Will 21^c capitalism be as unequal as 19^c capitalism?

Thomas Piketty
Paris School of Economics
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- Q.: What do we know about the long run tendancies of income & wealth distribution in capitalist economies?
- A.: Very little! Heated discussions & theoretical speculations for centuries... But relatively little scientific knowledge & data collection so far
- → in this lecture, I will try however to provide the best educated guess about the future, for two reasons: (a) we need answers; (b) we have more research than ever before

We need answers

- Long run distributional trends = key question asked by 19^C economists
- Many came with apocalyptic answers
- Ricardo-Marx: a small group in society (land owners or capitalists) will capture an ever growing share of income & wealth; no balanced development path can occur
- During 20^C, a more optimistic consensus emerged: "growth is a rising tide that lifts all boats" (Kuznets 1953; cold war context)

We need answers (contd')

- But inequality ↑ since 1970s destroyed this fragile consensus (US 1977-2007: >50% of total growth was absorbed by top 1%)
- → 19^c economists raised the right questions; we need to adress these questions again; we have no strong reason to believe in balanced development path
- 2007-2009 crisis also raised doubts about balanced devt path... will stock options & bonuses, or oil-rich countries & China, or tax havens, absorb an ever growing share of world ressources in 21^c capitalism?

We have more research


- Top income project: Piketty JPE'03, Piketty-Saez QJE'03, Atkinson-Piketty Oxford University Press 2007 & 2010
- → series for 20+ countries over 20^C
- Wealth project:
- Piketty-Postel-Vinay-Rosenthal "Wealth concentration in France 1807-1994" AER'06
- "On the long-run evolution of inheritance, France 1820-2050", WP'09
- On-going work UK & US with Atkinson-Saez

- Q.: What do we know about the long run tendancies of income & wealth distribution in capitalist economies?
 Can we return to 19^c inequality?
- A.: Yes, and it can get even worst
- (1): 20^c decline in inequality of inherited weatlh = mostly accidental (1914-45 shocks); nothing structural
- (2): Since 1970s, inequality in labor income has reached unheard of levels; not much to do with merit; grabbing hand; not virtuous invisible hand

Fall of Rentiers & Rise of Working Rich 30% -- United States United Kingdom → France 0%

1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000

Are the U.S. the Future?



1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000

There are two ways to get rich...

- Y = Y_K + Y_L & Y_K = r W
 With Y = total income
 Y_K = capital income & Y_L = labor income,
 W = total wealth (=K if closed econ, no govt)
 r = average rate of return
- → Typically: W/Y=600%, r=5%, so that capital share $\alpha = Y_K/Y = 30\%$
- → Inequality comes from inequality of labor income Y_L & inequality of inherited wealth W (but wealth also comes from savings)


Orders of magnitude for Y & W

- France 2010: National income Y = 1 700 billions € (i.e. 35 000€ per adult)
- W = 9 500 billions € (200 000€ per adult)
- → W/Y = 560%: on average individual wealth = about 5.5-6 years of income
- On average: Y₁ = 26 000€ & Yκ = 9 000€
- \rightarrow capital share $\alpha = 25\%$
- \rightarrow average rate of return r = 4.5%
- There are still two ways to get rich...

The human capital illusion

- Illusion n°1: « today human capital has replaced old-style capital »; « modern growth = decline of coupon-clipping rentiers & triumph of meritocracy »
- In fact, non-human wealth W (i.e. real estate + financial assets) & capital income Y_K (i.e. rent + dividend + interest) did not disappear at all: capital share α stable around 30% since 19°!
- But W/Y did follow a very pronounced U-shaped pattern during 20^C → long-lasting illusion

Wealth-income ratio in France 1820-2008



The « war of ages » illusion

- Illusion n°2: « today the war of generations has replaced old-style class war »; « modern wealth accumulation = life-cycle savings, not inherited wealth »
- → It is true that inheritance virtually disappeared during 1950s-60s; but this was a purely transitory phenomenon
- **Key intuition**: with **r>g** (r=4-5% vs g=1-2%), wealth coming from the past is being capitalized faster than growth, and is bound to dominate wealth coming from labor savings


Annual inheritance flow as a fraction of national <u>income, France 1820-2008</u> 40% ◆ Economic flow (computed from national wealth estimates, mortality 36% tables and observed age-wealth profiles) 32% —□— Fiscal flow (computed from observed bequest and gift tax data, inc. tax exempt assets) 28% 24% 20% 16% 12% 8% 4% 0% 1840 1860 1880 1900 1940 1980 2000 1820 1920 1960

Annual inheritance flow as a fraction of disposable income, France 1820-2008 40% → Economic flow (computed from national wealth estimates, 36% mortality tables and observed age-wealth profiles) —□ Fiscal flow (computed from observed bequest and gift tax data, 32% inc. tax exempt assets) 28% 24% 20% 16% 12% 8% 4% 0% 1820 1840 1860 1880 1900 1940 1980 2000 1920 1960

Can wealth inequality ↑ 19[°]?

- Wealth inequality: astronomical levels around 1900-1910: Top 1% share ≈ 50%; Top 10% share ≈ 90%; tiny middle class
- Inequality started ↓ only after 1914
- Today: Top 1% ≈ 20%, Top 10% ≈ 50%, Middle 40% ≈ 40%, Bottom 50% < 10%...
- Why no recovery since 1945? Progressive tax & income growth? This can change
- & today's top wealth shares are probably under-estimated: tax havens etc.
- Impact of '07-'09 crisis on W inequality? ↑?

Wealth concentration, Paris and France, 1807-1994



Changes in the wealth distribution 1900-2010: The Rise of the Middle Class

1900

2010

Top 10%
"Upper Class"

90% 1 800 000 € 50% 1 000 000 €

Middle 40%
"Middle Class"

10% 50 000 € 40% 200 000 €

Bottom 50%
"Poor"

0% 0 €

10% 40 000 €

Share in total wealth

Average per adult wealth

100% 200 000 € 100% 200 000 €

Memo: Average per adult income

35 000 €

35 000 €

Changes in the wealth distribution 1900-2010 (contd')

1900

2010

Top 10%
"Upper Class"

90% 1 800 000 € 50% 1 000 000 €

incl. Top 1%
"Very Rich"

50% 10 000 000 € *20% 4 000 000 €*

incl. Other 9%
"Upper Middle Class"

40% 900 000 € *30%* 700 000 €

Middle 40%
"Middle Class"

10% 50 000 € 40% 200 000 €

Bottom 50%
"Poor"

0% 0 € 10% 40 000 €

Share in total wealth Average per adult wealth 100% *200 000 €*

100% 200 000 €


Top Heirs vs Top Labor Earners

- What is the best way to get rich?
 Inheritance or labor income?
- Lifetime perspective on inequality
- Bottom 50% labor earners vs Top 50% heirs → we are already back to 19^C
- Top 10% heirs vs Average labor income


 → we are still far from 19^C... but we are on
 the way

Top 50% inheritance vs bottom 50% lifetime labor income received by cohorts 1850-2000 120% 110% ■ top 50% inheritance as a fraction 100% of bottom 50% lifetime pre-tax labor income ressources (about 90% 15 000€ x 60yrs) 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20% 10% 0% 1910 1850 1870 1890 1930 1950 1990 1970

Top 10% inheritance vs average lifetime labor income received by cohorts 1850-2000




Top 1% inheritance vs average lifetime labor income received by cohorts 1850-2000



The Working Rich Illusion


- US '77-'07: >50% of total growth was absorbed by top 1%
- Technological story: « This is because the marginal product of the working rich has risen enormously »…
- → Very naïve view of the top labor market!
- Grabbing hand story: When pay setters set their own pay, there are no limits to rent extraction... unless confiscatory marginal tax rates at the very top
- Memo: US top rate (1m\$+) 1932-80: 82%

Are the U.S. the Future?



1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000

Are the U.S. the Future? (contd')



1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000

Growth & Inequality in the US 1976-2007

	Average Income Real Annual Growth	Top 1% Incomes Real Annual Growth	Bottom 99% Incomes Real Annual Growth	Fraction of total growth captured by top 1%
Period 1976-2007	1.2%	4.4%	0.6%	58%
Clinton Expansion 1993-2000	4.0%	10.3%	2.7%	45%
Bush Expansion 2002-2007	3.0%	10.1%	1.3%	65%

Why do we care?

- Lenin 1916: WW1 as the product of 19^C capitalist inequality
- (Imperialism, the highest stage of capitalism: nationalism as working class opium; imperialism due to competition over foreign assets between capitalists)
- → a bit simplistic, but not completely wrong: unregulated capitalism knows no limit and can create huge social & political tensions; the level of inequality around 1900-1910 was truly astonishing

Why do we care? (contd')

- 21^c capitalism can be even worst: rentiertype 19^c inequality + working-rich inequality + global scale, weak govts, tax havens...
- Democracies rely on meritocratic values; capitalism can destroy these values; Golden-age postwar meritocratic societies were built upon transitory illusions; they are fragile & can disappear
- Some of today's economists seem ready to accept & justify any inequality level (just like mainstream economists around 1900); but societies won't accept

What shall we do?

- I turned 18 in 1989; I don't want USSR; I believe in markets for efficiency & freedom
- But we need tough regulation & tax policy; this will require violent fights against tax havens & the rich; not just a few quiet G20 summits
- 20^C inequality compression = temporary illusion due to the wars: old wealth destruction + war-induced political reaction
- Let's try to make 21^c anti-inequality policies less violent & more durable