FAMILY TIES AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

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Abstract

We establish an inverse relationship between family ties and political participation, such that the more individuals rely on the family as a provider of services, insurance, and transfer of resources, the lower is one's civic engagement and political participation. We also show that strong family ties appear to be a substitute for generalized trust, rather than a complement to it. These three constructs—civic engagement, political participation, and trust—are part of what is known as social capital; therefore, in this paper, we contribute to the investigation of the origin and evolution of social capital. We establish these results using within-country evidence and looking at the behavior of immigrants from various countries in 32 different destination places (JEL: P16, Z10, Z13).

1. Introduction

Well-functioning democracies need citizens' participation in politics. The concept of politics is broader than simply voting in elections, including a host of activities like volunteering as an unpaid campaign worker, debating politics with others, and attending political meetings (e.g., campaign appearances of candidates), joining political groups, participating in boycott activities, strikes or demonstrations, writing letters to representatives and so on. What determines it?

The purpose of this paper is to investigate an hypothesis put forward by Banfield (1958) in his study of a southern Italian village. In this study, he defines *amoral familism* as a social equilibrium in which people exclusively trust (and care about) their immediate family, expect everybody else to behave in that way and therefore (rationally) do not trust non-family members and do not expect to be trusted outside the family.¹ He argues that amoral familism leads to low civic engagement, low political participation, low generalized trust, and a lack of confidence in political institutions. As a result, amoral familism prevents the development of well-functioning political

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^{1.} It is indeed not a coincidence that Italian mafia clans identify themselves as *families*. Trust within a mafia family is an absolute necessity, and complete distrust for outsiders is a key ingredient of the mafia organization. See Gambetta 1990.

institutions, creates a situation where politics is simply a private affair of those who control it, common goods are completely disregarded and there is very little interest in participating in public affairs. In other words, the more the family is all that matters for an individual, the less he or she will care about the rest of society and the polity.

In this paper, we look at the relationship between family ties and political participation on the one hand, and family ties and the level of generalized trust on the other hand. We argue that a lack of political participation and generalized trust is transmitted from parents to children in strong family ties societies. Therefore, once political attitudes are acquired, they tend to remain fairly stable over time. As a result, attitudes of dissatisfaction with politics do not vary with the fortunes of specific parties or candidates. In societies where trust is built overwhelmingly on the family, modern democracy will face long-lasting challenges if these negative attitudes towards politics are transmitted from one generation to the next.

In Alesina and Giuliano (2010) we measured the strength of family ties, that is, the extent to which in different cultures family members are closely tied together, using answers to survey questions. Amoral familism would be the (pathological) extreme in the direction of strong family ties, so strong that they are the *only* social connection that matters. In the present paper we test the idea that political participation and civic engagement are inversely related to the closeness of family ties. Even casual observations reveal a correlation between strength of family ties and civic engagement. In Northern European cultures, family ties are relatively low and social capital, trust and political participation are high; the opposite holds for Southern European cultures. A comparison of northern and southern Italy (a widely studied country in the literature on social capital), points to a similar correlation.² Note that political participation, trust, and civic engagement are part of what is known as social capital, therefore in this paper we contribute to the investigation of the origin and evolution of social capital over time, a topic investigated in particular by Putnam (1993, 2000) and Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2008a).

Cultural values like the strength of family ties can be explanatory variables of political participation if they are relatively slow-moving. In fact, cultural values like the structure of the family are very stable over time as shown in many different ways by Alesina and Giuliano (2010), Bertrand and Schoar (2006), Reher (1998), and Todd (1985). The transmission of values regarding the family relies on parent–child relationships: parents teach children values about only trusting the family, or trusting others, for instance. For a recent discussion on the intergenerational transmission of values from parents to children through institutions and beliefs, see Bisin and Verdier (2001), Tabellini (2008) and Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2008b). See also Hauk and Saez Marti (2002) on the cultural transmission of corruption.

We gather our evidence in two ways. First, we use the World Value Survey for a within-country analysis. (We do not rely on capturing, say, the differences between the average Norwegian and the average Italian, a comparison that may be affected by a host

^{2.} Orizo (1996) also finds that in Spain the great majority of youth expresses little interest in politics or in belonging to political organizations.

of other variables differentiating the two countries.) The second source of evidence is a comparison of political participation among second-generation immigrants in 32 different destination countries. The approach of studying immigrant behavior has been used in a growing literature on the economic effects of culture. Alesina and Giuliano (2010), Algan and Cahuc (2010), Blau (1992), Carroll et al. (1994), Fernandez and Fogli (2009), Giuliano (2007) and Luttmer and Singhal (2011) analyze the behavior of immigrant groups to determine the effects of culture on female labor force participation, trust, fertility, savings, geographical mobility, and preferences for redistribution among many others.³ Rather than using the United States as unique destination country, in this paper we look at immigrants coming not only from multiple source countries, but also going to multiple destination countries. By comparing the relationship between the family ties and political participation of immigrants from different origins, we further eliminate any effect emerging from making cross-country comparisons. By looking at immigrants going to multiple destination countries, we also limit the likelihood of selection bias since we would expect the form of selection to differ across different destination countries.⁴ We also look at immigrants to study the relationship between family ties in the country of origin and the level of generalized trust. Establishing causality in this case is more difficult as both family ties and lack of trust could be persistent cultural traits passed from parents to children and therefore could persist across generations. While we cannot prove that there is a causal link going from family ties to generalized trust, we argue that this link is plausible and consistent with additional evidence. Bertrand and Schoar (2006) show that family ties are more slow-moving than trust for a large set of countries. Similarly, Ermish and Gambetta (2008) provide evidence that in an experimental setting people with strong family ties have a lower level of trust in strangers than people with weak family ties. They also argue that this association is causal rather than the result of selection.

Political participation and trust are obviously affected by many other factors besides family ties. In particular, we find that education is strongly positively associated with political participation, a result in line with Glaeser, Ponzetto, and Shleifer (2007). We find that many individual characteristics affect trust, in line with Alesina and La Ferrara (2002).⁵ There is also a vast literature in political science on what determines turnout in elections (see Merlo 2006 and Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980 for a review) but our emphasis here is not specifically on turnout but on a broader definition of political engagement. Finally, our paper is also related to the sociological literature on the importance of social capital in the determination of economic outcomes among immigrants (Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993).

^{3.} See also the survey by Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2006) on the impact of culture on economic outcomes.

^{4.} Note that to the extent that different cultures have different levels of preferences for active political participation, changes in the composition of the pool of immigrants may at least in part explain the reduction in participation in social activities, as pointed out by Putnam (2000).

^{5.} The same authors (Alesina and La Ferrara 2004) investigate the effect of racial fragmentation on participation in social activities finding a negative correlation between the two.

We should stress that we are not implying that family ties (perhaps with the exception of the extreme case of amoral familism) are *bad*. In fact, in Alesina and Giuliano (2010) we show that life satisfaction and happiness are positively associated with strong family ties. In addition, the amount of home production is substantially higher in strong family ties societies, implying that their level of GDP can be underestimated. This shows that the effect of family relationships is complex and not unidirectional. Strong or weak family ties are neither *bad* nor *good* but they lead to different organizations of the family and have different social implications.⁶ In this paper we investigate the effects of family ties on political participation. Interestingly, to the extent that in some cases political participation may turn ugly it would be interesting to check whether stronger family ties also imply fewer instances of negative or hateful forms of political participation. Todd (1985) argues that indeed certain types of family structures are more or less compatible with more or less desirable forms of political organization of this point is left for future research.

The paper is organized as follows. In the next section we describe our data and our measures of family ties and of political participation. In Section 3 we present international evidence based upon the World Value Survey. In Section 4 we focus on immigrants. The last section concludes.

2. Empirical Strategy

2.1. Data Description

We use two data sets, the World Value Survey and the European Social Survey. The World Value Survey (WVS) is a compilation of national surveys on values and norms on a wide variety of topics, carried out four times (1981–1984, 1990–1993, 1995–1997 and 1999–2004). The coverage varies depending on the wave. The 1981–1983 survey covered 22 countries, the 1990–1993 wave 42, the 1995–1997 wave 54 and, finally the last wave covered 81 countries. The questionnaires contain information on different types of attitudes, religion and preferences, as well as information on standard demographic characteristics (gender, age, education, labor market status, income, etc.) We also use data from three rounds of the European Social Survey (ESS), a biennial cross-sectional survey administered in a large sample of mostly European nations. The survey was conducted in three waves, in 2002–2003, 2004–2005 and 2006–2007. Thirty-two countries participated in at least one round of the survey (22 in the first, 26 in the second and 25 in the last). The list of countries for both the World Value Survey and the European Social Survey, together with the demographic characteristics of our sample for both surveys are given in the Appendix, Tables A.1–A.4.

^{6.} See Esping-Andersen (1999) for an illustration of the role of the family in different cultures as a provider of social insurance.

For the European Social Survey our primary sample consists of second-generation immigrants (we define immigrants as individuals born in a certain country but whose fathers were born abroad). We associate to each immigrant the level of family ties in the home country as measured by the average at the country level calculated in the World Value Survey database. Summary statistics for second-generation immigrants are provided in the Appendix, Tables A.4 and A.5. The sample provides at least 13 observations per country of origin. The most representative groups come from the Russian Federation (850 observations), followed by Germany, Italy and Turkey. The respondents in our sample of second-generation immigrants are on average 48 years old, 45% are men, 14% of them have only primary education, 5% of them are unemployed, 52% are out of the labor force, with an yearly average family income between €18,000 and €24,000.⁷ Demographic characteristics, variables on political participation, trust and attitudes towards society of second-generation immigrants are not statistically different from those of natives.

Table A.5 in the Appendix also reports summary statistics of demographic variables and political participation of immigrants by country. There is a lot of heterogeneity across immigrant groups: Northern European countries tend to have a higher level of trust and more interest in political participation. Southern European groups are among the groups with the lowest levels of trust and lower interest in politics. Eastern European countries lie somewhere in between: on the one hand they do show a low level of trust, on the other they do have a higher interest in politics. Income levels also vary greatly, with immigrants from Russia and Latvia in the lowest range, and those from Northern Europe, the UK and Canada among the richest.

2.1.1. A Measure of Family Ties. We measure the strength of family ties by looking at three variables from the WVS which capture beliefs regarding the importance of the family in the respondent's life, the duties and responsibilities of parents and children, and the love and respect for one's own parents. The first question assesses how important the family is in one person's life and can take values from 1 to 4 (with 1 being very important and 4 not important at all). The second question asks whether the respondent agrees with one of the two statements (taking the values of 1 and 2, respectively).

^{7.} In the ESS income is defined as total net household income. Each respondent is asked to report which income category, identified with a letter, best approximates his or her household's total net income. This includes income from all sources, including labor income and income from capital and investments. In order to facilitate the answers, the question is framed in a way that accounts for country-specific conventions in the frequency of income payments. Respondents can provide the income figure using the frequency they know best: weekly, monthly, or annual. Each letter identifies an income bracket in euros (the 12 income categories for the annual income figures are less than $\xi 1,800, \xi 1,800$ to under $\xi 3,600, \xi 3,600$ to under $\xi 6,000, \xi 6,000$ to under $\xi 12,000, \xi 12,000$ to under $\xi 18,000, \xi 0,000$ to under $\xi 24,000, \xi 0,000$ to under $\xi 120,000, \xi 0,000$ to under $\xi 1,800$ per week or below $\xi 150$ per month or below $\xi 1,800$ per year. These figures are equivalent if a month is made of four paid working weeks and a year of 12 paid working months.




FIGURE 1. Family ties.

- Regardless of what the qualities and faults of one's parents are, one must always love and respect them,
- One does not have the duty to respect and love parents who have not earned it.

The third question prompts respondents to agree with one of the following statements (again taking the values of 1 and 2, respectively).

- It is the parents' duty to do their best for their children even at the expense of their own well-being;
- Parents have a life of their own and should not be asked to sacrifice their own well-being for the sake of their children.

We combine these measures in two ways. First we take the sum of all of them and recode the variables such that a higher number corresponds to stronger family ties. Second, we extract the first principal component from the whole data set with all individual responses for the original variables. Figure 1 displays the values of our measure of the strength of family ties (expressed using the first principal component) at the country level. The ranking of the different countries is broadly consistent with perceptions and insights from the sociological and political science literature. Germany, the Netherlands, and the Northern European countries have the weakest ties, while African, Asian, and Latin American countries lie in the highest range. Among OECD countries, we find that Poland, the United States, Canada, and Southern European countries (with the somewhat surprising exception of Greece) are among the countries with the strongest ties while, as before, Northern Europe, the Netherlands, and Germany have the weakest ties. Note that the United States is an average of very different levels of family ties depending on the origin of the members of the *melting pot*. The weak family ties of many Central and Eastern European former communist countries may be the result of communist collectivist ideology and propaganda (see Alesina and Fuchs-Schulden 2007).⁸ The analysis that follows, however, will use only within-country evidence.

2.1.2. Dependent Variables. The first group of variables contains measures of political participation, such as general interest in politics and a variety of other indicators of political action. Interest in politics is measured by the following three questions. The first asks the respondent: "When you get together with your friends, would you say you discuss political matters frequently, occasionally or never?" The variable takes the values of 3 if participants report *Frequently*, 2 if they answer *Occasionally* and 1 if the answer is *Never*. The answer to the second question, "Are you currently doing unpaid voluntary work for political parties or groups?" is equal to 1 if the answer is *Yes* and 0 otherwise. The third variable indicates the general interest of the person in politics?" and the answer could take the following four values: "Very interested" (4), "Somewhat interested" (3), "Not very interested" (2), and "Not at all interested" (1).

Political action is measured by looking at the following questions: "Now I am going to read out some different forms of political action that people can take, and I would like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have actually done any of these things, whether you might do it, or would never, under any circumstances, do it", where the forms of political action are (i) signing a petition, (ii) joining in boycotts, (iii) attending lawful demonstrations, (iv) joining unofficial strikes and (v) occupying buildings or factories. The answer for each form of political action could take the following three values: "Have done" (3), "Might do" (2), and "Would never do" (1). Note that each question is asked independently, meaning the respondent is not supposed to respond at the same time about the different forms of political participation.

The second group of questions contains measures of trust, reluctance to change, and obedience. According to Banfield (1958) and Putnam (1993), we should expect a strong association between family ties and the level of trust for his/her own family, but a lower association with the level of generalized trust. This was the essence of amoral familism. In order to capture these cultural features of strong family ties, we consider the following questions. As a measure of trust, the question is "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?" The answer could be either "Most people can be trusted" (1) or "Can't be too careful" (0). To measure the trust in the family, we use the following question:

^{8.} One may wonder how these regional averages relate to economic development. We also plot the residuals of a regression of family ties on the level of development of a country. The regional order remains the same, with two exceptions: Southern Europe shows stronger family ties than Latin America; moreover Eastern Europeans appear to have weaker ties than Northern Europeans, indicating that GDP per capita is not what is driving our results.

"Could you tell me how much you trust your family?", where the answer could take the following values: "Trust them completely" (5), "Trust them a little" (4), "Neither trust or distrust them" (3), "Do not trust them very much" (2), and "Do not trust them at all" (1).

In studying the village of Chiaromonte in Southern Italy, Banfield (1958) was also struck by the reluctance to change and resignation of the peasants of that village, which were so completely different from the attitudes of similar communities in the United States. The author also mentions that in these societies the role of parental education is to teach children obedience, as nothing good usually comes from individual initiatives. To capture these cultural features of strong family ties, we consider the following questions. As a measure of reluctance to change we choose the following question: "On this card are three basic kinds of attitudes concerning the society we live in. Please choose the one which best describes your own opinion", "Society must be radically changed" (1), "Society must be gradually improved by reforms" (2), and "Society must be valiantly defended" (3). As a measure for obedience we consider the questions on the virtues that children should be encouraged to learn at home⁹. The question assigns a value of 1 if the respondent believes that obedience is important and zero if she does not mention it.

2.2. Specification

For our within-country empirical analysis, we run a series of OLS regressions of the following type:¹⁰

$$Y_{ijt} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{familyties}_{iit} + \beta_2 X_{ijt} + \gamma_j + \delta_t + \gamma_j \delta_t + \varepsilon_{ijt},$$

where the left-hand side variable Y_{ijt} represents the realization of a certain variable for individual *i* in country *j* at time *t*, where time is given by the survey wave. Here, familyties_{*ijt*} is our variable of interest and the value of this variable is coded as increasing with the strength of family ties. X_{ijt} are our controls. Our choice of controls is standard and follows the relevant literature. In order to eliminate the impact of other country characteristics, all the regressions include country fixed effects, γ_j which are likely to underestimate the effect of family ties to the extent that their impact has been absorbed in the national culture. We also include time effects, δ_t , to take into account general trends in values over time, and all the interactions between country and time fixed effects, $\gamma_i \delta_t$, to take into account shocks that are country and time specific.

It is worth noting that, despite the inclusion of country fixed effects, we are well aware of the difficulty in interpreting the observed correlations as causal effects. Our results in this part can therefore be interpreted as mere correlations; therefore, whenever we use the word *impact* or *effect* of family ties on political attitudes it is only to simplify the exposition.

^{9.} Tabellini (2010) uses this question in a similar vein.

^{10.} We test the robustness of our results using ordered logit and nothing changes.

2.3. Results

Our results on the relationship between family ties, political participation, trust and reluctance to change are reported in Tables 1 and 2. According to the political science literature,¹¹ important determinants of political behavior are demographic characteristics such as age, gender, race, and especially education and income. Education appears to be the most important determinant of political interest as it is the best proxy for both information and civic virtues. The effect of age can be ambiguous, since young people should be more militant, but life experience should increase one's information and retired people may have more time in their hands. According to the literature, marital status should not be such an important determinant of interest in politics. Higher-income households should be more interested in politics. Interest in politics and political action should be more diffused among men. We also control for religious denomination, as differences in participation in politics could be the result of the acquisition of civic skills through associational membership. Verba et al. (1995) for example show that Catholic and Protestant churches develop different levels of such skills and this could explain the relatively low level of Latino political participation.

The results reported in Table 1 are broadly in line with previous findings. In our sample, interest in politics grows with income and education¹². Men are always more interested in politics and more active in political activity. The relationship between interest in politics and age is U-shaped. Employed people are more likely to discuss politics than people out of the labor force (the excluded group) and the unemployed. There is no difference for many measures of political action between employed and the unemployed; on the other hand, unemployed people are more likely to participate in the occupation of buildings, as expected. Married and single people are more interested and tend to discuss more about political matters than divorced people, but married people are more reluctant to participate in political activism, as opposed to singles who are especially more likely to attend demonstrations. The most likely interpretation is that singles have more time since they (generally) have no children, and they may be more left leaning.¹³ Catholic, Protestant, and Orthodox subjects show lower levels of political participation, compared to other religions and atheists. At least in our sample, there is no difference in political participation between Catholics and Protestants.

Our variable on the strength of family ties is always significant with the expected sign even after controlling for country, year fixed effects, their interactions and the whole range of individual controls. Individuals with strong family ties are consistently less interested in politics and also less likely to participate in any form of political activity from discussing politics to volunteering for a political party to the most active forms of political participation, such as strikes, demonstrations or signing a

^{11.} See Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980 for a survey.

^{12.} The effect of education is consistent with the analysis of Glaeser, Ponzetto, and Shleifer (2007) on the role of education in sustaining democratic institutions and political participation.

^{13.} Also political activism related to gay group activities would be primarily performed by singles.

	(1) Discuss political matter	(2) Unpaid work in political parties	(3) Interest in politics	(4) Sign petition	(5) Joining in boycotts	(6) Attending demonstrations	(7) Joining strikes	(8) Occupying buildings
Family ties	-0.012 (0.002)***	-0.001 (0.001)**	-0.012 (0.002)***	-0.029 (0.000)***	-0.046 (0.000)***	-0.034 (0.000)***	-0.039	-0.026
Male	0.178	0.027	0.179	0.077	0.115	0.141	0.097	090.0
Deimont	$(0.003)^{***}$	$(0.001)^{***}$	$(0.004)^{***}$	$(0.004)^{***}$	$(0.003)^{***}$	$(0.004)^{***}$	(0.003)***	$(0.002)^{***}$
FIIIId	-0.322 $(0.005)^{***}$	-0.020 $(0.003)^{***}$	$(0.007)^{***}$	$(0.006)^{***}$	$(0.006)^{***}$	$(0.006)^{***}$	-0.000 $(0.005)^{***}$	$(0.004)^{***}$
Secondary	-0.153	-0.016	-0.140	-0.151	-0.145	-0.177	-0.073	-0.032
Age	$(0.003)^{***}$	$(0.002)^{***}$ 0.017	(0.006) 0.099	$(0.005)^{***}$	0.082	$(0.006)^{***}$ 0.107	$(0.004)^{***}$ 0.037	$(0.003)^{***}$
)	$(0.006)^{***}$	$(0.002)^{***}$	$(0.008)^{***}$	$(0.007)^{***}$	$(0.006)^{***}$	$(0.007)^{***}$	$(0.005)^{***}$	(0.004)
Age squared	-0.016	-0.001	-0.005	-0.015	-0.012	-0.015	-0.008	-0.003
Employed	0.039	0.008	(100.0)	0.060	0.039	0.062	0.030	0.007
and four data	$(0.004)^{***}$	$(0.002)^{***}$	$(0.005)^{*}$	$(0.005)^{***}$	$(0.004)^{***}$	$(0.005)^{***}$	$(0.003)^{***}$	$(0.003)^{***}$
Unemployed	0.017	0.006	-0.004	0.003	0.030	0.031	0.035	0.020
	$(0.007)^{**}$	$(0.003)^{**}$	(0.008)	(0.007)	$(0.007)^{***}$	$(0.007)^{***}$	$(0.006)^{***}$	$(0.005)^{***}$
Married	0.023	0.003	0.011	-0.003	-0.012	-0.005	-0.023	-0.013
	$(0.005)^{***}$	(0.002)	(0.007)	(0.006)	$(0.005)^{**}$	(0.006)	$(0.004)^{***}$	$(0.003)^{***}$
Single	0.037	0.002	0.033	0.021	0.029	0.059	0.013	0.017
:	$(0.007)^{***}$	(0.002)	$(0.009)^{***}$	$(0.008)^{***}$	$(0.007)^{***}$	$(0.008)^{***}$	$(0.006)^{**}$	$(0.005)^{***}$
Catholic	-0.012	-0.003	-0.045	-0.013	-0.043	-0.043	-0.045	-0.043
ç	$(0.005)^{**}$	$(0.002)^{**}$	$(0.006)^{***}$	(0.006)** 0.025	$(0.005)^{***}$	$(0.006)^{***}$	$(0.005)^{***}$	$(0.004)^{***}$
FIOUCSIAIIU	0.004	-0.002	-0.000 (0.008)***	(0.007)***	-0.00 00 007)***	-0.002 (0.007)***	-0.047 0.006)***	(0.005)***
Orthodox	-0.004	-0.008	-0.022	-0.030	-0.023	0.016	-0.011	-00.00
	(0.008)	$(0.003)^{***}$	$(0.010)^{**}$	$(0.010)^{***}$	$(0.008)^{***}$	(0.010)	$(0.007)^{*}$	$(0.005)^{*}$
Medium income	0.056	0.001	0.016	0.078	0.035	0.038	0.010	-0.005
	$(0.004)^{***}$	(0.002)	$(0.005)^{***}$	$(0.004)^{***}$	$(0.004)^{***}$	$(0.004)^{***}$	$(0.003)^{***}$	$(0.003)^{*}$
Higher income	0.113	0.004	0.068	0.144	0.065	0.075	0.026	-0.007
	$(0.004)^{***}$	$(0.002)^{**}$	$(0.005)^{***}$	$(0.005)^{***}$	$(0.004)^{***}$	$(0.005)^{***}$	$(0.004)^{***}$	$(0.003)^{**}$
Observations	163633	88198	121227	149800	145421	151073	145858	144532
R-squared	0.14	0.06	0.10	0.28	0.18	0.15	0.12	0.10

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	(1) Generalized trust	(2) Trust the family	(3) Child qualities: obedience	(4) Basic kinds of attitudes concerning society
Family ties	-0.006	0.074	0.026	0.018
	(0.001)***	$(0.004)^{***}$	$(0.001)^{***}$	(0.001)***
Male	0.006	0.014	0.001	-0.031
	(0.002)**	$(0.007)^{**}$	(0.002)	(0.003)***
Primary	-0.064	-0.070	0.120	0.063
	$(0.004)^{***}$	$(0.022)^{***}$	$(0.004)^{***}$	$(0.005)^{***}$
Secondary	-0.052	-0.050	0.063	0.036
-	$(0.003)^{***}$	(0.016)***	$(0.003)^{***}$	$(0.004)^{***}$
Age	0.031	-0.028	-0.051	-0.018
	(0.004)***	(0.014)**	(0.005)***	(0.006)***
Age squared	-0.003	0.004	0.006	0.004
	$(0.000)^{***}$	(0.001)***	(0.001)***	(0.001)***
Employed	0.008	0.002	-0.008	-0.015
	(0.003)***	(0.009)	(0.003)***	(0.004)***
Unemployed	-0.014	-0.054	0.005	-0.010
	$(0.004)^{***}$	$(0.018)^{***}$	(0.005)	(0.006)
Married	0.011	0.115	0.007	0.002
	$(0.004)^{***}$	(0.013)***	(0.004)*	(0.005)
Single	0.025	0.073	-0.013	-0.004
	$(0.005)^{***}$	$(0.017)^{***}$	$(0.005)^{***}$	(0.006)
Catholic	-0.001	0.042	0.014	0.020
	(0.003)	(0.009)***	(0.004)***	(0.004)***
Protestant	0.018	0.019	0.030	0.040
	(0.005)***	(0.012)	(0.005)***	(0.006)***
Orthodox	-0.009	0.001	0.020	0.011
	(0.006)	(0.035)	(0.006)***	(0.007)
Observations	159721	39895	164658	129835
R-squared	0.10	0.19	0.12	0.05

TABLE 2. Family ties, trust, reluctance to change and obedience

Notes: [1] Each regression controls for country and wave fixed effects and their interactions; [2] Robust standard errors in parenthesis, ***significant at 1%, **significant at 5%, *significant at 10%.

petition. The magnitude of the coefficients is not negligible: moving from the lowest 5th percentile to the highest 5th percentile of the strength of family ties is equivalent to the impact of belonging to the highest income group of the income distribution and slightly smaller than the effect of having only primary education relative to the highest level of education. The impact is therefore substantial as income and education are the most important determinants of political participation.

Table 2 shows results on trust, reluctance to change and obedience. In particular, we find a negative correlation between family ties and trust, but a positive correlation between family ties and trust in the family. This negative association between family ties and generalized trust, a critical component of social capital, is at the core of the amoral familism hypothesis of Banfield (1958). The impact of family ties on trust is also substantial, moving from the lowest 5th percentile to the highest 5th percentile in the strength of family ties is equivalent to almost double the effect of the impact of having only primary education and of belonging to the highest level of the income distribution.

We finally look at two other variables that should help to perpetuate amoral familism across generations: these variables are obedience as one of the most important values that should be transmitted to children and the reluctance to change the society. Results are consistent with our prior: individuals with strong family ties also think that children should be obedient and that society should be valiantly defended and not radically changed. Given the emphasis on obedience strong family ties tend to persist.¹⁴ The magnitude of the effect is comparable to the impact of family ties on trust.

3. Evidence on Immigrants

We now turn to evidence drawn from immigrants. As discussed in the introduction, several papers have used this approach to help establish causality and to test whether cultural traits travel with people. That is, if immigrants behave in their new country of residence as at home, this would show two things. First, the effect of family ties is not an artifact of differences across countries in institutions, policies, etc. Even though in the cross-country evidence presented above we always included country fixed effects it is still worth checking that family ties matter when individuals coming from different countries of origin face the same institutional and economic environment. Second, that immigrants behave in their new countries of residence as they did at home. This shows that family ties stick with people when they move. Obviously cultural assimilation does take place and an important avenue for future research is to examine the speed of it.¹⁵ The literature reviewed in the introduction generally looks at immigrants in the United States.¹⁶ Here we consider immigrants in 32 destination countries, so our results cannot be driven by some special features of a particular receiving country (the United States). Our sample consists of second-generation immigrants, that is, individuals born in a given country and whose father was born abroad. We associate to each immigrant the measure of family ties constructed from the World Value Survey, i.e. we associate to each immigrant living in one of the 32 countries of the survey the average level of family ties of his/her country of origin.

3.1. Dependent Variables

3.1.1. Political Attitudes. We select similar types of questions on political interest, political action and reluctance to change; however, due to data availability the variables are in some cases not the same. As measures of political attitudes we select the following questions: Three measures of time spent per week watching TV, reading newspapers

^{14.} Tabellini (2010) shows, using the same answer for the WWS, that reliance on obedience is a component of cultural traits associated with lower level of development in European regions.

^{15.} For interesting empirical work on persistence of cultural traits see Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2009) and Tabellini (2008) for a model of cultural transmission of trust.

^{16.} Exceptions are Alesina and Giuliano (2010) and Luttmer and Singhal (2011) who also use evidence from the European Social Survey.

or listening to radio programs about politics and current affairs. The questions are as follows: "On an average weekday, how much of your time watching television is spent watching news or programs about politics and current affairs", "On an average weekday, how much of your time listening to the radio is spent listening to news or programs about politics and current affairs?", "On an average weekday, how much of your time is spent reading newspapers about politics and current affairs?"; the answer to the three questions is coded in the following way: "No time at all" (0), "Less than 0.5 hour" (1), "0.5 hour to 1 hour" (2), "More than 1 hour, up to 1.5 hours" (3), "More than 1.5 hours, up to 2 hours" (4), "More than 2 hours, up to 2.5 hours" (5), "More than 2.5 hours, up to 3 hours" (6), "More than 3 hours" (7). The fourth measure asks the respondent "How interested are you in politics", and the answer can take three values: "Very interested" (3), Quite interested (2) and Hardly interested (1).

We also select three questions of political action similar to the ones of the World Value Survey. The questions are: "During the last 12 months, have you done any of the following: Signed a petition, taken part in a lawful public demonstration and boycotted certain products?", and the answer is simply "Yes" or "No". As in the World Value survey, there are three different questions for each type of political activity. Note that this question is somewhat different than the World Value Survey, where the respondent was asked if he/she ever did any of this action or if he/she could contemplate doing it. The answer to the European Social Survey is much more demanding as it asks the respondent about the actual action in the last 12 months.

3.1.2. Trust and Reluctance to Change. We also replicate our analysis using a standard measure of generalized trust. The question in the ESS is phrased as follows: "Using this card, generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted, or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people? Please tell me on a score of 0 to 10, where 0 means you can't be too careful and 10 means that most people can be trusted." The European Social Survey does not have any question on obedience as an important value to be transmitted to children, therefore we choose a question that should pick up obedience and reluctance to change. We select the following question: "Now I will briefly describe some people. Please listen to each description and tell me how much each person is or is not like you. She/he believes that people should do what they are told. She/he thinks people should follow rules at all times, even when no-one is watching", the answer could be "Very much like me" (6), "Like me" (5) and "Somewhat like me" (4), "A little like me" (3), "Not like me" (2), "Not like me at all" (1).

3.2. Specification

For consistency with the regressions of the previous section, we run the following model in OLS regressions:¹⁷

$$Y_{ikc} = \alpha_0 + \alpha_1 \text{familyties}_k + \alpha_2 X_i + \delta_c + \varepsilon_{ikc},$$

^{17.} As before, we also run ordered logit and our results do not change.

where Y_{ikc} is the left-hand side of interest for individual *i*, living in country *c* and whose father comes from country *k*. X_i are individual controls, family_{tiesk} is our measure of the strength of family ties which varies by immigrant's country of origin and δ_c is a full set of country of residence dummies. Standard errors are clustered at the country of origin level.

3.3. Results

In Table 3, we test for the effects of family ties on political interest, political action, trust and reluctance to change among immigrants. We find a strong effect of family ties on almost all variables of interest. Immigrants coming from countries with strong family ties tend to follow less political events (the coefficients on following politics on TV, the radio or the newspapers is always negative and significant with the exception of watching political news on TV) and are generally less interested in politics.

The results for political activism are a bit weaker than the within-country analysis. One possibility, as mentioned above, is that the definition of political activism is much more strict in the ESS compared to the WVS as it asks respondents whether they were involved in these forms of political action in the last 12 months. Also immigrants can be a bit more reluctant to be involved in this type of political action in a foreign country as this could have some effect on the residence status of their families.

We find a very strong result on the impact of family ties on generalized trust. Looking at the impact of family ties and trust could be more problematic than political participation. Both trust and family ties could be cultural values that tend to persist across generations, therefore it is more difficult to argue that one is causing the other. For that reason, we do a horse race between family ties and generalized trust in the country of origin (column 9). Trust in the country of origin is an important determinant of individual trust among immigrants; however, its effect disappears when we include our measure of family ties. This result is consistent with the story that family ties could be an important determinant of social capital. Using experimental evidence, Ermish and Gambetta (2008) show that people with strong family ties. They also argue that this association is causal rather than the result of selection.

In the last column we finally show that strong family ties immigrants tend to follow rules more strictly than immigrants coming from countries with weak family ties. The results on immigrants are similar in magnitude to the results on the within country analysis: moving from the lowest 5th percentile to the highest 5th percentile of the strength of family ties has the same effect of having only primary education relative to the excluded group of those who have higher education. The results on trust are particularly telling, as in this case the impact of moving from the lowest 5th percentile to the highest 5th percentile of the strength of family ties is almost three times as large as the impact of having only primary education.

The other variables affect political participation, trust and reluctance to change in the expected direction. Higher-income households are more interested in politics (with the exception of listening to political programs on the radio for which income has a negative effect), similarly for individuals with a higher level of education.

TABLE 3. Family ties, political participation and reluctance to change. Evidence from second-generation immigrants in 32 destination countries	es, political p	articipation a	nd reluctance	to change. Evi	idence from s	econd-gener	ation immigra	ants in 32 des	stination cour	tries
	(1) TV politics	(2) Radio politics	(3) Newspaper politics	(4) Interested in politics	(5) Signed petition	(6) Lawful demons.	(7) Boycotted products	(8) Trust	(9) Trust	(10) Follow rules
Family ties in the country of origin	-0.025 (0.043)	-0.129 (0.071)*	-0.084 (0.044)*	-0.094 (0.054)*	0.025 (0.024) 0.007	0.035 (0.018) 0.000	-0.025 (0.019)	-0.413 (0.099)***	-0.347 (0.094)***	$0.130 \\ (0.076)^{*}$
Age squared	$(0.005)^{***}$ -0.000	000.0- 00000 00000-	-0.001 (0.005) 0.000	$(0.000)^{+**}$	(0.00) $(0.002)^{***}$ -0.000	(0.002) -0.000	$(0.002)^{***}$ $(0.002)^{***}$	(0.013) (0.000)	(0.013) (0.003)	-0.014 (0.009) 0.000
Male	(0.000)* 0.202 0.043)***	(0.000)*** 0.078 0.047)	(0.000)** 0.163 0.026)***	$(0.000)^{*}$ 0.271 $(0.020)^{***}$	$(0.000)^{***}$ -0.035	(0.000) 0.004	$(0.000)^{***}$ -0.004	(0.000) 0.172 0.079)**	(0.000) 0.174 0.277)**	(0.000)*** 0.045 0.027)
Married	0.065	0.076	-0.037	-0.039 -0.039 0.033	-0.017	-0.014	-0.023	-0.154 -0.154	-0.152	0.159 0.159 0.159
Single	(0000) 09000	-0.023	(0.00) -0.016	(ccu.u) 0.031 (0.040 0)	0.055	(0.003) (0.033)	(0.012) (0.051)	-0.140 -0.140	-0.145	(0.049) -0.114 (0.070)
Primary	-0.195	-0.190	(0.007) -0.412 0.0563***	-0.621	-0.182 -0.182	-0.069	-0.135	(0.143) -1.071 (0.107)***	-1.066	0.224 0.224
Secondary	-0.101	060.0-	-0.222	-0.297	-0.095	-0.036	-0.109	-0.725	-0.727	0.217
Unemployed	$(0.046)^{**}$ 0.025	$(0.039)^{**}$ -0.442	$(0.018)^{***}$ 0.083	$(0.022)^{***}$	$(0.021)^{***}$ -0.042	-0.000	$(0.022)^{***}$	$(0.080)^{***}$	$(0.081)^{***}$	$(0.041)^{***}$ -0.140
Out of labor force	(0.062) 0.080 (0.041)*	$(0.062)^{***}$ -0.002 (0.054)	(0.066) 0.072 $(0.030)^{**}$	$(0.033)^{*}$ 0.035 (0.030)	$(0.023)^{*}$ -0.002	(0.021) -0.014	(0.029) 0.031 (0.012)***	(0.155)*** 0.024 0.057)	(0.154)*** 0.023 0.057)	(0.100) -0.039 (0.041)
Family income	-0.015	(0.004) -0.041 ***	0.029	0.051 0.051 0.051	0.006 0.006 0.003)**	(0.001)	0.003	(7 CU-U) 0.066 ***(010 0)	(1.0.0) 0.065 0.01018***	(0.041) -0.027 $(0.011)^{**}$
Catholic	-0.073	0.027	0.004 0.004	-0.053	-0.050	(0.002) -0.035 $(0.010)^{***}$	(0.000) -0.057 (0.014)***	-0.059	-0.059	0.164 0.080)**
Orthodox	-0.080	(0.0.0) -0.082	-0.150	(1000)	-0.034	-0.033	-0.014	0.025	0.033	0.112
Protestant	-0.037	-0.058	0.032	0.025	0.003	-0.028	-0.017	0.025	(0.104) 0.021 (0.167)	(0.000) 0.133 (0.084)
Trust in the country of origin									(0.393 (0.326)	(1000)
Observations <i>R-squared</i>	4437 0.11	$3507 \\ 0.07$	$3436 \\ 0.12$	4632 0.17	$4616 \\ 0.14$	4628 0.05	4618 0.12	4632 0.13	4632 0.13	4475 0.11
Notes: [1] Each regression controls for 5%, *significant at 10%;	ntrols for coun	try of destinati	on fixed effects	country of destination fixed effects; [2] Standard errors are clustered at the country of origin level, ***significant at 1%, **significant at	rrors are cluste	red at the cour	try of origin le	evel, ***signifi	cant at 1%, **	ignificant at

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Higher-income households also tend to trust more and follow rules less. Education has the same effect. As before, men tend to be more interested in politics (although in the ESS they are less likely to sign a petition), trust more and follow rules less. As before, and consistently with the literature on political participation, marital status is not a relevant determinant of political participation. Catholic and Orthodox immigrants tend to have much lower levels of political participation and tend to place a lot of emphasis on the importance of following rules as a critical value.

4. Conclusions

Individuals with strong family ties do not engage much in political activity and are generally less interested in politics. Also, family ties and generalized trust are substitutes rather than complements. We have established these results with two sets of regressions. The first involves within-country comparisons of individuals using data drawn from the World Value Survey. The second considers the behavior of immigrants who have moved to one of 32 different destination countries. We confirm the relationship between family ties, trust and political participation even among immigrants, independent of the destination country.

Amoral familism is an extreme version of strong family ties, which, according to Banfield (1958), is a major determinant of underdevelopment. If people do not engage at all in political activities and have no interest in public affairs, they do not provide any incentive for elected politicians to be attentive to the common good. Moreover, if citizens do not trust others, including politicians, the latter have no reason to behave in a trustworthy manner, and may as well pursue private interests, as Banfield (1958) noted in his study of a Southern Italian village. Thus, strong family ties, related to a low level of social capital, may bring about a poor quality of politicians and a high level of corruption. Results by Nannicini et al. (2009) on Italy are consistent with this hypothesis, which deserves further study.

Political participation may turn ugly in certain cases. Would strong family ties provide a defense against degenerate political participation? Work by Todd (1985) stresses the relationship between the diffusion of certain ideologies, including undemocratic ones, and the structure of the family. This is a fascinating line of research worth pursuing.

Finally, in this paper we have emphasized how the structure of the family, and family ties in particular, are slow moving. Indeed they are, but they are not immobile. Like glaciers they slowly adjust to the external environment. Future research should tackle this question in three ways. First, how long does it take for cultural values to adjust in a melting pot like the United States? Second, whether there is convergence of family values in different countries, perhaps due to more frequent contacts between individuals of different nationalities. Is globalization making everybody more similar even in cultural matters, or is it creating incentives to preserve local cultures?¹⁸ Third,

^{18.} A recent paper by Maystre et al. (2009) begins to address this question.

since family ties slowly evolve over time, a primary focus of research should be their co-evolution and interplay with economic institutions. Alesina et al. (2010) investigate the interaction between family ties and the coevolution of labor market institutions in a society, finding evidence of a strong complementarity between family ties and the stringency of labor market regulations.

Appendix

First wave	Second wave	Third wave	Fourth wave
1981—1984	1989—1993	1994–1999	1999–2004
Argentina	Argentina	Albania	Albania
Australia	Austria	Azerbaijan	Algeria
Belgium	Belgium	Argentina	Argentina
Canada	Brazil	Australia	Austria
Denmark	Bulgaria	Bangladesh	Bangladesh
France	Belarus	Armenia	Belgium
Hungary	Canada	Bosnia and Herzegovina	Bosnia and Herzegovina
Iceland	Chile	Brazil	Bulgaria
Ireland	China	Bulgaria	Belarus
Italy	Czech Republic	Belarus	Canada
Japan	Denmark	Chile	Chile
Republic of Korea	Estonia	China	China
Malta	Finland	Taiwan	Croatia
Netherlands	France	Colombia	Czech Republic
Norway	Germany	Croatia	Denmark
Spain	Hungary	Czech Republic	Estonia
Sweden	Iceland	Dominican Republic	Finland
Great Britain	India	El Salvador	France
United states	Ireland	Estonia	Germany
West Germany	Italy	Finland	Greece
Northern Ireland	Japan	Georgia	Hungary
	Republic of Korea	Germany	Iceland
	Latvia	Hungary	India
	Lithuania	India	Indonesia
	Malta	Japan	Iran
	Mexico	Republic of Korea	Iraq
	Netherlands	Latvia	Ireland
	Nigeria	Lithuania	Israel
	Norway	Mexico	Italy
	Poland	Moldova	Japan
	Portugal	New Zealand	Jordan
	Romania	Nigeria	Republic of Kore
	Russian Fed.	Norway	Kyrgyzstan
	Slovakia	Pakistan	Latvia
	Slovenia	Peru	Lithuania
	South Africa	Philippines	Luxembourg
	Spain	Poland	Malta
	Sweden	Puerto Rico	Mexico

TABLE A.1. World Value Survey, list of countries, by wave

First wave 1981—1984	Second wave 1989—1993	Third wave 1994–1999	Fourth wave 1999–2004
	Switzerland Turkey Great Britain United States Northern Ireland	Romania Russian Federation Slovakia Slovenia South Africa Spain Sweden Switzerland Turkey Ukraine Macedonia Great Britain United states Uruguay Venezuela Serbia and Montenegro	Moldova Morocco Netherlands Nigeria Pakistan Peru Philippines Poland Portugal Puerto Rico Romania Russian Federation Saudi Arabia Singapore Slovakia Vietnam Slovenia South Africa Zimbabwe Spain Sweden Turkey Uganda Ukraine Macedonia Egypt Great Britain Tanzania United States Venezuela Serbia and Monteneg Northern Ireland

TABLE A.1. Continued

TABLE A.2. European Social Survey, list of countries, by wave

	ESS round1	ESS round2	ESS round3
1	Austria	Austria	Austria
2	Belgium	Belgium	Belgium
3	C C	c	Bulgaria
4	Switzerland	Switzerland	Switzerland
5	Czech Republic	Czech Republic	
6	1	Ĩ	Cyprus
7	Germany	Germany	Germany
8	Denmark	Denmark	Denmark
9		Estonia	Estonia
10	Spain	Spain	Spain
11	Finland	Finland	Finland
12	France	France	France
13	Great Britain	Great Britain	Great Britain
14	Greece	Greece	

	ESS round1	ESS round2	ESS round3
15	Hungary	Hungary	Hungary
16	Ireland	Ireland	Ireland
17	Israel		
18		Iceland	
19			Latvia
20	Italy	Italy	
21	Luxembourg	Luxembourg	
22	Netherland	Netherlands	Netherlands
23	Norway	Norway	Norway
24	Poland	Poland	Poland
25	Portugal	Portugal	Portugal
26	C C	C C	Romania
27			Russia
28	Sweden	Sweden	Sweden
29	Slovenia	Slovenia	Slovenia
30		Slovakia	Slovakia
31		Turkey	
32		Ukraine	Ukraine

TABLE A.2. Continued

TABLE A.3. World Value Survey: summary statistics

Variable	Mean	S.D.	Min	Max
Parents responsibilities	1.776	0.417	1	2
Respect and love for parents	1.802	0.398	1	2
Family important in life	3.857	0.412	1	4
Discuss political matters	1.858	0.668	1	3
Unpaid work in polit. parties	0.035	0.185	0	1
Interest in politics	1.765	0.706	1	3
Signing a petition	2.042	0.809	1	3
Joining in boycotts	1.512	0.660	1	
Attending demonstration	1.732	0.744	1	3 3
Joining strikes	1.299	0.559	1	3
Occupying buildings	1.173	0.433	1	3
Generalized trust	0.295	0.456	0	1
Trust the family	4.705	0.733	1	5
Obedience	0.356	0.478	0	1
Type of society	2.071	0.529	1	3
Male	0.480	0.500	0	1
Primary	0.253	0.435	0	1
Secondary	0.300	0.458	0	1
Age	41.237	16.333	15	101
Employed	0.543	0.498	0	1
Unemployed	0.078	0.269	0	1
Married	0.642	0.479	0	1
Single	0.238	0.426	0	1
Medium Income	0.370	0.483	0	1
High Income	0.292	0.455	0	1
Catholic	0.325	0.468	0	1
Protestant	0.126	0.332	0	1
Orthodox	0.084	0.276	0	1

	Mean	S.D.	Min	Max
TV watching politics	1.915	1.269	0	7
News politics	1.199	0.826	0	7
Interested in politics	2.413	0.912	1	4
Generalized trust	5.072	2.476	0	10
Follow rules	3.811	1.393	1	6
Family ties	-0.167	0.344	-0.917	0.498
Age	47.866	17.043	14	94
Male	0.447	0.497	0	1
Married	0.560	0.496	0	1
Single	0.214	0.410	0	1
Primary	0.141	0.348	0	1
Secondary	0.610	0.488	0	1
Unemployed	0.050	0.218	0	1
Out of labor force	0.528	0.499	0	1
Family income	5.905	2.953	1	12
Protestant	.0976	.2968	0	1
Catholic	.2676	.4428	0	1
Orthodox	.1343	.3410	0	1
Trust in the country of origin	.292	.1245	.101	.665

TABLE A.4. European Social Survey: summary statistics, second generation immigrants

	Orth.	.02	10. 5	19	60.	.01	9 [.]	0	.08	0	0	0	0	.32	.02	.02	.02	0	0	0	.24	.06	.15	00.	.05	0	.13	.41	0	.02	.30 .27
	Prot.	.17	<u>8</u> .8	07	.14	.08	.19	.24	.23	.02	.23	.05	.14	.02	.01	.12	.20	.06	.08	.03	.15	.07	.15	.07	.08	.01	.10	90.	.46	.03	.01 .02
	Cath.	.40	6 5	10.	.21	.43	.30	.03	.02	.45	.01	.40	.40	.08	.55	.42	.15	.52	.16	.57	.08	.34	.05	.33	.43	.59	.23	.0	.0	.33	.01 .10
European Social Survey: summary statistics, second generation immigrants, by country of origin	Trust cou. orig.	.33	.29 77	14	.37	.25	.37	99.	.23	.36	.57	.21	.29	.24	.21	.22	.52	.36	.41	.33	.27	.26	.19	.59	.18	.12	.10	.24	99.	.16	.16 .27
oy count	Fam. inc.	6.86	7.31	3.14	6.92	5.61	7.61	8.30	6.00	7.47	7.09	7.79	7.83	5.00	6.44	5.56	7.07	7.34	7.45	7.17	4.47	4.10	3.52	7.95	6.25	7.36	5.41	3.20	8.2	4.57	5.48 3.37
nigrants, h	Unem.	0.01	0.06	0.03	0.08	0.02	0.03	0.02	0.11	0.08	0.05	0.05	0.02	0.08	0.07	0.09	0.00	0.02	0.05	0.04	0.06	0.05	0.00	0.03	0.07	0.02	0.09	0.06	0.04	0.14	0.09 0.05
eration imn	Primary	0.07	0.13	0.06	0.08	0.05	0.10	0.08	0.05	0.10	0.14	0.11	0.09	0.27	0.16	0.09	0.02	0.04	0.07	0.23	0.00	0.08	0.09	0.16	0.05	0.51	0.10	0.09	0.02	0.07	$0.36 \\ 0.04$
econd gene	Married	0.55	0.43	0.44	0.54	0.65	0.59	0.59	0.50	0.53	0.40	0.55	0.52	0.48	0.65	0.62	0.49	0.58	0.55	0.57	0.76	0.51	0.43	0.75	0.49	0.71	0.63	0.53	0.46	0.52	$0.65 \\ 0.55$
ttistics, s	Male	0.39	0.47	0.27	0.69	0.45	0.44	0.47	0.33	0.49	0.35	0.49	0.45	0.40	0.33	0.46	0.34	0.51	0.60	0.55	0.47	0.40	0.29	0.53	0.43	0.54	0.44	0.38	0.27	0.55	0.52 0.44
mary sta	Age	54.3	47.2	50.9	43.1	48.9	49.6	45.1	51.4	43.2	46.5	44.5	45.1	48.1	48.1	50.9	50.1	50.8	41.8	47.6	42.82	46.54	42.61	49.87	46.67	37.82	45.3	52.8	48.1	48.3	44.8 46.3
rvey: sum	Fam. ties	-0.39	-0.17	-0.65	0.34	-0.28	-0.78	-0.91	-0.46	0.21	-0.50	-0.02	-0.19	-0.38	-0.13	-0.05	0.49	0.02	0.18	0.20	-0.19	-0.83	-0.19	-0.74	0.21	0.09	0.11	-0.17	-0.64	-0.12	0.17 - 0.13
ocial Su	Rules	3.85	3.49 1.6	4.16	3.30	3.81	3.56	3.79	3.94	3.54	3.49	3.50	3.66	4.17	3.35	3.59	4.05	3.57	4.08	3.59	3.75	4.19	3.29	3.48	3.75	4.08	3.80	3.98	4.10	4.04	4.26 3.91
opean S	Trust	5.42	5.30 4 00	4.61	6.38	4.50	5.76	7.00	5.61	4.8	6.03	5.14	6.14	4.25	4.94	4.07	5.67	5.51	5.41	4.75	4.76	5.00	5.04	5.51	4.98	4.84	4.49	4.82	6.73	4.31	4.26 4.84
	Inter. pol.	2.64	2.12 2.33	2.22	2.53	2.58	2.70	2.66	2.61	2.32	2.74	2.51	2.42	2.52	2.30	2.42	2.81	2.55	2.50	2.30	2.17	2.13	2.14	2.43	2.39	1.96	2.58	2.38	2.58	2.11	2.26 2.36
TABLE A.5.	News	1.18	1.08	1.05	1.37	1.24	1.40	1.29	1.47	1.12	1.25	1.20	1.27	1.29	1.15	1.28	1.17	1.17	1.34	1.12	0.66	1.11	-	1.28	1.20	0.82	1.15	1.16	1.26	1.24	$1.20 \\ 1.14$
L	TV	1.89	1.75	1.73	2.15	1.86	1.97	1.95	2.11	1.82	2.18	1.81	1.94	2.25	1.61	1.88	2.19	2.25	2.15	1.75	2.06	1.97	1.52	2.06	1.86	1.58	1.90	1.97	1.90	1.86	$1.97 \\ 1.93$
	Obs.	95	51 ç	109	13	124	419	59	18	90	149	224	189	48	54	69	61	47	40	379	17	37	21	95	216	208	105	851	52	87	280 180
	Cou. of orig.	АТ	BE	ΒY	CA	CZ	DE	DK	EE	ES	FI	FR	GB	GR	HR	ΗU	Э	ΙE	Z	IT	KZ	LT	LV	NL	PL	ΡT	RO	RU	SE	SK	TR UA

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