 2014, 10% of Muslim voters voted for the BJP (Hindus nationalists) and allied parties, vs 31% among SC/ST (scheduled castes/scheduled tribes, lower castes), 42% among OBC (other backward classes, intermediate castes), 49% among other FC (forward castes, upper castes except brahmins) and 61% among brahmins. Sources and series: piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 16.8).
Congress vote by caste and religion: India 1962-2014

Interpretation. In 2014, 45% of Muslim voters voted for the Congress (Indian National Congress) and allied parties, vs 38% among SC/ST (scheduled castes/scheduled tribes, lower castes), 34% among OBC (other backward classes, intermediate castes), 27% among other FC (forward castes, upper castes except brahmins) and 18% among brahmins. Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 16.9).
Left vote by caste and religion: India 1962-2014

**Interpretation**: In 2014, 23% of Muslim voters voted for the left and center-left parties (SP, BSP, CPI, etc.), vs 17% among SC/ST (scheduled castes/scheduled tribes, lower castes), 15% among OBC (other backward classes, intermediate castes), 11% among other FC (forward castes, upper castes except Brahmins) and 12% among Brahmins. **Sources and series**: piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 18.10).
BJP vote among upper castes, 1962-2014

- Difference between % vote BJP (and allies) among upper castes (FC) and other voters
- After controls for State
- After controls for State, age, sex, degree, rural/urban/city size

**Interpretation.** During the 1962-2014 period, upper caste voters (FC, forward castes) have always voted more than others for the BJP (and allies), before and after taking into account control variables. The impact of caste (after taking into account other variables) appears to have become more important over time. **Sources and series:** see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 16.11).
**Interpretation.** During the 1962-2014 period, lower caste voters (SC/ST, scheduled castes/scheduled tribes) have always voted less than others for the BJP (and allies), before and after taking into account control variables. **Sources and series:** see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 16.12)
The BJP & the religious cleavage: India 1962-2014

**Interpretation.** During the 1962-2014 period, hindus voters (all castes combined: SC/ST, OBC and FC) have always voted more than muslim voters for the BJP (and allies), before and after taking into account control variables. The magnitude of the religious cleavage has strongly increased over time. **Sources and series:** see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 16.13).
BJP vote by caste, religion and State: India 1996-2016

Interpretation. In all Indian States, the BJP (and allies) always obtains a higher score among upper castes (FC, forward castes) than among OBC (other backward classes, intermediate castes), SC/ST (scheduled castes/scheduled tribes, lower castes) and muslim voters. Note: the results reported here refer to the average regional elections conducted over the 1996-2016 period. Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 16.14).
• The case of Brasil is very different, but also illustrates a case of gradual policy-based development of a class-based conflict

• The first elections with universal suffrage took place in 1989 in Brasil (1890-1964: suffrage restricted to literate population; 1964-1985: military dictatorship)

• Many political parties, including PT (Workers Party), which initially attracted urban wage earners from manufacturing sector & intellectuals

• It is during PT’s experience in power in 2002-2014 that the PT electorate started to concentrate upon lower-income and lower-education voters (following redistributive policies: Bolsa Familia, minimum wage, etc.)

• Like India, Brasil’s experience also shows that it is difficult to develop a redistributive policy agenda in the current global ideological context, that is more favourable to identity-based conflict and nationalists
The politisation of inequality in Brasil, 1989-2018

- Difference between % vote PT among the top 10% highest education voters and bottom 90% lowest education voters (after controls)
- Difference between % vote PT among the top 10% income voters and the bottom 90% income voters (after controls)

**Interpretation**: During the 1989-2018 period, the vote in favour of PT (Workers Party) in Brasil has become more and more associated with voters with the lowest levels of income and degrees, which was not the case in the first elections conducted after the end of the military dictatorship. **Sources and series**: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 16.15).
Social-federalism vs social-nativism

• The current organization of globalization, in Europe and more generally at the world level, is based upon free capital flows, free trade and laissez-faire competition between countries and economic actors, with little no international cooperation on fiscal, social or environmental policies.

• Pb: economic openness has contributed to reduce poverty in poor countries, but free-market globalization also generates rising inequalities and social unrest, which itself fuels social-nativist & nationalist reactions.

• Ideal solution = social-federalism, i.e. a new organization of globalization where trade and capital flows are subject to verifiable targets in terms of global public goods and global fiscal, social and environmental justice.

• See Manifesto for the Democratization of Europe, Finance-Climate Pact, etc.

→ major challenges for the future, together with the development of new forms of educational justice and redistribution of income and wealth.
A novel organisation of globalisation: transnational democracy

Transnational Assembly
In charge of **global public goods** (climate, research, etc.) and of **global fiscal justice** (common taxes on high wealth and income holders and large corporations, carbon taxes)

National Assembly
Country A

National Assembly
Country B

National Assembly
Country C

National Assembly
Country D

...  

**Interpretation.** According to the proposed organisation, the treaties regulating globalisation (flows of goods, capital and individuals) will henceforth include the creation between the signatories States and Regional Unions of a Transnational Assembly in charge of global public goods (climate, research, etc.) and global fiscal justice (common taxes on high wealth and income holders and large corporations, carbon taxes). **Note.** Countries A, B, C, D can be States like France, Germany, Italy, Spain, etc., in which case the Transnational Assembly will be the European Assembly; or countries A, B, etc. could be Regional Unions like the European Union, the African Union, etc., in which case the Transnational Assembly would be that of the Euro-African Union. The Transnational Assembly could be formed of deputies from the National Assemblies and/or of transnational deputies especially elected for this purpose, depending on the situation. **Sources:** see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (table 17.2).
The inequality of educational investment: France 2018

Interpretation: Total public educational investment received during their studies (from kindergarten to university) by students of the cohort reaching 18 in 2018 will be about 120 k€ (i.e. about 15 years of studies for an average cost of 8000€ per year). Within this generation, the 10% of students receiving the smallest educational investment receive about 65-70 k€, while the 10% receiving the most receive between 200 k€ and 300 k€. Note: average costs per year of study in the French educational system in 2015-2018 range from 5-8 k€ in kindergarten-primary to 8-10 k€ in secondary, 9-10 k€ in universities and 15-16 k€ in preparatory classes to grandes écoles (elite tracks). Sources and series: see piketty.pse. ens.fr/ideology (figure 17.1).
The circulation of property and progressive taxation

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Progressive tax on property (funding of the capital endowment allocated to each young adult)</th>
<th>Progressive tax on income (funding of basic income and social and ecological State)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Multiple of average wealth</td>
<td>Annual tax on property (effective tax rate)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>5%</td>
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<td>1000</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10000</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Interpretation. The proposed tax system includes a progressive tax on property (annual tax and inheritance tax) funding a capital endowment for all young adults and a progressive tax on income (including social contributions and progressive tax on carbon emissions) funding the basic income and the social and ecological State (health, education, pensions, unemployment, energy, etc.). This system favouring the circulation of property is one of the constituting elements of participatory socialism, together with a 50-50 split of voting rights among workers representatives and shareholders in corporations. Note: in the example given here, the progressive property tax raises about 5% of national income (allowing to fund a capital endowment of about 60% of average net wealth, to be allocated to each young adult at 25-year of age) and the progressive income tax about 45% of national income (allowing to fund an annual basic income of about 60% of after-tax income, costing about 5% of national income, and the social and ecological State for about 40% of national income). Sources: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (table 17.1).
Thanks a lot for your attention!