



Figure 1.1a. Left-wing vote by income decile in France, 1958-2012



Source: author's computations using French post-electoral surveys 1956-2017 (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict)
Reading: in 1978, left-wing parties (PS, PCF, Rad., etc.) obtain 46% of the vote among voters with bottom 10% income, 23% of the vote among top 10% income voters, and 17% among top 1%. Generally speaking, the profile of left-wing vote by income percentile is relatively flat within the bottom 90%, and strongly declining for the top 10%, especially at the beginning of the period.


Figure 1.1b. Left-wing vote by wealth decile in France, 1974-2012



Source: author's computations using French post-electoral surveys 1956-2017 (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict)


Reading: in 1978, left-wing parties (PS, PCF, Rad., etc.) obtain 69% of the vote among voters with bottom 10% wealth, 23% of the vote among voters with top 10% wealth, and 13% among top 1% wealth holders. Generally speaking, the profile of left-wing vote by wealth percentile is strongly declining, all along the distribution, especially at the beginning of the period.

**Figure 1.2a. Left-wing vote in France, 1956-2017:
from the worker party to the high-education party**



Source: author's computations using French post-electoral surveys 1956-2017 (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict)
Reading: in 1956, left-wing parties (SFIO-PS, PCF, Rad., various left, green, extreme-left) obtain a score that is 17 points lower among university graduates than among non-university graduates; in 2012, their score is 8 points higher among graduates.


Figure 1.2b. Voting for left-wing & democratic parties in France and the US, 1948-2017: from the worker party to the high-education party



Source: author's computations using French and US post-electoral surveys 1948-2017 (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict)


Reading: in 1956, left-wing parties (SFIO-PS, PC, Rad., green, extr.-left) obtain a score that is 14 points lower among university graduates than among non-university graduates in France; in 2012, their score is 13 points higher among university graduates (after controls for age, sex, income, wealth, father's occupation). The evolution is similar for the democratic vote in the US.

**Figure 1.2c. Voting for left-wing & democratic parties in France, Britain, US
1948-2017: from the worker party to the high-education party**




Source: author's computations using French, US and British post-electoral surveys 1948-2017 (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict)
Reading: in 1956, left-wing parties (SFIO-PS, PC, Rad., etc.) obtain a score that is 14 points lower among university graduates than among non-university graduates in France; in 2012, their score is 13 points higher among university graduates (after controls for age, sex, income, wealth, father's occupation). The evolution is similar for democratic vote in the US and labour vote in Britain.

**Figure 1.2d. Voting for left-wing & democratic parties in France, Britain, US
1948-2017: from the worker party to the high-education party**




Source: author's computations using French, US and British post-electoral surveys 1948-2017 (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict)
Reading: in 1956, left parties (SFIO-PS, PC, Rad., etc.) obtain a score that is 14 points lower among top 10% education voters than among bottom 90% education voters in France; in 2012, their score is 13 points higher among top 10% educ.voters (after controls for age, sex, income, wealth, father's occupation). The evolution is similar for democratic vote in the US and labour vote in Britain.

**Figure 1.2e. Political conflict in France, 1956-2017:
toward a multiple-elite party system, or a great reversal?**



Source: author's computations using French post-electoral surveys 1956-2017 (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict)
Reading: the left vote used to be associated with lower education and lower income voters; it has gradually become associated with higher education voters, giving rising to a "multiple-elite" party system (education vs wealth); it might also become associated with high-income voters in the future, giving rise to a great reversal or realignment of the party system.


**Figure 1.2f. Political conflict in France, 1956-2017:
toward a multiple-elite party system, or a great reversal?**



Source: author's computations using French post-electoral surveys 1956-2017 (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict)


Reading: the left vote used to be associated with lower education and lower income voters; it has gradually become associated with higher education voters, giving rising to a "multiple-elite" party system (education vs wealth); it might also become associated with high-income voters in the future, giving rise to a great reversal or realignment of the party system.

Figure 2.1a. Political conflict in France: presidential elections 1965-2012




Vote shares in presidential second rounds opposing left and right: 1965 (De Gaulle 55%, Mitterrand 45%), 1974 (Giscard 51%, Mitterrand 49%), 1981 (Mitterrand 52%, Giscard 48%), 1988 (Mitterrand 54%, Chirac 46%), 1995 (Chirac 53%, Jospin 47%), 2007 (Sarkozy 53%, Royal 47%), 2012 (Hollande 52%, Sarkozy 48%). Other second rounds (opposing right, extreme-right and center) were not represented here: 1969 (Pompidou 58%, Poher 42%), 2002 (Chirac 82%, Le Pen 18%), 2017 (Macron 66%, Le Pen 34%). Source: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict.

Figure 2.1b. Political conflict in France: legislative elections 1946-2017




Vote shares in legislative elections 1956-2017 (1st round). The vote share obtained in 2017 by centrist LRM-Modem alliance (32%) was split 50-50 between center-right and center-left. Source: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict.

Figure 2.1c. Political conflict in France: legislative elections 1946-2017




Vote shares in legislative elections 1956-2017 (1st round), excluding other parties (regionalists, etc.). The vote share obtained in 2017 by centrist LRM-Modem alliance (32%) was split 50-50 between center-right and center-left.
 Source: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict.

Figure 2.1d. Left-wing vote in France: legislative elections 1946-2017




Vote shares in legislative elections 1956-2017 (1st round). The vote share obtained in 2017 by centrist LRM-Modem alliance (32%) was split 50-50 between center-right and center-left. Source: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict.

Figure 2.1.e. Right-wing vote in France: legislative elections 1946-2017



Vote shares in legislative elections 1956-2017 (1st round). The vote share obtained in 2017 by centrist LRM-Modem alliance (32%) was split 50-50 between center-right and center-left. Source: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict.


**Figure 2.2a. The structure of voting by gender in France, 1956-2017:
right-wing female vote until the 1980s**



Source: author's computations using French post-electoral surveys 1956-2017 (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict)


Reading: in 1956, left-wing parties (SFIO-PS, PCF, Rad., various left, greens, extreme left) obtain a score that is 15 points lower among women than among men; in 2012, their score is 2 point higher among men.

**Figure 2.2.b. The structure of voting by gender in France, 1956-2017:
right-wing female vote until the 1980s**



Source: author's computations using French post-electoral surveys 1956-2017 (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict)
Reading: in 1956, left-wing parties (SFIO-PS, PCF, Rad., various left, greens, extreme left) obtain a score that is 15 points lower among women than among men; in 2012, their score is 2 point higher among men.


**Figure 2.2c. The structure of voting by gender in France, 1956-2017:
right-wing female vote until the 1980s**



Source: author's computations using French post-electoral surveys 1956-2017 (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict)

Reading: in 1956, left-wing parties (SFIO-PS, PCF, Rad., various left, greens, extreme left) obtain a score that is 15 points lower among women than among men; in 2012, their score is 2 point higher among men.


**Figure 2.2d. The structure of voting by age in France, 1956-2017:
youth vote leans to left, but in a volatile manner**



Source: author's computations using French post-electoral surveys 1956-2017 (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict)

Reading: in 1956, left-wing parties (SFIO-PS, PCF, Rad., etc.) obtain a score that is 12 point shigher among the 18-34-year-old than among the 65-year-old-and over; in 2012, their score is 10 points higher among the 18-34-year-old.


**Figure 2.2e. The structure of voting by age in France, 1956-2017:
youth vote leans to left, but in a volatile manner**



Source: author's computations using French post-electoral surveys 1956-2017 (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict)

Reading: in 1956, left-wing parties (SFIO-PS, PCF, Rad., etc.) obtain a score that is 11 point shiger among the 18-34-year-old than among the 65-year-old-and over; in 2012, their score is 10 points higher among the 18-34-year-old.


**Figure 2.2f. The structure of voting by age in France, 1956-2017:
youth vote leans to left, but in a volatile manner**



Source: author's computations using French post-electoral surveys 1956-2017 (presidential and legislative elections)

Reading: in 1956, left-wing parties (SFIO-PS, PCF, Rad., various left, greens, extreme-left) obtain a score that is 12 point higher among the 18-to-34-year-old than among the 65+; in 2012, their score is 10 points higher among the 18-to-34-year-old.


**Figure 2.2g. The structure of voting by age in France, 1956-2017:
youth vote leans to left, but in a volatile manner**



Source: author's computations using French post-electoral surveys 1956-2017 (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict)


Reading: in 1956, left-wing parties (SFIO-PS, PCF, Rad., etc.) obtain a score that is 12 point shiger among the 18-34-year-old than among the 65-year-old-and over; in 2012, their score is 10 points higher among the 18-34-year-old.

**Figure 2.3a. Left-wing vote in France, 1956-2017:
from the worker party to the high-education party**



Source: author's computations using French post-electoral surveys 1956-2017 (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict)
Reading: in 1956, left-wing parties (SFIO-PS, PCF, Rad., various left, green, extreme-left) obtain a score that is 17 points lower among university graduates than among non-university graduates; in 2012, their score is 8 points higher among graduates.


Figure 2.3b. Left vote by education in France: election by election



Source: author's computations using French post-electoral surveys 1956-2017 (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict)

Reading: in 1956, left parties (SFIO-PS, PCF, Rad., etc.) obtain 57% of the vote among voters with no degree (other than primary), 54% among voters with secondary degrees (Bac, Brevet, Bep, etc.) and 37% among university graduates (higher education). In 2012, the left candidate (Hollande) obtains 47% of the vote among voters with no degree and 57% among university graduates.


Figure 2.3c. Left vote by education in France: election par election



Source: author's computations using French post-electoral surveys 1956-2017 (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict)

Reading: in 1956, left parties (SFIO-PS, PCF, Rad., etc.) obtain 57% of the vote among voters with no degree (other than primary), 54% among voters with secondary degrees (Bac, Brevet, Bep, etc.) and 37% among university graduates (higher education).


Figure 2.3d. Left vote by education in France: election par election



Source: author's computations using French post-electoral surveys 1956-2017 (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict)

Reading: in 2012, the left candidate (Hollande) obtains 47% of the vote among voters with no degree (other than primary), 50% among voters with secondary degrees (Bac, Brevet, Bep, etc.) and 57% among university graduates (higher education).


Figure 2.3e. Left vote by education in France: election par election



Source: author's computations using French post-electoral surveys 1956-2017 (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict)

Reading: in 1956, left parties (SFIO-PS, PCF, Rad., etc.) obtain 57% of the vote among voters with no degree (other than primary), 54% among voters with secondary degrees (Bac, Brevet, Bep, etc.) and 37% among university graduates (higher education).

Fig. 2.3f. Left vote by education in France: short vs long higher education




Source: author's computations using French post-electoral surveys 1956-2017 (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict)

Reading: in 2012, the left candidate (Hollande) obtains 47% of the vote among voters with no degree (except primary), 50% among voters with secondary degrees, 53% among voters with short higher education and 59% among voters with long higher education.


Note: 1973-1978, short high. = university, long high.= grande école. 1986-2012: short high. = bac+2, long high. = bac+3 or more.

**Figure 2.3g. Left-wing vote in France, 1956-2017:
from the worker party to the high-education party**




Source: author's computations using French post-electoral surveys 1956-2017 (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict).
Reading: in 1956, left parties (SFIO-PS, PCF, Rad., etc.) obtain a score that is 17 points lower among univ. graduates than among non-univ. graduates; in 2012, their score is 8 points higher among graduates. Fine lines indicate confidence intervals (90% level).

**Figure 2.3h. Left-wing vote in France, 1956-2017:
from the worker party to the high-education party**




Source: author's computations using French post-electoral surveys 1956-2017 (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict).
Reading: in 1956, left parties obtain a score that is 17 point lower among univ. graduates than among non-univ. graduates; in 2012, their score is 8 points higher among university graduates. Including control variables does not affect the trend (only the level).

**Figure 2.3i. Left-wing vote in France, 1956-2017:
from the worker party to the high-education party**




Source: author's computations using French post-electoral surveys 1956-2017 (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict).
Reading: in 1956, left parties obtain a score that is 17 point lower among univ. graduates than among non-univ. graduates; in 2012, their score is 8 points higher among university graduates. Including control variables does not affect the trend (only the level).

**Figure 2.3j. Left-wing vote in France, 1956-2017:
from the worker party to the high-education party**




Source: author's computations using French post-electoral surveys 1956-2017 (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict).
Reading: in 1956, left parties obtain a score that is 17 point lower among univ. graduates than among non-univ. graduates; in 2012, their score is 8 points higher among university graduates. Including control variables does not affect the trend (only the level).

**Figure 2.3k. Left-wing vote in France, 1956-2017:
from the worker party to the high-education party**




Source: author's computations using French post-electoral surveys 1956-2017 (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict).
Reading: in 1956, left parties obtain a score that is 14 point lower among top 10% education voters; in 2012, their score is 9 points higher among top 10% education voters. Including control variables does not affect the trend (only the level).

**Figure 2.3I. Left-wing vote in France, 1986-2017:
from the worker party to the high-education party**




Source: author's computations using French post-electoral surveys 1956-2017 (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict).
Reading: in 1956, left parties obtain a score that is 17 point lower among univ. graduates than among non-univ. graduates; in 2012, their score is 8 points higher among university graduates. Including control variables does not affect the trend (only the level).

Figure 2.4a. Left-wing vote by income decile in France, 1958-2012



Source: author's computations using French post-electoral surveys 1956-2017 (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict)
Reading: in 1978, left-wing parties (PS, PCF, Rad., etc.) obtain 46% of the vote among voters with bottom 10% income, 23% of the vote among top 10% income voters, and 17% among top 1%. Generally speaking, the profile of left-wing vote by income percentile is relatively flat within the bottom 90%, and strongly declining for the top 10%, especially at the beginning of the period.


Figure 2.4b. Left-wing vote by wealth decile in France, 1974-2012



Source: author's computations using French post-electoral surveys 1956-2017 (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict)


Reading: in 1978, left-wing parties (PS, PCF, Rad., etc.) obtain 69% of the vote among voters with bottom 10% wealth, 23% of the vote among voters with top 10% wealth, and 13% among top 1% wealth holders. Generally speaking, the profile of left-wing vote by wealth percentile is strongly declining, all along the distribution, especially at the beginning of the period.

Figure 2.4c. High-income vote in France: before and after controls



Source: author's computations using post-electoral surveys 1956-2017 (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict)
Reading: top 10% income voters always vote less for the left than bottom 90% income voters, before and after controls (except in 2017, where I use dashed lines, due to the difficulty to classify centrist votes).


Figure 2.4d. High-wealth vote in France: before and after controls



Source: author's computations using post-electoral surveys 1956-2017 (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict)

Reading: top 10% wealth voters always vote much less for the left than bottom 90% wealth voters, before and after controls (I use dashed lines in 2017, due to the difficulty to classify centrist votes).


**Figure 2.5a. Political conflict in France, 1956-2017:
toward a multiple-elite party system, or a great reversal?**



Source: author's computations using French post-electoral surveys 1956-2017 (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict)


Reading: the left vote used to be associated with lower education and lower income voters; it has gradually become associated with higher education voters, giving rising to a "multiple-elite" party system (education vs wealth); it might also become associated with high-income voters in the future, giving rise to a great reversal or realignment of the party system.

**Figure 2.5b. Political conflict in France, 1956-2017:
toward a multiple-elite party system, or a great reversal?**




Source: author's computations using French post-electoral surveys 1956-2017 (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict)
Reading: the left vote used to be associated with lower education and lower income voters; it has gradually become associated with higher education voters, giving rise to a "multiple-elite" party system (education vs wealth); it might also become associated with high-income voters in the future, giving rise to a great reversal or realignment of the party system.

**Figure 2.5c. Political conflict in France, 1956-2017:
toward a multiple-elite party system, or a great reversal?**



Source: author's computations using French post-electoral surveys 1956-2017 (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict)
Reading: the left vote used to be associated with lower education and lower income voters; it has gradually become associated with higher education voters, giving rising to a "multiple-elite" party system (education vs wealth); it might also become associated with high-income voters in the future, giving rise to a great reversal or realignment of the party system.


**Figure 2.5d. Political conflict in France, 1956-2017:
toward a multiple-elite party system, or a great reversal?**



Source: author's computations using French post-electoral surveys 1956-2017 (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict)


Reading: the left vote used to be associated with lower education and lower income voters; it has gradually become associated with higher education voters, giving rising to a "multiple-elite" party system (education vs wealth); it might also become associated with high-income voters in the future, giving rise to a great reversal or realignment of the party system.

**Figure 2.5e. Political conflict in France, 1956-2017:
toward a multiple-elite party system, or a great reversal?**




Source: author's computations using French post-electoral surveys 1956-2017 (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict)
Reading: the left vote used to be associated with lower education and lower income voters; it has gradually become associated with higher education voters, giving rising to a "multiple-elite" party system (education vs wealth); it might also become associated with high-income voters in the future, giving rise to a great reversal or realignment of the party system.

**Figure 2.5f. Political conflict in France, 1956-2017:
toward a multiple-elite party system, or a great reversal?**




Source: author's computations using French post-electoral surveys 1956-2017 (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict)
Reading: the left vote used to be associated with lower education and lower income voters; it has gradually become associated with higher education voters, giving rising to a "multiple-elite" party system. Fine lines indicate 90% confidence intervals.

**Figure 2.5g. Political conflict in France, 1956-2017:
toward a multiple-elite party system, or a great reversal?**



Source: author's computations using French post-electoral surveys 1956-2017 (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict)
Reading: the left vote used to be associated with lower education and lower income voters; it has gradually become associated with higher education voters, giving rise to a "multiple-elite" party system (education vs wealth); it might also become associated with high-income voters in the future, giving rise to a great reversal or realignment of the party system.


**Figure 2.5h. Political conflict in France, 1956-2017:
toward a multiple-elite party system, or a great reversal?**



Source: author's computations using French post-electoral surveys 1956-2017 (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict)


Reading: the left vote used to be associated with lower education and lower income voters; it has gradually become associated with higher education voters, giving rising to a "multiple-elite" party system (education vs wealth); it might also become associated with high-income voters in the future, giving rise to a great reversal or realignment of the party system.

**Figure 2.5i. Political conflict in France, 1956-2017:
toward a multiple-elite party system, or a great reversal?**



Source: author's computations using French post-electoral surveys 1956-2017 (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict)
Reading: the left vote used to be associated with lower education and lower income voters; it has gradually become associated with higher education voters, giving rise to a "multiple-elite" party system (education vs wealth); it might also become associated with high-income voters in the future, giving rise to a great reversal or realignment of the party system.


**Figure 2.5j. Political conflict in France, 1956-2017:
toward a multiple-elite party system, or a great reversal?**



Source: author's computations using French post-electoral surveys 1956-2017 (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict)

Reading: the left vote used to be associated with lower education and lower income voters; it has gradually become associated with higher education voters, giving rising to a "multiple-elite" party system (education vs wealth); it might also become associated with high-income voters in the future, giving rise to a great reversal or realignment of the party system.


Figure 2.6a. The structure of the electorate by religion in France



Source: author's computations using French post-electoral surveys 1956-2017 (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict).

Reading: between 1967 and 2012, the fraction of the electorate reporting to be "practicing catholic" (church at least once a month) dropped from 25% to 6%, non-practicing-catholics dropped from 66% to 49%, no-religions rose from 6% to 35%, other-religions (protestantism, judaism, budhism, etc., except islam) rose from 3% to 5%, and the fraction reporting islam rose from 0% to 5%.


Figure 2.6b. Left-wing vote by religion in France 1973-2012



Source: author's computations using French post-electoral surveys 1956-2017 (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict)


Reading: in 2012, the left candidate (Hollande) obtains 38% of the vote among voters reporting to be practicing catholics (going to church at least once a month), 42% among non-practicing catholics, and 64% among voters reporting no religion.

**Figure 2.6c. Political conflict in France, 1956-2017:
a persistently strong cleavage between non-believers and catholics**




Source: author's computations using French post-electoral surveys 1956-2017 (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict)
Reading: we observe a strong and persistent political cleavage between non-believers (voters reporting no religion, voting left) and practicing catholics (voting right); fine lines indicate 90% confidence intervals.

**Figure 2.6d. Political conflict in France, 1956-2017:
a persistently strong cleavage between non-believers and catholics**



Source: author's computations using French post-electoral surveys 1956-2017 (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict)
Reading: we observe a strong and persistent political cleavage between non-believers (voters reporting no religion, voting left) and practicing catholics (voting right), before and after controls.


Figure 2.6e. Left-wing vote by religion in France : the case of Islam



Source: author's computations using French post-electoral surveys 1956-2017 (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict)

Reading: in 1995, left-wing parties (PS, PCF, Rad., etc.) obtain 19% of the vote among practicing catholics (at least once a month), 45% among non-practicing catholics, 50% among voters reporting another religion (protestantism, judaism, buddhism, etc., except islam), 73% among voters with no religion and 84% among muslims. Islam is classified with "other religion" in 1973-1978.


Figure 2.6f. Left-wing vote by religion in France: the case of Islam



Source: author's computations using French post-electoral surveys 1956-2017 (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict)


Reading: in 2012, the left-wing candidate (Hollande) obtains 38% of the vote among practicing catholics (at least once a month), 42% among non-practicing catholics, 52% among voters reporting another religion (protestantism, judaism, buddhism, etc., except islam), 64% among voters with no religion and 91% among muslims. Islam is classified with "other religion" in 1973-1978.

**Figure 2.6g. Political conflict in France, 1986-2012:
Muslim vote leans to the left**




Source: author's computations using French post-electoral surveys 1956-2017 (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict)
Reading: in 2012, the left candidate (Hollande) obtained a score among muslim voters that was 42 points higher than among other voters.

**Figure 2.6h. Political conflict in France, 1986-2012:
muslim vote leans to the left**



Source: author's computations using French post-electoral surveys 1956-2017 (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict)
Reading: in 2012, the left candidate (Hollande) obtained a score among muslim voters that was 42 points higher than among other voters; fine lines indicate 90% confidence intervals.


**Figure 2.6i. Political conflict in France, 1986-2012:
muslim vote leaning to the left**



Source: author's computations using French post-electoral surveys 1956-2017 (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict)

Reading: in 2012, the left candidate (Hollande) obtained a score among muslim voters that was 42 points higher than among other voters; the gap falls to 38 points after controls for age, sex, educ., income, wealth, father's occupation.


Figure 2.6j. Left-wing vote by national origin in France 2007-2012



Source: author's computation using French post-electoral surveys 1956-2017 (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict)

Reading: in 2012, the left-wing candidate (Hollande) obtained 49% of the vote among voters with no foreign origin (no foreign grand-parent), 49% of the vote among voters with European foreign origins (in practice mostly Spain, Italy, Portugal, etc.), and 77% of the vote among voters with extra-European foreign origins (in practice mostly Maghreb and sub-Saharan Africa).


Figure 2.6k. Decomposition of the Muslim vote in France 2007-2012



Source: author's computations using French post-electoral surveys 1956-2017 (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict)

Reading: in 2012, the left candidate (Hollande) obtained a score among muslim voters that was 42 points higher than among other voters; the gap falls to 38 points after controls for age, sex, educ., income, wealth, father's occup., and 26 pts if we add controls for foreign origins (broken down by area: Italy, Spain, Portugal, other Europe, North Africa, Subsaharan Africa, Asia, other non Europe).


Figure 2.6I. Political conflict and the migration cleavage in France



Source: author's computations using French post-electoral surveys 1956-2017 (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict)

Lecture: in 1986, 72% of voters consider that there are too many migrants in France (vs 28% believing the opposite); in 2017 this fraction is equam to 56% (vs 44% believing the opposite).


Figure 2.6m. Political conflict and the migration cleavage in France



Source: author's computations using French post-electoral surveys 1956-2017 (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict)


Reading: in 1988, left vote is 31 points higher among voters believing that there are not too many migrants than among those believing there are too many migrants; in 2012, this gap is equal to 40 points.

Figure 2.6n. Political conflict and the inequality cleavage in France



Source: author's computations using French post-electoral surveys 1956-2017 (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict)
Lecture: in 2002, 63% of voters consider that we should reduce inequality gap between rich and poor in France (vs 37% believing the opposite); in 2017 this fraction is equal to 52% (vs 48% believing the opposite).

Fig. 2.6o. Two-dimensional political conflict & the four-quarter electorate



Source: author's computations using French post-electoral surveys 2002-2017 (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict)


Lecture: in 2017, 21% of voters are "internationalists-egalitarians" (they consider that there are not too many migrants, and that we should reduce inequality between rich and poor); 26% are "nativists-inegalitarians" (they consider that there are too many migrants and that we should not reduce rich-poor gap); 23% are "internationalists-inegalitarians" & 30% "nativists-egalitarians".

Table 2.1. Two-dimensional political conflict in France 2017: an electorate divided into four quarters

Presidential election 2017 (1 st round)	All voters	Mélenchon /Hamon ("left")	Macron ("center")	Fillon ("right")	Le Pen /Dupont-Aignan ("extreme right")
	100%	28%	24%	22%	26%
"There are too many immigrants in France" (% agree)	56%	32%	39%	62%	91%
"In order to achieve social justice we need to take from the rich and give to the poor" (% agree)	51%	67%	46%	27%	61%
University graduates (%)	33%	39%	41%	36%	16%
Income > 4000€/m (%)	15%	9%	20%	26%	8%
Internationalist-Egalitarian (pro-migrant, pro-poor)	21%	58%	28%	9%	5%
Internationalist-Inegalitarian (pro-migrant, pro-rich)	23%	26%	38%	30%	6%
Nativist-Inegalitarian (anti-migrant, pro-rich)	26%	12%	16%	37%	35%
Nativist-Egalitarian (anti-migrant, pro-poor)	30%	19%	16%	14%	51%


Source: author's computations using French post-electoral survey 2017 (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict). **Reading:** in 2017, 28% of first-round voters voted for Mélenchon/Hamon, and 32% of them believe that there are too many migrants in France (vs 56% among all voters); 21% of first-round voters are "internationalist-egalitarian" (they believe that there are not too many migrants and that we should redistribute from rich to poor), and 58% of them voted for "left" candidates. **Note:** the votes for Arthaud/Poutou (2%) and Asselineau/Cheminade/Lassale (2%) were added to the votes for Melenchon-Hamon and Fillon (respectively).

Figure 3.1a. Political conflict in the US: presidential elections 1948-2016




Percentage of popular vote obtained by democratic, republican and other candidates in US presidential elections 1948-2016.
Source: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict.

Fig. 3.1b. Political conflict in the US: democrats vs republicans (1948-2016)




Percentage of popular vote obtained by democratic and republican candidates in US presidential elections 1948-2016 (excluding other candidates). Source: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict.

**Figure 3.2a. Voting for the democratic party in the US, 1948-2017:
female vote turning from right to left**




Source: author's computations using US post-electoral surveys 1948-2016 (ANES) (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict)
Reading: in 1948, the democratic candidate obtained a score that was 3 points lower among women than among men; in 2016, the score of the democratic candidate is 13 points higher among women.

**Figure 3.2b. Voting for the democratic party in the US, 1948-2017:
young vote leaning to the left, but volatile**




Source: author's computations using US post-electoral surveys 1948-2016 (ANES) (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict)
Reading: in 1948, the democratic candidate obtained a score that was 10 points lower among 18-to-34-year-old voters than among the 65-year-old+; in 2016, the score of the democratic candidate is again 10 points higher among the young.

**Figure 3.3a. Voting for the democratic party in the US, 1948-2017:
from the worker party to the high-education party**



Source: author's computations using US post-electoral surveys 1948-2016 (ANES) (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict)
Reading: in 1948, the democratic candidate obtained a score that was 17 points lower among university graduates than among non-university graduates; in 2016, the score of the democratic candidate is 13 points higher among university graduates.


Figure 3.3b. Vote for democratic party by education in the US, 1948-2016



Source: author's computations using US post-electoral surveys 1948-2016 (ANES) (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict)


Reading: in 2016, the democratic party candidate (Clinton) obtained 45% of the vote among high-school graduates and 75% among PhDs. Primary: voters with no high-school degree. Secondary: high-school degree but not bachelor degree. Higher (BA): bachelor degree. Higher (MA): advanced degree (master, law/medical school). Higher (PhD): PhD degree.

**Figure 3.3c. Voting for the democratic party in the US, 1948-2017:
from the worker party to the high-education party**



Source: author's computations using US post-electoral surveys 1948-2016 (ANES) (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict)
Reading: in 1948, the democratic candidate obtained a score that was 21 points lower among top 10% education voters than among bottom 90%; in 2016, the score of the democratic candidate is 23 points higher among top 10% education voters.


Figure 3.3d. Voting for left-wing & democratic parties in France and the US, 1948-2017: from the worker party to the high-education party



Source: author's computations using French and US post-electoral surveys 1948-2017 (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict)


Reading: in 1956, left-wing parties (SFIO-PS, PC, Rad., green, extr.-left) obtain a score that is 17 points lower among university graduates than among non-university graduates in France; in 2012, their score is 9 points higher among university graduates. The evolution is similar for the democratic vote in the US.

Figure 3.3e. Voting for left-wing & democratic parties in France and the US, 1948-2017: from the worker party to the high-education party



Source: author's computations using French and US post-electoral surveys 1948-2017 (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict)
Reading: in 1956, left-wing parties (SFIO-PS, PC, Rad., green, extr.-left) obtain a score that is 14 points lower among university graduates than among non-university graduates in France; in 2012, their score is 13 points higher among university graduates (after controls for age, sex, income, wealth, father's occupation). The evolution is similar for the democratic vote in the US.


**Figure 3.3f. Voting for left-wing & democratic parties in France, Britain, US
1948-2017: from the worker party to the high-education party**



Source: author's computations using French and US post-electoral surveys 1948-2017 (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict)

Reading: in 1956, left-wing parties (SFIO-PS, PC, Rad., green, extr.-left) obtain a score that is 14 points lower among top 10% education voters than among bottom 90% education voters in France; in 2012, their score is 9 points higher among top 10% education voters. The evolution is similar for the democratic vote in the US.


**Figure 3.3g. Voting for left-wing & democratic parties in France, Britain, US
1948-2017: from the worker party to the high-education party**



Source: author's computations using French and US post-electoral surveys 1948-2017 (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict)

Reading: in 1956, left-wing parties (SFIO-PS, PC, Rad., etc.) obtain a score that is 14 points lower among top 10% education voters than among bottom 90% education voters in France; in 2012, their score is 13 points higher among university graduates (after controls for age, sex, income, wealth, father's occupation). The evolution is similar for democratic vote in the US.


Fig. 3.4a. Vote for democratic party by income decile in the US 1948-2016



Source: author's computations using US post-electoral surveys 1948-2016 (ANES) (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict)

Reading: the profile of voting for the democratic party candidate by income percentile is generally downward sloping, especially at the level of the top 10%, and particularly at the beginning of the period (from the 1950s to the 1980s). Since the early 1990s, the profile of the vote at the top is relatively flat.


Fig. 3.4b. Vote for democratic party by income decile in the US, 1948-2016



Source: author's computations using US post-electoral surveys 1948-2016 (ANES) (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict)


Reading: the profile of voting for the democratic party candidate by income percentile is generally downward sloping, especially at the level of the top 10%, and particularly at the beginning of the period (from the 1950s to the 1980s). Since the early 1990s the profile is really flat at the top. **In the 2016 presidential election, the profile is reversed: for the first time, top 10% voters support the democratic party candidate.**

**Figure 3.4c. High-income vote in the US, 1948-2017:
before and after controls**



Source: author's computations using US post-electoral surveys 1948-2016 (ANES) (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict)
Reading: in 1948, the democratic candidate obtained a score that was 22 points lower among top 10% income voters than among bottom 90% income voters; in 2016, the score of the democratic candidate is 10 points higher among top 10% income voters.


**Figure 3.5a. Political conflict in the US, 1948-2017:
toward a multiple-elite party system, or a great reversal?**



Source: author's computations using US post-electoral surveys 1948-2016 (ANES) (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict)


Reading: the democratic vote used to be associated with low education and low income voters; it has gradually become associated to high education voters, giving rise to a "multiple-elite" party system (education vs income); it might also become associated with high income voters in the future, giving rising to great reversal and complete realignment of the party system.

**Figure 3.5b. Political conflict in the US, 1948-2017:
toward a multiple-elite party system, or a great reversal?**



Source: author's computations using US post-electoral surveys 1948-2016 (ANES) (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict)
Reading: the democratic vote used to be associated with low education and low income voters; it has gradually become associated to high education voters, giving rise to a "multiple-elite" party system (education vs income); it might also become associated with high income voters in the future, giving rising to great reversal and complete realignment of the party system.


**Figure 3.5c. Political conflict in the US, 1948-2017:
toward a multiple-elite party system, or a great reversal?**



Source: author's computations using US post-electoral surveys 1948-2016 (ANES) (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict)

Reading: the democratic vote used to be associated with low education and low income voters; it has gradually become associated to high education voters, giving rise to a "multiple-elite" party system (education vs income); it might also become associated with high income voters in the future, giving rising to great reversal and complete realignment of the party system.


**Figure 3.5d. Political conflict in the US, 1948-2017:
toward a multiple-elite party system, or a great reversal?**



Source: author's computations using US post-electoral surveys 1948-2016 (ANES) (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict)

Reading: the democratic vote used to be associated with low education and low income voters; it has gradually become associated to high education voters, giving rise to a "multiple-elite" party system (education vs income); it might also become associated with high income voters in the future, giving rising to great reversal and complete realignment of the party system.


Figure 3.6a. Vote for democratic party by ethnic origin in the US, 1948-2016



Source: author's computations using US post-electoral surveys 1948-2016 (ANES) (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict)


Reading: in 2016, the democratic party candidate (Clinton) obtains 37% of the vote among white voters, 89% of the vote among black voters and 64% of the vote among latino and other voters.

**Figure 3.6b. Minority vote in the US, 1948-2017:
before and after controls**




Source: author's computations using US post-electoral surveys 1948-2016 (ANES) (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict)
Reading: in 1948, the democratic candidate obtained a score that was 11 points higher among minority voters than among whites; in 2016, the democratic candidate obtained a score that was 39 points higher among minority voters.

Figure 3.6c. Political conflict and national-ethnic origins: France vs the US




Source: author's computation using French and US post-electoral surveys 1956-2017 (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict)
Reading: in 2012, the French left-wing candidate (Hollande) obtained 49% of the vote among voters with no foreign origin (no foreign grand-parent), 49% of the vote among voters with European foreign origins (mostly Spain, Italy, Portugal, etc.), and 77% of the vote among voters with extra-European foreign origins (mostly Maghreb and sub-Saharan Africa). In 2016, the US democratic candidate (Clinton) obtains 37% of the vote among Whites, 64% of the vote among Latinos/others, and 89% of the vote among Blacks.

Figure 4.1a. Political conflict in Britain: legislative elections 1945-2017




Percentage of popular vote obtained by labour, conservative, liberal/lib-dem and other parties in British legislative elections 1945-2017. SNP: Scottish National Party. UKIP: UK Independence Party. Other parties include greens, other regionalist parties, etc.
 Source: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict.

Figure 4.1b. Political conflict in Britain: labour vs conservative (1945-2017)




Percentage of popular vote obtained by labour and conservative parties in British legislative elections 1945-2017 (excluding other parties). Source: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict.

**Figure 4.2a. Voting for the labour party in Britain, 1955-2017:
female vote turning from right to left**



Source: author's computations using British post-electoral surveys 1963-2017 (BES) (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict)
Reading: in 1955, the labour party obtained a score that was 11 points lower among women than among men; in 2017, the score of the labour party is 4 points higher among women.


**Figure 4.2b. Voting for the labour party in Britain, 1955-2017:
youth vote leaning to the left, but volatile**



Source: author's computations using British post-electoral surveys 1963-2017 (BES) (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict)

Reading: in 1959, the labour party obtained a score that was 9 points higher among the 18-to-34-year-old than among the 65-year-old and over; in 2017, the score of the labour party is 39 points higher among the 18-to-34-year-old.


**Figure 4.3a. Voting for the labour party in Britain, 1955-2017:
from the worker party to the high-education party**



Source: author's computations using British post-electoral surveys 1963-2017 (BES) (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict)

Reading: in 1955, the labour party obtained a score that was 26 points lower among university graduates than among non-university graduates; in 2017, the score of the labour party is 6 points higher among university graduates. Controls alter levels but do not affect trends. Note: here "university graduates" include both technical and general higher-education degrees.


**Figure 4.3b. Voting for the labour party in Britain, 1955-2017:
from the worker party to the high-education party**



Source: author's computations using British post-electoral surveys 1963-2017 (BES) (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict)


Reading: in 1955, the labour party obtained a score that was 26 points lower among university graduates than among non-university graduates; in 2017, the score of the labour party is 6 points higher among university graduates. Controls alter levels but do not affect trends. Note: here "university graduates" include both technical and general higher-education degrees.

**Figure 4.3c. Voting for the labour party in Britain, 1955-2017:
from the worker party to the high-education party**




Source: author's computations using British post-electoral surveys 1963-2017 (BES) (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict)
Reading: in 1955, the labour party obtained a score that was 25 points lower among top 10% education voters than among bottom 90% education voters (registered voters are ranked by highest degree); in 2017, the score of the labour party is 13 points higher among top 10% education voters. Controls alter levels but do not affect trends.

**Figure 4.3d. Voting for left-wing & democratic parties in France, Britain, US
1948-2017: from the worker party to the high-education party**




Source: author's computations using French, US and British post-electoral surveys 1948-2017 (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict)
Reading: in 1956, left-wing parties (SFIO-PS, PC, Rad., green, extr.-left) obtain a score that is 17 points lower among university graduates than among non-university graduates in France; in 2012, their score is 9 points higher among university graduates. The evolution is similar for the democratic vote in the US and the labour vote in Britain.

**Figure 4.3e. Voting for left-wing & democratic parties in France, Britain, US
1948-2017: from the worker party to the high-education party**




Source: author's computations using French, US and British post-electoral surveys 1948-2017 (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict)
Reading: in 1956, left-wing parties (SFIO-PS, PC, Rad., etc.) obtain a score that is 14 points lower among university graduates than among non-university graduates in France; in 2012, their score is 13 points higher among university graduates (after controls for age, sex, income, wealth, father's occupation). The evolution is similar for democratic vote in the US and labour vote in Britain.

Figure 4.3f. Voting for left-wing & democratic parties in France, Britain, US 1948-2017: from the worker party to the high-education party




Source: author's computations using French, US and British post-electoral surveys 1948-2017 (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict)
Reading: in 1956, left-wing parties (SFIO-PS, PC, Rad., green, extr.-left) obtain a score that is 14 points lower among top 10% education voters than among bottom 90% education voters in France; in 2012, their score is 9 points higher among top 10% education voters. The evolution is similar for the democratic vote in the US and the labour vote in Britain.

**Figure 4.3g. Voting for left-wing & democratic parties in France, Britain, US
1948-2017: from the worker party to the high-education party**




Source: author's computations using French, US and British post-electoral surveys 1948-2017 (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict)
Reading: in 1956, left parties (SFIO-PS, PC, Rad., etc.) obtain a score that is 14 points lower among top 10% education voters than among bottom 90% education voters in France; in 2012, their score is 13 points higher among top 10% educ.voters (after controls for age, sex, income, wealth, father's occupation). The evolution is similar for democratic vote in the US and labour vote in Britain.

Figure 4.4a. Vote for labour party by income decile in the UK, 1955-2017



Source: author's computations using UK post-electoral surveys 1963-2017 (BES) (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict)
Reading: the profile of voting for the labour vs. conservative (excluding other votes) by income percentile is generally downward sloping, especially at the level of the top 10%, and particularly at the beginning of the period (from the 1950s to the 1980s).


**Figure 4.4b. High-income vote in Britain, 1955-2017:
before and after controls**



Source: author's computations using British post-electoral surveys 1963-2017 (BES) (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict)

Reading: in 1955, the labour party obtained a score that was 30 points lower among top 10% income voters than among bottom 90% income voters; in 2017, the score of the labour party is 12 points lower among top 10% income voters.


**Figure 4.4c. High-income vote in Britain, 1955-2017:
before and after controls**



Source: author's computations using British post-electoral surveys 1963-2017 (BES) (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict)

Reading: in 1955, the labour party obtained a score that was 30 points lower among top 10% income voters than among bottom 90% income voters; in 2017, the score of the labour party is 12 points lower among top 10% income voters.


**Figure 4.5a. Political conflict in Britain, 1955-2017:
toward a multiple-elite party system, or a great reversal?**



Source: author's computations using British post-electoral surveys 1963-2017 (BES) (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict)

Reading: the labour vote used to be associated with low education and low income voters; it has gradually become associated to high education voters, giving rise to a "multiple-elite" party system (education vs income); it might also become associated with high income voters in the future, but at this stage this seems less likely in Britain than in France or the US.


**Figure 4.5b. Political conflict in Britain, 1955-2017:
toward a multiple-elite party system, or a great reversal?**



Source: author's computations using British post-electoral surveys 1963-2017 (BES) (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict)

Reading: the labour vote used to be associated with low education and low income voters; it has gradually become associated to high education voters, giving rise to a "multiple-elite" party system (education vs income); it might also become associated with high income voters in the future, but at this stage this seems less likely in Britain than in France or the US.

**Figure 4.5c. Political conflict in Britain, 1955-2017:
toward a multiple-elite party system, or a great reversal?**



Source: author's computations using British post-electoral surveys 1963-2017 (BES) (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict)

Reading: the labour vote used to be associated with low education and low income voters; it has gradually become associated to high education voters, giving rise to a "multiple-elite" party system (education vs income); it might also become associated with high income voters in the future, but at this stage this seems less likely in Britain than in France or the US.


**Figure 4.5d. Political conflict in Britain, 1955-2017:
toward a multiple-elite party system, or a great reversal?**



Source: author's computations using British post-electoral surveys 1963-2017 (BES) (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict)


Reading: the labour vote used to be associated with low education and low income voters; it has gradually become associated to high education voters, giving rise to a "multiple-elite" party system (education vs income); it might also become associated with high income voters in the future, but at this stage this seems less likely in Britain than in France or the US.

**Figure 4.5e. Political conflict in Britain, 1955-2017:
toward a multiple-elite party system, or a great reversal?**




Source: author's computations using British post-electoral surveys 1963-2017 (BES) (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict)
Reading: the labour vote used to be associated with low education and low income voters; it has gradually become associated to high education voters, giving rise to a "multiple-elite" party system (education vs income); it might also become associated with high income voters in the future, but at this stage this seems less likely in Britain than in France or the US.

**Figure 4.5f. Political conflict in Britain, 1955-2017:
toward a multiple-elite party system, or a great reversal?**



Source: author's computations using British post-electoral surveys 1963-2017 (BES) (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict)
Reading: the labour vote used to be associated with low education and low income voters; it has gradually become associated to high education voters, giving rise to a "multiple-elite" party system (education vs income); it might also become associated with high income voters in the future, but at this stage this seems less likely in Britain than in France or the US.


**Figure 4.5g. Political conflict in Britain, 1955-2017:
toward a multiple-elite party system, or a great reversal?**



Source: author's computations using British post-electoral surveys 1963-2017 (BES) (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict)

Reading: the labour vote used to be associated with low education and low income voters; it has gradually become associated to high education voters, giving rise to a "multiple-elite" party system (education vs income); it might also become associated with high income voters in the future, but at this stage this seems less likely in Britain than in France or the US.


**Figure 4.5h. Political conflict in Britain, 1955-2017:
toward a multiple-elite party system, or a great reversal?**



Source: author's computations using British post-electoral surveys 1963-2017 (BES) (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict)

Reading: the labour vote used to be associated with low education and low income voters; it has gradually become associated to high education voters, giving rise to a "multiple-elite" party system (education vs income); it might also become associated with high income voters in the future, but at this stage this seems less likely in Britain than in France or the US.


Figure 4.6a. Labour vote by religion in Britain 1964-2017



Source: author's computations using British post-electoral surveys 1963-2017 (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict)

Reading: in 2017, the labour party obtains 39% of the vote among self-reported Christians (inc. Anglicans, other Protestants, Catholics), 56% among voters reporting other religions (Judaïsm, Hinduism, etc., except Islam), 54% among voters reporting no religion, and 96% among self-reported Muslims. Before 1979, Islam is included with other religions.

Figure 4.6b. Labour vote by ethnic group in Britain 1979-2017



Source: author's computations using British post-electoral surveys 1963-2017 (see piketty.pse.ens.fr/conflict)

Reading: in 2017, the labour party obtains 41% of the vote among self-reported ethnic "Whites", 81% among among "Africans-Caribbeans", 82% among "Indians-Pakistanis-Bengladeshis" and 69% among "Other" (including "Chinese", "Arabs", etc.).

Note: in 2017, 5% of voters refused to answer the ethnic identity question (and 77% of them voted Labour) (not shown here).