Technical appendix to the book « Capital et ideology »

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
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
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
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
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
Health and education in the world, 1820-2020









Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 0.4).





Interpretation. The bottom 50% incomes of the world saw substantial growth in purchasing power between 1980 and 2018 (between +60% and +120%). the top 1% incomes saw even stronger growth (between +80% and +240%). Intermediate categories grew less. In sum, inequality decreased between the bottom and the middle of the global income distribution, and increased between the middle and the top. Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 0.5).



Inequality, 1900-2020: Europe, United States, Japan










Transformation of political and electoral conflict 1945-2020:


Interpretation. In the period 1950-1970, the vote for the Democratic party in the U.S. and for left-wing parties (Socialists, Communists, Radicals, Ecologists) in France was associated to voters with the lowest educational degrees and income levels; in the period 1980-2000, it became associated with the voters with the highest degrees; in the period 2010-2020, it is also becoming associated with the voters with the highest incomes (particularly in the U.S.). Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 0.9).



The structure of ternary societies: Europe-India 1660-1880







The Church as a property-owning organization 1750-1780

Interpretation. Around 1750-1780, the Church owned between 25% and 30% of total property in Spain and close to 25% in France (all assets combined: land, real estate, financial assets, including capitalisation of church tithes). By comparison, in 2010, the set of all non-profit institutions (including religious organizations, universities, museums, foundations, etc.) owned less than 1% of total property in France, 6% in the United States and 3% in Japan. Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 2.3).

Clergy and nobility in France 1380-1780 (% of total population)

	1380	1470	1560	1660	1700	1780	
Clergy	1,4%	1,3%	1,4%	1,4%	1,1%	0,7%	
Nobility	2,0%	1,8%	1,9%	2,0%	1,6%	0,8%	
Total Clergy + Nobility	3,4%	3,1%	3,3%	3,4%	2,7%	1,5%	
Third Estate	96,6%	96,9%	96,7%	96,6%	97,3%	98,5%	
Total population (millions)	11	14	17	19	22	28	
incl. Clergy (thousands)	thousands) 160 190		240	260	230	200 210	
incl. Nobility (thousands)			320	360	340		

Interpretation: in 1780, the clergy and the nobility included respectively about 0,7% and 0,8% of total population in France, hence a total of 1,5% for the two dominant orders (about 410 000 individuals out of 28 millions). Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (table 2.1).

Clergy and nobility in France 1380-1780 (% of adult male population)

	1380	1470	1560	1660	1700	1780	
Clergy	3,3%	3,2%	3,3%	3,3%	2,5%	1,7%	
Nobility	1,8%	1,6%	1,8%	1,8%	1,5%	0,7%	
Total Clergy + Nobility	5,1%	4,8%	5,1%	5,1%	4,0%	2,4%	
Third Estate	94,9%	95,2%	94,9%	94,9%	96,0%	97,6%	
Adult male population (millions)	3,4	4,2	5,1	5,6	6,5	8,3	
incl. Clergy (thousands)	110	130	160	180	160	140	
incl. Nobility (thousands)	60	60	90	100	90	60	

Interpretation: in 1780, the clergy and the nobility included respectively about 1,7% and 0,7% of adult male population in France, hence a total of 2,4% for the two dominant orders (about 200 000 individuals out of 8,3 millions). Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (table 2.2).

Some progressive tax projects in 18th century France


Graslin : progressive tax on income (Essai analytique sur la richesse et l'impôt , 1767)							
Multiple of average income	Effective tax rate						
0,5	5%						
20	15%						
200	50%						
1300	75%						


Lacoste : progressive tax on inheritance


(Du droit national d'hérédité, 1792)

Multiple of average wealth	Effective tax rate				
0,3	6%				
8	14%				
500	40%				
1500	67%				

Interpretation. In the progressive income tax project presented by Graslin in 1767, the effective tax rate rose gradually from 5% for an annual income of 150 livres tournois (about half of average per adult income at the time) to 75% for an annual income of 400000 livres (about 1300 times average income). One observes a comparable progressivity with the progressive inheritance tax project presented by Lacoste in 1792. **Sources:** see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (table 3.1).








The composition of Parisian wealth, 1872-1912


	Real estate assets (buildings, houses, agricultural land, etc.)	incl.: Paris real estate	incl.: out-of-Paris real estate	Financial assets (equity, bonds, etc.)	incl.: French equity	incl.: foreign equity	incl.: French private bonds	incl.: foreign private bonds	incl.: French public bonds	incl.: foreign public bonds	incl.: other financial assets (deposits, cash, etc.)	Total foreign financial assets	Furniture, precious objects, etc.
Composition of total wealth													
1872	41%	28%	13%	56%	14%	1%	17%	2%	10%	3%	9%	6%	3%
1912	35%	24%	11%	62%	13%	7%	14%	5%	5%	9%	9%	21%	3%
					Corr	positior	n of top 1	% weal	th				
1872	43%	30%	13%	55%	15%	1%	14%	2%	9%	4%	10%	7%	2%
1912	32%	22%	10%	66%	15%	10%	14%	5%	4%	10%	8%	25%	2%
Composition of next 9%													
1872	42%	27%	15%	56%	13%	1%	21%	2%	10%	2%	7%	5%	2%
1912	42%	30%	12%	55%	11%	2%	14%	4%	7%	8%	9%	14%	3%
Composition of next 40%													
1872	27%	1%	26%	62%	12%	1%	23%	1%	14%	2%	9%	4%	11%
1912	31%	7%	24%	59%	12%	1%	20%	2%	10%	4%	10%	7%	10%


Interpretation: In 1912, real esate assets made 35% of total property owned by Parisian wealth holders, financial assets made 62% of the total (including 21% for foreign financial assets), and furniture and precious objects made 3%. Among top 1% wealth holders, the share of financial assets reached 66% (including 25% for foreign financial assets). Sources: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (table 4.1).





The weight of the clergy in Europe, 1530-1930


intermediate in France. Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 5.1).














and 1%) and 88% in Sweden (vs 11% and 1%). Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 5.6).



34% and 13%). Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 5.7).




Atlantic slave societies, 18th-19th societies




An expanding slave island: Saint-Domingue 1700-1790

Interpretation. The total population of Saint-Domingue (Haïti) rose from less than 50 000 individuals in 1700-1710 (including 56% of slaves, 3% of coloured and mulatto free individuals and 41% of whites) to over 500 000 individuals in 1790 (including 90% of slaves, 5% of coloured and mulatto free individuals and 5% of whites). Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 6.2).




dropped or disappeared in Northern States. Sources and series: voir piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideologie (figure 6.3).




The structure of slave and free population in the United States (1800-1860)

	Total (thousands)	Blacks (slaves)	Blacks (free) Whites		Total (%)	Blacks (slaves)	Blacks (free)	Whites
Total United States 1800	5 210	880	110	4 220	100%	17%	2%	81%
Northern States	2 630	40	80	2 510	100%	2%	3%	95%
Southern States	2 580	840	30	1 710	100%	33%	1%	66%
Total United States 1860	31 180	3 950	490	26 740	100%	13%	2%	85%
Northern States	18 940	0	340	18 600	100%	0%	2%	98%
Southern States	12 240	3 950	150	8 140	100%	32%	1%	67%

Interpretation. The number of slaves was multiplied by more than 4 in the United States between 1800 and 1860 (from 880 000 to 3,950 millions), while at the same time representing an approximately fixed fraction of total population of Southern States (about one third), and a declining fraction of total U.S. population (given the even faster rise of the population of Northern States). **Note**: all slave States as of 1860 were classified as Sourthern States: Alabama, Arkansas, North and South Carolina, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississipi, Missouri, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia. **Sources and series**: voir piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (table 6.1).





The weight of Europeans in colonial societies




Inequality in colonial and slave societies


about 90% slaves and less than 10% Europeans settlers), vs close to 70% in colonial Algeria in 1930 (then made of about 90% local population and 10% European settlers), and about 50% in metropolitan France in 1910. Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 7.2).






The top percentile in historical and colonial perspective





Interpretation. In a society where average income is 3 times larger than subsistence income, the maximal share received by top 10% highest incomes (compatible with a subsistence income for the bottom 90%) is equal to 70% of total income, and the maximal share of top 1% highest incomes (compatible with a substistence income for the bottom 99%) is equal to 67% of total income. The richer the society, the more it is feasible to reach a high inequality level. Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 7.6).





The top percentile in historical perspective (with Haiti)

investment in historical perspective Share of educational spending benefiting the top 10% most favoured children, the bottom 50% least favoured, and the intermediate 40% 80% 70% **Top 10%** 60% 50% 40% **Top 10%** 30% Next 20% Next 40% 40% Bottom **Bottom Top 10%** 10% 50% 50% Next **Bottom** 40% 50% 0% France 1910 France 2018 Algeria 1950 Interpretation. In Algeria in 1950, the 10% the most favoured (the settlers) benefited from 82% of total educational spending. By comparison, the share of total educational spending benefiting the top 10% of the population which benefited from the highest educational investement (i.e. those children which did the longest and most expensive studies) was 38% in France in 1930 and 20% in 2018.


Colonies for the colonizers: inequality of educational


Sources and series: see piketty pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 7.8).







Population in India, China and Europe, 1700-2050






The evolution of ternary societies: Europe-India 1530-1930





Interpretation. The results reported here were obtained from the decennial censuses 1951-2011 and NSS surveys 1983-2014. Quotas for accessing universities and public sector jobs were enacted for "scheduled castes" (SC) and "scheduled tribes" (ST) (ancient discriminated groups of untouchables and aborigenal tribes) in 1950, before being gradually extended beginning in 1980-1990 to "other backward classes" (OBC) (ancient shudras), following the Mandal commission in 1979-1980. OBCs are registered in NSS surveys since 1999 only, so the estimates reported here for 1981 and 1991 (35% of population) are approximate. Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 8.5).



Discrimination and inequality in comparative perspective

The structure of the population in censuses of India, 1871-2011


	1871	1881	1891	1901	1911	1921	1931	1941	1951	1961	1971	1981	1991	2001	2011
Hindus	75%	76%	76%	74%	73%	72%	71%	72%	84%	83%	83%	82%	81%	81%	80%
Muslims	20%	20%	20%	21%	21%	22%	22%	24%	10%	11%	11%	12%	13%	13%	14%
Other religions (sikhs, christians, buddhists, etc.)	5%	4%	4%	5%	6%	6%	7%	4%	6%	6%	6%	6%	6%	6%	6%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%	100%
Scheduled castes (SC)									15%	15%	15%	16%	17%	16%	17%
Schedules tribes (ST)									6%	7%	7%	8%	8%	8%	9%
Total Indian population (millions)	239	254	287	294	314	316	351	387	361	439	548	683	846	1 029	1 211


Interpretation: The results reported here were obtained using the decennial censuses conducted in British colonial India between 1871 and 1941 and in independant India from 1951 to 2011. The proportion of Muslims falls from 24% in 1941 to 10% in 1951, due to the partition with Pakistan. Starting in 1951, censuses register "scheduled castes" (SC) and "scheduled tribes" (ST) (untouchables and aborigenal tribes formerly discriminated), which can belong to the various religions (mostly hindus and other religions). Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (table 8.1).

The structure of upper castes in India, 1871-2014


	1871	1881	1891	1901	1911	1921	1931	1962	1967	1971	1977	1996	1999	2004	2009	2014
Total upper castes	13,3%	12,6%	13,4%	13,2%	12,3%	12,0%	12,7%	13,6%	13,8%	14,2%	13,7%	12,8%	13,6%	13,7%	12,8%	14,0%
incl. Brahmins (priests, intellectuals)	6,7%	6,6%	6,5%	6,4%	5,9%	5,8%	5,6%	6,6%	6,7%	7,1%	6,5%	5,6%	6,1%	6,1%	5,7%	6,2%
incl. Kshatryas (Rajputs) (warriors)	3,8%	3,7%	4,5%	4,6%	4,1%	4,2%	4,1%	3,9%	4,0%	4,1%	4,2%	4,0%	4,2%	4,7%	4,6%	4,8%
incl. other upper castes: Vaishyas (Banias), Kayasths	2,8%	2,3%	2,4%	2,2%	2,3%	2,1%	3,0%	3,1%	3,1%	3,0%	3,0%	3,2%	3,3%	2,9%	2,5%	3,0%
Total hindu population (millions)	179	194	217	217	228	226	247	375	419	453	519	759	800	870	939	1 012

Interpretation: The results reported here were obtained using the British colonial censuses of India conducted between 1871 and 1931 and the post-electoral surveys (self-declaration) run from 1962 to 2014. One observes a relative stability of the proportion of the population registered as brahmins (former classes of priests and intellectuals), kshatryas (rajputs) (former classes of warriors) and other upper castes: vaishyas (banias) (craftsmen, tradespeople) and kayasths (writers, accountants). Other local upper castes such as the marathas (about 2% of population) were not included here. Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (table 8.2).






Interpretation. Around 1500-1600, tax revenues per inhabitant the main European States were between 2 and 4 days of urban unskilled maneuver wages; in 1750-1780, they were between 10 and 20 days of unskilled wages. Per inhabitant fiscal revenues remained around 2-5 days of wages in the Ottoman Empire as well as in the Chinese Empire. With a per inhabitant national income estimated to be around 250 days of unskilled urban wage, this implies that tax revenues have stagnated around 1%-2% of national incime in Chinese and Ottoman Empires, while they rose from 1%-2% to 6%-8% of national income in Europe. Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 9.2).





The evolution of ternary societies: Europe-Japan 1530-1870

fiefdom was significantly higher than that of shinto priests and monks, but it dropped significantly between 1720 and 1870, according to the censuses conducted in Japan during Edo era and at the beginning of Meiji era. Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 9.3).





Income inequality: Europe and the U.S. 1900-2015







Income inequality: the top percentile, 1900-2015







Wealth inequality: the top percentile, 1900-2015








Interpretation. In 1900-1910, the 1% highest capital incomes (rent, profit, dividend, interest, etc.) received about 60% of total capital incomes; the 1% highest capital owners (real estate, business and financial assets, net of debt) owned about 55% of total private property; the 1% highest total incomes (labour and capital) received about 20%-25% of total income; the 1% highest labour incomes (wages, self-employment income, pensions) received about 5M-10% of total labour incomes. In the long-run, the fall of inequality is entirely due to the fall in the concentration of property and incomes from capital. Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 10.7).

















Effective rates and progressivity in the U.S. 1910-2020


the total population (and particularly by the bottom 50% incomes). Since 1980, the tax system has not been very progressive, with little differences in effective tax rates across groups. Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 10.13).






Interpretation. In 2015, fiscal revenues represented 47% of national income on average in Western Europe et were used as follows: 10% of national income for regalian expenditure (army, police, justice, general administration, basic infrastructure: roads, etc.); 6% for education; 11% for pensions; 9% for health; 5% for social transfers (other than pensions); 6% for other social spending (housing, etc.). Before 1914, regalian expenditure absorbed almost all fiscal revenues. **Note.** The evolution depicted here is the average of Germany, France, Britain and Sweden (see figure 10.14). Sources and séries: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 10.15).







Divergence of top and bottom incomes 1980-2018


21%. The divergence between bottom and top incomes is general, but its magnitude varies across countries: it is larger in India and in the U.S. than in China and in Europe. Sources and series: see piketty pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 11.1).











Labour productivity : Europe vs United States














Primary inequality and redistribution: U.S. vs France



The share of private financing in education: diversity of euro-american models




Interpretation. In the U.S., private financing make 65% of total financing (private and public) of higher education, and 9% of total financing of primary and secondary education. The share of private financing in higher education varies substantially across countries, with an anglo-american model, a south-european model and a north-european model. The share of private financing is everywhere relatively small regarding primary and secondary education (2014-2016 figures). Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 11.11).




Growth and inequality in the U.S. 1870-2020

between 1990 and 2020, while the share of the top percentile (the 1% highest incomes) in national income rose from 12% to 18% over the same period. Sources and series: see piketty pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 11.12).




Growth and progressive taxation in the U.S. 1870-2020


Interpretation. in the U.S., the growth rate of per capita national income dropped from 2,2% per year between 1950 and 1990 to 1,1% between 1990 and 2020, while the top marginal tax rate applied to the highest incomes dropped from 72% to 35% over the same period. **Sources and series**: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 11.13).




Growth and inequality in Europe 1870-2020



Growth and progressive taxation in Europe 1870-2020




income, while the highest incomes mostly consist of capital income (especially dividends). Note: the distribution shown here is annual income per adult, before taxes but pensions and unemployment insurance. Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 11.16).




Composition of property (France 2015)


Interpretation. In France in 2015 (as in most countries where data are available), small fortunes consist primarily cash and bank deposits, medium fortunes of real estate, and large fortunes of financial assets (mainly stocks). Note: the distribution shown here is per adult wealth (wealth of couples divided by two). Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 11.17).




Inequalities with respect to capital & labour (France 2015)


Interpretation. The 10% highest capital incomes account for 66% of total capital income, vs 5% for the 50% lowest and 29% for the next 40%. Regarding labour income, these shares are respectively 27%, 24% and 49%. Note. The distributions shown here are per adult annual income (the incomes of couples were divided by two). Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideologie (figure 11.18).









The top percentile in Russia 1900-2015




The income gap between Russia & Europe 1870-2015








Financial assets held in tax havens

the U.S., 10% in Europe and 50% in Russia. These estimates exclude non-financial assets (such as real estate) and financial assets unreported to BIS and SNB and should be considered minimum estimates. Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 12.5).












Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 12.9).




Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 12.10).





Global inequality regimes (2018)

46% in Russia, 48% in the U.S., 55% in India, 56% in Brasil, 64% in the Middle East, 65% in South Africa and 68% in Qatar. Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 13.2).




Inequality in 2018: Europe, U.S., Middle East

320 million) they are 47% and 13%. Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 13.3).


Global inequality regimes (2018): the bottom 50% vs the top 1% 30% Share of total income received by the bottom 50% and the top 1% 25% **Top 1%** 20% **Top 1% Bottom** 15% 50% **Bottom Top 1%** 50% 10% **Bottom Top 1%** 50% **Bottom** 50% 5% 0% China **United States Middle East** Europe Interpretation. The share of bottom 50% highest incomes is only 9% of total income in the Middle East, vs 30% for the top 1% share. In Europe, these two shares are 21% and 11%. In China they are 15% and 14%, and in the U.S; they are 13% and 20%.

Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 13.4).




Inequality between the top 10% and the bottom 50% (2018)

Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 13.5).




Inequality between the top 1% and the bottom 50% (2018)


Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 13.6).





The global distribution of carbon emissions 2010-2018


Interpretation. The share of North America (U.S.-Canada) in total global emissions (direct and indirect) was 21% on average in 2010-2018; this share rises to 36% if one looks at emissions greater than global average (6,2t CO2e per year), 46% for emissions above 2,3 times the global average (i.e. the top 10% of world emitters, accounting for 45% of total emissions, compared to 13% for the bottom 50% of world emitters), and 57% of those emitting over 9,1 times the global average (i.e. the top 1% of world emitters, accounting for 14% of total emissions). Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 13.7).















The size of central bank balance sheets 1900-2018

Note. The average of rich countries is the arithmetic average of the 17 following countries: Australia, Belgium, Britain, Canada, Denmark, France, Finland, Germany, Holland, Italy, Japan, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, U.S.). Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 13.13).




Central banks and financial globalization


The rise of top global wealth holders, 1987-2017					
Annual average real growth rate 1987-2017 (after deduction of inflation)	World	U.SEurope-China			
The one hundred-millionth richest (Forbes)	6,4%	7,8%			
The one twenty-millionth richest (Forbes)	5,3%	7,0%			
The top 0,01% (WID.world)	4,7%	5,7%			
The top 0,1% (WID.world)	3,5%	4,5%			
The top 1% (WID.world)	2,6%	3,5%			
Per adult average wealth	1,9%	2,8%			
Per adult average income	1,3%	1,4%			
Total adult population	1,9%	1,4%			
GDP or total income	3,2%	2,8%			


Interpretation. Between 1987 and 2017, the average wealth of the one hundred-millionth richest individuals in the world (i.e. about 30 individuals out of 3 billions adults in 1987, and 50 out of 5 billions in 2017) grew by 6,4% a year globally; the average wealth of the 0,01% richest individuals (about 300 000 individuals in 1987, 500 000 in 2017) grew by 4,7% a year, and average global wealth by 1,9% a year. The rise of very top wealth holders has been even more marked if we concentrate on U.S.-Europe-China. Sources: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (table 13.1).


Social cleavages & political conflict in France 1955-2020




Electoral left in Europe and the U.S. 1945-2020: from the workers' party to the party of the highly educated










Interpretation. The score obtained by left-wing parties (socialistes, communistes, radicals, greens and ohter parties from the center-left, left and extreme-left) has oscillated between 40% and 57% of the votes in the first rounds of legislative elections conducted in France over the 1945-2017 period. Note: the score obtained by the LREM-MODEM coalition in 2017 (32% of votes) was divided 50-50 between center-left and center-right. Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 14.4).








Interpretation. Voter turnout has been relatively stable around 80%-85% in French presidential elections since 1965 (with however a small fall to 75% in 2017). The fall has been much stronger in legislative elections, which was around 80% until the 1970s, and was less than 50% in 2017. Electoral participation dropped in Britain before rising again since 2010. In the U.S., it has generally fluctuated around 50%-60%. Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 14.7).




Interpretation. During the 1950-1980 period, electoral participation in France and Britain was at most 2%-3% higher among the 50% highest incom voters than among the 50% lowest income voters. This gap rose significantly since the 1980s and reached 10%-12% in the 2010s? thereby approaching the levels historically observed in the U.S. Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 14.8).





Left vote vote by level of education, France 1956-2012

Interpretation. In the 1956 legislative elections, 57% of voters with a primary education or less (certificat d'études primaires) (i.e. 72% of the electorate at the time) voted for left-wing parties (socialists-communists-radicals), vs. 50% of voters with secondary diplomas (23% of the electorate) and 37% of voters with higher education diplomas (5% of the electorate). In the 2012 presidential elections, the education cleavage was totally reversed: the left-wing candidate obtained 58% of the vote in the second round among voters with higher education diplomas, vs 47% of the vote among voters with primary education only. Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 14.9).




2010s, the pattern is completely reversed. Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 14.10).








bottom 90% income voters, and strongly decreasing among top 10% income voters, especially at the beginning of the period. Note: D1 refers to the 10% lowest incomes, D2 to the next 10%,..., and D10 to the 10% highest incomes. Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 14.12).



10% lowest wealth holders, D2 to the next 10%,..., and D10 to the 10% highest wealth holders. **Sources and series**: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology. (figure 14.13)









Political conflict & religious diversity: France 1967-1997

Interpretation. Self-reported muslim voters vote significantly more for left-wing parties than voters with no religion beginning in 1997. Before 1988, muslims were classified with other religions (protestantism, judaism, buddhims, hinduism, etc.), and made less than 1% of the electorate . Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 14.16).




Political conflict & religious diversity: France 2002-2017


Interpretation. About 80%-90% of self-reported muslim voters vote for left-wing parties in all elections in France since the 1990s. Before 1988, muslims were classified with other religions (protestantism, judaism, buddhims, hinduism, etc.), and made less than 1% of the electorate . Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 14.17).



Interpretation. In 2012, the socialist candidate received 49% of the vote among voters with no foreign origin (no foreign grand-parent), 49% of the vote among voters with European foreign origine (in practice mostly Spain, Italy, Portugal) and 77% of the vote among voters with extra-European foreign origins (in practice mostly North Africa and Subsaharan Africa). Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 14.18).




Interpretation. In 2017, 21% of voters can be classified as "internationalists-egalitarians" (they consider that there are not too many migrants and that inequalities between the rich and the poor ought to be reduced); 26% as "nativists-inegalitarians" (they consider that there are too many migrants and that there is no need to reduce the inequalities between the rich and the poor); 23% as "internationalits-inegalitarians" (pro-migrants, pro-rich) and 30% as "nativists-egalitarians" (anti-migrants, pro-poor). Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 14.19).




Politico-ideological conflict in France 2017: an electorate divided into four quarters

Presidential election 2017 (1 st round)	All voters	Melenchon /Hamon (vote "egalitarian- internationalist")	Macron (vote "inegalitarian- internationalist")	Fillon (vote "inegalitarian nativist")	Le Pen /Dupont-Aignan (vote "egalitarian- nativist")
	100%	28%	24%	22%	26%
"There are too many migrants in France" (% agree)	56%	32%	39%	62%	91%
"In order to achieve social justice, one should take to the rich and give to the poor" (% agree)	51%	67%	46%	27%	61%
Higher education graduates (%)	33%	39%	41%	36%	16%
Monthly income > 4000€ (%)	15%	9%	20%	26%	8%
Home owners (%)	60%	48%	69%	78%	51%


Interpretation. In 2017, 28% of first-round voters voted for Melenchon-Hamon; 32% of them considered that there are too many migrants in France (vs 56% on average among all voters) and 67% that we should take from the rich and give to the poor (vs 51% on average). In that sense this electorate is ideologically "egalitarian-internationalist", while the Macron electorate is "inegalitarian-internationalist" (pro-migrants, pro-rich), the Fillon electorate "inegalitarian-nativist" (anti-migrants, pro-rich) and the Le Pen/Dupont Aignan electorate "egalitarian-nativist" (anti-migrants, pro-poor). Note: the votes for Arthaud/Poutou (2%) and Asselineau/Cheminade/Lassale (2%) were added to Melenchon/Hamon and Fillon. Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (table 14.1).







Democratic vote by diploma in the U.S. 1948-2016

Interpretation. In 1948, the democratic candidate (Truman) obtained 62% of the vote among voters with primary education (no high school diploma) (63% of the electorate at the time) and 26% among voters with advanced higher education diplomas (1% of the electorate). In 2016, the democratic candidate (Clinton) obtained 45% of the vote among voters with secondary education (56% of the electorate) and 75% among those holding a PhD (2% of the electorate). Like in Fance, we see a full reversal of the educational cleavage between 1948 and 2016. Note: BA: bachelor degree or equivalent. MA: master & other advanced degres (law/medical school). PhD: doctorate. Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 15.2)





Democratic vote in the U.S. 1948-2016: from the workers' party to the party of the highly educated






Social cleavages and political conflict: U.S. 1948-2016





Political conflict and ethnic identity: U.S. 1948-2016

Interpretation. In 2016, the democratic candidate obtained 37% of the vote among white voters (70% of the electorate), 89% of the vote among black voters (11% of the electorate) and 64% of the vote among Latinos and other non-whites (19% of the electorate, including 16% for Latinos). In 1972, the democratic candidate obtained 32% of the vote among whites (89% of the electorate), 82% among blacks (10% of the electorate) and 64% among Latinos and other categories (1% of the electorate). Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 15.7).




Political conflict and racial cleavage: U.S. 1948-2016


Sources and series: see piketty pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 15.8).

Political conflict and origins: France & the US 100% ■ No foreign origin (France); Whites (U.S.) % vote democrat (US) or socialist (France) European foreign origins (France); Latinos (U.S.) 90% 89% Extra-European foreign origins (France); Blacks (U.S.) 80% 77% 70% 64% 60% 50% 49% 49% 40% 37% 30% 20% 72% 9% 19% 70% 11% 19% 10% **France 2012**


Etats-Unis 2016

Interpretation. In 2012, the socialist candidate in the second round of the French presidential election obtained 49% of the vote among voters with no foreign origin (no reported foreign grand-parent) and among voters with European foreign origins (in practice mostly Spain, Italy, Portugal) and 77% of the vote among voters with extra-European foreign origins (in practice mostly North Africa and Subsaharan Africa). In 2016, the democratic candidate at the U.S. presidential election obtained 37% of the vote among white voters, 64% among latinos and other minority voters and 89% among black voters. Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 15.9).








From the workers' party to the party of the highly educated: the Labour vote, 1955-2017




The electoral left in Europe & the US, 1945-2020: from the workers' party to the party of the highly educated











Political conflict & religious diversity: Britain 1964-2017


among self-reported muslim voters. Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 15.16).





Political conflict & ethnic categories, Britain 1979-2017

Interpretation. In 2017, the labour party obtained 44% of the vote among voters describing themselves as "Whites", 81% among "Africans-Caribbeans", 82% among "Indians-Pakistanis-Bengladeshis" and 69% among "others" ("Chinese", "Arabs", etc.). In 2017, 5% of the electorate refused to answer to the ethnic question, and 77% among them voted labour. Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 15.17).












among voters with the lowest incomes. Sources and series: see piketty pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 16.3).






income voters. Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 16.5).





Catalan regionalism and education, 2008-2016


self-determination referendum (both answers were added), vs 60% among the voters with secondary degrees and 74% among those with higher education diplomas. Sources and series: see piketty pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 16.6).


Legislative elections in India (Lok Sabha), 1962-2014
























The politisation of inequality in Brasil, 1989-2018

The circulation of property and progressive taxation

Progressive tax on property (funding of the capital endowment allocated to each young adult)			Progressive tax on income (funding of basic income and social and ecological State)	
Multiple of average wealth	Annual tax on property (effective tax rate)	Tax on inheritances (effective tax rate)	Multiple of average income	Effective tax rate (including social contributions and carbon tax)
0,5	0,1%	5%	0,5	10%
2	1%	20%	2	40%
5	2%	50%	5	50%
10	5%	60%	10	60%
100	10%	70%	100	70%
1000	60%	80%	1000	80%
10000	90%	90%	10000	90%

Interpretation. The proposed tax system includes a progressive tax on property (annual tax and inheritance tax) funding a capital endowment for all young adults and a progressive tax on income (including social contributions and progressive tax on carbon emissions) funding the basic income and the social and ecological State (health, education, pensions, unemployment, energy, etc.). This system favouring the circulation of property is one of the constituting elements of participatory socialism, together with a 50-50 split of voting rights among workers representatives and shareholders in corportations. Note: in the exemple given here, the progressive property tax raises about 5% of national income (allowing to fund a capital endowment of about 60% of average net wealth, to be allocated to each young adult at 25-year of age) and the progressive income tax about 45% of national income (allowing to fund an annual basic income of about 60% of after-tax income, costing about 5% of national income, and the social and ecological State for about 40% of national income). Sources: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (table 17.1).



The inequality of educational investment: France 2018

Interpretation. Total public educational investment received during their studies (from kindergarten to university) by students of the cohort reaching 18 in 2018 will be about 120 k€ (i.e. about 15 years of studies for an average cost of 8000€ per year). Within this generation, the 10% of students receiving the smallest educational investment receive about 65-70 k€, while the 10% receiving the most receive between 200 k€ and 300 k€. Note: average costs per year of study in the French educational system in 2015-2018 rank from 5-6 k€ in kindergarten-primary to 8-10 k€ in secondary, 9-10 k€ in universities and 15-16 k€ in preparatory classes to *arandes ecoles* (etlite tracks). Sources and series: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (figure 17.1).

A novel organisation of globalisation: transnational democracy


Transnational Assembly

In charge of **global public goods** (climate, research, etc.) and of **global fiscal justice** (common taxes on high wealth and income holders and large corporations, carbon taxes)

National Assembly Country A National Assembly Country B

National Assembly Country C

National Assembly Country D



Interpretation. According to the proposed organisation, the treaties regulating globalisation (flows of goods, capital and individuals) will henceforth include the creation between the signatories States and Regional Unions of a Transnational Assembly in charge of global public goods (climate, research, etc.) and global fiscal justice (common taxes on high wealth and income holders and large corporations, carbon taxes). Note. Countries A, B, C, D can be States like France, Germany, Italy, Spain, etc., in which case the Transational Assembly will be the European Assembly; or countries A, B, etc. could be Regional Unions like the European Union, the African Union, etc., in which case the Transnational Assembly would be that of the Euro-African Union. The Transnational Assembly could be formed of deputies from the National Assemblies and/or of transnational deputies especially elected for this purpose, depending on the situation. **Sources**: see piketty.pse.ens.fr/ideology (table 17.2).