Capital in the 21st century
A Middle East Perspective

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Paris School of Economics
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This presentation is partly based upon my book *Capital in the 21st century* (HUP, 2014)

In this book, I study the global dynamics of income and wealth distribution since 18c in 20+ countries. I use historical data collected over the past 15 years with Atkinson, Saez, Postel-Vinay, Rosenthal, Alvaredo, Zucman, and 30+ others. **Aim is to put distribution back at the center of political economy.**

I attempt to develop a multidimensional approach to capital ownership and property relations, and to study beliefs systems about inequality.

Today I will present a number of selected historical evolutions & attempt to draw lessons for the future.

All series available at [http://piketty.pse.ens.fr/capital21c](http://piketty.pse.ens.fr/capital21c) & the **World Wealth and Income Database**
This presentation: three points

• 1. The long-run dynamics of income inequality. The end of the Kuznets curve. Institutions and policies matter: education, labor, tax. In the West, it took major shocks for elites to accept social and fiscal reforms in 20c.

• 2. The return of a patrimonial (or wealth-based) society. Wealth-income ratios seem to be returning to very high levels in rich countries. The metamorphosis of capital. With high r - g during 21c, then wealth inequality might rise again. Need for more democratic transparency on wealth.

• 3. Inequality in developing countries & in the post-colonial world. Need for more data access. Need to go beyond the Western-centered perspective on inequality.
Inequality in the Middle East

• We know very little about income and wealth inequality levels within Middle East countries. No access to income tax or inheritance tax data. Impossible to make reliable comparisons with other countries. **Official household surveys vastly underestimate inequality.**

• Huge inequality between Middle East countries, largely due to concentration of oil resources in small territories with limited population. E.g. total educational investment of Egypt (80m pop) is 100 times smaller than oil revenues in UAE-Qatar (1m pop).

• If we measure income inequality at the level of the region taken as a whole, then the Middle East appears as the most unequal region in the world.
  Top 10% income share ≈ 60% of total income in Middle East (lower bound, i.e. assuming low within-country inequality)
  ≈ 35% in Europe, 45-50% in USA, 55-60% in South Africa or Brasil
Top 10% income share

- Middle East (pop: 280m)
- Egypt (80m)
- Western Europe (410m)
- US (310m)
Top 10% income share

- Middle East (pop: 280m)
- Egypt (80m)
- Western Europe (410m)
- US (310m)
- South Africa (50m)
- Brasil (200m)
• Like other countries, and even more than other countries, Middle East countries need more transparency about income and wealth.
• Progressive taxation = powerful way to produce information, fight corruption & limit concentration of property.

• Ideally, the Middle East would also need regional political integration and redistribution of oil and other resources.
• Very difficult to organize peacefully... especially if Western countries do everything they can to preserve the high-inequality status quo.
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• 2. The return of a patrimonial (or wealth-based) society. Wealth-income ratios seem to be returning to very high levels in rich countries. The metamorphosis of capital. With high r - g during 21c, then wealth inequality might rise again. Need for more democratic transparency on wealth.

• 3. Inequality in developing countries & in the post-colonial world. Need for more data access. Need to go beyond the Western-centered perspective on inequality.
• 1. The long-run dynamics of income inequality. The end of the Kuznets curve, the end of universal laws. Institutions and policies matter: education, labor, tax, etc.
• During 20c, major shocks – wars, depressions, revolutions – played a major role in the reduction of inequality, and in order to force elites to accept the new social and fiscal institutions which they refused before these shocks.
• Political determinants of inequality are more important than pure economic determinants
The top decile share in U.S. national income dropped from 45-50% in the 1910s-1920s to less than 35% in the 1950s (this is the fall documented by Kuznets); it then rose from less than 35% in the 1970s to 45-50% in the 2000s-2010s.

Sources and series: see Figure I.1. Income inequality in the United States, 1910-2012
The share of total income accruing to top decile income holders was higher in Europe than in the U.S. around 1900-1910; it is a lot higher in the U.S. than in Europe around 2000-2010.

Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/capital21c (fig.9,8)
The top decile income share was higher in Europe than in the U.S. in 1900-1910; it is a lot higher in the U.S. in 2000-2010. Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/capital21c.
• The rise in US inequality in recent decades is mostly due to rising inequality of labor income

• It is due to a mixture of reasons: changing supply and demand for skills; race between education and technology; globalization; more unequal to access to skills in the US (rising tuitions, insufficient public investment); unprecedented rise of top managerial compensation in the US (changing incentives, cuts in top income tax rates); falling minimum wage in the US

→ institutions and policies matter
Figure 9.1. Minimum wage in France and the U.S., 1950-2013

Expressed in 2013 purchasing power, the hourly minimum wage rose from $3.8 to $7.3 between 1950 and 2013 in the U.S., and from €2.1 to €9.4 in France. Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/capital21c.
2. The return of a patrimonial (or wealth-based) society. Wealth-income ratios seem to be returning to very high levels in rich countries. Intuition: in a slow-growth society, wealth accumulated in the past can naturally become very important. In the very long run, this can be relevant for the entire world. Not bad in itself, but new challenges. **The metamorphosis of capital call for new regulations of property relations.** The key role of the legal and political system. Democratizing capital: worker codetermination, patent laws, etc.
Figure I.2. The capital/income ratio in Europe, 1870-2010

Aggregate private wealth was worth about 6-7 years of national income in Europe in 1910, between 2 and 3 years in 1950, and between 4 and 6 years in 2010. Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/capital21c.
National capital is worth about 7 years of national income in the United Kingdom in 1700 (including 4 in agricultural land). Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/capital21c.
Figure 3.2. Capital in France, 1700-2010

National capital is worth almost 7 years of national income in France in 1910 (including 1 invested abroad).

Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/capital21c.
Figure 5.3. Private capital in rich countries, 1970-2010

Private capital is worth between 2 and 3.5 years of national income in rich countries in 1970, and between 4 and 7 years of national income in 2010. Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/capital21c.
Private capital almost reached 8 years of national income in Spain at the end of the 2000s (ie. one more year than Japan in 1990). Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/capital21c.
In Italy, private capital rose from 240% to 680% of national income between 1970 and 2010, while public capital dropped from 20% to -70%. Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/capital21c.
• The future of wealth concentration. With high \( r - g \) during 21\(^c\) (\( r = \text{net-of-tax rate of return}, \ g = \text{growth rate} \)), then wealth inequality might reach or surpass 19\(^c\) oligarchic levels. Need for more transparency about wealth. Need for progressive taxation of net wealth.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<th>1987-2013</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Average real growth rate</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><em>per year</em> (after deduction of inflation)</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>The top 1/(100 million) highest wealth holders (about 30 adults out of 3 billions in 1980s, and 45 adults out of 4.5 billions in 2010s)</td>
<td>6.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The top 1/(20 million) highest wealth holders (about 150 adults out of 3 billions in 1980s, and 225 adults out of 4.5 billions in 2010s)</td>
<td>6.4%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Average world wealth per adult</td>
<td>2.1%</td>
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<td>Average world income per adult</td>
<td>1.4%</td>
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<tr>
<td>World adult population</td>
<td>1.9%</td>
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<tr>
<td>World GDP</td>
<td>3.3%</td>
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Between 1987 and 2013, the highest global wealth fractiles have grown at 6%-7% per year, vs. 2.1% for average world wealth and 1.4% for average world income. All growth rates are net of inflation (2.3% per year between 1987 and 2013). Sources: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/capital21c.
Table 12.2. The return on the capital endowments of U.S. universities, 1980-2010

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Average real annual rate of return (after deduction of inflation and all administrative costs and financial fees)</th>
<th>Période 1980-2010</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>All universities (850)</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
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<tr>
<td>incl.: Harvard-Yale-Princeton</td>
<td>10.2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>incl.: Endowments higher than 1 billion $ (60)</td>
<td>8.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>incl. Endowments between 500 millions and 1 billion $ (66)</td>
<td>7.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>incl. Endowments between 100 and 500 million $ (226)</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dont: Endowments less than 100 million $ (498)</td>
<td>6.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Between 1980 and 2010, U.S. universities earned an average real return of 8.2% on their capital endowments, and all the more so for higher endowments. All returns reported here are net of inflation (2.4% per year between 1980 and 2010) and of all administrative costs and financial fees.

Sources: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/capital21c.
The top marginal tax rate of the income tax (applying to the highest incomes) in the U.S. dropped from 70% in 1980 to 28% in 1988. Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/capital21c.
Figure 14.2. Top inheritance tax rates, 1900-2013

The top marginal tax rate of the inheritance tax (applying to the highest inheritances) in the U.S. dropped from 70% in 1980 to 35% in 2013. Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/capital21c.
• 3. Inequality in developing countries & in the post-colonial world. Need for more data access. Need to go beyond the Western-centered perspective on inequality.

• On-going work on inequality work on inequality in South Africa, Brasil, Middle East, India, China suggest that official measures vastly underestimate inequality.
Share of top 1% in total pretax income

South Africa, United States, France
Top 1% income share: Brazil and US, 2006-2012

Top 1% Brazil (fiscal data - Medeiros et al.)
Top 1% United States (fiscal data)
Top 1% Brazil (survey - PNAD)
Top 10% income share: Brazil and US, 2006-2012

- Top 10% Brazil (fiscal & survey data)
- Top 10% United States (fiscal data)
- Top 10% Brazil (survey-PNAD)
Top 10% income share

- Middle East (pop: 280m)
- Egypt (80m)
- Western Europe (410m)
- US (310m)
• Western illusion about modern inequality (supposedly based upon equality of rights, meritocracy) vs ancient inequality regimes (based upon rigid inequality of status, castes, etc.).

• But meritocracy is largely a myth invented by the winners: in practice there is very little equality of rights in access to high-quality education or good-paying jobs. Real vs formal rights.

• Huge discrimination in post-colonial societies: see e.g. muslim names in France.

• Indian debates about caste-based vs gender-based vs parental-income-based reservations: very relevant for Western countries & the world.
Conclusions

• The history of income and wealth inequality is deeply political, social and cultural; it involves beliefs systems, national identities and sharp reversals

• In a way, both Marx and Kuznets were wrong: there are powerful forces pushing in the direction of rising or reducing inequality; which one dominates depends on the institutions and policies that different societies choose to adopt

• The ideal solution involves a broad combination of inclusive institutions, incl. progressive taxation of income, wealth and carbon; education, social & labor laws; financial transparency; economic & political democracy, incl. new forms of property, power structure and participatory governance.

• Inequality regimes need to be put into a broad historical and comparative perspective, so as to invent new solutions.