Lecture 10: Property Regimes and Political Systems in Historical Perspective (II):
Party Systems and Inequality in Electoral Democracies
(check on line for updated versions)
• Advanced Economic History (12 lectures): full syllabus [here](#)
• Lectures 1-8 and 11-12 are taught by E. Monnet/L. Keszenbaum, F. Alvaredo, D. Cogneau and J. Bourdieu
• In lectures 9-10, I develop a long-run perspective on the joint evolution of property regimes and political systems.
• **Lecture 9: Property Regimes & Political Systems in Historical Perspective (I): From Ternary Societies to Proprietarian Societies** (Wednesday November 16th 2020)
• **Lecture 10: Property Regimes & Political Systems in Historical Perspective (II): Party Systems & Inequality in Electoral Democracies** (Wednesday November 23rd 2020)
• I assume you are familiar with the material presented in the “Introduction to Economic History" course. Students who have not taken this course (or need to refresh their memory) are encouraged to go through the [syllabus and slides](#) used in this course.
• **Lecture 9: Property Regimes & Political Systems in Historical Perspective (I): From Ternary Societies to Proprietarian Societies**

The first lecture focuses on the transition from ternary societies (based upon functional political-religious-economic inequality: rulers-priests-workers) to proprietary societies (based upon a sharp demarcation between property rights and political rights) and their followers (including social-democratic, communist and post-communist societies).

Some of the material is extracted from *Capital & ideology*, chap.1-9.

• **Lecture 10: Property Regimes & Political Systems in Historical Perspective (II): Party Systems & Inequality in Electoral Democracies**

The second lecture studies the joint evolution of property/inequality regimes and party systems in electoral democracies. In particular, I stress the interaction between inequality dynamics and the structure of political cleavages and ideology (class-based vs identity-based).

Some of the material is extracted from *Capital & ideology*, chap.14-16.
Roadmap of Lecture 10

• The Democratic Party, from Slavery to New Deal
• Beyond left and right: the dimensions of political conflict
• The transformation of the electoral left in Western democracies: from the workers party to the party of educated
• Changing political cleavages about property and identity: France, US, Britain, India, Brasil
The Democratic party, from slavery to New Deal

• The US party system is often viewed as very bizarre from the perspective of « European », « standard » left vs right view of politics. But maybe it is not so bizarre if we take a very long-run perspective.

• How is it that the pro-slavery party (Democrats in 1860) gradually became the New Deal party (Roosevelt 1932) and the Progressives/Civil Rights/Left-wing party (Kennedy/Clinton/Obama)? And also more recently the high-education, high-income party.

• And conversely how is it that the free-labour party (Lincoln’s Republicans in 1860) gradually became the pro-business pro-laissez-faire party (Hoover 1928) and the anti-minority party (Trump 2016)? And also more recently the pro-white-poor party (≈Democrats 19c).

• To understand these evolutions one needs a multi-dimensional view of politics: income vs race vs regionalism vs money vs free-trade etc.

• There is nothing « normal » in one-dimensional class-based conflict.
• N. Barreyre, *L’or et la liberté – Une histoire spatiale des Etats-Unis après la guerre de sécession* (Ed. EHESS 2014)


• Very interesting book on the changing structure of US political conflict 1860-1884

• Q.: How did the Democrats (who lost 1860 election against Lincoln’s Republicans and lost the Civil War) manage to reconstruct themselves and win the 1884 presid. election?

• A.: New South-Midwest coalition against the blacks and against the North-East financial elite (free-labour capitalism Republican ideology not well suited to adress all issues).
• **Key role of slavery in US history**: out of the 15 first presidents, 13 were slave owners (including Washington, Jefferson, etc.)

• Slaves very well recorded in US censuses because they give more seats in US Congress: three-fifths rule

• Virginia: largest slave state, and by far largest US state in 1800

• In the 1850s, 75% of cotton used in European textile factories comes from US south → **key role in the overall industrialization process**

• In some states (e.g. South Carolina), the proportion of slaves rose up to 55%-60% in the 1850s. In Virginia, stable around 40%.

• Very large slave concentrations, but less extreme that in Caribbean islands

• Very strong repression: laws in the 1830s-1850s putting in jail those who teach reading/writing to slaves and those who help fugitives → rising tensions between slave states and free states
The proportion of slaves in the United States 1790-1860

Interpretation. The proportion of slaves in total population rose or remained stable at a high level in the main southern slave States between 1790 and 1860 (between 35% and 55% in 1850-1860, up to 57%-58% in South Carolina), while slavery dropped or disappeared in Northern States. Sources and series: var piketty.pse ens.fr/ideology (figure 6.3).
• **Jefferson 1820**: OK with abolition, but only if full compensation to owners (self-evident from owners’ viewpoint) and if we can send slaves back to Africa (American Colonization Society, Liberia) (=extreme form of separation).

• “I tremble for my country when I reflect that God is just, and that his justice cannot sleep forever (...). The cessation of that kind of property would not cost me a second thought if a general emancipation and **expatriation** could be effected; and gradually, and with due sacrifices, I think it might be. But as it is, we have a wolf by the ears, and we can neither hold him, nor safely let him go. Justice is in one scale, self-preservation in the other ».

• **Calhoun 1837** in _Slavery as a positive good_ has a more positive justification of slavery: « there is more misery among the poor, sick and elderly in the urban proletariat of Europe and North-East US than in the South slave society »; « Boston capitalists pretend that they want to free the slaves, but all they want is cheap labor, which they will throw away when they don’t need it any more »
• Was a peaceful end to US slavery possible?
• Total market value of slaves in 19c US: about 100% of US national income (and >250% of South US national income)
• By comparison, UK compensation to slave owners: 5% national income in 1833-43. Total public debt due by US Civil war 1861-65: <30% national income
• In 19c US, slave-owners and Democratic party leaders (Jefferson, Monroe, etc.) made such computations and started to draft plans about massive land transfers from new western states to former slave-owners. But the scale of the wealth transfer to compensate slave-owners was unrealistic (& unfair).
Lincoln 1860: elected on a platform putting an end to the extension of slavery in the West, and proposing a gradual emancipation (with compensation) to the South. But everybody knew that a full compensation was impossible, and that the South was becoming a shrinking minority within the US Congress → secession attempt by Southern states, Civil War 1861-65

A fair and peaceful end would have required a radical rethinking of property regime, with large transfers both to former slaves and poor Southern whites, so as to create common interest between them (not easy)

In 1863-1864, a transfer to former slaves (« 40 acres of land and a mule ») was promised by Northern troops in order to mobilize African Americans, but the promise was quickly forgotten after the war
US first party system:

Democrats-Republicans (Jefferson, Virginia) vs Federalists (Adams, Massach.)

- I.e. South (slavery-based plantations, rural economy, state autonomy, weak federal government) vs North-East (urban economy, manufacturing, banking, pro-industrialization, strong federal government)

- Federalists win in 1796 but lose more and more heavily in 1800-1820, disappear in 1824-1832 (Dem-Rep become « Democrats » in 1828), Federalists replaced by Whigs in 1836-1852, and finally by Republicans in 1856-1860 with the free-labour, abolitionist Lincoln victory >>> Civil war 1860-1865

- Complex ideological and political changes over the 1796-1860 period, but one important fixed point: South states always vote Democrats (or Dem-Rep), while North-East states always vote Republicans (or Federalists or Whigs). True until 1960s and the Civil Rights movement.

- Detailed state-level series for all presidential elections 1792-2016 on « The American Presidency Project » UCSB website
US Political Parties 1796-1860: from Federalists to Republicans

1796: Federalists (Adams) vs Dem-Rep (Jefferson) (North vs South)

1800: Dem-Rep vs Federalists

1844: Dem vs Whigs

1812: Dem-Rep vs Federalists

1860: Rep (Lincoln) vs Dem

Democrats (& Dem-Rep) in blue
Republicans in red
Federalists (&Whigs) in orange

• Whigs keep the North-East electoral base of former Federalists (and future Republicans) but manage to appeal to transregional interests.

• Whig victory 1840 with high participation and transregional voting patterns: Harrison (VA Whig) vs Van Buren (NY Dem)

• 1840 = Successful democratic mobilization and democratic change... but only by avoiding the central territorial confrontation on slavery, and with no strong ideological platform (Mc Cormick a bit too 1840-nostalgic & anti-ideology)

• In 1856-1860, Whigs are replaced by Republicans with free-labour abolitionnist platform: back to strong North vs South regional divide >> War

• Very interesting analysis of the structure of political conflict between Democrats and Whigs in Virginia in 1824-1854

• Both parties present themselves as pro-slavery and accuse each other of being abolitionist: Natt Turner revolt in 1831-32 in Southampton and Nottoway counties (up to 60-75% of slaves); NY slave fugitives in 1840-41

• Calhoun 1837 on *Slavery as a positive good*: « there is more misery among the poor, sick and elderly in the urban proletariat of Europe and North-East US than in the South slave society » (organic solidarity, ≈ caste system)

• Both parties support slavery, but in practice stronger Whig vote in urban counties (those who can imagine the future without slavery), and stronger Democrat vote in rural counties with large slave concentration

• Whigs support tax-financed public education, railway, banking, while Democrats focus on protection of slavery system (large slave owners + poor rural whites)
N. Barreyre, *L’or et la liberté – Une histoire spatiale des Etats-Unis après la guerre de sécession* (Ed. EHESS 2014)


**Very interesting book on the changing structure of US political conflict 1860-1884**

Q.: How did the Democrats (who lost 1860 election against Lincoln’s Republicans and lost the Civil War) manage to reconstruct themselves and win the 1884 presid. election?

A.: New South-Midwest coalition against the blacks and against the North-East financial elite (free-labour capitalism Republican ideology not well suited to address all issues).
Free-labour Republican coalition quickly loses its majority, first because divided Reps soon abandon the South to segregationists democrats: by 1868-1870, end of any serious attempt to impose racial equality and black suffrage; 14th amendment never applied, partly because Reps were strongly attached to literacy tests on Irish migrants in Mass and NY (Democrats favour Irish naturalization & white migrants in the North and black lynching in the South). And next because on the two other major policy issues of the day (war debt repayment: hard vs soft money, interest vs veteran pension; manufacturing protection/federal tariff vs free trade/no federal tax), Democrats are able to attract lower-class & middle-class white voters from the West and the North-East by describing the Republicans as captured by North-East financial/manufacturing elite. 1884 Democrat winning coalition: already the flavour of the New Deal « left-wing » 1932 coalition... except that strongly anti-black (until 1960-1964, when South vote turn from Dems to Reps).
• Between the 1940s and 1960s, Democrats choose to turn pro-Civil rights and to loose the South. Why?

• **International factors:** post-WW2 cold war context, anti-Nazi coalition with Soviet Union, decolonization, competition with USSR for moral leadership and prestige. Being openly racist is very costly on the international scene in the 1950s-1960s. In the 1980s, Reps still oppose sanctions against Apartheid regime in South Regime, but not the Democrats: complete change as compared to 1860-1930.

• **Domestic factors:** the post-Great-Depression New Deal social policy platform (social security, health and unemployment insurance, progressive taxation, etc.) favours all the poor, black and white; so it makes little sense for the New Deal party to seek support from poor whites and not from poor blacks

1884

1920

1932 (Roosevelt)

1964
US Political Parties 1964-2016: the rise of Southern Republicans
• Kuziemko-Washington « Why did the Democrats Lose the South? Bringing New Data to an Old Debate », WP 2016

= by using newly digitized opinion survey data, K-W show that racial views explain most of the white voters shift from Dem to Rep (as opposed to the rise in Southern relative per capita income, from 60% to 89% of US average between 1940 and 1980, which appears to explain very little)

• On the impact of voting rights act of 1965 (end of literacy tests in the South) on the empowerment of blacks, see Cascio-Washington, « Valuing the Vote: The Redistribution of Voting Rights and State Funds Following the Voting Rights Act of 1965 », QJE 2014

Figure 1: Share of whites identifying as Democrats, by region

Notes: Individual-level data from Gallup polls (see Section 3 for more detail). South is defined throughout as the eleven states of the former Confederacy: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas and Virginia. Democratic identification is coded throughout as one if the respondent identifies with the Democratic party and zero otherwise (so independent is coded as zero).

= calibration of a model of voting and party competition with two policy dimensions: attitudes toward inequality/redistribution between rich and poor (level of progressive taxation, size of public sector, etc.) vs attitudes towards minorities/migrants/foreigners

• Result: the xenophobia dimension substantially reduces the equilibrium level of redistribution, and can explain the US vs Europe gap in redistribution (race issue more salient in US... until now)

• Direct anti-solidarity effect (voter reaction): racist white voters stop voting for Democrats because they don’t want black to benefit from redistribution (≈Kuziemko-Washington)

• Indirect policy-bundle effect (party reaction): Reps react by shifting to more racist platform; Dems policy shift to less redistribution, etc.

• Very relevant, but difficult to fully capture in a simple model; more historical data on party systems, ideology and inequality is necessary
See also Alesina-Glaeser-Sacerdote, « Why doesn’t the US have a European style Welfare », BPEA 2001; Alesina-Glaeser, Fighting Poverty in the US and Europe: a word of difference, OUP 2004 (see also EcoPub slides)

Main explanation: less demand for redistribution because more racial prejudice in the US (also: stronger US beliefs in effort and mobility, but difficult to separate from racial prejudice); negative cross-country correlation between racial fractionalisation and social transfers
Beyond left and right: the dimensions of political conflict

• On-going comparative research program using post-electoral surveys:

• More countries are currently being studied

• Unfortunately, there exists no post-electoral survey before the 1940s-1950s. In order to study longer time periods, one needs to use other data sources: local-level election results matched with local-level census & fiscal data.
• « Standard » view of the left-right party system:
  - political conflict is about redistribution between social classes
  - lower socioeconomic groups vote for the left, higher groups vote for the right
• Pb: this « standard » view may apply to certain societies and historical periods (e.g. 1950-1980 in Western electoral democracies), but it is certainly not universal.
• First, the different dimensions of socioeconomic cleavages (education, income, wealth, etc.) may not always be aligned. E.g. they were aligned in 1950-1980, but in 1990-2020 we observe the rise of a « multiple elites » system: educational elite now votes for the left, while wealth elite keeps voting for the right (though less and less so) (Brahmin Left vs Merchant Right)
• Next, other dimensions of social cleavages, in particular in relation to ethnic or religious identity and foreign origins, can play a central role, in a way that can vary a lot across societies and over time.
Social cleavages & political conflict in France 1955-2020

- Difference between % vote for left parties among the top 10% education voters and the bottom 90% education voters (after controls)
- Difference between % vote for left parties among the top 10% income voters and the bottom 90% income voters (after controls)
- Difference between % vote for left parties among the top 10% wealth voters and the bottom 90% wealth voters (after controls)

Interpretation. In the 1950-1970 period, the vote for left-wing parties (socialists-communists-radicals-greens) was associated to voters with the lowest education degrees and the lowest levels of income and wealth; in the 1990-2010 period, it became associated to the voters with the highest education degrees. Note: fine lines indicate 90% confidence intervals. Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 14.1).
The transformation of the electoral left in Western democracies: from the workers’ party to the party of the educated

• Key transformation over the 1950-2020 period: a complete reversal of the education cleavage.

• I.e. in 1950-1970 period, the less educated voters vote more for the « left » than the more educated. In the 1990-2020 period, it is the opposite.

• Very gradual change happening in all Western electoral democracies over the 1950-2020 period (US, UK, France, Germany, Sweden, Italy, etc.), in spite of the many historical differences in party systems

• At the same time, one observes in recent decades a fall in electoral participation among lower socioeconomic groups
Electoral left in Europe and the U.S. 1945-2020: from the workers' party to the party of the highly educated

- **U.S.:** difference between % vote democrat among the top 10% education voters and the bottom 90% education voters (after controls)
- **France:** same difference with the vote for left parties
- **Britain:** same difference with the vote for Labour party

**Interpretation:** In the 1950-1970 period, the vote for the Democrats in the US., left-wing parties (socialists-communists-radicals-greens) in France and the Labour party in Britain was associated to voters with the lowest education; in the 1990-2010 period, it became associated to the voters with the highest education degrees. **Sources and series:** see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 14.2).
The reversal of the education cleavage, 1950-2020: U.S., France, Britain, Germany, Sweden, Norway

Interpretation: During the 1950-1970 period, the vote for the democratic party in the U.S. and for the various left-wing parties in Europe (labour, social-democrats, socialists, communists, greens, etc.) was stronger among the voters with the lowest education levels; in the period 2000-2020, it has become associated with the voters with the highest diplomas. The trend happens later in Nordic Europe, but follows the same direction. Note: "1950-59" includes elections conducted between 1950 and 1959, etc. Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 16.1).
Political cleavage and education, 1960-2020:
Italy, Holland, Switzerland, Canada, Australia, New-Zealand

Interpretation: During the 1960-1980 period, the vote for left-wing parties (labour, social-democrats, socialists, communists, radicals, greens, etc.) was associated to the voters with the lowest education levels; in the period 2000-2020, it has become associated to those with the highest diplomas. This general evolution happened in the U.S. and in Europe, as well as in Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Note: "1960-69" includes elections conducted between 1960 and 1969, "1970-79" those conducted from 1970 to 1979, etc. Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 16.2).
The evolution of voter turnout 1945-2020

Interpretation. Voter turnout has been relatively stable around 80%-85% in French presidential elections since 1965 (with however a small fall to 75% in 2017). The fall has been much stronger in legislative elections, which was around 80% until the 1970s, and was less than 50% in 2017. Electoral participation dropped in Britain before rising again since 2010. In the U.S., it has generally fluctuated around 50%-60%. Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 14.7).
Voter turnout & social cleavages 1945-2020

Interpretation. During the 1950-1980 period, electoral participation in France and Britain was at most 2%-3% higher among the 50% highest income voters than among the 50% lowest income voters. This gap rose significantly since the 1980s and reached 10%-12% in the 2010s, thereby approaching the levels historically observed in the U.S. Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 14.8).
• Why did lower socioeconomic groups stop voting for the « left »?

• US-centered explanation: « poor white flight » away from the Democrats following the Civil Rights movement. I.e. the poor racists abandoned the left.

• Problem with this explanation: the same gradual evolution happened in Europe, even though there was no Civil Rights movement in the 1960s

• Potentially more convincing: « left » parties gradually changed their policy platform & abandoned lower socioeconomic groups. Or, to put it in a more positive way, they were unable to adjust their platform to economic changes.

• Large and persistent inequalities in access to education. With the rise of higher education, left parties became the party of the highly educated. Possible explanation: it was easier to design an egalitarian education platform at the time of primary & secondary education than with higher education.

• Decline in tax progressivity and redistribution since 1980s-1990s: tax competition, lack of international coordination and financial transparency.

• Rise of post-colonial identity-based conflict & xenophobic right in Europe & US since 1980s-1990s reinforced the evolution but was not the primary factor.
The reversal of the education cleavage: the case of France

- Very robust finding
- True both for presidential and legislative elections
- True all along the primary-secondary-higher education hierarchy
- True before and after controls for other variables: age, gender, income, wealth, etc.
Interpretation. The scores obtained during the second rounds left-right of French presidential elections reported here are the following: 1965 (De Gaulle 55%, Mitterrand 45%), 1974 (Giscard 51%, Mitterrand 49%), 1981 (Mitterrand 52%, Giscard 48%), 1988 (Mitterrand 54%, Chirac 46%), 1995 (Chirac 53%, Jospin 47%), 2007 (Sarkozy 53%, Royal 47%), 2012 (Hollande 52%, Sarkozy 48%). Other second rounds (opposing the right, the center and the extreme-right) were not reported here: 1969 (Pompidou 58%, Poher 42%), 2002 (Chirac 82%, Le Pen 18%), 2017 (Macron 66%, Le Pen 34%). Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 14.6).
Legislative elections in France, 1945-2017

Interpretation: The scores obtained by left-wing parties (all parties from the center-left, left and extreme-left) and right-wing parties (all parties from center-right, right and extreme-right combined) have oscillated between 40% and 58% of the votes in the first rounds of legislative elections conducted in France over the 1945-2017 period. Note: the score obtained by the LREM-MODEM coalition in 2017 (52% of votes) was divided 50-50 between center-left and center-right (see figures 14.4-14.5). Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 14.3)
The electoral left in France 1945-2017

Interpretation. The score obtained by left-wing parties (socialistes, communistes, radicals, greens and other parties from the center-left, left and extreme-left) has oscillated between 40% and 57% of the votes in the first rounds of legislative elections conducted in France over the 1945-2017 period. Note: the score obtained by the LREM-MODEM coalition in 2017 (32% of votes) was divided 50-50 between center-left and center-right.

Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 14.4).
Interpretation. The score obtained by right-wing parties (all parties from the center-right, right and extreme-right combined) varied between 40% and 58% of the votes in the first rounds of legislative elections conducted in France over the 1945-2017 period. Note: the score obtained by the LREM-MODEM coalition in 2017 (32% of votes) was divided 50-50 between center-left and center-right. Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 14.5).
Left vote vote by level of education, France 1956-2012

Interpretation. In the 1956 legislative elections, 57% of voters with a primary education or less (certificat d'études primaires) (i.e. 72% of the electorate at the time) voted for left-wing parties (socialists-communists-radicals), vs. 50% of voters with secondary diplomas (23% of the electorate) and 37% of voters with higher education diplomas (5% of the electorate). In the 2012 presidential elections, the education cleavage was totally reversed: the left-wing candidate obtained 55% of the vote in the second round among voters with higher education diplomas, vs 47% of the vote among voters with primary education only. Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 14.9).
The reversal of the education cleavage, France 1956-2017

Interpretation. During the 1950s and 1960s, the vote for left-wing parties (socialists-communists-radicals-greens) was highest among voters with no degree (except primary education degrees), then fell among secondary and higher education degree holders. In the 2000s and 2010s, the pattern is completely reversed. Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 14.10).
The left and education in France 1955-2020

- Difference in the % vote for left-wing parties among higher education graduates and non-higher education graduates
- After controls for age, sexe, family situation
- After controls for age, sex, family situation, income, wealth

**Interpretation.** In 1956, left-wing parties (socialists-communists-radicals) obtained a score that was 17 points lower among higher education graduates than among non-higher education graduates; in 2012, this score was 6 points higher among higher education graduates. Controlling for other variables does not affect the trend (only the level). **Sources and series:** see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 14.11).
Changing political cleavages about property and identity: France, US, Britain, India, Brasil

• Unlike high education groups (which have turned to the left), high wealth groups have kept voting for the right (though less and less so). High income groups are between the two: human capital and financial capital have opposite effects and are not fully correlated.

• New cleavages based upon ethnic-religious identity and foreign origins have started to play a more important role since the 1980s-1990s
Political conflict and income, France 1958-2012

Interpretation. In 1978, left-wing parties (socialists-communists-radicals-greens) obtained 46% of the vote among bottom 10% income voters, 38% among top 10% income voters and 17% among top 1% income voters. Generally speaking, the left vote profile is relatively flat among the bottom 90% income voters, and strongly decreasing among top 10% income voters, especially at the beginning of the period. Note: D1 refers to the 10% lowest incomes, D2 to the next 10%,..., and D10 to the 10% highest incomes. Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 14.12).
Political conflict and property, France 1974-2012

Interpretation. In 1978, left-wing parties (socialists-communists-radicals-greens) obtained 69% of the vote among bottom 10% wealth voters, 23% among top 10% wealth voters and 13% among top 1% wealth voters. Generally speaking, the left vote profile with respect to wealth is sharply declining (much more strongly than with respect to income), especially at the beginning of the period. Note. D1 refers to the 10% lowest wealth holders, D2 to the next 10%, . . . , and D10 to the 10% highest wealth holders. Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology. (figure 14.13)
Social cleavages & political conflict in France 1955-2020

**Interpretation.** In the 1950-1970 period, the vote for left-wing parties (socialists-communists-radicals-greens) was associated to voters with the lowest education degrees and the lowest levels of income and wealth; in the 1990-2010 period, it became associated to the voters with the highest education degrees. **Note:** fine lines indicate 90% confidence intervals. **Sources and series:** see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 14.1).
Interpretation. In 2012, the socialist candidate received 49% of the vote among voters with no foreign origin (no foreign grand-parent), 49% of the vote among voters with European foreign origin (in practice mostly Spain, Italy, Portugal) and 77% of the vote among voters with extra-European foreign origins (in practice mostly North Africa and Subsaharan Africa). Sources and series. see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 14.18).
The religious structure of the electorate, France 1967-2017

Interpretation: Between 1967 and 2017, the proportion of the electorate reporting to be practicing Catholic (going to the church at least once per month) dropped from 25% to 6%. Non-practicing Catholics dropped from 66% to 49%. Those reporting no religion increased from 8% to 36%. Other religions (protestantism, Judaism, Buddhism, etc., except Islam) increased from 3% to 4%, and Muslims increased from less than 1% to about 5% of the electorate. Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 14.14).
Political conflict and catholicism: France 1967-2017

% vote for left-wing parties as a function of reported religion

- Practicing catholics
- Non practicing catholics
- No religion

Interpretation. Self-reported practicing and non-practicing catholic voters have always voted less strongly for left-wing parties than voters reporting no religion, but the gap has reduced over time. Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 14.15).

**Interpretation.** Self-reported Muslim voters vote significantly more for left-wing parties than voters with no religion beginning in 1997. Before 1988, Muslims were classified with other religions (protestantism, Judaism, Buddhism, Hinduism, etc.), and made less than 1% of the electorate. **Sources and series.** piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 14.16).
Political conflict & religious diversity: France 2002-2017

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Practicing Catholics</th>
<th>Non-practicing Catholics</th>
<th>Other Religion</th>
<th>No Religion</th>
<th>Muslims</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>29%</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>35%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Interpretation: About 80%-90% of self-reported Muslim voters vote for left-wing parties in all elections in France since the 1990s. Before 1988, Muslims were classified with other religions (protestantism, judaism, buddhisms, hinduism, etc.), and made less than 1% of the electorate. Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 14.17).
Borders and property: the four-way electorate in France

• The current political conflict in France can be summarized with two main dimensions: support or hostility to redistribution between rich and poor, and support or hostility to migrants.

• I.e. conflict about wealth vs conflict about borders.

• The striking point is that these two dimensions have little correlation in the distribution of voters preferences, so that in effect the electorate is divided between four quarters of comparable size.

• → very unstable situation (as exemplified by first round of presidential election 2017: very tight race between four candidates)

• Future evolution will depend on which of the two dimensions will appear to matter the most: if redistribution is considered to be impossible (e.g. due to tax competition), then the conflict will be mostly about borders
### Politico-ideological conflict in France 2017: an electorate divided into four quarters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Presidential election 2017 (1st round)</th>
<th>All voters</th>
<th>Melenchon/Hamon (vote &quot;egalitarian-internationalist&quot;)</th>
<th>Macron (vote &quot;inegalitarian-internationalist&quot;)</th>
<th>Fillon (vote &quot;inegalitarian-nativist&quot;)</th>
<th>Le Pen/Dupont-Aignan (vote &quot;egalitarian-nativist&quot;)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>26%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;There are too many migrants in France&quot; (% agree)</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;In order to achieve social justice, one should take to the rich and give to the poor&quot; (% agree)</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Higher education graduates (%)</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monthly income &gt; 4000€ (%)</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Home owners (%)</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>48%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>51%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Interpretation.** In 2017, 28% of first-round voters voted for Melenchon-Hamon; 32% of them considered that there are too many migrants in France (vs 56% on average among all voters) and 67% that we should take from the rich and give to the poor (vs 51% on average). In that sense this electorate is ideologically "egalitarian-internationalist", while the Macron electorate is "inegalitarian-internationalist" (pro-migrants, pro-rich), the Fillon electorate "inegalitarian-nativist" (anti-migrants, pro-rich) and the Le Pen/Dupont-Aignan electorate "egalitarian-nativist" (anti-migrants, pro-poor). Note: the votes for Arthaud/Poujou (2%) and Asselineau/Chehade/Lassale (2%) were added to Melenchon/Hamon and Fillon. Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (table 14.1).
Borders and property: the four-way ideological divide in France

Interpretation. In 2017, 21% of voters can be classified as "internationalists-egalitarians" (they consider that there are not too many migrants and that inequalities between the rich and the poor ought to be reduced); 26% as "nativists-inegalitarians" (they consider that there are too many migrants and that there is no need to reduce the inequalities between the rich and the poor); 23% as "internationalists-inegalitarians" (pro-migrants, pro-rich) and 30% as "nativists-egalitarians" (anti-migrants, pro-poor). Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 14.19).
Changing political cleavages in the United States

• Unlike France, US formally has a two-party system: Democrats vs Republicans (partly due to electoral system)

• But in practice each party is also divided by major conflicts about redistribution (some Dems are strongly pro-redistribution, some not) & migration/ethnicity (some Reps are strongly anti-minority, some not)

• In the end, the general evolution of the structure of political conflict in recent decades bears a lot of similarity with that of France, including the unstablity of the four-way electorate
Interpretation. The scores obtained by democratic and republican parties candidates in presidential elections conducted in the U.S. between 1948 and 2016 have generally varied between 40% and 60% of the vote (popular vote, all States combined). The scores obtained by other candidates have generally been relatively small (less than 10% of the vote), with the exception of Wallace in 1968 (14%) and Perot in 1992 and 1996 (20% and 10%). Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 15.1).
**Democratic vote by diploma in the U.S. 1948-2016**

- **Primary**: 63%, 45%, 19%, 9%, 9%
- **Secondary**: 31%, 44%, 58%, 59%, 59%
- **Higher education (BA)**: 5%, 9%, 16%, 19%, 11%
- **High (MA)**: 1%, 2%, 7%, 19%, 2%
- **High (PhD)**: 1%, 7%, 2%, 2%

**Interpretation.** In 1948, the democratic candidate (Truman) obtained 62% of the vote among voters with primary education (no high school diploma) (63% of the electorate at the time) and 26% among voters with advanced higher education diplomas (1% of the electorate). In 2016, the democratic candidate (Clinton) obtained 45% of the vote among voters with secondary education (56% of the electorate) and 75% among those holding a PhD (2% of the electorate). Like in France, we see a full reversal of the educational cleavage between 1948 and 2016. **Note:** BA: bachelor degree or equivalent. MA: master & other advanced degrees (law/medical school). PhD: doctorate. **Sources and series:** see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 15.2)
The Democratic vote and education: U.S. 1948-2016

- Blue line: Difference between % Democratic vote among college graduates and non-college graduates
- Red line: After controls for age, sex, family situation
- Green line: After controls for age, sex, family situation, income, wealth, race

Interpretation. In 1948, the democratic candidate obtained a score that was 20 points smaller among college graduates than among college graduates; in 2016, this score is 14 points higher among college graduates. Controlling for other variables ("other things equal") does not affect the trend (only the levels). Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 15.3).
Democratic vote in the U.S. 1948-2016: from the workers' party to the party of the highly educated

Interpretation: In 1948, the democratic candidate obtained a score that was 21 points smaller among the top 10% highest-education voters than among the remaining 90%; in 2016, this score is 23 points higher among the top 10% highest-education voters. Controlling for other variables ("other things equal") does not affect the trend (only the levels). Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 15.4).
Political conflict and income: U.S. 1948-2016

Interpretation: In 1964, the democratic candidate obtained 69% of the votes among the voters with the 10% lowest incomes, 37% of the vote among those with the top 10% highest incomes and 22% among top 1% income holders. Generally speaking, the profile of democratic vote is declining with respect to income, especially at the beginning of the period. In 2016, for the first time, the profile is reversed: 59% of the top income decile voters support the democratic candidate. Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 15.5).
Social cleavages and political conflict: U.S. 1948-2016

**Interpretation.** During the 1950-1970 period, the democratic vote was associated with voters with the lowest levels of education and the lowest levels of income and wealth. In the 1980-2010 period it became associated to the voters with the highest diplomas. In the 2010-2020 period, it is maybe close to become associated with the highest income and wealth voters. **Sources and series:** see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 15.6).
Political conflict and ethnic identity: U.S. 1948-2016

% vote democrat as a function of ethnic category

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Whites (Blacks, Latinos/others)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1972</td>
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<tr>
<td>1976</td>
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<tr>
<td>1980</td>
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<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>1996</td>
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<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2004</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Interpretation: In 2016, the democratic candidate obtained 37% of the vote among white voters (70% of the electorate), 89% of the vote among black voters (11% of the electorate) and 64% of the vote among Latinos and other non-whites (19% of the electorate, including 16% for Latinos). In 1972, the democratic candidate obtained 32% of the vote among whites (89% of the electorate), 82% among blacks (10% of the electorate) and 64% among Latinos and other categories (1% of the electorate). Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 15.7)
Political conflict and racial cleavage: U.S. 1948-2016

Interpretation. In 1948, the democratic vote was 11 points higher among black and other minority voters (9% of the electorate) than among white voters (91% of the electorate). In 2016, the democratic vote was 39 points higher among black and other minority voters (30% of the electorate) than among white voters (70% of the electorate). Taking into account control variables has a limited impact on this gap.

Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 15.8)
Political conflict and origins: France & the US

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>France 2012</th>
<th>Etats-Unis 2016</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No foreign origin (France); Whites (U.S.)</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European foreign origins (France); Latinos (U.S.)</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Extra-European foreign origins (France); Blacks (U.S.)</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Interpretation: In 2012, the socialist candidate in the second round of the French presidential election obtained 49% of the vote among voters with no foreign origin (no reported foreign grand-parent) and among voters with European foreign origins (in practice mostly Spain, Italy, Portugal) and 77% of the vote among voters with extra-European foreign origins (in practice mostly North Africa and Subsaharan Africa). In 2016, the democratic candidate at the U.S. presidential election obtained 37% of the vote among white voters, 64% among latinos and other minority voters and 89% among black voters. Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 15.9).
Changing political cleavages in the United Kingdom

• Despite the UK, US and French party systems, it is striking to see relatively similar evolutions in all three countries

• This expresses the fact that Western electoral democracies have gone through comparable challenges and limitations:
  large & persistent educational inequalities (higher education challenge);
  tax competition & globalization; post-communist hyper-capitalism;
  post-colonial

• But there are also UK specificities: shifts in Labour party leadership; rising role of the conflict over Brexit
Interpretation. In the 1945 legislative elections, the Labour party obtained 48% of the vote and the Conservatives 36% of the vote (hence a total of 84% of the vote for the two main parties). In the 2017 legislative elections, the Conservatives obtained 42% of the vote, and the Labour party 40% of the vote (hence a total of 82%). Note. Liberals/Lib-Dem: Liberals, Liberals-democrats, SDP Alliance. SNP: Scottish National Party. UKIP: UK Independence Party. Other parties include green and regionalist parties. Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 15.10).
Labour party and education, 1955-2017

Interpretation: In 1955, the Labour party obtained a score that was 26 points lower among college graduates than among non-college graduates; in 2017, the score of the Labour party was 6 points higher among college graduates. Taking into account control variables does not affect the trend (only the level). Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 15.11).
From the workers' party to the party of the highly educated: the Labour vote, 1955-2017

**Interpretation.** In 1955, the Labour party obtained a score that was 25 points lower among top 10% highest-education voters than among bottom 90% lowest-education voters; in 2017, the score of the Labour party was 13 points higher among top 10% education voters. Taking into account control variables does not affect the trend (only the level). **Sources and series:** see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 15.12).
The electoral left in Europe & the US, 1945-2020: from the workers' party to the party of the highly educated

Interpretation: During the 1960-1970 period, the vote for the democratic party in the U.S., left-wing parties in France (socialists-communists-radicals-greens) in France and the labour party in Britain was associated with the voters with the lowest educational diplomas; in the 1990-2010 period is became associated with the voters with the highest education diplomas. The British evolution is slightly lagging behind the French and U.S. evolutions but goes in the same direction. Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 15.13)
Political conflict and income: Britain 1955-2017

Interpretation: The profile of the vote for the Labour party as a function of income decile has generally been strongly decreasing, particularly at the level of the 10% highest incomes, and especially from the 1950s to the 1980s. Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 15.14).
Social cleavages & political conflict: Britain 1955-2017

Interpretation: The labour vote was associated during the 1950-1980 period to the voters with the highest diplomas and levels of income and wealth; since the 1990s, it became associated to the highest education degrees. Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 15.15).
Interpretation. During the 1950-1970 period, the democratic vote was associated to voters with the lowest levels of education and the lowest levels of income and wealth. In the 1980-2010 period it became associated to the voters with the highest diplomas. In the 2010-2020 period, it is maybe close to become associated with the highest income and wealth voters. Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 15.6).
Political conflict & religious diversity: Britain 1964-2017

Interpretation: In 2017, the Labour party obtained 39% of the vote among self-reported Christian voters (anglicans, other protestants, catholics), 56% among voters reporting other religions (Judaism, Hinduism, etc., except Islam), 54% among voters with no religion and 96% among self-reported Muslim voters. Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 15.16).
## Political conflict & ethnic categories, Britain 1979-2017

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Whites</th>
<th>Africans-Caribbeans</th>
<th>Indians-Pakistanis</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>98%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>96%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>94%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>3%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Interpretation.** In 2017, the Labour party obtained 44% of the vote among voters describing themselves as "Whites", 81% among "Africans-Caribbeans", 82% among "Indians-Pakistanis-Bengaladeshis" and 63% among "others" ("Chinese", "Arabs", etc.). In 2017, 5% of the electorate refused to answer the ethnic question, and 77% among them voted Labour. *Sources and series:* see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 15.17).
The cleavage about Europe and globalization

• In the UK, but also in France and in most European countries, the conflict about European integration has played a more & more important role in recent decades

• Referendum about Europe in UK 2016 and in France 1992 & 2005: in all cases, only top socioeconomic deciles support European Union

• Conflict about EU cuts across « standard » left-right lines because it is a transnational conflict that is both about redistribution between rich and poor (EU and the free mobility of capital and goods and services are perceived to favour the most mobile and wealthiest economic actors) and about borders, identity and migration (EU membership implies free labor mobility)

• Without some fundamental changes to EU functionning and some form of « social-federalism » (common social policies to reduce inequalities: tax justice, education, wages, environment, etc.), it is difficult to see why this will change
The European cleavage in Britain: the Brexit referendum in 2016

Interpretation. In the 2016 referendum over Brexit (victory of Leave with 52%), one observes a very strong social cleavage of the vote: the top deciles of income, education and wealth vote strongly for Remain, while bottom deciles vote for Leave.

Note: D1 refers to the bottom 10% (either for income, education or wealth), D2 for the next 10%, etc., and D10 for the top 10%.

Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 15.18).
The European cleavage in France: the referenda of 1992 and 2005

% vote for the YES in the referenda of 1992 and 2005 as a function of income, education and wealth decile

Interpretation. In the 1992 referendum over the Maastricht treaty ("yes" won with 51%) as well as in the 2005 referendum on the European constitutional treaty ("yes" lost with 45%), one observes a very strong social cleavage: top deciles of income, educational degrees and wealth vote strongly for the "yes", while bottom deciles vote for the "no". Note. D1 represents the bottom 10% (for the distribution of income, education or wealth), D2 the next 10%,..., and D10 the top 10%. Sources and series. see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 14.20)
Changing political cleavages and class conflict in India

• It is critical to look at the political economy of redistribution in electoral democracies outside the West

• First, the breakdown of the left-right class-based party system observed in the West between 1950-1980 and 1990-2020 may not hold in other parts of the world. E.g. in India or Brasil, one observes a move toward a more class-based party system since the 1980s-1990s (to some extent, and despite adverse international trends making redistributive policies hard to conduct). I.e. different political strategies and coalitions can make difference.

• Next, the structure of class-based vs identity-based conflict can take various forms and ought to be analyzed in a comparative spirit. E.g. anti-Muslim cleavages play a key role in India and are in a way closer to the European identity-based conflicts than to the US racial divide.
India’s party system. INC (Congress) was the independance party and used to be the dominant catch-all party.

Beginning in the 1980s-1990s, the BJP (nationalist Hindu party) built its strategy against the Muslim minority and against the extension of the quota system from SC-ST (Scheduled Castes, Schedules Tribes) to OBC (other backward classes, including Muslims)

As a consequence, BJP has developed as an upper-caste, upper-class party, while Congress and left parties (socialist or low-caste parties like BSP) attract both the votes of the poor Muslims & the poor Hindus ≠ Western democracies, where poor minority & poor majority voters generally do not vote for the same parties

This illustrates the role of institutions & ideology to build coalitions

Interpretation: In the 2014 legislative elections, the Congress party (INC, Indian National Congress) and its allied parties (center) obtained 34% of the vote (including 19% for INC alone), the BJP (Hindus nationalists) and its allied parties (right) 37% of the vote, the left and center-left parties (SP, BSP, CPI, etc.) 16% of the vote and other parties 13% of the vote. Note: in the 1977 elections (post-emergency), the Janata Dal included all opponents to INC (from left and right), and it classified here with "other parties". Sources and series: see Piketty pse ens frideology (figure 16.7).
BJP vote by caste and religion: India 1962-2014

**Interpretation:** In 2014, 10% of Muslim voters voted for the BJP (Hindus nationalists) and allied parties, vs 31% among SC/ST (scheduled castes/scheduled tribes, lower castes), 42% among OBC (other backward classes, intermediate castes), 49% among other FC (forward castes, upper castes except Brahmins) and 61% among Brahmins. *Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 16.8).*
Congress vote by caste and religion: India 1962-2014

Interpretation. In 2014, 45% of Muslim voters voted for the Congress (Indian National Congress) and allied parties, vs 38% among SC/ST (scheduled castes/scheduled tribes, lower castes), 34% among OBC (other backward classes, intermediate castes), 27% among other FC (forward castes, upper castes except brahmins) and 18% among brahmins. Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 16.9).
Left vote by caste and religion: India 1962-2014

Interpretation: In 2014, 23% of Muslim voters voted for the left and center-left parties (SP, BSP, CPI, etc.) vs 17% among SC/ST (scheduled castes/scheduled tribes, lower castes), 15% among OBC (other backward classes, intermediate castes), 11% among other FC (forward castes, upper castes except brahmins) and 12% among brahmins. Sources and series: piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 15.10)
BJP vote among upper castes, 1962-2014

Interpretation: During the 1962-2014 period, upper caste voters (FC, forward castes) have always voted more than others for the BJP (and allies), before and after taking into account control variables. The impact of caste (after taking into account other variables) appears to have become more important over time. Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 16.11).
Interpretation: During the 1962-2014 period, lower caste voters (SC/ST, scheduled castes/scheduled tribes) have always voted less than others for the BJP (and allies), before and after taking into account control variables. Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 16.12)
The BJP & the religious cleavage: India 1962-2014

**Interpretation.** During the 1962-2014 period, hindus voters (all castes combined: SC/ST, OBC and FC) have always voted more than muslim voters for the BJP (and allies), before and after taking into account control variables. The magnitude of the religious cleavage has strongly increased over time. **Sources and series:** see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 16.13).
BJP vote by caste, religion and State: India 1996-2016

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Municipality</th>
<th>Muslims</th>
<th>SC/ST (lower castes)</th>
<th>OBC</th>
<th>FC (upper castes)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bihar</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Gujarat</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Jharkhand</td>
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<tr>
<td>Maharashtra</td>
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<tr>
<td>Rajasthan</td>
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<tr>
<td>Uttar Pradesh</td>
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<tr>
<td>Uttarakhand</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Interpretation: In all Indian States, the BJP (and allies) always obtains a higher score among upper castes (FC, forward castes) than among OBC (other backward classes, intermediate castes), SC/ST (scheduled castes/schedules tribes, lower castes) and muslim voters. Note: the results reported here refer to the average regional elections conducted over the 1996-2016 period. Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 16.14).
• The case of Brasil is very different, but also illustrates a case of gradual policy-based development of a class-based conflict

• The first elections with universal suffrage took place in 1989 in Brasil (1890-1964: suffrage restricted to literate population; 1964-1985: military dictatorship)

• Many political parties, including PT (Workers Party), which initially attracted urban wage earners from manufacturing sector & intellectuals

• It is during PT’s experience in power in 2002-2014 that the PT electorate started to concentrate upon lower-income and lower-education voters (following redistributive policies: Bolsa Familia, minimum wage, etc.)

• Like India, Brasil’s experience also shows that it is difficult to develop a redistributive policy agenda in the current global ideological context, that is more favourable to identity-based conflict and nationalists
The politisation of inequality in Brasil, 1989-2018

- **Red line**: Difference between % vote PT among the top 10% highest education voters and bottom 90% lowest education voters (after controls)
- **Green line**: Difference between % vote PT among the top 10% income voters and the bottom 90% income voters (after controls)

**Interpretation**: During the 1989-2018 period, the vote in favour of PT (Workers Party) in Brasil has become more and more associated with voters with the lowest levels of income and degrees, which was not the case in the first elections conducted after the end of the military dictatorship. **Sources and series**: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 16.15).
More work is needed on these issues
If you do research in these areas, please keep me posted

Thanks a lot for your attention!