TAXATION OF CORPORATE CAPITAL INCOME: TAX REVENUES VERSUS TAX DISTORTIONS

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This paper shows that when uncertainty is taken into account explicitly, taxation of corporate income can leave corporate investment incentives, and individual savings incentives, basically unaffected, in spite of the sizable tax revenues collected. In some plausible situations, such taxes can increase efficiency. The explanation for these surprising results is that the government, by taxing capital income, absorbs a certain fraction of both the expected return and the uncertainty in the return. While investors as a result receive a lower expected return, they also bear less risk when they invest, and these two effects are largely offsetting.

Many papers over the past twenty years have emphasized the high average tax rates on corporate capital income resulting from the combination of corporate and personal income taxes as well as property taxes. For example, Feldstein and Summers [1979] calculate that the average combined personal and corporate income tax rate on corporate income is on the order of 66 percent. Many studies have then calculated the efficiency costs of this heavy tax burden on the corporate sector. Harberger [1962]; Shoven and Whalley [1972]; and Fullerton, Shoven, and Whalley [1978], in increasingly elaborate models, estimate the efficiency costs arising from the resulting movement of capital out of the corporate sector into other uses. Feldstein [1978] also emphasizes the efficiency cost of the heavy tax burden discouraging savings and investment in general.

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This paper departs from that tradition. It shows that when uncertainty is incorporated into the model, the taxation of corporate income can leave corporate investment incentives, and individual savings incentives, basically unaffected, despite the sizeable tax revenues collected. Further, in some plausible situations, such taxes might even cause a gain in efficiency. The explanation for these surprising results is that the government, by taxing capital income, absorbs a certain fraction of both the expected return to corporate capital and the uncertainty in that return. As a result, while investors receive a lower expected return, they also bear less risk when they invest, and these two effects seem to be largely offsetting.

This argument that the taxation of corporate income is non-distorting is entirely different from that of Stiglitz [1973]. Stiglitz's argument, developed in a certainty setting, relied on the possibility of 100 percent debt finance for marginal investments. For much of the argument in this paper, firms will be constrained to use only equity finance. When debt finance is allowed, the changes in the results are minor.

The argument is related to earlier analyses of the effects of taxes on the amount of risk bearing, e.g., Domar and Musgrave [1944], Tobin [1958], Mossin [1968], and Stiglitz [1969]. These papers, however, all assumed that individuals no longer bear what risk is passed to the government. This paper develops a general equilibrium framework, in which individuals ultimately bear all the risk,¹ and attempts to relate the argument more closely to real investment decisions and to the actual U.S. tax structure.

The argument will first be developed intuitively in Section I in a mean-variance setting. In Section II a more general and formal version of the argument will be presented. In Section III some generalizations of the model will be explored. Section IV is the conclusion.

I. ANALYSIS OF TAXES GIVEN INFLATION AND UNCERTAINTY:
AN EXAMPLE

Since corporate capital income is subject not only to corporate taxes but also to personal taxes and property taxes, there is a strong presumption in the literature, e.g., Feldstein [1978], that there is too little corporate capital, with large efficiency costs. To express this argument in notation, let $r^a$ equal the after-tax real

¹. Atkinson and Stiglitz [1980, pp. 109–10] do point out, however, that a utility-compensated increase in the tax on risk taking has no effect on behavior.
rate of return required by corporate shareholders, which by utility
maximization must equal their marginal time preference rate.
Also, let $\rho$ equal the value of the marginal product of capital net
of depreciation. Without any tax distortions, competition (and
efficiency) requires that $\rho = r^a$.

However, with a corporate tax at rate $\tau$, a property tax at
rate $t$, and a personal tax on income from shares at rate $e$, the
after-tax return to corporate capital becomes only $(1 - e)(1 - \tau)$
$(\rho - t)$. Competition requires that this return equal $r^a$. It then
follows that

$$\rho = t + \frac{r^a}{(1 - e)(1 - \tau)}. \tag{1}$$

The three taxes in this setting compound to drive the mar-
ginal product of corporate capital sharply above the investors' margi-
ral time preference rate. To illustrate the size of this dis-
tortion, let us set $\tau = 0.5$, a representative average corporate tax
rate during the 1970s according to the figures in the Economic
Report of the President. Also, assume that $e = 0.16$, which is ap-
proximately the personal tax rate on income to equity holders
calculated by Feldstein and Summers [1979], and assume that
t = 0.013, a representative property tax on corporate capital ac-
cording to the figures in Fullerton-Gordon [1983]. Finally, as-
sume that the after-tax real return required by corporate inves-
tors is $r^a = 0.04$, the figure assumed in Fullerton, Shoven, and
Whalley [1978]. These figures together imply that the equilibrium
value of $\rho$ equals 0.108, suggesting that a substantial excess bur-
den is created by these taxes, given that the marginal time pref-
ERENCE rate of investors equals 0.04. This procedure for modeling
the effects of taxes is basically that used by Harberger [1962] and
Fullerton, Shoven, and Whalley [1978], among others.

However, the above argument ignores the effects of uncer-
tainty. When we take uncertainty into account, the results change
dramatically. Investors would now require that the expected af-
ter-tax real rate of return on an investment at least equal the
after-tax real risk-free interest rate, which we denote by $r^a_\varepsilon$, plus
enough to compensate for the risk in the return on the investment.

2. For simplicity, we assume that purely inflationary gains are not subject
to tax, and ignore any inappropriate measurement of the tax base due to inflation.
For further discussion of the effects of inflation, see Feldstein [1980] and Gordon
[1983].

3. The figures in Fullerton-Gordon [1981] equal half of property tax payments
relative to the value of the capital stock. This halving of the tax rate was intended
to capture, however crudely, the benefits from local public services that firms
receive, which to a degree offset the tax payments they make.
In the context of the capital asset pricing model, the required risk premium on an investment would equal $\delta = \bar{r}_m \cdot \text{cov}(\rho, r_m)/\text{var}(r_m)$, where $r_m$ is the excess in the rate of return on the market portfolio above $r_z^a$, and $\bar{r}_m$ is its expected value. If there were no taxes, then in equilibrium investment would occur until $\bar{\rho} = r_z^a + \delta$, where $\bar{\rho}$ is the expected real return on capital.

How do taxes affect the equilibrium value of $\bar{\rho}$? After corporate taxes and property taxes, the expected rate of return would be $(1 - \tau)(\bar{\rho} - t)$. This then leaves $(1 - e)(1 - \tau)(\bar{\rho} - t) - c\pi$ after personal taxes, where we assume that purely inflationary capital gains are taxed at a rate $c$, which presumably is smaller than $e$.

In equilibrium, this after-tax return ought just to equal the rate of return required by investors, given the risk. Let us assume that the excess return on the market portfolio remains unchanged. (This is a key part of the argument, which we focus on below.) Then the risk premium required on this marginal investment will equal only $(1 - e)(1 - \tau)\delta$ since the covariance of the after-tax return on the investment with that on the market is reduced by the factor $(1 - e)(1 - \tau)$. Therefore, in equilibrium, we find that

$$(1 - e)(1 - \tau)(\bar{\rho} - t) - c\pi = r_z^a + (1 - e)(1 - \tau)\delta,$$

which implies that

$$\bar{\rho} = t + \frac{r_z^a + c\pi}{(1 - e)(1 - \tau)} + \delta. \tag{2}$$

To what degree does this differ from the equilibrium without taxes, where $\bar{\rho} = r_z^a + \delta$? For purposes of illustration, let us assume that $r_z^a = -0.015$, a figure implied, for example, by assuming that treasury bills are risk free, earn a zero real return before taxes as in Fama [1975], yet accrue tax liability each year of 0.015 per dollar invested due to the full taxation of nominal interest. Also assume that $c = 0.05$ is the effective capital gains tax rate. With these figures along with the tax rate assumptions used previously, we find that the equilibrium $\bar{\rho}$ is left almost exactly unchanged in spite of the taxes. As is shown below, these taxes will be distorting only to the degree that taxes would be paid even on a (perhaps hypothetical) risk-free real investment. With the illustrative parameter values, a risk-free investment would have net tax payments of zero. While these parameter values were chosen with a bit of care, each one is quite representative of the values used in other papers.

4. During 1960–1980, the ex post real after-tax return on 6-month treasury bills, assuming a 30 percent tax rate, varied between $-5.7$ percent and 2.6 percent.
While the value of $\bar{\rho}$ is basically unaffected by these taxes, however, considerable tax revenue is still collected. According to the above formulas, total expected tax revenue collected per year on this dollar investment by the corporate, property, and personal income taxes together will equal $\tau(\bar{\rho} - t) + t + e(\bar{\rho} - t)(1 - \tau) + c\pi$. If we assume that $\delta = 0.12$, a number consistent with the figures in Fullerton and Gordon [1981], together with the previous parameter assumptions, then the expected tax revenues equal 0.070 per year. Since with these figures the total expected return $\bar{\rho}$ equals 0.105, the average tax rate on corporate income is 0.663.

How can $\bar{\rho}$ be left basically unaffected by a set of taxes producing an average tax rate of 0.663? The simple explanation is that while investors receive much less after tax as a return on their investment, they also require much less in return since the investment is no longer as risky. In the example above, the fall in the risk premium required by investors just matches the fall in the expected after-tax return, leaving the equilibrium $\bar{\rho}$ unaffected. The government, in taxing away part of the return, is charging the market price for the risk that it absorbs.

So far we have assumed that the investment was entirely equity financed. Yet, the tax law treats debt-financed investment more favorably. We have also ignored the investment tax credit and the effects of tax versus true depreciation rates. Fullerton and Gordon [1981] incorporate these further complications into the model. After much effort in measuring the needed parameters for 1973, they conclude that the various taxes on corporate income, rather than merely leaving corporate investment incentives unaffected, caused a slight increase in corporate investment incentives, at least in that year.

Let us return now to the assumption that the excess return on the market portfolio remains unchanged when taxes are introduced. If the utility function is quadratic, then the market risk premium is simply proportional to the variance of the total return received by individuals. Given that the government absorbs a sizable fraction of the risk as a result of the taxes on corporate income, one might have expected the market risk premium to fall. However, the government cannot freely dispose of the risk that it bears. Individuals must ultimately bear this risk, whether through random tax rates on other income, random government expenditures, or random government deficits. If this risk in go-

5. Note that the risk premium on the marketed securities would equal $(1 - \tau)\delta$.
6. While all these calculations are merely illustrative, it is interesting to note that in both cases, the value of $\rho$ is close to the value of 0.106 observed by Feldstein-Summers [1977].
ernment revenues is no more or less costly to bear than privately traded risks, then the total risk borne by individuals equals the total risk in the return on the capital investments, with or without taxes. Since the variance of the return to individuals depends only on the level of investment, and not on tax rates, so does the excess return on the market portfolio, where the market portfolio now embodies, as it should, all the sources of risk that the individual faces.

The government, however, might be able to reallocate the risk more efficiently, in which case the market risk premium ought to fall, stimulating investment as well as increasing efficiency. For example, if government expenditures are not a perfect substitute for individual expenditures, then there is an efficiency gain from making government expenditures at least somewhat risky. Alternatively, the government might create an efficiency gain by exchanging risks among individuals where this cannot occur adequately in the market, as between generations not alive simultaneously. In earlier papers by Domar and Musgrave [1944], Tobin [1958], Mossin [1968], and Stiglitz [1969], it was implicitly assumed that the risk in government tax revenues is not borne at all by individuals. In this case, the risk premium on a taxed investment would fall to $(1 - \varepsilon)^2(1 - \tau)^2\delta$, and investment is stimulated by the tax due to the implied reduction in the amount of risk that individuals must bear—an efficiency gain. The assumption in this paper, that risk in government tax revenues is as costly to bear as privately traded risks, seems much more plausible.

II. General Two-Period Analysis

The results in the previous section do not rely on the special assumptions underlying a mean-variance analysis of risk. To show this, we redevelop the argument in this section using a general two-period utility function in a setting similar to that used by Diamond [1967] and Leland [1974]. We first characterize the equilibrium amount and allocation of capital when there are no taxes, and then investigate how the equilibrium changes when taxes are introduced.

A. Equilibrium Without Taxes

Let us assume that there are $J^*$ potential firms. The $j$th firm, if it invests $K_j$ units of capital in the first period, will produce a
stochastic real return in the second period of \( R_j = f_j(K_j)\theta_j + h_j(K_j) \). Here, \( f_j \) and \( h_j \) are nonstochastic nonconvex functions, and \( \theta_j \) is a random variable with mean \( \bar{\theta}_j \). In the second period the firm pays back to its owners its initial capital stock, now worth \((1 + \tau)K_j\), plus the return \( R_j \). The inflation rate \( \pi \) is assumed for simplicity to be nonstochastic.

The firm in the first period “goes public” and sells shares of ownership in this return to individual investors. Denote the market value of these shares by \( V_j \), where \( V_j \) implicitly depends on the amount of capital \( K_j \) that the firm promises to acquire. The initial owners of the firm when it goes public then divide the residual \( V_j - K_j \) among themselves. As noted earlier, we do not allow firms to use any debt finance. The implications of relaxing this assumption will be discussed later.

Before going public, the firm must decide how much capital \( K_j \) it will promise to acquire. We assume that in doing so the firm maximizes the value of the residual \( V_j - K_j \) going to its initial owners. (We show below that each of the initial owners will find this policy to be utility maximizing.) If \( V_j < K_j \) for all positive values of \( K_j \), then the potential firm would never come into existence. Assume that the first \( J \) firms choose to go public and acquire positive amounts of capital.

For these \( J \) firms, \( K_j \) will be chosen such that \( \partial V_j / \partial K_j = 1 \) at this \( K_j \). This implies that in equilibrium investors are willing to accept a stochastic real return in the second period of \( \rho_j = f_j(K_j)\theta_j + h_j(K_j) \), with expectation \( \bar{\rho}_j \), on a dollar invested in the first period.

Let there be \( I \) individuals. Individual \( i \) has a utility function \( U_i(C_1^i, C_2^i) \) which depends on consumption in each of the two periods. For convenience, both \( C_1^i \) and \( C_2^i \) are expressed in nominal dollars, in spite of the presence of (nonstochastic) inflation.

Individual \( i \)'s initial wealth is \( W_i \) plus an initial percent ownership \( s_{ij} \) in each of the \( J \) firms which decide to go public. He can lend to (or borrow from) other individuals at a nonstochastic nominal interest rate \( r + \pi \), with the amount lent being denoted by \( D_i \). He can also buy a percent \( s_{ij} \) of the shares issued by each of

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7. As Leland [1974] points out, many alternative stochastic models are special cases of this formulation. For example, the formulation can be consistent with either price or production uncertainty, and with either competitive or noncompetitive firm behavior.

8. The joint distribution of the \( \theta_j \) is unrestricted.
the $J$ firms when they go public. In doing so, he is subject to the budget constraint,

\begin{equation}
C_i^1 + D_i + \sum_{j=1}^{J} s_{ij} V_j = W_i + \sum_{j=1}^{J} \bar{s}_j (V_j - K_j).
\end{equation}

Individual $i$ chooses values for $C_i^1$, $D_i$, and $s_{ij}$, subject to his budget constraint, so as to maximize his expected utility $EU_i(C_i^1,C_i^2)$, where

\begin{equation}
C_i^2 = (1 + r + \pi)D_i + \sum_{j=1}^{J} s_{ij} ((1 + \pi)K_j + R_j).
\end{equation}

The resulting first-order conditions characterizing his optimal choices can be expressed as

\begin{align}
(5a) \quad & EU_{i1} = (1 + r + \pi)EU_{i2} \\
(5b) \quad & E[(1 + \pi)K_j + R_j - (1 + r + \pi)V_j]U_{i2} = 0 \quad \text{for all } j,
\end{align}

where $U_{i1} = \partial U_i/\partial C_i^1$ and $U_{i2} = \partial U_i/\partial C_i^2$. Given the definition for $R_j$, we can infer from equation (5b) that

\begin{equation}
f_j \bar{\theta}_j + h_j = rK_j + (1 + r + \pi)(V_j - K_j) - f_i \frac{\text{cov}(\theta_j, U_{i2})}{EU_{i2}} \quad \text{for all } j.
\end{equation}

The last term on the right represents the risk premium. It must have the same value for all individuals, since each equation holds for all $i$, and it will generally increase the right-hand side given that individuals are risk averse.

These equations must be satisfied for each individual. There is also an overall market-clearing condition in the debt market which requires that

\begin{align}
(7a) \quad & \sum_{i=1}^{I} D_i = 0 \\
(7b) \quad & \sum_{i=1}^{I} s_{ij} = 1 \quad \text{for all } j.
\end{align}

We know in addition that the return from a marginal dollar of capital invested in any of the $J$ firms is valued at a dollar by the market. Since the "marginal investment" is itself not a sep-
arate freely traded security, in general any individual might value the resulting returns differently from a dollar. In this model, however, the return pattern of a marginal investment is identical to that from a suitably chosen portfolio of freely traded securities. In particular, the nominal return from a marginal dollar of capital investment in the \( j \)th firm will have exactly the same distribution as the combined returns from an amount \( f_j V_j f_j \) invested in shares of the \( j \)th firm and an amount \([1/(f_j(1 + r + \pi))]
\[f_j(1 + \pi + h_j) - f_j(h_j + (1 + \pi)K_j)]\) lent to other individuals. (That is, the return pattern of the marginal investment is within the span of the return patterns from these two other available assets.) Therefore, all individuals can implicitly trade in a composite security with a return pattern equal to that from a marginal investment in the \( j \)th firm so all must assign the same value, one dollar, to this composite security. This implies that

\[\frac{f_j V_j}{f_j} = \frac{1}{f_j(1 + r + \pi)}[f_j(1 + \pi + h_j) - f_j(h_j + (1 + \pi)K_j)] = 1\]

or that

\[(1 + r + \pi)(V_j - K_j) = \left[\frac{f_i}{f_j} - K_j\right] r - \frac{h_j f_i}{f_j} + h_j.\]

If an individual is willing to pay just one dollar for the returns from the marginal investment in the \( j \)th firm, it follows that

\[E[((1 + \pi) + f_j \theta_j + h_j - (1 + r + \pi)) U_{i2}] = 0 \text{ for all } j.\]

This implies that\(^9\)

\[\bar{p}_j = f_j \bar{\theta} + h_j = r - f_j (\text{cov}(\theta_j, U_{i2})/EU_{i2}).\]

Note that this equation is very similar to the one derived above characterizing the equilibrium without taxes in the mean-variance context. The set of equations (3), (4), (5a), (6), (7a), (7b), and (11) jointly determine the equilibrium values for \( D_i, C_1^i, C_2^i, s_{ij}, r, V_j, \) and \( K_j \) for all \( i \) and \( j \).

**B. Equilibrium with Taxes**

Now let us calculate the implications of imposing a corporate and a personal income tax, as well as a property tax, with the
tax revenue redistributed back to individuals in the second period in a lump sum fashion. The lump sum transfers will be designed to eliminate any income effects from the tax, so that we can focus on the effects of the price distortions.

Let us assume that the personal income tax is uniform across individuals and is imposed at a flat rate $m$ on income from bonds and at a flat rate $e$ on income from stocks. As before, assume that purely inflationary capital gains are taxed at a lower rate $c$. We assume that there is full loss offset.\(^{10}\)

In addition, assume that the effects of the corporate and property taxes together are to tax income from capital at a rate $\tau$ and to tax the replacement cost of the capital stock at a rate $t$. As before, we assume that the tax payments $tK_j$ are deductible from corporate income before $\tau$ is imposed. To a degree, $\tau$ and $t$ represent the corporate tax and the property tax, respectively. However, the marginal corporate tax rate often differs substantially from the average corporate tax rate. We interpret $\tau$ to equal the marginal corporate tax rate, while $t$ is assumed set so as to produce the correct average tax rate from both corporate and property taxes together. For further discussion, see Section III.A.

With these taxes, when $K_j$ is invested in the $j$th type of capital, it produces an after corporate and property tax income of $R_j^*$, where

\begin{equation}
R_j^* = (1 - \tau)(f_j\theta_j + h_j - tK_j).
\end{equation}

The new market value of this capital will be denoted by $V_j^*$. As before, we assume that firms invest in this capital until the market value of the after-tax return to a dollar additional investment just equals one. Also as before, the residual amount $V_j^* - K_j$ is divided among the initial owners of the firm.

When an individual now invests in bonds and stocks, his second period income will equal

\begin{equation}
C_i^2 = (1 + (1 - m)(r^* + \pi))D_i \\
+ \sum_{j=1} s_{ij} (1 + (1 - c)\pi)K_j + (1 - e)R_j^* + T_i,
\end{equation}

\(^{10}\) The U.S. tax law does not allow full loss offset. However, a firm with tax losses has the ability to carry losses backward and forward to other tax years, and it has the option to merge with a firm with taxable profits. As a result, the assumption of full loss offset should not be a bad approximation to the actual tax law.
where $r^*$ denotes the new equilibrium real interest rate and where $T_i$ is the lump sum transfer received by the individual in period 2. The individual's budget constraint is

$$
C_i + D_i + \sum_{j=1}^{J} s_{ij} V_j^* = W_i + \sum_{j=1}^{J} \bar{s}_{ij} (V_j^* - K_j).
$$

Solving again for the first-order conditions characterizing the individual's optimal choices, we find that equations (5a) and (5b) are replaced by

$$
EU_{i1} = (1 + (1 - m)(r^* + \pi)) EU_{i2}
$$

(15a)

$$
E[(1 + (1 - c)\pi)K_j + (1 - e)R_j^* - (1 + (1 - m)(r^* + \pi))V_j^*)U_{i2} = 0 \quad \text{for all } j.
$$

Substituting for $R_j^*$ as before, we obtain, analogously to equation (6), that

$$
f_j \bar{\theta}_j + h_j = tK_j + \frac{(1 - m)r^* - (m - c)\pi}{(1 - e)(1 - \tau)} K_j
$$

$$
+ \frac{(1 + (1 - m)(r^* + \pi))}{(1 - e)(1 - \tau)} (V_j^* - K_j)
$$

$$
- \frac{f_j \operatorname{cov}(\theta_j, U_{i2})}{EU_{i2}} \quad \text{for all } j.
$$

(15b)

A dollar marginal investment in any of the $J$ firms must still be valued at a dollar both by the market and by each individual. This is true since the distribution of the after-tax return from a marginal investment is identical to the distribution of the combined after-tax returns from an amount $f_j V_j^*/f_j$ invested in stock of the $j$th firm and an amount,

$$
A = 1/f_j(1 + (1 - m)(r^* + \pi)) [(1 - e)(1 - \tau)(f_j h_j' - f_j h_j - t f_j K_j - t f_j) + (1 + (1 - c)\pi)(f_j - f_j K_j)]
$$

lent to other individuals. This implies that the market value of the latter portfolio must equal one dollar, so that $f_j' V_j^*/f_j + A = 1$. Substituting for $A$, we see that

$$
\frac{(1 + (1 - m)(r^* + \pi))}{(1 - e)(1 - \tau)} (V_j^* - K_j) = \left[ \frac{f_j}{f_j'} - K_j \right]
$$

$$
\left[ t + \frac{(1 - m)r^* - (m - c)\pi}{(1 - e)(1 - \tau)} \right] - \frac{h_j' f_j}{f_j'} + h_j.
$$

(17)
Substituting equation (17) into equation (16) and simplifying, we find that

\[
(18) \quad \bar{p}_j = f_j \bar{\theta}_j + h_j = t + \frac{(1 - m)r^* - (m - c)\pi}{(1 - e)(1 - \tau)} - f_j \frac{\text{cov}(\theta_j, U_{i2})}{EU_{i2}}.
\]

This equation, the analogue to equation (11), corresponds closely to equation (2).

The equilibrium, treating these taxes and transfers as parameters, can be characterized by the joint solution of equations (13), (14), (15a), (16), and (18), along with equations (7a) and (7b). Taxes enter these equations in many ways, so clearly this equilibrium will differ in general, and in complicated ways, from the equilibrium without any taxes. However, as shown above in a mean-variance setting, there are conditions under which the equilibrium allocation remains precisely unchanged in spite of the various taxes. In particular, we can prove that as long as (a) a risk-free investment would pay no taxes on net, and (b) taxes paid by an individual are returned to him in a lump sum fashion, eliminating income effects, then these taxes have absolutely no effect on the equilibrium allocation. Stated formally:

**Theorem.** Imposing property taxes as well as corporate and personal income taxes on corporate income, with the revenue returned in a lump sum fashion to individuals, will not affect the equilibrium values for the $C_i^1$ and $K_j$, or the distribution of values for the $C_i^2$, as long as the following conditions are satisfied:\(^{11}\)

(a) $(1 - e)(1 - \tau)t + r(\tau + e(1 - \tau)) + c\pi = 0$

(b) $T_i = (\tau + e(1 - \tau)) \sum_{j=1}^{J} [(V_j - K_j)(\bar{s}_{ij} - s_{ij})(1 + r + \pi)$

\[+ s_{ij}(R_j - rK_j)],
\]
evaluated at the values for $s_{ij}$ and $K_j$ in the no tax equilibrium.

**Proof.** In order to prove this theorem, we shall show that the set of equations (7a), (7b), (13), (14), (15a), (16), and (18), together

\(^{11}\) Note that $r$ and $V_j$ refer here to the prices prevailing in the equilibrium without taxes.
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characterizing the equilibrium with taxes, are all satisfied at the equilibrium prices

(19a) \( r^* = (r + \pi)/(1 - m) - \pi, \)

and

(19b) \( V_j^* = K_j + (1 - e)(1 - \tau)(V_j - K_j), \)

and at the values for \( C^*_i \) and \( K_j \), and the distribution of values for \( C^*_j \), implied by the no-tax equilibrium, whenever conditions (a) and (b) from the theorem are both satisfied. In addition, we will show that the same number of firms \( J \) will choose to go public with and without taxes. These results are sufficient to prove the theorem. In doing so, we find that the equilibrium values for the \( s_{ij} \) remain unchanged, but the equilibrium values for \( D_i \) do change.

As a first step, it is straightforward to verify that if the values for \( C^*_i \), \( s_{ij} \), and \( K_j \) remain unchanged, then the distribution of \( C^*_j \) implied by equations (13) and (14) with taxes is identical to that implied by equations (3) and (4) without taxes, given conditions (a) and (b) and equations (12), (19a), and (19b). Condition (b) is designed so as to ensure this result. (The tedious algebra is left to the reader.) This result implies that the equilibrium \( C^*_i \) and \( C^*_j \) when there are no taxes remain just feasible for each individual when there are taxes. If the \( s_{ij} \) remain unchanged, then equation (7b) clearly continues to hold. Since \( V_j^* \) and \( V_j \) are not equal, however, we see comparing equations (14) and (3) that the values for \( D_i \) cannot be the same when the other endogenous variables have their original equilibrium values.

If \( C^*_i \) and \( C^*_j \) remain unchanged, then it follows that \( EU_{i1}, EU_{i2}, \) and \( \text{cov}(\theta_j, U_{i2}) \) all remain unchanged. Given this result and equation (19a), it follows immediately that equation (15a) will be satisfied whenever equation (5a) is satisfied. In addition, given condition (a), equation (18) will also be satisfied whenever equation (11) is satisfied.

In the case of equation (16), condition (a) and equation (19a) imply that

\[
tK_j + \frac{(1 - m)r^* - (m - c)\pi}{(1 - e)(1 - \tau)} K_j = rK_j.
\]

Equations (19a) and (19b) imply that

12. Note that a modified Fisher's law must be satisfied, requiring \( \partial r^*/\partial \pi = m/(1 - m). \)
\[
\frac{(1 + (1 - m)(r^* + \pi))}{(1 - e)(1 - \tau)} \quad (V^*_j - K_j) = (1 + r + \pi)(V_j - K_j).
\]

Together these results imply that equation (16) is satisfied whenever equation (6) is satisfied.

The last equation to be checked is equation (7a). As noted, the values of \(D_i\) will differ between the two allocations. However, if we solve for \(D_i\) using equation (14) and then add across individuals, we find that

\[
\sum_{i=1}^{I} D_i = \sum_{i=1}^{I} (W_i - C_i) - \sum_{j=1}^{J} K_j,
\]

since \(\sum_{i=1}^{I} s_{ij} = \sum_{i=1}^{I} s_{ij} = 1\). From equation (3) and the hypothesis that \(C_i\) and \(K_j\) are unchanged from the no-tax equilibrium, it follows that the right-hand side is zero. Therefore, equation (7a) is satisfied at the proposed allocation in the equilibrium with taxes. Therefore, all the first-order conditions characterizing the equilibrium with taxes are satisfied at the no-tax equilibrium values for \(C_i\), \(C_i^*\), \(s_{ij}\), and \(K_j\), and at the proposed prices in equations (19a) and (19b).

While it implicitly follows by Walras’ law, it seems worth showing explicitly that the government budget is balanced. Government revenues, collected from property taxes, corporate income taxes, and personal taxes, equal

\[
\sum_{j=1}^{J} tK_j + \sum_{j=1}^{J} \tau(R_j - tK_j) + \sum_{i=1}^{I} \left( mD_i(r^* + \pi) \\
+ s_{ij} \sum_{j=1}^{J} (c\pi K_j + e(1 - \tau)(R_j - tK_j)) \right).
\]

Using equations (7a) and (19a) and condition (a), we may simplify this to

\[
(\tau + e(1 - \tau)) \sum_{j=1}^{J} (R_j - rK_j).
\]

Total transfers, however, equal

\[
\sum_{i=1}^{I} T_i = (\tau + e(1 - \tau)) \sum_{j=1}^{J} (R_j - rK_j),
\]

since \(\sum s_{ij} = \sum s_{ij} = 1\). Since revenues equal transfers, the budget is balanced.
As a final step, we show that the same number of firms chooses to go public. A firm will go public with no taxes if and only if $V_j - K_j \geq 0$. But equation (19b) implies that $V_j^* - K_j$ is proportional to $V_j - K_j$, so when one is nonnegative, the other is nonnegative. Therefore, the same set of $J$ firms will choose to go public with and without taxes.

Q.E.D.

Before proceeding, let us return briefly to confirm that the firm, when it chooses $K_j$ so as to maximize $V_j^* - K$, is in fact acting in the interests of its shareholders. If initial owner $i$ were to choose the value of $K_j$ best for him, he would choose that value maximizing his utility, taking into account the effects on $V_j^*$ but taking other prices as given. The resulting first-order condition would be

$$E \left\{ \left[ (1 + (1 - m))r^* + \pi \right) \left( \frac{\partial V_j^*}{\partial K_j} (\bar{s}_{ij} - s_{ij}) - \bar{s}_{ij} \right) 
+ s_{ij}(1 + (1 - c)\pi) + (1 - e) \frac{\partial R_j^*}{\partial K_j} \right\} U_{ij} = 0. $$

Denote the value of $\frac{\partial V_j^*}{\partial K_j}$ at his preferred choice for $K_j$ by $v_j$. If the returns from the marginal investment are valued at $v_j$ in the market, however, then individual $i$ will also value these returns at $v_j$ (since the pattern of returns is within the span of those available from marketed securities). This implies that

$$E \left\{ \left[ (1 + (1 - c)\pi) + (1 - e) \frac{\partial R_j^*}{\partial K_j} 
- (1 + (1 - m)(r^* + \pi))v_j \right] U_{ij} \right\} = 0. $$

Given equation (23), however, equation (22) simplifies to

$$E \left[ (1 + (1 - m)(r^* + \pi))\bar{s}_{ij}(v_j - 1)U_{ij} \right] = 0. $$

We conclude that the $K_j$ for which $v_j = 1$ is the optimal choice for any individual $i$. Therefore, all shareholders will want the firm to choose $K_j$ so as to maximize $V_j^* - K_j$, the assumed policy. If all tax rates were set to zero, this result continues to hold.

Let us now explore the implications of the above theorem. Since tax revenues were returned to each individual in a lump sum fashion, the theorem gives assumptions under which taxation of capital income causes no real change and consequently no efficiency loss whatever. Condition (b), while necessary to prevent
any change in the equilibrium allocation, however, is not necessary to prevent any efficiency costs from the taxes. The equilibrium will certainly remain efficient with any nonstochastic change in the lump sum transfers. Redistributing the lotteries among individuals will also have no efficiency effect, as shown in Diamond [1967]. Individuals trade freely in these lotteries, and will arrive at an efficient allocation of them regardless of government transfers.

The key assumption, therefore, implying that these taxes are nondistorting, is condition (a). This condition requires that no net tax revenues be collected from any risk-free investment, which would earn a real rate of return in this case of \( r = (1 - m) r^* - m\pi \). The parameter values used in the argument in Section I just satisfy this condition. As in Section I, however, the average tax rate can still be quite high. Equation (21) provides an expression for total tax revenues. Since real earnings to capital equal \( \Sigma_j R_j \), the average tax rate in this economy would equal

\[
(\tau + e(1 - \tau)) \left( 1 - \frac{r \sum_{j=1}^{J} K_j}{\sum_{j=1}^{J} R_j} \right).
\]

The ratio \( \Sigma_j R_j/\Sigma_j K_j \) is the aggregate before tax real rate of return to capital. Feldstein and Summers [1977] estimate that for U.S. nonfinancial corporations, this rate of return has averaged 0.106 for the period 1948–1976. Using this estimate along with the parameter value assumptions from Section I, we see that the average tax rate would be 0.662. Since

\[
\left\{ E \left[ \sum_{j=1}^{J} R_j / \sum_{j=1}^{J} K_j \right] \right\}^{-1} < E \left[ \sum_{j=1}^{J} K_j / \sum_{j=1}^{J} R_j \right],
\]

the expected average tax rate would in fact exceed 0.662.

Expected tax revenues, from equation (21), equal

\[
(\tau + e(1 - \tau)) \sum_{j=1}^{J} (E R_j - r K_j).
\]

13. Though see Stiglitz [1982].

14. Redistributing lotteries with zero market value between individuals will have no allocation effect at all, merely inducing offsetting portfolio adjustments by individuals. For example, it is simple to show that condition (b) in the theorem can be replaced by a condition requiring that the market value of each \( T_i \) merely equal \( T_i = (\tau + e(1 - \tau)) \sum_j (V_j - K_j) s_j (1 + r + \pi) \), the value in period 2 of the lump sum tax paid on rents from initial ownership of firms.
Substituting from equation (16) for \( ER_j \), and simplifying using condition (a) and equations (19a) and (19b), we conclude that expected tax revenues can be expressed as\(^{15}\)

\[
(\tau + e(1 - \tau)) \sum_{j=1}^{J} \left\{ (1 + r + \pi) (V_j - K_j) - f_j \frac{\text{cov}(\theta_i, U_{i2})}{EU_{i2}} \right\}. 
\]

Therefore, tax revenues in effect come from a tax on pure profits plus a tax on the risk premium. The pure profits tax is clearly nondistorting. The tax on the risk premium leaves incentives unaffected, as in Section I, because the government provides just offsetting benefits to investors by absorbing the same fraction \((\tau + e(1 - \tau))\) of the risk in the return from the investment.

We therefore conclude that taxes on capital income are distorting in this model only to the degree that the total taxes paid from the returns to a risk-free investment are nonzero. If these taxes are negative, then the tax law provides a net stimulus to savings and investment, even though the average tax rate can still remain very high. If the parameter value assumptions made above are close to correct, then the net distortion is at least very small.

The net distortion also depends in unexpected ways on some of the tax rates. For example, given the assumed parameter values, if the tax rate \( e \) on equity income were larger than 0.16, then there would be net subsidy to savings and investment. Similarly, if the marginal corporate income tax rate is higher than 0.5, then there is also a net subsidy. These counterintuitive results arise because taxable corporate income \((r - t)\) on a risk-free investment is negative,\(^ {16}\) given the other assumed parameter values. In either case, however, total tax revenue should go up, as seen in equation (20).

### III. Exploration of Underlying Assumptions

The model in Section II, while in some ways very general, still contains many restrictive assumptions. In this section we shall briefly explore how the results are affected if several of these

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\(^{15}\) Note that the last term in equation (24) has the same value for all \( i \), since equation (16) holds simultaneously for all \( i \).

\(^{16}\) Recall that \( r = (1 - m)r^* - m\pi \), where \( r^* \) is the real market interest rate, with taxes.
assumptions are relaxed. We shall find, as we relax assumptions, that the taxation of capital income can well result in an efficiency gain.

A. Average versus Marginal Corporate Tax Rate

So far we have assumed that the corporate tax is a proportional tax on economic income. Yet there are many reasons why, in the existing corporate tax, the average tax rate differs from the marginal tax rate on extra income. For example, both the investment tax credit and taxable depreciation not equaling economic depreciation will cause the two to differ (as would interest deductions when debt finance is allowed for). If we let the two rates differ, the previous argument changes in a straightforward way. Let $\tau_a$ represent the average corporate tax rate and $\tau_m$ the marginal rate. Then, returning to the derivation of equation (2), we see that the expected after-tax rate of return on a new investment would equal $(1 - e)(1 - \tau_a)(\bar{\rho} - t) - c\pi$. However, following the previous argument, we note that the risk premium required on this new investment now drops to $(1 - e)(1 - \tau_m)\delta$. The implied equilibrium value of $\bar{\rho}$ becomes

$$(2a) \quad \bar{\rho} = t + (r^* + c\pi)/(1 - e)(1 - \tau_a) + (1 - \tau_m) \delta/(1 - \tau_a).$$

For this to remain unchanged from the equilibrium $\bar{\rho}$ without taxes, then condition (a) must be replaced by

$$(a') \quad (1 - e)(1 - \tau_a)t + (\tau_a + e(1 - \tau_a))r^* + c\pi + (1 - e)(\tau_a - \tau_m)\delta = 0.$$

This condition implies that raising $\tau_m$, holding $\tau_a$ constant, stimulates investment—passing more risk on to the government, while paying no more in taxes on average, is beneficial to investors. In contrast, raising $\tau_a$, holding $\tau_m$ constant, discourages investment. The focus of this paper has been on the offsetting effects of taxes of collecting revenue from the firm but also of lessening the amount of additional risk borne by the firm’s investors when new investment occurs. Here these two effects have been separated, with $\tau_a$ describing how much revenue is collected and $\tau_m$ describing how much risk is passed on to the government. Given the large size of $\delta$ empirically relative to $r^*$ or $t$, the net tax effect ought to be very sensitive to the difference $\tau_a - \tau_m$.

Developing the argument more formally, following the approach in Section II, let us introduce an investment tax credit at
rate $k$. Also, let the true depreciation rate be $d$ while the allowed
tax depreciation rate is $d_t$. Gross returns to capital, when $K_j$ is
invested, will now equal $f_j\theta_j + h_j + dK_j$. The return to capital
after true depreciation, property taxes, and corporate income taxes,
would now be\(^{17}\)

\[
(f_j\theta_j + h_j + dK_j) - dK_j - tK_j - \tau(f_j\theta_j + h_j + dK_j - d_tK_j
- tK_j) + kK_j
= (1 - \tau) \left[ f_j\theta_j + h_j - (t + (\tau(d - d_t)) - k) K_j/(1 - \tau) \right].
\]

Comparing this with equation (12) in the text, we see that this
more complicated set of tax provisions is equivalent to a corporate
income tax at rate $\tau$ and a property tax at rate $t + (\tau(d - d_t) - k)/(1 - \tau)$. The rest of the argument, using these revised tax rates,
follows as before.

**B. Introduction of Noncorporate Investment**

In the above model all capital was assumed to be in the
corporate sector. Let us now introduce a noncorporate sector with
$J_n$ active firms.\(^{18}\) When the amount of capital $K^n_j$ is-invested by
the $j$th noncorporate firm, the real return in period 2 will be
$f^n_j(K^n_j)\theta^n_j + h^n_j(K^n_j)$. For simplicity, let each firm be owned by one
individual. Without loss of generality, let the owner of firm $j$ be
individual $j$.

Let us first recharacterize the no-tax equilibrium with these
additional firms. The proprietor of firm $j$ has to decide how much
of his wealth to invest in the capital stock of his firm. The first-
order condition characterizing his optimal choice is

\[
(25) \quad E \left[ (f^n_j\theta^n_j - h^n_j' + (1 + \pi) - (1 + r + \pi))U_{j2} \right] = 0,
\]

which implies that

\[
(26) \quad f^n_j\theta^n_j + h^n_j' = r - f^n_j\text{ cov}(\theta^n_j, U_{j2})/EU_{j2}.
\]

While equation (26) is identical in form to equation (11), it holds
only for individual $j$, and not for all individuals. Risk from non-

---

\(^{17}\) Two implicit simplifying assumptions here are (1) all taxes are paid or
received in the second period, as before; and (2) the corporate tax is at least locally
linear, so that $\tau_m$ does not depend on $\theta_j$.

\(^{18}\) Firms are assumed to be corporate or noncorporate by fiat, and not by
choice.
corporate capital is borne entirely by the proprietor, while pro-
portional shares in the risk from corporate capital are distributed 
efficiently across individuals.

Let us now reexplore how the equilibrium conditions would 
be different when taxes exist. Assume that noncorporate firms 
face a property tax rate $t_n$, and that proprietors have a personal 
income tax rate $n$ on real income from their firms, and a personal 
tax rate $c_n$ on inflationary capital gains. Now, the first-order con-
dition for the proprietor's investment decision is

\[(27) \quad E\left\{ \left[ (1 - n)(f_j^n \theta_j^n + h_j^n - t_n) + (1 + (1 - c_n)\pi) 
- (1 + (1 - m)(r^* + \pi))U_{j2} \right] \right\} = 0,\]

which implies that

\[(28) \quad f_j^n \theta_j^n + h_j^n = t_n + ((1 - m)r^* - (m - c_n)\pi/(1 - n)) 
- f_j^n (\text{cov}(\theta_j^n, U_{j2})/EU_{j2}).\]

For this tax structure to leave the equilibrium unaffected, it 
is easy to show that the following conditions, in addition to those 
in the previous theorem, must be satisfied:

(a1) \quad t_n(1 - n) + nr + c_n\pi = 0
(b1) \quad The lump sum transfer to individual $j$ must be larger 
by $n(f_j^n \theta_j^n + h_j^n - rK_j^n)$.

Three interesting conclusions follow from this. First, capital 
will normally be misallocated between the corporate and noncor-
porate sectors, since the first two terms on the right-hand sides 
of equations (18) and (28), which measure the expected value of 
the marginal product in each sector net of risk bearing costs, will 
differ in general. However, the nature of the resulting misallo-
cation of capital will likely be counterintuitive. For example, assume that $t_n = t$ and $c_n = c$ but $n < \tau + e(1 - \tau)$, so that proprie-
tors face a lower net tax rate on real income. Then with our 
previous parameter assumptions (which imply that $(1 - m)r^* - 
(m - c)\pi < 0$), the tax law would induce capital to flow out of 
the noncorporate sector into the corporate sector.\(^{19}\)

Second, if proprietors were given the option of incorporating, 
their choice would be surprisingly complicated. Let us assume

---

19. This occurs because the first two terms on the right-hand side of equation (28) exceed those in equation (18) with taxes, but are equal without taxes.
that the only tax difference is that \( n < \tau + e(1 - \tau) \), and consider whether the proprietor's utility goes up when \( n \) is increased. The derivative of his utility with respect to \( n \) equals

\[
-E \left[ (f^n_j \theta^n_j + h^n_j - tK^n_j)U_{j2} \right].
\]

This can be reexpressed, using equation (27), as

\[
-E \left\{ (f^n_j \theta^n_j + h^n_j) - (f^n_j \theta^n_j)K^n_j + \frac{(1 - m)r^* - (m - c_n)\pi}{1 - n} K^n_j \right\}U_{j2} \}
\]

We find that there are two offsetting aspects affecting the proprietor's decision. The difference between the first two terms reflects the pure profits earned by the firm. These profits would be taxed at a higher rate if the firm were to incorporate, thus discouraging incorporation. (Of course, if the firm were in a competitive industry with free entry, then pure profits would be zero.) Whether the increased tax rate on normal profits is a net cost or a net benefit depends on whether the real before-tax risk-free return (the last term) is positive or negative. Any extra taxes paid on the risk premium are entirely offset by the fact that the government also absorbs more of the risk. With the above parameter value assumptions, the before-tax risk-free return is negative, so the higher tax rate is a net gain. Therefore, in general, the proprietor's optimal choice would depend on the characteristics of his profit function as well as on the tax rates.\(^{20}\)

Third, condition (b1) above prevents any redistribution of the risk in the return from noncorporate capital. This risk, however, is not distributed efficiently initially. Therefore, within the model, the government could create an efficiency gain by redesigning the lump sum transfers so as to shift at least some of the risk from a noncorporate firm away from the proprietor. The higher the tax rate \( n \), the more of the risk the government can reallocate, so the larger the potential efficiency gain.\(^{21}\)

A high tax rate \( n \) can cause condition (a1) to be substantially violated, however, distorting noncorporate investment decisions.

\(^{20}\) This analysis ignores any gains to incorporation from public trading of equity, and the resulting sharing of risk by a larger group of individuals.

\(^{21}\) Note though, that there is initially one proprietor by constraint, in spite of potential efficiency gains from risk spreading. No attempt was made here to model why the market fails to spread this risk more broadly.
This counterbalancing cost can be lessened (or even eliminated), however, by suitable readjustment of the tax rate $t_n$. Recall that $t_n$ incorporates effects from the difference between the marginal and the average personal income tax rates, as well as from property taxes. Therefore, if the net tax rate on the left-hand side of condition (a1) is positive, at any given $n$, investment tax credits or a more liberal tax depreciation policy can be introduced so as to lower $t_n$. This lessens the violation of condition (a1) while maintaining $n$, and so the potential for redistributing risk in a more efficient manner.\textsuperscript{22}

C. Inefficient Distribution of Corporate Risk

We have assumed so far that corporate risk would be allocated efficiently by the private market, with or without taxes. Therefore, unlike the situation with noncorporate risks, the government has no potential to improve on the allocation of corporate risk. However, there is some reason to presume that the private sector has not distributed this risk efficiently. According to the Statistics of Income for 1977, only 15.5 percent of tax returns reported any dividend income whatsoever, and only 10.6 percent reported dividend income exceeding the exempt amount of $200 for married couples and $100 for single individuals. (Of course, some individuals might own equity in a nontaxable form, such as through an IRA account.) Yet, in the above model, the optimal value of $s_{ij}$ for an individual would almost always be nonzero.

Why then do such a large percentage of the population not own stock? Much of the explanation probably lies in the standard forms of market "imperfections"—trading costs, borrowing constraints, etc. Market institutions undoubtedly develop so as to minimize the importance of these problems, but do so conditional on the true resource costs involved in running a market, and on the statutory regulations governing individual bankruptcies.

If the government, however, faced lower costs in reallocating risk than the private sector, then it could potentially create an efficiency gain by shifting risk toward those who face a trading constraint preventing them from reaching the optimal amount of risk bearing.\textsuperscript{23} As with taxation of noncorporate income, the in-

\textsuperscript{22} One further problem, however, is that $n$ is also the tax rate on the labor income to the proprietor, inhibiting the use of a high $n$ to redistribute risk.

\textsuperscript{23} If individuals face no constraint, however, then the government cannot create an efficiency gain by reallocating risk, even if risk is distributed inefficiently, since individuals will trade so as to undo any reallocation by the government.
centive would be to set a high corporate income tax rate, so that a large part of the risk goes to the government, it is hoped to be reallocated toward those who can bear it more cheaply. Any resulting distortions to investment incentives can then be corrected by suitable changes in the nonstochastic components of the tax structure, such as the investment tax credit or tax depreciation policies.24

For this to be worthwhile, however, the government must face lower costs than the private sector in reallocating risk. One situation where the government should find it cheaper is in the intergenerational reallocation of risk. In principle, efficiency would require that even unborn generations share in the risk in the return on existing capital. Yet these individuals do not trade currently in equity for the obvious reason that they are not yet alive. Also since they are not alive yet, there is no alternative way to set up a mutually beneficial contract ex ante to spread the risk across generations. If parents choose to leave bequests, or children choose to aid their parents, however, then the transfer can be adjusted to reflect the outcomes of current lotteries, without need of an ex ante contract. Otherwise, such sharing of risk is unlikely to occur through the private market.

The government can easily reallocate wealth across generations in this context through its debt management policy. When there is an unfavorable outcome, causing tax revenues to fall, it can run a deficit, creating government debt. This new debt replaces real capital in individual portfolios, implying a smaller capital stock available to following generations. By lowering their wage rate, and so their utility, this shifts some of the risk onto them. (Diamond [1965] develops this argument very generally in a nonstochastic setting.) Allowing the deficit to be stochastic is probably the main way in which the government does in fact handle stochastic revenue from capital income.

Thus, this argument provides a rationale for high corporate tax rates, perhaps generous investment incentives, and a variable government deficit.25 It is intriguing that government policy has in fact evolved in this direction.

24. Current tax credit and depreciation policy, however, distorts the firm’s choice concerning the durability of its capital, as shown in Auerbach [1979] or Bradford [1980].

25. In principle, government expenditures ought to respond to stochastic changes in income, as do private expenditures. There is therefore some efficiency gain from letting government expenditures absorb part of the variation in government tax revenues.
D. Variation in Corporate Tax Rates

So far, we have assumed that corporate and property tax rates are equal for all firms, and all types of corporate capital. What if these tax rates vary by firm or type of capital? Introducing a noncorporate sector was in effect a special case of this.

Let us now assume that capital in use $j$ faces a property tax rate $t_j$ and a corporate income tax rate $\tau_j$. Then, in equilibrium, equation (18) becomes

\begin{equation}
\rho_j = t_j + \frac{(1 - m)r^* - (m - c)\pi}{(1 - e)(1 - \tau_j)} - f_j \frac{\text{cov} (\theta, U_{i2})}{E U_{i2}}.
\end{equation}

In general, the sum of the first two terms on the right-hand side of equation (18a), which measures the marginal product of capital net of risk-bearing costs, will vary by use. Therefore, capital will indeed be misallocated. However, if $(1 - m)r^* < (m - c)\pi$, then capital will move toward those uses facing higher values for $\tau_j$, though away from those uses facing higher values for $t_j$.

In the special case where $(1 - m)r^* = (m - c)\pi$, we find that any variation in $\tau_j$ creates no additional distortions, so no reallocation of capital. More generally, the difference $(1 - m)r^* - (m - c)\pi$ would normally be very much smaller than the risk premium. As a result, the implied percent distortion in the required marginal product of capital (the right-hand side of equation (18a) would be very small, even with wide variations in $\tau$. For example, with the parameter values from Section I, the equilibrium $\rho$ is 0.105. If, for any firm, the corporate tax were to be entirely eliminated, the equilibrium $\rho$ increases to 0.119, a change of only 13.3 percent. Similarly, if any firm were to face twice as large a property tax rate, its equilibrium $\rho$ would increase to 0.118, a change of just 12.4 percent.\(^{26}\) We find that even very large changes in tax rates should cause only modest changes in the allocation of capital.

Therefore, while variation in $\tau$ will still cause a misallocation of capital across uses, capital may well be shifted toward more highly taxed uses, and the degree of misallocation, and so the distortion costs, caused by the varying tax rates ought to be small.

\(^{26}\) Recall that $\rho$ equals the value of the marginal product net of depreciation. The percent change in the value of the marginal product gross of depreciation, the value of the physical marginal product of capital, would be yet smaller.
These conclusions are in sharp contrast to those from certainty models, as in Harberger [1962].

E. Availability of Debt Finance

So far, we have assumed that firms use only equity finance. In allowing for debt finance, let us assume that the Modigliani-Miller [1958] theorem is satisfied, so that in the no-tax equilibrium the equilibrium conditions derived above remain unchanged. Then, in the tax equilibrium, the right-hand side of equation (18) represents the marginal cost of capital to the firm under the constraint that only equity finance be used. When the firm has the option of using debt finance, the cost of capital can only fall. Therefore, with debt finance available, the equilibrium marginal product of capital with taxes will be smaller than that implied by equation (18), implying a further departure from the standard results.

IV. Conclusions

By treating uncertainty explicitly in modeling the effects of taxes on capital income, we have produced conclusions sharply at variance with those in earlier papers, where uncertainty is ignored. The principal contrasting conclusions here are as follows:

1. While the average tax rate on corporate capital income may be very high, the tax-created distortion to investment incentives can be very small, and could amount to a slight subsidy. The explanation is that, while investors given taxes receive a lower expected return, they also bear less risk when they invest, and these two effects are largely offsetting.

2. While the average tax rate on income from noncorporate capital is smaller than that on income from corporate capital, taxes may yet induce a slight flow of capital from the noncorporate sector to the corporate sector. The intersectoral distortion is likely to be very small, however.

27. When the Modigliani-Miller [1958] theorem is not satisfied, as in Auerbach-King [1979], the analysis becomes much more complicated. 28. Allowing for the possibility of debt finance without further modifications to the model will normally lead to a corner solution with all debt finance. Various approaches have been suggested for rationalizing the simultaneous use of both debt and equity finance. See, for example, Miller [1977], DeAngelo-Masulis [1980], and Gordon [1982].
3. It follows that the efficiency costs arising from tax distortions affecting either the amount or allocation of real investment can be very small. In addition, there could well be efficiency gains resulting from these taxes due to a reallocation of risk bearing across individuals and across generations.

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