Income Inequality, Local Taxation, Education and Voting Behavior

Evidence from France, 1968-2017

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Abstract

This study documents the long-running structure of the political cleavage in France over the last fifty years, by focusing on the correlation between education, income, local taxation and voting preferences at the local level. We built long-term series of historical data from French censuses, electoral results, local taxation records and income distributions at the level of nearly 3,500 *cantons* and 36,000 *communes*, a much more disaggregated level of analysis than most of the literature on the political and economic legacy of political cleavage in France. We show that both *cantons* and *communes* in the top income (for the 1993-2017 period) and local tax ratio deciles (for the 2002-2017 period) tend to significantly vote more for right-wing parties than those in the median decile, and less for left-wing parties. Between 1993 and 1997, the education effect goes in the opposite direction, since *cantons* and *communes* in the top education deciles in terms of university graduates vote more for left-wing parties and less for right-wing parties than *cantons* and *communes* in the middle of the distribution. Interestingly, education seems to have the same impact as income for the 1968-1988 period, when we do not control for income because of the lack of available data: this suggests that the effect of income would have been the same for this time period as for the subsequent years. This might show that university graduates did not have the same voting habits in the 1960s-1970s and today (which would corroborate Piketty's finding (2018)).

Keywords: local taxation, income inequalities, education, voting behaviors
JEL Classification: J12, N34, Z130

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Contents

1 Introduction 6

2 Data 13

3 Estimation method and preliminary results 22

4 Conclusion 31

5 References 32

A Appendix 35

B Marginal impact of share of university graduates on the extreme-right 45

C Marginal impact of share of university graduates on the extreme-left 57

D Marginal impact of share of university graduates on the central right 69

E Marginal impact of share of university graduates on the central left 81

F Marginal impact of share of university graduates on the right 93

G Marginal impact of share of university graduates on the left 105

H Marginal impact of tax/inhabitants ratio on the extreme-left 125

I Marginal impact of tax/inhabitants ratio on the central right 133

J Marginal impact of tax/inhabitants ratio on the central left 141

K Marginal impact of tax/inhabitants ratio on the right 149

L Marginal impact of tax/inhabitants ratio on the left 157

M Marginal impact of net average taxable income on the extreme-right 165

N Marginal impact of net average taxable income on the extreme-left 177

O Marginal impact of net average taxable income on the central right 189

P Marginal impact of net average taxable income on the central left 201

Q Marginal impact of net average taxable income on the right 213

R Marginal impact of net average taxable income on the left 225

S Marginal impact of share of university graduates on the right 237

T Marginal impact of share of university graduates on the left 261

U Marginal impact of tax/inhabitants ratio on the right 285

V Marginal impact of tax/inhabitants ratio on the left 293

W Marginal impact of the net average taxable income on the right 301

X Marginal impact of the net average taxable income on the left 313

1 Introduction

What are the immediate and long-term political effects of socio-economic factors on voting behaviors? How do socio-economic inequalities lead some individuals to vote for the extreme political trends, and other rather to choose the pragmatic and classical view of the traditional parties? Since the 18th century, the literature on political cleavage in France has shown the relevance of socio-economic and socio-demographic factors on voting behaviors, such as age, gender, education, occupation and income. However, most of the past and recent studies rely on selected samples from post-electoral surveys or focus on limited time periods. Hence, this paper attempts to further explore the standard electoral theory by constructing new consistent long-run series of electoral results at the municipality and the *cantons* level (the second smallest administrative division of France) for the 1968-2017 period, allowing for a systematic study of the changing political cleavages in France over this period.

This paper builds upon a significant literature on the evolution of political behaviors depending on several socio-economic factors, such as geographical and cultural determinants, education, occupation, income and wealth. The seminal contribution of Siegfried (1949) in the Third Republic France inaugurated the very first national work in spatial politics, by analyzing the persistence of voting behaviors in Western France at a local level, depending on several factors, such as the structure of the land property, religion and geographical conditions. This pioneering study paved the way to subsequent local monographies, such as the analysis of the French Alps (Hugonnier, 1954) and of the Bouches-du-Rhône region (Olivesi and Roncayolo, 1961). More recently, Viskanic and Vertier (2018) analyzed the effect of migration, by studying the relocation of migrants from the Calais 'Jungle' to migrant centers, and its effect on the 2017 presidential elections at a municipal level. They show that the presence of a nearby center reduces the vote share for the extreme-right party.

Regarding socio-economic determinants of voting behaviors, Lipset-Rokkan (1967) stressed the fact that upper social classes are generally in favor of less state intervention, lower wages and taxes. More recently, Nadeau and al. (2012) focus on income as a significant predictor of contemporary voting behaviors. They show a positive correlation between income and the center-right vote, and a negative relationship between income and the extreme-left vote in the French presidential elections between 1988 and 2007. Moreover, by focusing on post-electoral surveys in France, Britain and the United States of America, Piketty (2018) shows that the top 10% (and especially the top 5% and top 1%) income decile is also more likely to vote for the right-wing parties than the bottom 90% of the income distribution, a fact that Pasteau (2018) also shows in his study at the département level. Voting habits seem also to depend on wealth, since voters in the top wealth deciles systematically vote more for right-wing parties than voters in the middle or in the lower wealth deciles (Piketty, 2018).

However, as social stratification declines over time, occupation and education might also play a great role to explain voting behaviors (Cautrès and Mayer, 2004). Goux and Maurin (2004) show that occupation was a predominant explanatory variable for the vote for the Maastricht referendum in 1992, especially for the right-wing parties at the municipal level. More generally, Cautrès and Mayer (2004) point out the positive correlation between extreme-right voting preferences and low education. Finally, Piketty (2018) shows that, while high education was correlated with a right-wing vote in the 1950s-1960s period, a reversal occured in the 1980s-1990s, leading to highly educated individuals now rather voting for the left.

Finally, this paper forms part of a broader perspective in terms of political cleavages. Modern democracies are shown to face several types of political conflicts across various dimensions, such as center vs periphery, state vs clerical leadership, agriculture vs manufacturing, working class vs owners, universalist vs traditionalist or liberal vs communitarian (Lipset-Rokkan, 1967, Bornshier, 2010). These moving cleavages change voting behaviors over time: for instance, Piketty (2018) reveals the emergence of an intellectual elite (Brahmin left) in the US, Great Britain and France at the end of the 20th century, who votes more for the left-wing parties, *versus* a business-oriented elite, who votes in favor of the right-wing parties. This paper is an attempt to further investigate the emergence and evolution of this two-elite system in France over the 1968-2017 period.

Relative to the existing literature, this paper makes several contributions. First, we measure political preferences for very precise and disaggregated political nuances. The specificities of French politics, with a variety of political parties running for elections, allows to give a very detailed picture of local political preferences. While the French political landscape has considerably evolved along the sample period, it is still possible to classify each party along an Extreme Left - Extreme Right axis based on the description of each platform by historians and political scientists[1]. Moreover, we use these measures at the level of nearly 3,500 *cantons* and 36,000 *communes* , a much more disaggregated level of analysis than most of the literature on the political and economic legacy of political cleavage in France, which generally relies on the level of 90 *départements* [2]. We also match these electoral results to socio-economic determinants of political preferences, such as age structure, occupation, gender, education and unemployment.

The second significant contribution of this research is to explore the impact of local taxation on aggregated voting behaviors and its interactions with education, income and wealth. Local taxation has not been considered in the literature yet, although it is the one of the few variables that represents the economic dynamic of the *canton* or the *communes.*

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[1] In this study, we use Julia Cagé's classification of political parties, see Section 2.2.

[2] In this regard, Pasteau (2018) is our main model of analysis.

Last but not least, local taxation enables us to differentiate between voting behaviors of 'residential local economies', defined by Laurent Davezies (2008) as areas with wealthy non-active individuals (such as retirees), and areas with a high economic potential.

More generally, the main innovation of this research is to build systematic long-running series of electoral results and socio-economic inequality measures at a local level, and to focus on disparate voting attitudes at a local level across education, income and local taxation. This decomposition of voting behaviors along socio-economic commensurable inequality variables is useful for comparative studies over long time periods and across countries (Piketty, 2018).

Our main empirical results are the following: first, *cantons* and *communes* in the top deciles in terms of average income (for the 1993-2017 period) tend to significantly vote more for right-wing parties and less for left-wing parties than *cantons* and *communes* in the median decile. More specifically, average taxable income is positively correlated with right-wing vote at the end of the period (2002-2017). It is also negatively correlated with extreme parties. Average taxation during the 2002-2017 period has the same postive and negative impacts as average income, respectively on the right- and left-wing parties, while it does not present any significant correlation with center-wing nor extreme parties. Finally, *cantons* and *communes* in the top deciles in terms of education level (i.e. in terms of population shares of university graduates[3]) vote more for the left- and less for the right-wing parties than the median decile. They also vote far less for extreme parties that the median decile. These results could be interpreted as follows: first, the emergence of an intellectual elite in France in the 1970s-1980s, who vote more for left-wing parties (Piketty, 2018), is verified in our study. Moreover, the intellectual elite clearly vote against the extreme-parties. In the absence of income as a control variable over the 1968-1988 period, we observe a complete reversal of the education effect, since *cantons* and *communes* in the top deciles in terms of education level now vote more for the right and less for the left-wing parties. This might show that the income effect over this period was predominant, even though multiple political equilibria might have coexisted, depending on individual's type of higher degree or occupation [4]. Another interpretation would be that highly educated left-oriented voters tended to live less together than wealthy right-oriented voters during this period. Finally, it might also be the case that the reversal of the political cleavage in terms of education *versus* income was not entirely completed at this time period (as shown by Piketty, 2008).

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[3] By running the analysis on population shares of baccaulaureat graduates, instead of university graduates, we found less significant and consistent results. In fact, since the 1970s-1980s, a large part of the population gets the baccalaureat, which makes this degree not significative enough to illustrate political cleavages in terms of education level.

While income and education combined give us great insight on the effect of aggregated individual characteristics, local taxation gives us additional details on the impact of the economic ecosystem of *cantons* and *communes* on voting behaviors. In fact, local taxation is mostly made of corporate tax, which is an indication of the spatial concentration of manufacturing and services. Therefore, *cantons* and *communes* with a strong concentration should favor pro-business attitudes and be liberal-oriented. Our results are consistent with this hypothesis, since areas in the top deciles in terms of average local taxation product vote more for the right- and less for the left-wing parties than the median decile. This interpretation, however, assumes either that the individuals that depend on the firms' welfare are part of the local electorate, or that the presence of a given number of firms at the *cantons* or *communes* level favors the existence of a pro-business electorate.

The identification of this paper relies on comparing deciles of *cantons* and *communes* according to education, income and local taxation, in a cross-sectional framework from 1968 onwards. The first methodological challenge is to classify the plethora of political trends into comparable categories over time and across countries. We explain this categorization in further details later in the paper. This classification can be difficult since new parties (such as En Marche, Emmanuel Macron's party) claim themselves as not partisan and gather traditional political aspects from both the right- and the left-wing parties. We should also remain cautious of false causal interpretation for observed trends, since we don't observe several variables, such as religion, migration or household structure, and since we don't observe voting behaviors at an individual level. In fact, our analysis poses methodological issues in terms of artificial homogenization of individual voting preferences. Robinson (1950) pointed out the fact that ecological effects cannot be equivalent to individual correlations, in the way that they could cancel individual correlations out. Rather, our analysis focuses on social interactions and spatial influences in terms of voting behaviors. As pointed out by Goodman (1959), in response to Robinson, ecological correlations are of primary interest, since people may socialize in different places and influence each other, which explains a significative spatial difference in terms of voting attitudes. As stressed by Pasteau (2018): "the ecological analysis of electoral results appears to be a valid method as long as there is no straightforward inference of the aggregated relations on the individuals". Our analysis, which is done at the *cantons* and *communes* levels, is an improvement on these two perspectives, since it gives a more accurate sense of political spatial differentiation and social interactions in voting behaviors than previous works that have been done at the *département* level. Still, for robustness purposes, we compare our results to Piketty's analysis of post-electoral individual surveys (2018).

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[4] In fact, teachers, researchers and high-level public agents may tend to vote more for left-wing parties, whereas equally highly-educated individuals, who work in the private sector, may prefer to vote for right-wing candidates.

The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents historical statistical data on electoral results and time series based on newly collected census data for the 1968-2017 period. Section 3 presents the main specification and empirical results based on historical census data and electoral results at the canton level and focuses on the correlation between education, income and local taxation on voting behaviors during the 1993-2017 period. Section 4 concludes.

2 Data

2.1 Electoral and geographical levels of analysis

In the 20th century French electoral system, several types of elections are sequentially held: municipal, departmental, legislative, senatorial and presidential elections. We chose to focus on the legislative elections for the following reasons, also mentioned by Siegfried in his seminal work (1913):

-municipal elections have only a clear political meaning for big municipalities: for small ones, however, the challenge of the elections is not political *per se*, but rather revolves around personalities and candidates.

-departmental elections are not of prime interest for voters: turnout is often high for this type of elections. The same reason applies for senatorial elections. Moreover, results for these elections are only aggregated at the *département* level and cannot be studied at a smaller local level.

-presidential elections often turn out to be a struggle between two main opponents and thus, the diversity of political opinions is hard to observe. Moreover, alliances between different political parties are often created, making the analysis of each political force more difficult to analyze separately along the traditional left-right political scale.

It follows that legislative elections seem to be the accurate and optimal level of electoral analysis in case of French politics. However, by focusing on legislative elections, one should be aware of two major facts, as shown by Siegfried: “Two conditions should be respected, in order to draw any meaningful interpretation from legislative electoral results: first, one should accurately look at geographical disparities within *circonscriptions*, and secondly, one should careful study persistent long-term political trends across legislative elections. In fact, interpreting the results of only one election, and extrapolating general political trends from this single point, would be misleading." (p. 50). Therefore, we should carefully choose our geographical level of analysis. French metropolitan administrative system is made of six main levels: municipalities (roughly 36 000, depending on the year), *cantons* (around 3000-4000), *circonscriptions* (around 500-600), *départements* (95-100) and régions (22). While the literature mainly focuses on the *départements*, we focus on the *cantons* , a far narrower level of analysis, which allow us to increase the number of observations, to better illustrate the local political trends, a fact that Siegfried already mentioned in his seminal work (1913): "*départements* and *circonscriptions* aren't homogeneous units of analysis for the study of political preferences. *cantons*, however, seem to be the most natural and easily observable political units: they are expanded enough to avoid excessive details and small enough to comprise homogeneous political trends" (p.51). Sometimes, the use of municipality data is also useful, in case of infra-cantonal political divisions: "However it happens sometimes that the canton comprises different political trends. It this case, one needs to study one's political object at the municipality level" (p. 52). Individual data are of course the most accurate level of analysis. However, although post-electoral survey data, used by Mayer (2004) or Piketty (2008), have obvious advantages, such as gathering individual data on electoral behavior, socio-demographic and economic characteristics, they also have major flaws: their sample size is limited, and they don't exist before the 20th century. Therefore, in the absence of long-term series of individual electoral preferences and census data, a second-optimal level of analysis is the use of legislative electoral results, census and fiscal data, either at the municipality or at the *canton* level. Moreover, analyzing both geographical scopes allows to detect aggregation effects, such as endogeneous choices of localization for households. In fact, we might observe different results between both levels, as it is more likely that we observe less heterogeneity in terms of socio-economic and socio-demographic characteristics between cantons than between municipalities (since population with the same characteristics often live in the same cross-municipalities surroundings). For all these reasons, this paper deals both with the municipality and the *canton* level.

2.2 Electoral results and classification of political parties

Legislative elections. In this paper, we focus on the 1968, 1973, 1978, 1981, 1986, 1988, 1993, 1997, 2002, 2007, 2012 and 2017 legislative elections. Legislative elections take place every 5 years in France. Since the French president can dissolve the National Assembly, more frequent elections can occur (which explains why our election time periods fluctuate). Data are available online at all levels from 1993 onwards. Data from 1968 to 1988 are only available at the département, *circonscription* and *cantons* levels [5]. Nowadays, the French National Assembly has 577 seats - one for each consistuency (*circonscription*) [6]. In order to obtain a majority of votes, a political party must win a total of 289 seats in any *circonscription* in a two-round process: if a candidate wins 50% of the votes and a minimum of 25% of the votes at the end of the first round, there is no second round. However, since most *circonscriptions* have several candidates, this case is rare, and the two candidates with the most votes during the first round move to a second ballot. More than two candidates can move to the second round of elections, since any candidate with at least 12.5 percent of all registered voters in any *circonscription* is eligible for the second ballot. The candidate who obtains most votes win.

Classification of political parties. While legislative electoral results at a departmental level are relatively easy to find - the Centre de données socio-politiques (CDSP) has digitalized harmonized electoral data for the Fifth Republic (1958-2012)-, this is not the case of *cantons*'s level data. We gathered cantonal electoral data from the Ministry of the Interior and digitalized them. We focus our analysis only on the results of the first round of the legislative elections. In fact, results of the second rounds often conceal the diversity of political opinions since only the two most-voted candidates can take part. Moreover, some political parties, such as regionalist or some specific federations, have no clear positioning on the left-right political scale. Therefore, we don't take them into account. We rather focus on the extreme-right, center right, center left and extreme left parties, which we classified as follows [7]:

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[5] For this time period, we use the data from the Centre de Données Socio-politiques, as well as Nicolas Sauger's election results by *cantons*.

[6] The number of seats varies over the years



Year	Extreme-left	Centre-left	Centre-right	Extreme-right	Diverse
1968	PC, app. au PC, PSU, ext. gauche	FGDS, Radicaux-socialistes	UDR, RI, RI/UDR, PDM, div. gaullistes, Radicaux de droite, Modérés	Alliance républicaine, div. ext. droite	Mouv. pour la réf., divers, Tech. et dém., régionalistes
1973	PC, PSU, LO, LCR, OCR	PS, MRG, div. gauche	Radicaux réformateurs, div. réformateurs, RI-URP, UDR-URP, CD-URP, divers URP, UDR, RI, div. gaullistes, div. droite	ext. droite	-
1978	PC, Front autogestionnaire, ext. gauche	PS-MRG, div. gauche, écologistes	UDF, RPR, gaullistes d'opposition, div. droite	ext. droite	-
1981	PC, ext. gauche	PS, Radicaux de gauche, écologistes, div. gauche	UDF, RPR, div. droite	Front National, ext. droite	régionalistes
1986	PC, ext. gauche	PS, Radicaux de gauche, écologistes, div. gauche	UDF, RPR, UDF/RPR, div. droite	FN	régionalistes
1988	PC, ext. gauche	PS, Majorité présid., Radicaux de Gauche, écologistes	UDF, RPR, div. droite	FN, ext. droite	régionalistes
1993	PC, ext. gauche	PS, Majorité présid., MRG, Verts, Génération Ecologie	UDF, RPR, div. droite	FN, ext. droite	divers, régionalistes
1997	PC, ext. gauche	PS, PRG, écologistes, div. gauche	UDF, RPR, div. droite	FN, ext. droite	divers
2002	PC, LO, LCR, div. ext. gauche	PS, PRG, Verts, écologistes, Pole republicain, div. gauche	UDF, UMP, Démocratie Libérale, div. droite	FN, MPF, MNR, RPF, ext. droite	divers, CPNT, régionalistes
2007	PC, ext. gauche	PS, PRG, écologistes, div. gauche	MODEM, UMP, PSLE, div. droite	FN, ext. droite	divers
2012	Front de gauche, ext. gauche	PS, PRG, EELV, écologistes, div. gauche	IMP, All. Cent., Le Centre pour la France, Nouv. Cent., Parti radical, div. droite	FN, ext. droite	régionalistes, autre

Source: Etienne Pasteau (2018)

On top of these four categories, we analyze the right and left categories, that respectively gather the center- and extreme-right and the center- and extreme-left votes. Shares of votes for each of these political trends are described in Table 1 below. Furthermore, at this stage of the analysis, we restrict our study to plain vote shares and exclude turnout as a potential dependent variable, although it can be considered as a major determinant of the vote shares' magnitude of the different political parties (see Braconnier and Dormagan, 2007, for a sociological analysis of turnout in Paris area).

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[7] The following table represents the classification of the main political trends only. However, the raw election results contain a myriad of political parties that have been classified by Julia Cagé (see References). This study uses Julia Cagé's classification.

2.3 Census data, income and local taxation

Census data. Census data with socio-demographic variables, such as occupation, education, age and gender, are available online for the 1968-2015 period, at the municipal level. We make use of a table of equivalence between municipalities and *cantons* to aggregate municipal census data at the level of our unit of analysis [8]. For each election year, we compute a linear extrapolation of every census variable by averaging the census data of the previous and following elections, by weighting more the census results closer to the election year.

Local taxation and income distribution. . The local taxation and the income structure at the municipality level are only available from 1993 (for income) and 2002 (for local taxation) onwards. We collected local taxation data at the municipality level for the 2002-2017 period that are made available by the Tax Directorate of the Ministry of Economy and Finance. French local taxation system did not vary much across time during the 1968-2017 period, although some tax did change names. They are four main types: housing tax, property tax imposed on constructed and non-constructed property and corporate tax. As for income distribution, the average net income is only available at the municipality level for 1993 and 1997. We use the average taxable income, which is available from 2002 to 2017, as a proxy for the average net income for the subsequent years of the analysis. To get a general perspective on the effect of socio-economic inequality on voting attitudes, we first compute the average net and taxable income and tax level per adult as the ratio of total net or taxable income/ total local tax revenue over the number of adults aged more than 20 years old, to make levels comparable over time across *cantons* and *communes* (see Section 3).

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[8] This table of equivalence has been created by Frédéric Salmon.

Tables 1 and 2 show descriptive statistics for our main socio-demographic and socio-economic variables each year, both at the *cantons* and *communes* level. Sources for census, average income and tax ratio are described in Appendix A1-A3.

As expected, the share of elderly on the active population increases over the period (from around 20% to 28% per cent), as well as the share of the population who holds a university degree (from 2% to 23%), due to the so-called democratization of education in the 1960s. Interestingly is also the participation, which shrinks from 80% to 50% at the end of the period. This might induce that the results that we get at the end of the period should be carefully interpreted, as they show the impact of socio-economic and socio-demographic characteristics on the voting behaviors of a restricted sample of the population.

Another notable fact is the number of *cantons*, which is reduced by almost half between 2012 and 2017. This follows the law that was passed on the 17 May 2013, which proceeds to a rezoning of *cantons* so that parity in departmental elections is imposed and that voters can chose two elected representatives of both sexes.

In order to provide some context for the interpretation of the main results, other descriptive tables are provided in Appendix A4. They represent the number of units (either municipalities or textitcantons) for each decile of the share of the population in terms of university graduates, tax ratio and income level, as well as for the top 5% and 1%.

Table 1: General descriptive statistics for the 1968-2017 period - *canton* level (reference for codification of the *cantons*: Salmon's table of equivalence, see Appendix A.3.)

	(1968)		(1973)		(1978)		(1981)		(1986)		(1988)		(1993)		(1997)		(2002)		(2007)		(2012)		(2017)	
	mean	sd	mean	sd	mean	sd	mean	sd	mean	sd	mean	sd	mean	sd	mean	sd	mean	sd	mean	sd	mean	sd	mean	sd
pop 0-20 years old	5149	7896	5167	7937	4844	6851	4915	7102	4480	5991	4518	6065	4244	5669	4329	5735	4234	5646	4186	5601	4278	5791	7324	5878
pop 20-35 years old	2932	5646	3097	5943	3565	6249	3382	6143	3583	6070	3581	6054	3443	6162	3521	6092	3247	6301	3322	6230	3169	6406	3168	11453
pop 35-50 years old	2928	4932	2942	4884	2773	4147	2808	4270	2892	4096	2754	3943	3419	4570	3237	4424	3597	4673	3560	4652	3541	4698	3519	8713
pop 50-65 years old	2312	4020	2313	3958	2350	3565	2233	3542	2414	3341	2386	3384	2528	3287	2478	3246	3135	3844	2769	3499	3396	4074	3452	8096
pop 65-80 years old	1575	2563	1630	2626	1661	2548	1674	2592	1595	2380	1585	2398	1864	2501	1691	2389	2014	2485	1995	2533	2174	2617	2287	4728
pop 80+ years old	339	551	354	580	428	694	388	635	518	813	485	771	586	900	582	896	839	1173	680	1000	1010	1339	1065	2384
pop 65+ years old	1914	3106	1984	3200	2089	3237	2062	3221	2113	3187	2070	3162	2450	3390	2273	3275	2853	3645	2675	3522	3183	3939	3352	8092
pop 20+ years old	10086	17510	10336	17774	10777	16937	10485	16918	11002	16425	10791	16277	11840	17098	11509	16745	12832	18081	12326	17557	13288	18683	13491	25896
ratio pop 65+ over 20+	22	5	22	5	23	6	23	6	22	6	22	6	24	6	22	6	25	6	25	6	27	6	28	6
ratio 20-35 over 20+	26	5	26	6	29	6	28	6	29	5	30	5	26	5	27	5	21	5	23	5	20	5	19	5
share of women	50	2	50	2	50	2	50	2	50	2	50	2	50	1	50	2	50	1	50	1	50	2	50	2
share of pop. with a higher degree	2	2	2	2	5	3	4	3	7	4	6	4	11	6	9	5	19	7	15	7	22	8	23	8
registered voters	82454	90819	87525	99900	82171	87567	87211	91488	83127	82776	82683	83046	86095	86667	85800	86727	90688	92394	96115	99203	98560	103075	123117	180356
ratio registered voters over 20+	1206	836	1229	826	1188	907	1285	871	1152	798	1179	830	1091	756	1115	776	1038	718	1133	778	1072	743	1881	3114
voters	66716	73266	71934	81940	69782	74865	63761	66259	66870	66765	56572	56210	61151	61394	60758	61547	59706	59834	59726	60419	59376	61091	61748	122149
participation	79	5	80	5	82	3	72	5	76	4	67	6	67	4	67	4	65	5	62	5	60	5	50	5
share CR	60	16	53	16	49	12	45	13	46	10	42	13	46	12	38	10	44	11	53	11	36	12	53	11
share CL	22	12	27	13	28	9	39	10	34	7	39	10	28	9	35	9	33	10	32	10	40	10	14	8
share ER	0	0	0	1	1	1	0	1	9	4	8	4	12	5	14	6	12	5	5	2	14	6	16	7
share EL	17	11	20	11	22	10	16	11	11	7	11	9	10	7	12	8	7	7	8	6	8	6	15	5
share total right	60	16	53	16	50	12	45	13	55	10	51	12	58	11	52	10	56	11	58	11	50	12	69	11
share total left	39	15	47	16	50	12	55	13	45	10	49	12	38	11	47	10	41	10	40	11	48	11	29	10
share othervoters	0	2	-0	1	0	2	0	1	0	1	0	1	4	3	1	2	3	3	2	3	1	4	3	4
N	3121		3125		3319		3319		3494		3494		3516		3519		3530		3532		3532		1881	

Note: this table provides descriptive statistics (mean and standard deviation) for the first round of each legislative election between 1968 and 2017 in Metropolitan France.

Table 2: General descriptive statistics for the 1968-2017 period - municipality level (reference for codification of the municipalities: 2012)

	(1968)		(1973)		(1978)		(1981)		(1986)		(1988)		(1993)		(1997)		(2002)		(2007)		(2012)		(2017)	
	mean	sd	mean	sd	mean	sd	mean	sd	mean	sd	mean	sd	mean	sd	mean	sd	mean	sd	mean	sd	mean	sd	mean	sd
pop 0-20 years old	445	2252	450	2249	448	2112	455	2207	431	1949	435	1980	409	1840	418	1870	409	1834	405	1823	428	1910	433	1936
pop 20-35 years old	253	1644	270	1723	330	1957	313	1928	345	1984	344	1981	332	2006	340	1993	314	2040	321	2025	317	2102	317	2114
pop 35-50 years old	253	1442	256	1421	257	1294	260	1345	278	1332	265	1286	330	1488	312	1444	348	1521	344	1521	354	1550	352	1553
pop 50-65 years old	200	1202	201	1184	217	1141	207	1136	232	1112	229	1127	244	1089	239	1085	303	1266	268	1157	340	1362	345	1368
pop 65-80 years old	136	772	142	793	154	821	155	836	153	793	152	798	180	839	163	801	195	834	193	855	218	885	229	920
pop 80+ years old	29	167	31	176	40	224	36	205	50	271	47	257	56	301	56	300	81	396	66	337	101	460	107	476
pop 65+ years old	165	937	173	968	193	1044	191	1040	203	1062	199	1053	236	1138	219	1099	276	1227	259	1189	319	1342	336	1392
pop 20+ years old	870	5182	900	5250	997	5378	970	5390	1058	5428	1038	5385	1141	5646	1110	5552	1240	5960	1191	5806	1330	6244	1350	6308
ratio pop 65+ over 20+	23	10	24	8	24	9	25	10	23	9	23	9	24	9	23	9	24	9	24	9	26	9	27	11
ratio 20-35 over 20+	24	9	24	8	27	9	26	10	28	8	28	9	24	7	26	8	20	7	22	7	19	7	18	8
share of women	50	6	50	5	50	4	50	6	50	4	50	4	50	4	50	4	50	4	50	4	50	4	50	5
share of pop. with a higher degree	1	2	2	2	4	4	3	4	6	5	5	5	10	6	8	6	18	8	14	7	21	9	23	11
registered voters	7085	6476	7537	7190	7717	6057	8121	6403	8025	5512	8044	5426	989	3295	1000	3294	1047	3352	1122	3651	1182	4118	1229	3950
ratio registered voters over 20+	3848	5955	3884	5580	3971	5668	4280	6290	3790	5162	3970	5724	107	23	110	24	102	20	112	20	103	18	105	19
voters	5733	5170	6194	5840	6553	5136	5937	4514	6456	4360	5504	3565	685	2176	684	2110	678	2124	681	2143	680	2127	611	1938
participation	79	5	80	4	83	3	73	5	77	3	68	5	69	7	68	7	67	7	64	7	63	7	54	8
share CR	61	15	53	16	50	11	46	13	47	9	43	12	48	14	40	13	45	14	55	14	38	14	53	14
share CL	22	12	28	13	28	9	40	10	34	7	39	11	27	12	34	12	32	13	31	13	38	13	13	11
share ER	0	0	0	1	0	1	0	1	8	3	8	4	11	6	14	7	13	7	5	3	15	7	18	9
share EL	17	10	19	10	21	9	15	11	10	6	10	8	9	8	11	8	6	7	7	6	7	6	14	8
share total right	61	15	54	16	51	11	46	12	56	10	51	12	59	14	54	14	58	14	60	14	53	15	71	14
share total left	39	15	46	16	49	12	54	12	44	10	48	12	36	14	45	14	38	13	37	14	45	15	26	13
share othervoters	0	3	-0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	1	5	5	1	3	4	5	3	4	1	6	3	6
N	36631		36628		36262		36271		36640		36626		36700		36712		36712		36731		36819		35537	

Note: this table provides descriptive statistics (mean and standard deviation) for the first round of each legislative election between 1968 and 2017 in Metropolitan France.

2.4 *Cantons*' boundaries

One major issue of our analysis is the change in *cantons*' boundaries across time. *Cantons* have changed a lot since 1968: around 400 of them were divided and 200 of them were re-united, while most of the remaining *cantons* ' administrative boundaries have experienced expansion or size reduction (Gaudillère, 1995). The challenge of our analysis is to consider comparable *cantons* and try to exactly match *cantons* over the years, in order to rigorously analyze evolution in voting behaviors. To do so, we rely on Salmon's *cantons* maps and table of equivalence for the 1968-2012 period (Salmon, 2018), and on the Ministry of Interior's table between 2012 and 2017, to attribute matching identifiers for each canton over the whole period. Although Gaudillère (1995) shows that municipalities's boundaries have experienced a few changes, we assume that they remain substantially the same for simplification purposes. We then use the Code géographique officiel (INSEE, 2012) to aggregate municipalities' income distribution, local taxation level, and socio-demographic variables to the *canton* level.

3 Estimation method and preliminary results

3.1 Specification

Following Pasteau (2018), at the *canton* and *commune* level, we first implement a simple OLS in order to look at basic correlation patterns in cross-section for each year of study by clustering standard errors at the *département* level (each *département* contains several *cantons*):

$$y_{it} = \gamma I_{it} + \beta X_{it} + \epsilon_{it}(1)$$

Where i is the canton index, t the year of study, Y the vote share considered (either extreme-right, center-right, center-left, extreme-left), I is our variable of interest (either average net or taxable income, local tax ratio, or education) and X a set of socio-demographic and economic variables, such as gender, age, occupation, rurality and education (when it is not used as a variable of interest). The main focus of this study is the analysis of cross-sectional correlation, and not causality, between our dependent variables (voting shares) and our variables of interest. In fact, we aim at extending Piketty's descriptive findings on France at a local level (Piketty, 2018), regarding education and income, such that we are rather focusing on historical changes in voting behaviors and political cleavages than in causal relations between variables. [9].

Voting shares are standardized by using the following computation:

$$y_{it} = \frac{sC_{it} - s\bar{C}_t}{\sigma_{sC_t}}$$

---

[9] Other variables, such as the level of religious observance for instance, are obviously missing, leading to an endogeneity issue that does not allow for causal interpretation. We omit religion because of the absence of consistent and comparable data across time at the *cantons* and *communes* level. In any ways, endogeneity might also occur through unobservables that we are not able to control for in this study.

Where sC_{it} is the voting share for candidate C in the canton i in the year t, $s\bar{C}_t$ is the voting share for the candidate C at the national level in the year t, and σ_{sC_t} is the standard deviation of the vote gained by C in the year t.

Finally, variables of interest and control variables are fractioned in deciles, weighted by the population of registered voters, and all results must be interpreted with respect to the 50-60 decile.

3.2 Results

First, we analyze the cross-sectional correlations between education and voting behaviors for the 1968-2017 period. We haven't disaggregated data on income at the canton level for the 1968-1988 period yet, so for this period, it will be hard to disentangle the education effect from the income and the wealth effects. Secondly, we focus on the relationship between average local taxes and income per adult and voting behaviors from 1993 onwards. It is worth noticing that we observe the same trends (in terms of sign and magnitude of the correlations) both at the municipality and at the *cantons* level. Our hypothesis that we would observe endogenous localization effects of the households do not seem to hold, at least at the *cantons* level. Therefore, the following results present the range of magnitude at both levels and for both the top 5 and 1 of the distribution, either in terms of education, income or local taxation (see tables in Appendix for further details).

3.2.1 Focus on the educational effect (1968-2017)

The top deciles in terms of share of university graduates seem to be significantly and positively correlated with left-wing voting behaviors and negatively correlated with right-wing voting behaviors (if we consider by left-wing -respectively right-wing - votes the votes for the extreme-left, the center-left and the left -respectively the extreme-right, the center-right and the right- parties). The magnitude of these correlations goes from 0.6 to 1.4 standard deviations of vote for left-wing parties and from 0.3 to 1.4 standard deviations of vote for right-wing parties over the 1993-2017 period. This variable does not show any significant and consistent correlation with the center-left or right parties but displays a significant negative correlation with extreme-wing parties, which goes from 0.5 to 1.4 standard deviation, depending on the year of analysis.

The following present these results for 2012 at the municipality level:



Note: Standardised share of vote for the left in the first round of French legislative elections. The effect on the vote is expressed in standard-deviation of the vote. The share of university graduates is the share of individuals aged more than 20 with a university diploma in the municipality. Income is the average taxable income per adult in the municipality. Population density is the ratio of the total number of municipal residents over the municipal surface area. Control variables:, share of women, share of the population aged 20 to 35, share of the population aged 65+, share of workers, share employed in the industry, share employed in agriculture, unemployment rate, population density. Standard errors are clustered at the département level.



It is also worth noticing that for the 1968-1988 period, while we do not control for income because of the lack of accessible data, the correlation between education and left/ right voting behaviors goes in the opposite direction than the correlation from 1993 onwards (once we control for income), i.e. the top deciles in terms of share of university graduates seem to be significantly and positively correlated with right-wing voting behaviors and negatively correlated with left-wing behaviors, as show in this example at the municipality level for1993:



3.2.2 Focus on the income (1993-2017) and the local taxation effect (2002-2017)

The net and taxable average income is also significantly and negatively correlated with extreme-wing voting behaviors, with a magnitude of 0.5 to 0.9 standard deviations for the extreme-left and 0.3 to 0.8 standard deviations for the extreme-right. It is worth noticing that the impact of income on the extreme-right vote is less negatively significant at the municipality level (only negative, 0.4st. deviation, at the end of the period) than the impact on the extreme-left vote (which is consistently and significantly negative over the 1993-2017 period, from 0.3 to 0.8 st. deviations). In contrast to education, net and taxable income is negatively correlated with left-wing parties (0.3 to to 1.8 st. deviations) and positively correlated with right-wing parties (0.3 to 1.7 st. deviations).

The following present these results for 2002 at the municipality level:





Finally, the impact of the local tax product ratio on voting behaviors goes in the same direction as the impact of net and taxable average income, since it is significantly and positively correlated with right-wing parties (0.3 to 0.8 st. deviations) and negatively correlated with left-wing parties (0.3 to 0.8 standard deviations).

The following present these results for 2002 at the municipality level:





These results corroborate previous findings in the literature. First, the reversal of the political cleavage in terms of education – left-oriented intellectual elite -*versus* income - right-oriented business elite - was not entirely completed in the beginning of the period (Piketty, 2008). In fact, in his paper, Piketty shows that, in the 1950s-1960s, the more educated voters were the ones who voted for the right-wing parties, while, at the end of 2010s, the higher the education level, the higher the left-vote. The reversal in the education gradient would have taken place gradually, a fact that we also observe in our results. Secondly, we also corroborate Pasteau's results (2018), which report a positive and significant correlation between average income per adult and vote for the right, a negative correlation between average income per adult and vote for the left, and a positive correlation between education and the extreme-right, at the municipality level. We expand these results and show a positive impact of education on voting behaviors for the left and a negative one for the right. Moreover, we show that the local taxation effect goes in the same direction as the income, which makes this variable less informative than expected for explaining voting behaviors in a spatial perspective.

3.2.3 Robustness check

These results are robust to the inclusion of a wide range of control variables, such as the population density, the share of women, the unemployment rate, the share of workers and employees, the share of the population between 0 and 20 years old and more than 65 years old. As an additional robustness check, we also include the share of votes (from left to right) in 1968 as a control variable in all regressions from 1973 onwards, in order to control for past political trends and partly take into account omitted variables, which might have influenced past election results. The previous results for education and income hold.

The following present these results for 2002 at the municipality level:



Note: All previous control variables are included. The share of votes for the right in 1968 is added as a control variable. Standard errors are clustered at the département level.



Note: All previous control variables are included. The share of votes for the left in 1968 is added as a control variable. Standard errors are clustered at the département level.

4 Conclusion

This study gives some insight on the correlation between education, income, local taxation and voting patterns both at the canton and municipality levels, over the 1968-2017 period. We build long-running series of socio-demographic and socio-economic variables, as well as electoral results on the whole period, in order to analyze the historical evolutions of the political cleavages in France. We corroborate both Piketty's and Pasteau's findings, by showing that *cantons* and *communes* in the top income (for the 1993-2017 period) and local tax ratio deciles (for the 2002-2017 period) tend to significantly vote more for right-wing parties than those in the median decile, and less for left-wing parties. The fact that education has an opposite impact before and after 1988 either shows that the voting habits of the higher educated part of the population changed over time, or that the income effect, which is not taken into account for the 1968-1988 period, is predominant.

However, this study is mostly descriptive and does not show causal relations (even though our results are robust to multiple specifications, including various control variables and past voting trends). Further avenue for research should deal with the omitted variable issue, by expanding our data collection to religious observance or migration, for instance. Moreover, one should try to collect consistent data on wealth over the whole period of analysis in order to disentangle the effect of wealth and income on voting patterns. Finally, expanding the data collection back in time would be a formidable challenge, in order to trace back the evolution of political cleavages in France before the 1950s-1960s.

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A Appendix

A.1 Census

The INSEE has digitalized census series at the municipality level for the 1968-2015 period, which contain the following data (among others):

-occupation categories: number of working individuals classified as workers, entrepreneurs-merchants, employees, executives, farmers and intermediary professions.

-(un)employment: number of active versus unemployed individuals per municipality.

-age categories: number of individuals per age category (from 0 to 95 years old, 5-year categories, and one last category for 95+ years old individuals).

-gender: number of men and women per municipality.

-education level: number of individuals per municipalities who do not hold any degree, who hold a CAP/BEP (professional degree), a baccalaureat degree, and an university degree.

All variables are available for the following years: 1968, 1975, 1982, 1990, 1999, 2010 and 2015. These series are available online.

Sources: Données harmonisées des recensements de la population à partir de 1968.

-Position vis-a-vis de l'emploi – Données harmonisées RP1968-2015

-Catégories socio-professionnelles - Données harmonisées RP1968-2015

-Age quinquennal - Données harmonisées RP1968-2015

-Sexe - Données harmonisées RP1968-2015

-Diplômes - Données harmonisées RP1968-2015

A.2 Income and tax data

Data on the average net and taxable income at the municipality level are made available on request by the Quetelet Progedo Diffusion project. Originally, data were gathered from DGFIP and INSEE.

The average net income is only available at the municipality level for 1993 and 1997. We use the average taxable income as a proxy for the average net income for the subsequent years of the analysis (2002 to 2017). The average taxable income is defined as the cumulated amount of taxable income of all fiscal units divided by the number of fiscal units within a city. The net income is defined as the cumulated net income of all fiscal units divided by the number of fiscal units within a municipality. Both variables are averaged at the *canton* level, when needed.

Data on local taxation product are available online on the DGFIP website, from 2002 onwards. Our local taxation product variable is defined at the sum of the main categories of local taxes (real estate tax, land tax, professional tax), divided by the number of individuals within each municipality, who are 20+ years old. This variable is averaged at the *canton* level, when needed.

A.3 *Cantons* maps and table of equivalence between *communes* and *cantons* for the 1968-2017 period

In his book *Atlas historique des circonscriptions électorales françaises* (1995), Bernard Gaudillère describes the methodology that he used to draw the evolution of all administrative units of France (from the municipality to the *département*) across history. The following extract (in French) gives some insight on his sources regarding the geographical changes of the *cantons* since the 19th century:

‘Une cartographie aussi rigoureuse eut nécessité deux dépouillements exhaustifs : soit celui des procès-verbaux d’élections [. . .], soit subsidiairement celui des Bulletins des Lois et Journaux Officiels, indiquant les changements de rattachement cantonal des communes. Un tel travail, mené dans quatre-vingt-dix départements, excédait de très loin les capacités d’un chercheur isolé.

On a donc, dans la plupart des cas, donné aux cantons leurs limites actuelles, mais en y apportant de nombreuses corrections, à la lumière des diverses sources :

-la “Carte Cantonale de la France”, dite “carte Donnet”, dressée en 1817 et révisée en 1884.

-les volumes départementaux de deux ouvrages : le Dictionnaire Topographique de la France (34 volumes parus) et Paroisses et Communes de France (éditions CNRS ; 21 volumes départementaux parus).

-les arrêtés consulaires de 1801-1802, qui ont tracé la première division cantonale. Ils sont notamment indispensables pour reconstituer les cantons périphériques des villes, qui ont aujourd’hui disparu.

-les lois et décrets créant de nouveaux cantons après 1801-1802. ‘

Frédéric Salmon completed Gaudillère’s substantial work and created a table of equivalence between *cantons* over time, as well as *cantons*’ maps, based on the following additional sources:

-he used INSEE and IGN maps from the 1960s, that he corrected based on the collect and the revision of some publications of the Bulletins des Lois and Journaux officiels.

-he created maps of cantons after 1966 by using the “Index Atlas de France” (Oberthur, 1976).

Source: fondsdecarte.free.fr

A.4 Descriptive tables

The following tables represent the number of units (either municipalities or *cantons*) for each decile of the share of the population in terms of university graduates, tax ratio and income level, as well as for the top 5% and 1%.

Table 3: Descriptive statistics of the share of higher degree's deciles for the 19681997 period *canton* level (reference for codification of the *cantons*: Salmon's table of equivalence, see Appendix A.3.)

	(1968)		(1973)		(1978)		(1981)		(1986)		(1988)		(1993)		(1997)		(2002)		(2007)		(2012)		(2017)	
	share of univ. grad.	regist. voters	share of univ. grad.	regist. voters	share of univ. grad.	regist. voters	share of univ. grad.	regist. voters	share of univ. grad.	regist. voters	share of univ. grad.	regist. voters	share of univ. grad.	regist. voters	share of univ. grad.	regist. voters	share of univ. grad.	regist. voters	share of univ. grad.	regist. voters	share of univ. grad.	regist. voters	share of univ. grad.	regist. voters
0 to 10																								
mean	1	86740	1	85877	2	88452	2	87663	3	104524	3	96572	6	109268	4	105821	11	121055	9	115127	13	133492	13	304630
sd	0	72400	0	67374	0	62851	0	60038	0	78634	0	72224	1	81903	0	77261	1	88367	1	85075	1	122026	1	195430
count	25566748	25566748	27211145	27211145	27228922	27228922	28852730	28852730	28965304	28965304	28773261	28773261	30153816	30153816	30113585	30113585	31892099	31892099	33867174	33867174	34746018	34746018	43414736	43414736
10 to 20																								
mean	1	107570	1	110513	3	117001	2	128064	4	118460	4	121113	7	127062	6	127209	13	144745	10	155670	16	155773	16	346005
sd	0	75131	0	78091	0	81958	0	87802	0	80383	0	80525	0	76013	0	77396	0	123115	0	128234	1	107609	1	195409
count	25630891	25630891	27207235	27207235	27156021	27156021	28904146	28904146	28998654	28998654	28921030	28921030	30223066	30223066	30149960	30149960	31948764	31948764	33890330	33890330	34595368	34595368	43408536	43408536
20 to 30																								
mean	1	127873	2	132911	3	158057	3	162656	5	161518	4	164898	8	170778	6	166170	14	179627	11	184524	18	176559	18	385243
sd	0	104960	0	109007	0	138143	0	146036	0	138967	0	139787	0	149927	0	145902	0	127635	0	134548	0	138652	0	225236
count	25493881	25493881	27106156	27106156	27277585	27277585	28872529	28872529	28972483	28972483	28893972	28893972	30203309	30203309	30100809	30100809	31983043	31983043	33939463	33939463	34887903	34887903	43408103	43408103
30 to 40																								
mean	1	134125	2	143817	4	160988	3	156739	5	156352	5	146475	9	156313	7	166518	16	166355	13	181418	19	188777	19	366995
sd	0	100346	0	114973	0	127946	0	122519	0	107392	0	102736	0	102704	0	113826	0	122721	0	131640	0	131240	0	228291
count	25742861	25742861	27318352	27318352	27214791	27214791	28983914	28983914	28914399	28914399	28854838	28854838	30287704	30287704	30154782	30154782	31920263	31920263	33897504	33897504	34794373	34794373	43449822	43449822
40 to 50																								
mean	2	167825	2	174418	4	170313	3	173785	6	170924	5	185536	10	176753	8	165537	17	178503	14	192707	21	186106	21	415198
sd	0	153559	0	174626	0	124456	0	130617	0	121614	0	126060	0	134390	0	127610	0	133742	0	143358	0	145278	0	241552
count	25620033	25620033	27222069	27222069	27239298	27239298	28895853	28895853	28856125	28856125	28864085	28864085	30190068	30190068	30267443	30267443	31915841	31915841	33535429	33535429	34654431	34654431	43048842	43048842
50 to 60																								
mean	2	203154	2	256342	5	175508	4	201036	6	162687	6	169904	11	157296	9	171510	18	178318	15	191281	22	199993	22	353065
sd	0	212781	0	247883	0	130446	0	153837	0	114788	0	121237	0	101240	0	124833	0	128333	0	138801	0	136784	1	214641
count	25598910	25598910	27259185	27259185	27352963	27352963	28905937	28905937	29213607	29213607	28844780	28844780	29923690	29923690	30173236	30173236	32119366	32119366	33949285	33949285	34755097	34755097	43928492	43928492
60 to 70																								
mean	2	210717	3	205861	5	200480	4	201770	7	163355	6	169021	12	194662	10	203945	20	215163	16	229019	24	234342	24	457685
sd	0	158992	0	148943	0	145047	0	161739	0	107793	0	109220	0	135755	0	133920	0	149725	0	159208	1	161846	0	275273
count	25133839	25133839	27208534	27208534	27260024	27260024	28831574	28831574	28934586	28934586	28836693	28836693	30412331	30412331	30111975	30111975	31948908	31948908	34214311	34214311	34401649	34401649	42455048	42455048
70 to 80																								
mean	3	216913	3	277087	6	228467	5	233010	8	201392	7	190688	13	188104	11	193898	22	179745	18	209174	27	217057	26	403535
sd	0	161059	0	191109	0	201938	0	184642	0	136244	0	128702	1	122790	0	133256	1	117017	1	135113	1	155967	1	264204
count	26053038	26053038	27122981	27122981	27262717	27262717	28949046	28949046	29066519	29066519	28922094	28922094	30081559	30081559	30101782	30101782	31854976	31854976	33877593	33877593	35141228	35141228	43392424	43392424
80 to 90																								
mean	3	292239	4	311365	7	210334	6	236241	10	219662	9	212628	16	228296	13	205981	25	240059	21	259387	30	279073	29	401223
sd	0	200098	0	224962	0	147007	0	150073	1	175140	1	166718	1	190197	1	157366	1	193839	1	208924	1	220876	1	258022
count	25625442	25625442	27148436	27148436	27022230	27022230	28762776	28762776	28911104	28911104	28729205	28729205	30482714	30482714	29910699	29910699	31790953	31790953	33938401	33938401	34863316	34863316	44319679	44319679
90 to 95																								
mean	4	279042	5	287580	9	220261	8	259267	11	213028	11	219646	19	228390	15	234062	29	249406	25	267721	34	292952	33	473735
sd	0	209947	0	195046	0	157888	0	254255	1	164108	0	173267	1	178898	1	181393	1	167228	1	184212	1	191351	1	342924
count	12664866	12664866	13830051	13830051	13866253	13866253	14663857	14663857	14570240	14570240	14330618	14330618	15089083	15089083	15439169	15439169	15993269	15993269	16738473	16738473	16956764	16956764	21773494	21773494
95 to 99																								
mean	6	310092	8	381027	11	304656	10	266563	15	185934	14	201146	25	240935	21	236517	35	270333	31	302840	41	334383	40	462442
sd	1	174273	1	247314	2	273241	2	243794	2	171507	2	181101	3	203986	3	208734	3	221124	3	240709	3	250489	4	278566
count	10143604	10143604	10901425	10901425	10907781	10907781	11565634	11565634	11594354	11594354	11783270	11783270	11994673	11994673	12052904	12052904	13100567	13100567	13753944	13753944	14261293	14261293	17382996	17382996
99 to 100																								
mean	10	212838	13	275694	20	136492	19	156061	26	179434	24	146153	38	144531	33	172742	50	131117	45	132788	54	140854	54	220160
sd	3	202218	3	204878	3	95488	3	104114	4	129829	4	107114	5	125785	4	147780	4	128799	5	136585	4	136598	5	183814
count	2839667	2839667	2747392	2747392	2739623	2739623	2891124	2891124	2920177	2920177	2928106	2928106	3152916	3152916	3045521	3045521	3205808	3205808	3419276	3419276	3580622	3580622	4584455	4584455
Total																								
mean	2	182454	3	201513	5	175460	4	183157	7	165531	6	166070	12	173313	9	173439	19	184794	16	198476	23	206326	23	387247
sd	2	166167	2	187834	3	151458	3	159274	3	130718	3	130534	5	138468	4	136931	7	146056	6	158059	7	165607	7	247820
count	256113780	257338372	272282961	273516410	272528208	272725527	289079120	289452169	289917552	290446903	288681952	288895227	302194929	302711734	301621865	301929781	319673857	320128475	339021183	339477765	347638062	348113577	434566627	434850062
N	3058		3054		3128		3209		3459		3416		3491		3503		3514		3516		3516		1881	

Note: this table provides descriptive statistics (the average share of adults with a higher degree and the average number of registered voters) for higher education's deciles (weighted by the number of registered voters) for the first round of each legislative election between 1968 and 2017 in Metropolitan France.

Table 4: Descriptive statistics of the share of higher degree's deciles for the 19681997 period - municipality level (reference for codification: 2012)

	(1968)		(1973)		(1978)		(1981)		(1986)		(1988)		(1993)		(1997)		(2002)		(2007)		(2012)		(2017)	
	share of univ. grad.	regist. voters	share of univ. degree	regist. voters	share of univ. grad.	regist. voters	share of univ. grad.	regist. voters	share of univ. grad.	regist. voters	share of univ. grad.	regist. voters	share of univ. grad.	regist. voters	share of univ. grad.	regist. voters	share of univ. grad.	regist. voters	share of univ. grad.	regist. voters	share of univ. grad.	regist. voters	share of univ. grad.	regist. voters
0 to 10																								
mean									1	7336	0	7208	5	1628	3	1293	9	2509	7	2381	12	2772	12	2523
sd									1	4170	0	4090	1	2388	1	1845	2	3502	2	3465	2	3636	3	3198
count									28843955	28843955	28687297	28687297	3464823	3464823	3492618	3492618	3644852	3644852	3892845	3892845	3948913	3948913	4102249	4102249
10 to 20																								
mean					0	7644	0	8090	2	9023	2	9025	7	2911	5	2943	13	3801	10	3425	16	5416	17	5669
sd					1	4726	0	5051	0	5506	0	5122	0	3824	0	3812	1	4971	1	4557	1	8497	1	8370
count					54040845	54040845	57410449	57410449	28836811	28836811	28735217	28735217	3470140	3470140	3494220	3494220	3643152	3643152	3900013	3900013	3950915	3950915	4109131	4109131
20 to 30																								
mean			0	8847	2	11071	1	10344	3	10596	3	10199	9	4195	7	3933	15	4684	12	4547	18	5350	20	6325
sd			0	7553	0	8173	0	6762	0	6763	0	6014	0	6072	0	5603	1	6022	0	5998	1	6743	1	8256
count			81047314	81047314	27143228	27143228	28706259	28706259	28875898	28875898	28703574	28703574	3468334	3468334	3493528	3493528	3649420	3649420	3895078	3895078	3946051	3946051	4108776	4108776
30 to 40																								
mean			1	13057	3	11235	2	12018	4	10853	4	11000	10	5362	8	4803	17	6798	14	6487	21	8579	22	8013
sd			0	11012	0	8395	0	8553	0	6579	0	6399	0	6611	0	5981	1	8980	0	7679	1	12218	1	11316
count			26878541	26878541	27084740	27084740	28715541	28715541	28481117	28481117	28781224	28781224	3468063	3468063	3493404	3493404	3643144	3643144	3894825	3894825	3947561	3947561	4106549	4106549
40 to 50																								
mean	0	9669	1	13052	3	12275	2	13362	5	10909	5	11228	11	7577	9	7786	19	7633	16	7509	23	9210	24	11413
sd	0	8512	0	10204	0	9262	0	10358	0	6331	0	6434	0	10234	0	9834	1	10261	1	10970	1	12200	1	15229
count	127868629	127868629	27174235	27174235	27057050	27057050	28289485	28289485	29120193	29120193	28730697	28730697	3458922	3458922	3492169	3492169	3647434	3647434	3903553	3903553	3938167	3938167	4080580	4080580
50 to 60																								
mean	1	15141	2	15077	4	12860	3	13743	6	12098	6	11976	13	9927	11	9278	21	10481	18	11942	25	10790	27	10287
sd	0	11112	0	12229	0	9355	0	10317	0	7425	0	7051	1	12184	0	11364	1	12849	1	13538	1	14800	1	13903
count	25210700	25210700	27057807	27057807	27073351	27073351	29102817	29102817	27878948	27878948	28744449	28744449	3466727	3466727	3492649	3492649	3649199	3649199	3896480	3896480	3966999	3966999	4135027	4135027
60 to 70																								
mean	1	15554	2	15597	5	13510	4	14808	7	12437	7	12532	15	13501	12	13338	23	11884	20	13502	28	11586	30	10467
sd	0	12284	0	12665	0	10161	0	10671	0	7448	0	7099	1	14212	0	13505	1	14431	1	15144	1	13314	1	11710
count	25966174	25966174	27018457	27018457	27072861	27072861	28736180	28736180	29910882	29910882	28723651	28723651	3476859	3476859	3493862	3493862	3647255	3647255	3893477	3893477	3950238	3950238	4079993	4079993
70 to 80																								
mean	2	15430	3	17343	6	15083	5	15514	9	13513	8	13373	17	15977	14	16395	26	12642	22	14737	31	14703	33	15530
sd	0	12278	0	13784	0	11492	0	11596	1	7944	0	7529	1	17567	1	16640	1	15239	1	17863	1	18713	1	19034
count	25147216	25147216	27029639	27029639	27034827	27034827	28676800	28676800	28861920	28861920	28732055	28732055	3469004	3469004	3494588	3494588	3609695	3609695	3902221	3902221	3949613	3949613	4134138	4134138
80 to 90																								
mean	3	16225	4	18742	8	16258	7	17594	11	14715	10	14449	21	15242	18	16638	31	14750	27	15610	37	14653	39	14840
sd	0	12760	0	14337	1	11615	1	12167	1	8336	1	7667	2	16087	2	17294	2	16860	2	16364	2	17364	2	17792
count	26099479	26099479	27027474	27027474	27104246	27104246	28735292	28735292	28857242	28857242	28733576	28733576	3459446	3459446	3489493	3489493	3681611	3681611	3897904	3897904	3948603	3948603	4093405	4093405
90 to 95																								
mean	4	19934	6	23635	10	16954	9	17948	14	15467	13	15482	28	23490	24	22625	39	18148	35	22137	46	23441	48	23699
sd	0	15216	0	16678	1	10946	1	11988	1	8549	1	8505	2	19700	2	19427	3	17692	3	20350	3	21403	3	22444
count	12709667	12709667	13492469	13492469	13522854	13522854	14350159	14350159	14418369	14418369	14329081	14329081	1740421	1740421	1743839	1743839	1801696	1801696	1948366	1948366	1973659	1973659	2040163	2040163
95 to 99																								
mean	7	19287	8	26607	14	17726	13	18561	19	17084	18	16264	38	37390	32	34585	51	34829	46	39993	57	45900	59	46899
sd	1	15389	1	19022	2	12503	2	12463	2	9084	2	8584	3	21808	3	22120	4	19935	4	22781	3	26322	3	27384
count	10319360	10319360	10828148	10828148	10834033	10834033	11493286	11493286	11527984	11527984	11528949	11528949	1386361	1386361	1398820	1398820	1464824	1464824	1555565	1555565	1519335	1519335	1607760	1607760
99 to 100																								
mean	13	19041	15	24618	24	16586	24	16846	30	18688	29	17832	48	38400	42	37223	59	46072	55	52412	65	63309	66	67979
sd	4	14432	4	16676	6	9146	6	9456	5	8103	6	7825	2	20064	2	20454	2	16554	2	20526	1	19035	1	18198
count	2567471	2567471	2710319	2710319	2713084	2713084	2873836	2873836	2909272	2909272	2875409	2875409	349620	349620	355913	355913	381450	381450	397472	397472	459117	459117	472917	472917
Total																								
mean	1	13004	2	14396	5	12471	4	13170	7	11810	6	11704	14	11966	12	11846	22	11781	19	13003	26	15525	28	13918
sd	2	11430	2	12847	4	9741	4	10186	5	7508	5	7142	8	16714	7	16365	10	16402	10	18367	12	23709	12	19866
count	255888696	257338372	270264403	273516410	270681119	272725527	287090104	289452169	288522591	290446903	287305179	288895227	34678720	36295749	34935103	36718896	36463732	38432838	38977799	41207935	39499171	43531697	41070688	43683314
N	36320		36290		35342		35643		36192		35914		36699		36707		36708		36727		36817		35535	

Note: this table provides descriptive statistics (the average share of adults with a higher degree and the average number of registered voters) for higher education's deciles (weighted by the number of registered voters) for the first round of each legislative election between 1968 and 2017 in Metropolitan France.

Table 5: Descriptive statistics of the tax/inhabitant ratio's deciles for the 20022017 period - *canton* level (reference for codification of the *cantons*: Salmon's table of equivalence, see Appendix A.3.)

	(2002)		(2007)		(2012)		(2017)	
	ratio of total local taxes over the active pop.	registered_voters	ratio of total local taxes over the active pop.	registered_voters	ratio of total local taxes over the active pop.	registered_voters	ratio of total local taxes over the active pop.	registered_voters
0 to 10								
mean	10362	167975	12398	167830	15310	203661	15735	398466
sd	2032	119507	2239	125636	2933	172432	2867	208163
count	30976685	30976685	32867117	32867117	34504074	34504074	42569923	42569923
10 to 20								
mean	13768	217850	16605	218956	20278	192546	20637	483667
sd	658	189887	849	163140	964	124288	851	258618
count	31408354	31408354	33136843	33136843	34760639	34760639	44082803	44082803
20 to 30								
mean	15672	194870	18964	194961	22756	215173	23444	432575
sd	479	143073	518	130572	671	186427	672	234084
count	31066584	31066584	33022536	33022536	34521333	34521333	43013165	43013165
30 to 40								
mean	17280	190814	20682	230439	25007	205901	25433	382798
sd	432	133681	530	200307	614	145730	588	207404
count	31137441	31137441	33017684	33017684	34718798	34718798	43650721	43650721
40 to 50								
mean	18933	178665	22580	211607	27109	257187	27719	395270
sd	466	142893	511	178748	628	212330	728	271423
count	31285158	31285158	32985287	32985287	34657927	34657927	42719203	42719203
50 to 60								
mean	20578	207683	24473	195005	29121	194344	30179	345801
sd	538	135875	602	148992	616	123532	678	184361
count	31241669	31241669	32923879	32923879	34549168	34549168	43542055	43542055
60 to 70								
mean	22658	181065	27036	202667	31757	210377	32620	414161
sd	698	133383	836	133365	886	148335	718	294420
count	31059750	31059750	32985143	32985143	34739587	34739587	43341072	43341072
70 to 80								
mean	25492	188633	30224	211749	35260	221135	35616	383752
sd	880	131268	1102	149455	1098	160797	1151	254591
count	31391276	31391276	33037924	33037924	34594184	34594184	43697495	43697495
80 to 90								
mean	30404	191459	35782	213968	40985	199110	41219	380042
sd	1904	174753	2317	184903	2582	157713	2193	281852
count	31129284	31129284	33029348	33029348	34616678	34616678	43307543	43307543
90 to 95								
mean	37651	182468	44658	186146	50422	224969	49409	287288
sd	2357	164874	2656	156473	2521	234244	2895	149398
count	15544317	15544317	16595037	16595037	17443025	17443025	21277516	21277516
95 to 99								
mean	51825	107744	62562	140424	64786	119076	67442	249284
sd	8999	87312	10616	127731	8221	111057	11977	242531
count	12626440	12626440	13213392	13213392	13736876	13736876	17635798	17635798
99 to 100								
mean	112829	98078	146589	95505	142355	104418	167765	232630
sd	34777	74025	48784	59477	52391	62405	62340	142510
count	3128296	3128296	3313286	3313286	3625702	3625702	4488740	4488740
Total								
mean	22618	184794	27090	198476	31345	206326	32182	387247
sd	13535	146056	17142	158059	16962	165607	19180	247820
count	311995254	320128475	330127476	339477765	346467991	348113577	433326034	434850062
N	3514		3516		3516		1881	

Note: this table provides descriptive statistics (the average tax/inhabitant ratio and the average number of registered voters) for tax/inhabitant ratio's deciles (weighted by the number of registered voters) for the first round of each legislative election between 2002 and 2017 in Metropolitan France.

Table 6: Descriptive statistics of the tax/inhabitant ratio's deciles for the 20022017 period - municipality level (reference for codification: 2012)

	(2002)		(2007)		(2012)		(2017)	
	ratio of total local taxes over the active pop.	registered_voters	ratio of total local taxes over the active pop.	registered_voters	ratio of total local taxes over the active pop.	registered_voters	ratio of total local taxes over the active pop.	registered_voters
0 to 10								
mean	10520	890	12419	806	16396	924	17883	964
sd	2627	1292	3383	1283	3741	1229	4118	1314
count	3340862	3340862	3467480	3467480	3741160	3741160	3941497	3941497
10 to 20								
mean	15596	1365	18885	1365	23576	1465	25771	1706
sd	1056	1525	1250	1858	1399	1851	1538	2717
count	3340713	3340713	3465925	3465925	3741339	3741339	3944509	3944509
20 to 30								
mean	19136	2215	22829	1947	28286	2107	30665	2141
sd	982	2439	1087	2354	1365	2259	1391	2308
count	3340977	3340977	3468299	3468299	3741417	3741417	3941523	3941523
30 to 40								
mean	22966	4009	26823	3122	32989	3838	35670	3360
sd	1228	7676	1219	4021	1402	4720	1455	3385
count	3340339	3340339	3467020	3467020	3740112	3740112	3941592	3941592
40 to 50								
mean	27297	6582	31109	5891	38110	6556	41040	6966
sd	1314	7577	1279	7511	1529	8904	1603	9351
count	3337164	3337164	3467929	3467929	3735437	3735437	3946586	3946586
50 to 60								
mean	32277	10279	36059	6658	43445	11251	46998	9035
sd	1579	12137	1542	6850	1499	14496	1718	9896
count	3340189	3340189	3465372	3465372	3743545	3743545	3937014	3937014
60 to 70								
mean	37778	15782	41769	15193	48934	17422	53197	14501
sd	1506	14911	1614	15986	1638	18937	1847	17552
count	3343696	3343696	3439477	3439477	3732190	3732190	3949112	3949112
70 to 80								
mean	43323	17667	47913	19683	55474	17973	60218	20706
sd	1771	14789	2111	17167	2141	14104	2367	16921
count	3340952	3340952	3486154	3486154	3748085	3748085	3922838	3922838
80 to 90								
mean	52050	19923	56540	20905	63308	20557	69463	22260
sd	3291	16648	3142	16292	2516	14448	3012	15340
count	3341735	3341735	3477396	3477396	3727364	3727364	3953207	3953207
90 to 95								
mean	64882	12997	69569	17370	72681	25048	80326	25461
sd	4442	8982	5120	16361	2816	19821	2814	18657
count	1671385	1671385	1723460	1723460	1884561	1884561	1930693	1930693
95 to 99								
mean	88972	18101	100436	18257	92900	16975	98677	21068
sd	11235	14774	16307	15744	12738	13091	12285	17491
count	1328518	1328518	1397380	1397380	1498387	1498387	1626706	1626706
99 to 100								
mean	174975	15437	207530	18087	192827	12819	200022	12334
sd	80294	15870	126216	18206	94287	15924	107227	15465
count	342173	342173	348992	348992	379779	379779	396399	396399
Total								
mean	34671	11781	39035	13003	44360	15525	48094	13918
sd	24837	16402	29312	18367	25958	23709	27755	19866
count	33408703	38432838	34674884	41207935	37413376	43531697	39431676	43683314
N	36708		36727		36817		35535	

Note: this table provides descriptive statistics (the average tax/inhabitant ratio and the average number of registered voters) for tax/inhabitant ratio's deciles (weighted by the number of registered voters) for the first round of each legislative election between 2002 and 2017 in Metropolitan France.

Table 7: Descriptive statistics of the average net taxable income's deciles for the 19932017 period - *canton* level (reference for codification of the *cantons*: Salmon's table of equivalence, see Appendix A.3.)

	(1993)		(1997)		(2002)		(2007)		(2012)		(2017)	
	Average net income	registered_voters	Average net income	registered_voters	Average taxable income	registered_voters	Average taxable income	registered_voters	Average taxable income	registered_voters	Average taxable income	registered_voters
0 to 10												
mean	264324	48531	296764	46082	10496	88114	15859	86732	18512	86055	18637	202728
sd	105377	39632	117754	34241	751	69406	994	65143	1235	70285	1302	124298
count	30261122	30261122	30176640	30176640	31981131	31981131	33794816	33794816	34810296	34810296	43461177	43461177
10 to 20												
mean	499254	72877	554246	73996	11868	107568	17602	117627	20599	115032	20800	338042
sd	48640	38186	51582	39831	267	66232	345	75358	369	66403	352	224173
count	30268389	30268389	30171058	30171058	31945350	31945350	33710199	33710199	34799081	34799081	43086992	43086992
20 to 30												
mean	646800	84790	718369	87673	12728	126506	18709	133816	21860	151017	21869	342467
sd	39730	42097	46576	41832	226	73947	291	94767	355	104795	312	219759
count	30239459	30239459	30197192	30197192	31962846	31962846	33733017	33733017	34806169	34806169	43801912	43801912
30 to 40												
mean	795536	121661	881817	122373	13445	180769	19660	184602	23005	177224	22960	375368
sd	41205	64162	45569	61852	209	133347	283	120996	330	118501	297	237792
count	30176918	30176918	30200191	30200191	32060096	32060096	33961873	33961873	34740384	34740384	43462438	43462438
40 to 50												
mean	947929	140778	1046798	141073	14216	181839	20697	190459	24143	203084	23934	370564
sd	44934	73381	48464	72286	239	134641	307	138669	394	150948	318	221927
count	30405841	30405841	30219302	30219302	31707618	31707618	33771055	33771055	34864713	34864713	43336634	43336634
50 to 60												
mean	1099277	165100	1220043	169714	15094	195429	21841	206743	25574	213734	25118	391324
sd	46378	73297	57044	85771	278	124606	344	128070	402	139523	363	192337
count	30190643	30190643	30035862	30035862	32048552	32048552	33833913	33833913	34756298	34756298	43634143	43634143
60 to 70												
mean	1300706	191364	1450666	194955	16133	209216	23079	250461	26972	236271	26512	389488
sd	64945	101567	72823	97202	325	138895	385	168595	463	152469	393	202456
count	30271688	30271688	30174091	30174091	31902574	31902574	33763106	33763106	34890445	34890445	43193807	43193807
70 to 80												
mean	1540780	220502	1710873	226233	17223	261636	24644	281353	28695	318626	28238	421888
sd	88120	91255	86169	104484	346	196661	477	221429	546	235538	563	229541
count	30246541	30246541	30214906	30214906	32307292	32307292	33725303	33725303	34694370	34694370	43145595	43145595
80 to 90												
mean	1860919	290537	2051155	279870	18930	246582	26797	254351	31282	261691	30586	532550
sd	126486	152611	138687	128301	636	155970	840	149089	1000	163586	944	314667
count	29741929	29741929	30224104	30224104	32182613	32182613	33677783	33677783	34831888	34831888	43678740	43678740
90 to 95												
mean	2267225	353269	2485340	345378	21133	208823	29780	251843	34408	282010	34171	483470
sd	94327	150409	93377	163940	697	115328	884	148532	820	149712	910	233521
count	15639305	15639305	15006260	15006260	15817612	15817612	17161350	17161350	17502435	17502435	22231065	22231065
95 to 99												
mean	2636771	398015	2870747	408910	24330	276955	34447	293288	40611	298021	39866	544488
sd	166164	145989	206667	165325	1405	174950	2376	183215	3246	195252	3184	340492
count	11722117	11722117	11902530	11902530	12920789	12920789	13203745	13203745	13862781	13862781	17067023	17067023
99 to 100												
mean	3925578	562412	4087879	531914	34744	331429	47655	394171	56072	400455	53130	471784
sd	622494	166634	552900	159576	6952	320957	7694	328924	10375	349385	8405	373164
count	3547782	3547782	3407645	3407645	3292002	3292002	3707916	3707916	3554717	3554717	4750536	4750536
Total												
mean	1157224	173313	1275580	173439	15402	184794	22250	198476	25976	206326	25726	387247
sd	693813	138468	745526	136931	3997	146056	5297	158059	6190	165607	5863	247820
count	302711734	302711734	301929781	301929781	320128475	320128475	338044076	339477765	348113577	348113577	434850062	434850062
N	3491		3503		3514		3516		3516		1881	

Note: this table provides descriptive statistics (the average net / taxable income and the average number of registered voters) for average net / taxable income's deciles (weighted by the number of registered voters) for the first round of each legislative election between 2002 and 2017 in Metropolitan France.

Table 8: Descriptive statistics of the average net taxable income's deciles for the 19932017 period - municipality level (reference for codification: 2012)

	(1993)		(1997)		(2002)		(2007)		(2012)		(2017)	
	Average net income	registered_voters	Average net income	registered_voters	Average taxable income	registered_voters	Average taxable income	registered_voters	Average taxable income	registered_voters	Average taxable income	registered_voters
0 to 10												
mean	52661	4362	57857	4796	10125	5468	14991	5024	16869	11207	17570	13246
sd	11921	12454	11235	11178	989	11312	1136	6564	1480	18101	1604	19373
count	3536475	3536475	3558679	3558679	3714320	3714320	3810357	3810357	4047143	4047143	4186149	4186149
10 to 20												
mean	64591	3278	69284	5276	11764	7287	16930	7491	19259	9378	20115	10516
sd	1836	4386	1791	8175	268	11180	340	11172	442	13201	426	13888
count	3535824	3535824	3558749	3558749	3713631	3713631	3810972	3810972	4115508	4115508	4149614	4149614
20 to 30												
mean	69866	7252	74283	8481	12572	9091	17980	10740	20556	13206	21433	14427
sd	1221	9967	1293	11906	223	12666	262	12518	337	17140	356	18436
count	3536303	3536303	3551736	3551736	3707218	3707218	3802673	3802673	4083290	4083290	4222555	4222555
30 to 40												
mean	73930	9378	78649	10988	13295	12060	18881	15119	21710	13870	22700	12353
sd	1248	12254	1232	14396	213	15548	289	20115	361	19604	375	18517
count	3540333	3540333	3566089	3566089	3723628	3723628	3815970	3815970	4079962	4079962	4185029	4185029
40 to 50												
mean	78028	14193	82789	15044	14014	13551	19882	11257	23006	9589	24029	13613
sd	1227	17082	1161	17058	224	16488	305	13874	380	12144	370	18047
count	3520824	3520824	3556983	3556983	3714233	3714233	3811035	3811035	4058176	4058176	4188512	4188512
50 to 60												
mean	82213	16497	87270	14230	14845	12671	21011	12060	24435	12672	25545	9982
sd	1302	17305	1517	17474	271	15830	347	16572	461	19104	490	15983
count	3515172	3515172	3523801	3523801	3714235	3714235	3814735	3814735	4107928	4107928	4185987	4185987
60 to 70												
mean	87312	16542	92830	14712	15899	12410	22455	9971	26241	11786	27365	10442
sd	1723	19342	1929	17664	374	16617	450	14478	561	17262	573	15798
count	3558273	3558273	3595492	3595492	3717533	3717533	3796920	3796920	4083122	4083122	4186382	4186382
70 to 80												
mean	95274	11825	101643	8865	17454	9231	24360	9351	28661	8771	29732	9269
sd	2871	16570	2938	12575	516	13433	644	13713	848	14449	761	14919
count	3555651	3555651	3553588	3553588	3714661	3714661	3817233	3817233	4072334	4072334	4186673	4186673
80 to 90												
mean	108045	13001	115134	11809	19743	9443	27248	8180	32308	12433	33353	12597
sd	4948	17601	5171	17331	898	14293	1071	12467	1463	19501	1418	20030
count	3536079	3536079	3554963	3554963	3670296	3670296	3814229	3814229	4089017	4089017	4186381	4186381
90 to 95												
mean	124553	15173	133077	14874	22961	14816	31132	12388	38074	17297	39115	17572
sd	4308	17051	4830	16851	947	18440	1137	16430	1800	22292	1882	23172
count	1770290	1770290	1785000	1785000	1902265	1902265	1901977	1901977	1976913	1976913	2062495	2062495
95 to 99												
mean	153249	19731	164324	18782	29089	21299	37442	13598	47765	30756	48872	32965
sd	15194	19839	16226	19232	3297	19926	3014	16235	5323	28511	4679	29656
count	1400381	1400381	1409811	1409811	1475176	1475176	1533649	1533649	1698670	1698670	1705531	1705531
99 to 100												
mean	264601	41646	284520	40956	53369	38663	58359	10058	88681	56560	85142	59992
sd	42325	22712	41641	23033	7985	23434	15661	11312	10102	27894	9285	28516
count	369045	369045	373828	373828	382917	382917	381402	381402	409868	409868	418943	418943
Total												
mean	86259	11966	92125	11846	15828	11781	22016	13003	26028	15525	26955	13918
sd	29938	16714	31927	16365	5857	16402	6646	18367	9627	23709	9358	19866
count	35374650	36295749	35588719	36718896	37150113	38432838	38111152	41207935	40821931	43531697	41864251	43683314
N	36699		36707		36708		36727		36817		35535	

Note: this table provides descriptive statistics (the average net / taxable income and the average number of registered voters) for average net / taxable income's deciles (weighted by the number of registered voters) for the first round of each legislative election between 2002 and 2017 in Metropolitan France.

A.5 Results

A.6 At the municipal level

B Marginal impact of share of university graduates on the extreme-right

B.1 1993



	(1) zshare_ER1993
1.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1993	0.0966
	(0.0734)
2.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1993	0.0502
	(0.0665)
3.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1993	0.1125**
	(0.0566)
4.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1993	0.1178**
	(0.0514)
5.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1993	0.0454
	(0.0514)
7.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1993	-0.0146
	(0.0748)
8.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1993	-0.1923**
	(0.0767)
9.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1993	-0.6233***
	(0.0932)
10.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1993	-1.0526***
	(0.1406)
11.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1993	-1.6065***
	(0.1743)
12.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1993	-1.3983***
	(0.2310)
N	35940

Standard errors in parentheses

Clustered at the departement level

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

B.2 1997


Marginal effect of share of the population with an university degree on the vote for the ER in 1997
(leg. T1 1997) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the share of the population with an university degree
Standard−deviation of the vote for the ER in 1997
0
−.5
−1
−1.5
−2
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 95
95 to 99
99 to 100
Percentiles of the share of the population with an university degree per city
Without controls
Controlling for the population density
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_ER1997
1.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1997	-0.0649 (0.0772)
2.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1997	-0.0922 (0.0819)
3.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1997	-0.0050 (0.0556)
4.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1997	-0.0115 (0.0589)
5.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1997	0.0232 (0.0688)
7.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1997	-0.0467 (0.0695)
8.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1997	-0.1900*** (0.0689)
9.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1997	-0.4981*** (0.0741)
10.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1997	-1.0297*** (0.1291)
11.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1997	-1.5712*** (0.1515)
12.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1997	-1.5250*** (0.1718)
N	35935

Standard errors in parentheses
Clustered at the departement level
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

B.3 2002


Marginal effect of the share of the population with an university degree on the vote for the ER in 2002
(leg. T1 2002) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the share of the population with an university degree
Standard−deviation of the vote for the ER in 2002
.5
0
−.5
−1
−1.5
−2
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 95
95 to 99
99 to 100
Percentiles of the share of the population with an university degree per city
Without controls
Controlling for the population density
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_ER2002
1.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2002	0.3600***
	(0.0935)
2.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2002	0.2809***
	(0.0786)
3.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2002	0.2159***
	(0.0652)
4.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2002	0.1881**
	(0.0770)
5.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2002	0.0515
	(0.0527)
7.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2002	-0.1622***
	(0.0462)
8.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2002	-0.4258***
	(0.0771)
9.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2002	-0.7948***
	(0.1094)
10.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2002	-1.2103***
	(0.1521)
11.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2002	-1.6608***
	(0.1679)
12.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2002	-1.5615***
	(0.1833)
N	35872

Standard errors in parentheses
Clustered at the departement level
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

B.4 2007


Marginal effect of the share of the population with an university degree on the vote for the ER in 2007
(leg. T1 2007) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the share of the population with an university degree
Standard−deviation of the vote for the ER in 2007
.5
0
−.5
−1
−1.5
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 95
95 to 99
99 to 100
Percentiles of the share of the population with an university degree per city
Without controls
Controlling for the population density
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_ER2007
1.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2007	0.3977***
	(0.0640)
2.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2007	0.2902***
	(0.0555)
3.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2007	0.2550***
	(0.0664)
4.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2007	0.1422***
	(0.0378)
5.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2007	0.0648*
	(0.0371)
7.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2007	-0.0987***
	(0.0357)
8.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2007	-0.2849***
	(0.0490)
9.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2007	-0.6527***
	(0.0758)
10.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2007	-0.9627***
	(0.1095)
11.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2007	-1.1806***
	(0.1382)
12.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2007	-1.0858***
	(0.1512)
N	35865

Standard errors in parentheses

Clustered at the departement level

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

B.5 2012



Marginal effect of the share of the population with an university degree on the vote for the ER in 2012
(leg. T1 2012) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the share of the population with an university degree
Standard−deviation of the vote for the ER in 2012
1
0
−1
−2
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 95
95 to 99
99 to 100
Percentiles of the share of the population with an university degree per city
Without controls
Controlling for the population density
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_ER2012
1.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2012	0.5499*** (0.0908)
2.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2012	0.4325*** (0.0762)
3.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2012	0.3292*** (0.0702)
4.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2012	0.2565*** (0.0701)
5.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2012	0.1515*** (0.0560)
7.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2012	-0.1218** (0.0485)
8.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2012	-0.4246*** (0.0797)
9.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2012	-0.7553*** (0.1114)
10.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2012	-1.2162*** (0.1507)
11.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2012	-1.3923*** (0.1636)
12.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2012	-1.3164*** (0.1995)
N	34677

Standard errors in parentheses

Clustered at the departement level

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

B.6 2017



Marginal effect of the share of the population with an university degree on the vote for the ER in 2017
(leg. T1 2017) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the share of the population with an university degree
Standard−deviation of the vote for the ER in 2017
1
.5
0
−.5
−1
−1.5
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 95
95 to 99
99 to 100
Percentiles of the share of the population with an university degree per city
Without controls
Controlling for the population density
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_ER2017
1.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2017	0.7289***
	(0.0661)
2.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2017	0.5400***
	(0.0616)
3.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2017	0.4490***
	(0.0625)
4.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2017	0.2972***
	(0.0510)
5.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2017	0.1881***
	(0.0447)
7.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2017	-0.1036**
	(0.0414)
8.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2017	-0.3954***
	(0.0585)
9.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2017	-0.5567***
	(0.0831)
10.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2017	-0.9064***
	(0.1027)
11.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2017	-0.9327***
	(0.1161)
12.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2017	-0.8988***
	(0.1506)
N	34667

Standard errors in parentheses
Clustered at the departement level
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

C Marginal impact of share of university graduates on the extreme-left

C.1 1993



	(1) zshare_EL1993
1.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1993	0.5709***
	(0.1322)
2.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1993	0.4264***
	(0.0808)
3.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1993	0.3974***
	(0.0944)
4.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1993	0.1727***
	(0.0656)
5.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1993	0.0780
	(0.0767)
7.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1993	-0.2493***
	(0.0707)
8.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1993	-0.2253***
	(0.0722)
9.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1993	-0.3438***
	(0.0864)
10.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1993	-0.6263***
	(0.1056)
11.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1993	-0.9780***
	(0.1405)
12.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1993	-0.8102***
	(0.2000)
N	35940

Standard errors in parentheses

Clustered at the departement level

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

C.2 1997


Marginal effect of share of the population with an university degree on the vote for the EL in 1997
(leg. T1 1997) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the share of the population with an university degree
Standard−deviation of the vote for the EL in 1997
−1.5
−1
−.5
0
.5
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 95
95 to 99
99 to 100
Percentiles of the share of the population with an university degree per city
Without controls
Controlling for the population density
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_EL1997
1.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1997	0.3744***
	(0.1369)
2.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1997	0.3642***
	(0.0951)
3.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1997	0.2468***
	(0.0840)
4.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1997	0.1892**
	(0.0730)
5.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1997	0.1076
	(0.0754)
7.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1997	-0.2281***
	(0.0627)
8.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1997	-0.1471**
	(0.0737)
9.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1997	-0.2511***
	(0.0844)
10.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1997	-0.4139***
	(0.1088)
11.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1997	-0.7681***
	(0.1305)
12.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1997	-0.6224***
	(0.1509)
N	35935

Standard errors in parentheses
Clustered at the departement level
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

C.3 2002


Marginal effect of the share of the population with an university degree on the vote for the EL in 2002
(leg. T1 2002) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the share of the population with an university degree
Standard−deviation of the vote for the EL in 2002
.5
0
−.5
−1
−1.5
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 95
95 to 99
99 to 100
Percentiles of the share of the population with an university degree per city
Without controls
Controlling for the population density
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_EL2002
1.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2002	0.4515^{***}
	(0.1325)
2.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2002	0.3423^{***}
	(0.1184)
3.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2002	0.2061^{*}
	(0.1223)
4.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2002	0.1407
	(0.1212)
5.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2002	0.0100
	(0.1040)
7.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2002	-0.0697
	(0.1197)
8.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2002	-0.0984
	(0.0974)
9.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2002	-0.2841^{**}
	(0.1115)
10.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2002	-0.3770^{**}
	(0.1477)
11.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2002	-0.7481^{***}
	(0.1755)
12.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2002	-0.8388^{***}
	(0.2474)
N	35872

Standard errors in parentheses

Clustered at the departement level

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

C.4 2007


Marginal effect of the share of the population with an university degree on the vote for the EL in 2007
(leg. T1 2007) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the share of the population with an university degree
Standard−deviation of the vote for the EL in 2007
1
.5
0
−.5
−1
−1.5
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 95
95 to 99
99 to 100
Percentiles of the share of the population with an university degree per city
Without controls
Controlling for the population density
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_EL2007
1.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2007	0.5336***
	(0.1595)
2.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2007	0.3812***
	(0.1064)
3.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2007	0.3464***
	(0.0879)
4.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2007	0.2336***
	(0.0762)
5.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2007	0.0983
	(0.0684)
7.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2007	-0.0485
	(0.0635)
8.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2007	-0.0020
	(0.0877)
9.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2007	-0.2159**
	(0.0874)
10.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2007	-0.3522***
	(0.1089)
11.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2007	-0.6955***
	(0.1644)
12.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2007	-0.8664***
	(0.2149)
N	35865

Standard errors in parentheses

Clustered at the departement level

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

C.5 2012


Marginal effect of the share of the population with an university degree on the vote for the EL in 2012
(leg. T1 2012) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the share of the population with an university degree
Standard−deviation of the vote for the EL in 2012
.5
0
−.5
−1
−1.5
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 95
95 to 99
99 to 100
Percentiles of the share of the population with an university degree per city
Without controls
Controlling for the population density
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_EL2012
1.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2012	0.1139
	(0.1273)
2.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2012	0.1707*
	(0.0999)
3.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2012	0.0340
	(0.0556)
4.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2012	0.0232
	(0.0781)
5.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2012	0.0479
	(0.0560)
7.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2012	0.0031
	(0.0496)
8.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2012	0.1003
	(0.0877)
9.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2012	0.0528
	(0.0873)
10.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2012	-0.1505
	(0.1157)
11.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2012	-0.4230***
	(0.1361)
12.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2012	-0.1118
	(0.1800)
N	34677

Standard errors in parentheses

Clustered at the departement level

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

C.6 2017


Marginal effect of the share of the population with an university degree on the vote for the EL in 2017
(leg. T1 2017) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the share of the population with an university degree
Standard−deviation of the vote for the EL in 2017
1
.5
0
−.5
−1
−1.5
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 95
95 to 99
99 to 100
Percentiles of the share of the population with an university degree per city
Without controls
Controlling for the population density
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_EL2017
1.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2017	-0.1120
	(0.0778)
2.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2017	-0.0485
	(0.0730)
3.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2017	-0.1266***
	(0.0422)
4.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2017	-0.0572
	(0.0485)
5.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2017	-0.0421
	(0.0465)
7.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2017	0.0023
	(0.0347)
8.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2017	0.0938*
	(0.0492)
9.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2017	0.1437**
	(0.0685)
10.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2017	-0.0109
	(0.1515)
11.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2017	-0.2895*
	(0.1658)
12.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2017	0.1098
	(0.3126)
N	34667

Standard errors in parentheses

Clustered at the departement level

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

D Marginal impact of share of university graduates on the central right

D.1 1993



	(1) zshare_CR1993
1.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1993	-0.0876
	(0.0763)
2.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1993	-0.1187*
	(0.0678)
3.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1993	-0.0905
	(0.0547)
4.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1993	-0.0347
	(0.0529)
5.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1993	0.0337
	(0.0545)
7.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1993	0.1004
	(0.0678)
8.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1993	0.0559
	(0.0651)
9.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1993	0.1862**
	(0.0874)
10.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1993	0.2891**
	(0.1388)
11.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1993	0.2000
	(0.1908)
12.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1993	-0.2027
	(0.2584)
N	35940

Standard errors in parentheses
Clustered at the departement level
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

D.2 1997


Marginal effect of share of the population with an university degree on the vote for the CR in 1997
(leg. T1 1997) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the share of the population with an university degree
Standard−deviation of the vote for the CR in 1997
.5
0
−.5
−1
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 95
95 to 99
99 to 100
Percentiles of the share of the population with an university degree per city
Without controls
Controlling for the population density
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_CR1997
1.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1997	0.0335
	(0.0653)
2.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1997	-0.0543
	(0.0588)
3.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1997	0.0006
	(0.0504)
4.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1997	-0.0090
	(0.0444)
5.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1997	0.0723*
	(0.0432)
7.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1997	0.1357**
	(0.0575)
8.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1997	0.0988*
	(0.0587)
9.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1997	0.1876***
	(0.0692)
10.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1997	0.0778
	(0.1333)
11.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1997	-0.1174
	(0.1932)
12.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1997	-0.4729**
	(0.2082)
N	35935

Standard errors in parentheses

Clustered at the departement level

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

D.3 2002


Marginal effect of the share of the population with an university degree on the vote for the CR in 2002
(leg. T1 2002) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the share of the population with an university degree
Standard−deviation of the vote for the CR in 2002
−.8
−.6
−.4
−.2
0
.2
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 95
95 to 99
99 to 100
Percentiles of the share of the population with an university degree per city
Without controls
Controlling for the population density
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_CR2002
1.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2002	0.0007
	(0.0593)
2.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2002	-0.0509
	(0.0526)
3.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2002	0.0115
	(0.0495)
4.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2002	-0.0447
	(0.0377)
5.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2002	-0.0726
	(0.0473)
7.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2002	-0.0115
	(0.0478)
8.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2002	0.0249
	(0.0514)
9.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2002	-0.0146
	(0.0772)
10.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2002	-0.0645
	(0.1118)
11.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2002	-0.0961
	(0.1755)
12.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2002	-0.3404
	(0.2270)
N	35872

Standard errors in parentheses

Clustered at the departement level

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

D.4 2007


Marginal effect of the share of the population with an university degree on the vote for the CR in 2007
(leg. T1 2007) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the share of the population with an university degree
Standard−deviation of the vote for the CR in 2007
−.5
0
.5
1
1.5
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 95
95 to 99
99 to 100
Percentiles of the share of the population with an university degree per city
Without controls
Controlling for the population density
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_CR2007
1.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2007	-0.3872*** (0.0614)
2.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2007	-0.2416*** (0.0543)
3.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2007	-0.2587*** (0.0490)
4.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2007	-0.1496*** (0.0414)
5.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2007	-0.0881** (0.0389)
7.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2007	0.1160** (0.0533)
8.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2007	0.1638*** (0.0505)
9.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2007	0.3759*** (0.0695)
10.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2007	0.6994*** (0.1178)
11.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2007	0.7952*** (0.1468)
12.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2007	0.7370*** (0.2235)
N	35865

Standard errors in parentheses

Clustered at the departement level

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

D.5 2012


Marginal effect of the share of the population with an university degree on the vote for the CR in 2012
(leg. T1 2012) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the share of the population with an university degree
Standard−deviation of the vote for the CR in 2012
−.4
−.2
0
.2
.4
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 95
95 to 99
99 to 100
Percentiles of the share of the population with an university degree per city
Without controls
Controlling for the population density
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1)
	zshare_CR2012
1.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2012	0.0894
	(0.0788)
2.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2012	0.0924
	(0.0578)
3.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2012	0.0576
	(0.0485)
4.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2012	-0.0010
	(0.0383)
5.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2012	0.0326
	(0.0425)
7.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2012	-0.0011
	(0.0502)
8.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2012	0.0338
	(0.0791)
9.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2012	0.0530
	(0.0759)
10.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2012	-0.0165
	(0.1030)
11.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2012	0.0791
	(0.1862)
12.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2012	0.0596
	(0.1901)
N	34677

Standard errors in parentheses

Clustered at the departement level

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

D.6 2017


Marginal effect of the share of the population with an university degree on the vote for the CR in 2017
(leg. T1 2017) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the share of the population with an university degree
Standard−deviation of the vote for the CR in 2017
−.5
0
.5
1
1.5
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 95
95 to 99
99 to 100
Percentiles of the share of the population with an university degree per city
Without controls
Controlling for the population density
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_CR2017
1.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2017	-0.2416***
	(0.0742)
2.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2017	-0.1877***
	(0.0616)
3.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2017	-0.1524***
	(0.0510)
4.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2017	-0.1407**
	(0.0542)
5.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2017	-0.1088**
	(0.0422)
7.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2017	-0.0450
	(0.0542)
8.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2017	0.1963***
	(0.0511)
9.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2017	0.3411***
	(0.0612)
10.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2017	0.4676***
	(0.1125)
11.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2017	0.7527***
	(0.1640)
12.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2017	1.2793***
	(0.1475)
N	34667

Standard errors in parentheses
Clustered at the departement level
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

E Marginal impact of share of university graduates on the central left

E.1 1993



	(1) zshare_CL1993
1.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1993	-0.0335
	(0.0693)
2.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1993	-0.0341
	(0.0592)
3.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1993	0.0359
	(0.0609)
4.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1993	0.0840
	(0.0690)
5.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1993	-0.0877*
	(0.0469)
7.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1993	0.0510
	(0.0766)
8.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1993	0.0166
	(0.0663)
9.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1993	-0.1183*
	(0.0698)
10.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1993	0.0131
	(0.1334)
11.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1993	0.0560
	(0.1398)
12.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1993	-0.1155
	(0.1433)
N	35940

Standard errors in parentheses

Clustered at the departement level

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

E.2 1997


Marginal effect of share of the population with an university degree on the vote for the CL in 1997
(leg. T1 1997) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the share of the population with an university degree
Standard−deviation of the vote for the CL in 1997
−.4
−.2
0
.2
.4
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 95
95 to 99
99 to 100
Percentiles of the share of the population with an university degree per city
Without controls
Controlling for the population density
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_CL1997
1.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1997	0.0034 (0.0614)
2.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1997	0.0197 (0.0570)
3.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1997	0.0482 (0.0432)
4.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1997	0.0042 (0.0491)
5.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1997	0.0052 (0.0409)
7.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1997	0.0678 (0.0498)
8.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1997	0.1501* (0.0770)
9.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1997	-0.0539 (0.0741)
10.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1997	0.0436 (0.1216)
11.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1997	0.1080 (0.1438)
12.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1997	-0.0576 (0.1414)
N	35935

Standard errors in parentheses

Clustered at the departement level

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

E.3 2002


Marginal effect of the share of the population with an university degree on the vote for the CL in 2002
(leg. T1 2002) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the share of the population with an university degree
Standard−deviation of the vote for the CL in 2002
−.2
0
.2
.4
.6
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 95
95 to 99
99 to 100
Percentiles of the share of the population with an university degree per city
Without controls
Controlling for the population density
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1)
	zshare_CL2002
1.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2002	0.0256
	(0.0664)
2.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2002	0.0104
	(0.0593)
3.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2002	0.0427
	(0.0506)
4.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2002	-0.0228
	(0.0528)
5.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2002	-0.0516
	(0.0430)
7.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2002	-0.0204
	(0.0441)
8.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2002	-0.0487
	(0.0461)
9.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2002	0.0400
	(0.0590)
10.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2002	0.1573
	(0.1159)
11.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2002	0.3235*
	(0.1772)
12.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2002	0.1134
	(0.1741)
N	35872

Standard errors in parentheses

Clustered at the departement level

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

E.4 2007


Marginal effect of the share of the population with an university degree on the vote for the CL in 2007
(leg. T1 2007) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the share of the population with an university degree
Standard−deviation of the vote for the CL in 2007
−.2
0
.2
.4
.6
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 95
95 to 99
99 to 100
Percentiles of the share of the population with an university degree per city
Without controls
Controlling for the population density
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_CL2007
1.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2007	-0.0496
	(0.0726)
2.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2007	-0.0324
	(0.0624)
3.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2007	-0.0072
	(0.0495)
4.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2007	-0.0286
	(0.0492)
5.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2007	-0.0231
	(0.0489)
7.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2007	-0.0482
	(0.0482)
8.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2007	-0.0688
	(0.0485)
9.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2007	-0.0824*
	(0.0456)
10.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2007	-0.0490
	(0.0599)
11.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2007	0.0081
	(0.0977)
12.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2007	0.1314
	(0.1795)
N	35865

Standard errors in parentheses

Clustered at the departement level

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

E.5 2012


Marginal effect of the share of the population with an university degree on the vote for the CL in 2012
(leg. T1 2012) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the share of the population with an university degree
Standard−deviation of the vote for the CL in 2012
−.6
−.4
−.2
0
.2
.4
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 95
95 to 99
99 to 100
Percentiles of the share of the population with an university degree per city
Without controls
Controlling for the population density
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_CL2012
1.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2012	0.0398
	(0.0854)
2.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2012	0.0805
	(0.0713)
3.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2012	0.0517
	(0.0642)
4.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2012	0.0502
	(0.0438)
5.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2012	0.0482
	(0.0427)
7.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2012	0.0395
	(0.0577)
8.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2012	0.0135
	(0.0460)
9.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2012	-0.0279
	(0.0521)
10.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2012	0.1160
	(0.1050)
11.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2012	-0.0996
	(0.2012)
12.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2012	-0.0506
	(0.2104)
N	34677

Standard errors in parentheses

Clustered at the departement level

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

E.6 2017


Marginal effect of the share of the population with an university degree on the vote for the CL in 2017
(leg. T1 2017) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the share of the population with an university degree
Standard−deviation of the vote for the CL in 2017
−.2
−.1
0
.1
.2
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 95
95 to 99
99 to 100
Percentiles of the share of the population with an university degree per city
Without controls
Controlling for the population density
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_CL2017
1.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2017	0.0128
	(0.0577)
2.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2017	0.0607
	(0.0652)
3.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2017	-0.0347
	(0.0356)
4.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2017	0.0609
	(0.0595)
5.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2017	0.0172
	(0.0383)
7.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2017	-0.0085
	(0.0233)
8.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2017	-0.0463
	(0.0319)
9.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2017	-0.0657*
	(0.0390)
10.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2017	-0.0962
	(0.0627)
11.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2017	0.0072
	(0.1026)
12.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2017	-0.0326
	(0.1018)
N	34667

Standard errors in parentheses

Clustered at the departement level

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

F Marginal impact of share of university graduates on the right

F.1 1993



	(1) zshare_right1993
1.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1993	-0.1848**
	(0.0918)
2.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1993	-0.1916*
	(0.0977)
3.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1993	-0.1964***
	(0.0572)
4.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1993	-0.0190
	(0.0487)
5.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1993	0.0037
	(0.0454)
7.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1993	0.0416
	(0.0525)
8.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1993	-0.0057
	(0.0633)
9.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1993	-0.1225
	(0.0782)
10.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1993	-0.0338
	(0.1006)
11.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1993	0.3088*
	(0.1772)
12.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1993	0.0151
	(0.2342)
N	35940

Standard errors in parentheses

Clustered at the departement level

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

F.2 1997


Marginal effect of share of the population with an university degree on the vote for the right in 1997
(leg. T1 1997) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the share of the population with an university degree
Standard−deviation of the vote for the right in 1997
−1.5
−1
−.5
0
.5
1
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 95
95 to 99
99 to 100
Percentiles of the share of the population with an university degree per city
Without controls
Controlling for the population density
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_right1997
1.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1997	-0.0795
	(0.0916)
2.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1997	-0.1876**
	(0.0809)
3.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1997	-0.1098**
	(0.0533)
4.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1997	-0.0730
	(0.0496)
5.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1997	-0.0474
	(0.0416)
7.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1997	0.0658
	(0.0531)
8.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1997	0.0194
	(0.0552)
9.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1997	-0.1515**
	(0.0746)
10.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1997	-0.1917
	(0.1186)
11.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1997	-0.0341
	(0.1876)
12.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1997	-0.5894*
	(0.3403)
N	35935

Standard errors in parentheses
Clustered at the departement level
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

F.3 2002



Marginal effect of the share of the population with an university degree on the vote for the right in 2002
(leg. T1 2002) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the share of the population with an university degree
Standard−deviation of the vote for the right in 2002
−1.5
−1
−.5
0
.5
1
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 95
95 to 99
99 to 100
Percentiles of the share of the population with an university degree per city
Without controls
Controlling for the population density
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_right2002
1.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2002	-0.1342 (0.0900)
2.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2002	-0.0908 (0.0718)
3.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2002	-0.0393 (0.0603)
4.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2002	-0.0173 (0.0521)
5.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2002	-0.0045 (0.0414)
7.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2002	-0.0276 (0.0381)
8.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2002	-0.1309^{**} (0.0644)
9.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2002	-0.3251^{***} (0.0906)
10.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2002	-0.4120^{***} (0.1365)
11.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2002	-0.3606^{**} (0.1539)
12.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2002	-0.9625^{***} (0.2050)
N	35872

Standard errors in parentheses

Clustered at the departement level

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

F.4 2007



Marginal effect of the share of the population with an university degree on the vote for the right in 2007
(leg. T1 2007) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the share of the population with an university degree
Standard−deviation of the vote for the right in 2007
−1
−.5
0
.5
1
1.5
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 95
95 to 99
99 to 100
Percentiles of the share of the population with an university degree per city
Without controls
Controlling for the population density
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_right2007
1.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2007	-0.1195
	(0.0923)
2.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2007	-0.0550
	(0.0628)
3.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2007	-0.0692
	(0.0514)
4.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2007	-0.0331
	(0.0389)
5.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2007	-0.0462
	(0.0359)
7.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2007	-0.0592
	(0.0466)
8.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2007	-0.1585**
	(0.0649)
9.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2007	-0.4084***
	(0.0975)
10.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2007	-0.4809***
	(0.1536)
11.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2007	-0.3359
	(0.2300)
12.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2007	-0.0443
	(0.2638)
N	35865

Standard errors in parentheses

Clustered at the departement level

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

F.5 2012


Marginal effect of the share of the population with an university degree on the vote for the right in 2012
(leg. T1 2012) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the share of the population with an university degree
Standard−deviation of the vote for the right in 2012
1
0
−1
−2
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 95
95 to 99
99 to 100
Percentiles of the share of the population with an university degree per city
Without controls
Controlling for the population density
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_right2012
1.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2012	0.3151***
	(0.0942)
2.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2012	0.2554***
	(0.0766)
3.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2012	0.1922***
	(0.0620)
4.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2012	0.1950***
	(0.0605)
5.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2012	0.1170**
	(0.0524)
7.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2012	-0.0982*
	(0.0533)
8.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2012	-0.3093***
	(0.0855)
9.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2012	-0.6247***
	(0.1215)
10.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2012	-0.6999***
	(0.1739)
11.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2012	-0.5629***
	(0.1975)
12.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2012	-1.2838***
	(0.3467)
N	34677

Standard errors in parentheses

Clustered at the departement level

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

F.6 2017


Marginal effect of the share of the population with an university degree on the vote for the right in 2017
(leg. T1 2017) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the share of the population with an university degree
Standard−deviation of the vote for the right in 2017
1
.5
0
−.5
−1
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 95
95 to 99
99 to 100
Percentiles of the share of the population with an university degree per city
Without controls
Controlling for the population density
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_right2017
1.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2017	0.2888***
	(0.0753)
2.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2017	0.2152***
	(0.0705)
3.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2017	0.2058***
	(0.0574)
4.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2017	0.1072**
	(0.0463)
5.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2017	0.1019**
	(0.0491)
7.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2017	-0.0756
	(0.0477)
8.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2017	-0.1640***
	(0.0583)
9.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2017	-0.3008***
	(0.0817)
10.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2017	-0.2253*
	(0.1336)
11.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2017	-0.0430
	(0.1896)
12.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2017	-0.5669*
	(0.3228)
N	34667

Standard errors in parentheses

Clustered at the departement level

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

G Marginal impact of share of university graduates on the left

G.1 1993



	(1) zshare_left1993
1.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1993	0.1906**
	(0.0880)
2.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1993	0.2032**
	(0.0957)
3.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1993	0.1984***
	(0.0555)
4.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1993	0.0274
	(0.0460)
5.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1993	0.0234
	(0.0425)
7.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1993	-0.0146
	(0.0494)
8.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1993	0.0088
	(0.0490)
9.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1993	0.1568*
	(0.0796)
10.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1993	0.0963
	(0.0981)
11.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1993	-0.0709
	(0.1342)
12.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1993	0.1705
	(0.1745)
N	35940

Standard errors in parentheses

Clustered at the departement level

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

G.2 1997


Marginal effect of share of the population with an university degree on the vote for the left in 1997
(leg. T1 1997) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the share of the population with an university degree
Standard−deviation of the vote for the left in 1997
−1
−.5
0
.5
1
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 95
95 to 99
99 to 100
Percentiles of the share of the population with an university degree per city
Without controls
Controlling for the population density
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_left1997
1.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1997	0.1016
	(0.0915)
2.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1997	0.2086^{**}
	(0.0814)
3.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1997	0.1219^{**}
	(0.0540)
4.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1997	0.0816
	(0.0496)
5.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1997	0.0486
	(0.0423)
7.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1997	-0.0707
	(0.0526)
8.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1997	-0.0294
	(0.0542)
9.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1997	0.1412^{*}
	(0.0750)
10.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1997	0.1682
	(0.1104)
11.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1997	-0.0335
	(0.1945)
12.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1997	0.5429
	(0.3283)
N	35935

Standard errors in parentheses

Clustered at the departement level

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

G.3 2002


Marginal effect of the share of the population with an university degree on the vote for the left in 2002
(leg. T1 2002) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the share of the population with an university degree
Standard−deviation of the vote for the left in 2002
−1
−.5
0
.5
1
1.5
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 95
95 to 99
99 to 100
Percentiles of the share of the population with an university degree per city
Without controls
Controlling for the population density
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_left2002
1.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2002	0.1516*
	(0.0902)
2.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2002	0.1225
	(0.0750)
3.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2002	0.0516
	(0.0610)
4.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2002	0.0262
	(0.0530)
5.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2002	0.0045
	(0.0416)
7.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2002	0.0384
	(0.0406)
8.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2002	0.1489**
	(0.0660)
9.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2002	0.3586***
	(0.0962)
10.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2002	0.4283***
	(0.1495)
11.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2002	0.3216*
	(0.1718)
12.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2002	0.7749***
	(0.2341)
N	35872

Standard errors in parentheses

Clustered at the departement level

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

G.4 2007


Marginal effect of the share of the population with an university degree on the vote for the left in 2007
(leg. T1 2007) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the share of the population with an university degree
Standard−deviation of the vote for the left in 2007
−1.5
−1
−.5
0
.5
1
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 95
95 to 99
99 to 100
Percentiles of the share of the population with an university degree per city
Without controls
Controlling for the population density
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_left2007
1.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2007	0.1103
	(0.0910)
2.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2007	0.0512
	(0.0669)
3.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2007	0.0640
	(0.0541)
4.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2007	0.0239
	(0.0395)
5.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2007	0.0434
	(0.0377)
7.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2007	0.0479
	(0.0496)
8.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2007	0.1649**
	(0.0659)
9.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2007	0.4281***
	(0.0975)
10.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2007	0.5002***
	(0.1536)
11.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2007	0.3685
	(0.2345)
12.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2007	-0.3588
	(0.3217)
N	35865

Standard errors in parentheses

Clustered at the departement level

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

G.5 2012


Marginal effect of the share of the population with an university degree on the vote for the left in 2012
(leg. T1 2012) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the share of the population with an university degree
Standard−deviation of the vote for the left in 2012
−1
0
1
2
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 95
95 to 99
99 to 100
Percentiles of the share of the population with an university degree per city
Without controls
Controlling for the population density
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_left2012
1.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2012	-0.2348**
	(0.0915)
2.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2012	-0.1927**
	(0.0746)
3.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2012	-0.1566**
	(0.0625)
4.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2012	-0.1713***
	(0.0594)
5.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2012	-0.0941*
	(0.0519)
7.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2012	0.0688
	(0.0523)
8.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2012	0.2591***
	(0.0796)
9.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2012	0.5487***
	(0.1102)
10.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2012	0.6339***
	(0.1718)
11.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2012	0.4530**
	(0.1974)
12.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2012	1.2219***
	(0.3371)
N	34677

Standard errors in parentheses

Clustered at the departement level

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

G.6 2017


Marginal effect of the share of the population with an university degree on the vote for the left in 2017
(leg. T1 2017) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the share of the population with an university degree
Standard−deviation of the vote for the left in 2017
−1
−.5
0
.5
1
1.5
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 95
95 to 99
99 to 100
Percentiles of the share of the population with an university degree per city
Without controls
Controlling for the population density
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_left2017
1.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2017	-0.2282*** (0.0754)
2.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2017	-0.1845*** (0.0688)
3.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2017	-0.2034*** (0.0589)
4.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2017	-0.0906* (0.0457)
5.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2017	-0.1083** (0.0480)
7.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2017	0.0316 (0.0507)
8.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2017	0.1815*** (0.0563)
9.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2017	0.3401*** (0.0851)
10.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2017	0.2816** (0.1409)
11.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2017	0.0764 (0.1925)
12.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2017	0.6055* (0.3319)
N	34667

Standard errors in parentheses

Clustered at the departement level

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

G.7 2002


Marginal effect of the tax/inhabitant ratio on the vote for the ER in 2002
(leg. T1 2002) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the tax/inhabitant ratio
Standard−deviation of the vote for the ER2002
−.3
−.2
−.1
0
.1
.2
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 95
95 to 99
99 to 100
Percentiles of the tax/inhabitant ratio
Without controls
Controlling for the share of univ. grad.
Controlling for the share of univ. grad. and the population density
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_ER2002
1.pctnrtax_product_capita2002	-0.0551
	(0.0913)
2.pctnrtax_product_capita2002	-0.1315
	(0.0812)
3.pctnrtax_product_capita2002	-0.1008
	(0.0779)
4.pctnrtax_product_capita2002	-0.0828
	(0.0572)
5.pctnrtax_product_capita2002	-0.0255
	(0.0580)
7.pctnrtax_product_capita2002	-0.2013***
	(0.0606)
8.pctnrtax_product_capita2002	-0.0526
	(0.0733)
9.pctnrtax_product_capita2002	0.0254
	(0.0714)
10.pctnrtax_product_capita2002	-0.1072
	(0.0765)
11.pctnrtax_product_capita2002	-0.0354
	(0.0649)
12.pctnrtax_product_capita2002	-0.0482
	(0.0996)
N	29120

Standard errors in parentheses

Clustered at the departement level

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

G.8 2007


Marginal effect of the tax/inhabitant ratio on the vote for the ER in 2007
(leg. T1 2007) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the tax/inhabitant ratio
Standard−deviation of the vote for the ER2007
−.4
−.2
0
.2
.4
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 95
95 to 99
99 to 100
Percentiles of the tax/inhabitant ratio
Without controls
Controlling for the share of univ. grad.
Controlling for the share of univ. grad. and the population density
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_ER2007
1.pctnrtax_product_capita2007	0.1440**
	(0.0708)
2.pctnrtax_product_capita2007	0.0156
	(0.0563)
3.pctnrtax_product_capita2007	0.0341
	(0.0776)
4.pctnrtax_product_capita2007	-0.0234
	(0.0391)
5.pctnrtax_product_capita2007	-0.0656**
	(0.0329)
7.pctnrtax_product_capita2007	-0.0319
	(0.0499)
8.pctnrtax_product_capita2007	-0.1784***
	(0.0503)
9.pctnrtax_product_capita2007	0.0106
	(0.0515)
10.pctnrtax_product_capita2007	-0.0136
	(0.0538)
11.pctnrtax_product_capita2007	-0.0972*
	(0.0584)
12.pctnrtax_product_capita2007	-0.1269
	(0.0935)
N	34650

Standard errors in parentheses

Clustered at the departement level

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

G.9 2012



Marginal effect of the tax/inhabitant ratio on the vote for the ER in 2012
(leg. T1 2012) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the tax/inhabitant ratio
Standard−deviation of the vote for the ER2012
−.4
−.2
0
.2
.4
.6
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 95
95 to 99
99 to 100
Percentiles of the tax/inhabitant ratio
Without controls
Controlling for the share of univ. grad.
Controlling for the share of univ. grad. and the population density
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_ER2012
1.pctnrtax_product_capita2012	0.1845 (0.1150)
2.pctnrtax_product_capita2012	0.1087 (0.0899)
3.pctnrtax_product_capita2012	0.0791 (0.0827)
4.pctnrtax_product_capita2012	0.0823 (0.0701)
5.pctnrtax_product_capita2012	0.1001** (0.0489)
7.pctnrtax_product_capita2012	0.0101 (0.0644)
8.pctnrtax_product_capita2012	-0.0684 (0.0572)
9.pctnrtax_product_capita2012	-0.0317 (0.0736)
10.pctnrtax_product_capita2012	0.0820 (0.1044)
11.pctnrtax_product_capita2012	0.0592 (0.0883)
12.pctnrtax_product_capita2012	0.2478 (0.1708)
N	31678

Standard errors in parentheses
Clustered at the departement level
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

G.10 2017


Marginal effect of the tax/inhabitant ratio on the vote for the ER in 2017
(leg. T1 2017) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the tax/inhabitant ratio
Standard−deviation of the vote for the ER2017
.5
0
−.5
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 95
95 to 99
99 to 100
Percentiles of the tax/inhabitant ratio
Without controls
Controlling for the share of univ. grad.
Controlling for the share of univ. grad. and the population density
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_ER2017
1.pctnrtax_product_capita2017	0.2619**
	(0.1041)
2.pctnrtax_product_capita2017	0.0923
	(0.0839)
3.pctnrtax_product_capita2017	0.0366
	(0.0818)
4.pctnrtax_product_capita2017	0.0137
	(0.0720)
5.pctnrtax_product_capita2017	-0.0266
	(0.0473)
7.pctnrtax_product_capita2017	-0.0852*
	(0.0475)
8.pctnrtax_product_capita2017	-0.1549***
	(0.0463)
9.pctnrtax_product_capita2017	-0.0522
	(0.0588)
10.pctnrtax_product_capita2017	-0.0205
	(0.0959)
11.pctnrtax_product_capita2017	0.1489
	(0.0989)
12.pctnrtax_product_capita2017	0.2786*
	(0.1653)
N	33596

Standard errors in parentheses

Clustered at the departement level

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

H Marginal impact of tax/inhabitants ratio on the extreme-left

H.1 2002



	(1) zshare_EL2002
1.pctnrtax_product_capita2002	-0.0849
	(0.1177)
2.pctnrtax_product_capita2002	0.0142
	(0.1115)
3.pctnrtax_product_capita2002	0.0680
	(0.1121)
4.pctnrtax_product_capita2002	0.0438
	(0.0900)
5.pctnrtax_product_capita2002	0.0273
	(0.0915)
7.pctnrtax_product_capita2002	0.0375
	(0.1033)
8.pctnrtax_product_capita2002	-0.1459
	(0.1147)
9.pctnrtax_product_capita2002	0.0858
	(0.1435)
10.pctnrtax_product_capita2002	0.0409
	(0.1545)
11.pctnrtax_product_capita2002	0.3233**
	(0.1544)
12.pctnrtax_product_capita2002	0.4002
	(0.3323)
N	29120

Standard errors in parentheses

Clustered at the departement level

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

H.2 2007


Marginal effect of the tax/inhabitant ratio on the vote for the EL in 2007
(leg. T1 2007) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the tax/inhabitant ratio
Standard−deviation of the vote for the EL2007
−.5
0
.5
1
1.5
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 95
95 to 99
99 to 100
Percentiles of the tax/inhabitant ratio
Without controls
Controlling for the share of univ. grad.
Controlling for the share of univ. grad. and the population density
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_EL2007
1.pctnrtax_product_capita2007	-0.1474
	(0.1105)
2.pctnrtax_product_capita2007	-0.0033
	(0.1135)
3.pctnrtax_product_capita2007	0.0148
	(0.1106)
4.pctnrtax_product_capita2007	0.0398
	(0.1078)
5.pctnrtax_product_capita2007	-0.1156*
	(0.0686)
7.pctnrtax_product_capita2007	-0.0719
	(0.0764)
8.pctnrtax_product_capita2007	-0.1264
	(0.0842)
9.pctnrtax_product_capita2007	-0.0298
	(0.0976)
10.pctnrtax_product_capita2007	-0.0702
	(0.1257)
11.pctnrtax_product_capita2007	0.4511**
	(0.1825)
12.pctnrtax_product_capita2007	0.3259
	(0.4326)
N	34650

Standard errors in parentheses

Clustered at the departement level

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

H.3 2012


Marginal effect of the tax/inhabitant ratio on the vote for the EL in 2012
(leg. T1 2012) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the tax/inhabitant ratio
Standard−deviation of the vote for the EL2012
.5
0
−.5
−1
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 95
95 to 99
99 to 100
Percentiles of the tax/inhabitant ratio
Without controls
Controlling for the share of univ. grad.
Controlling for the share of univ. grad. and the population density
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_EL2012
1.pctnrtax_product_capita2012	-0.2203**
	(0.1020)
2.pctnrtax_product_capita2012	-0.0860
	(0.1040)
3.pctnrtax_product_capita2012	-0.0533
	(0.0990)
4.pctnrtax_product_capita2012	-0.0558
	(0.0890)
5.pctnrtax_product_capita2012	-0.1146
	(0.0895)
7.pctnrtax_product_capita2012	-0.0762
	(0.0850)
8.pctnrtax_product_capita2012	-0.1123
	(0.0819)
9.pctnrtax_product_capita2012	0.0591
	(0.1010)
10.pctnrtax_product_capita2012	-0.1488
	(0.1229)
11.pctnrtax_product_capita2012	0.2049
	(0.1852)
12.pctnrtax_product_capita2012	-0.4077***
	(0.1170)
N	31678

Standard errors in parentheses
Clustered at the departement level
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

H.4 2017


Marginal effect of the tax/inhabitant ratio on the vote for the EL in 2017
(leg. T1 2017) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the tax/inhabitant ratio
Standard−deviation of the vote for the EL2017
.5
0
−.5
−1
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 95
95 to 99
99 to 100
Percentiles of the tax/inhabitant ratio
Without controls
Controlling for the share of univ. grad.
Controlling for the share of univ. grad. and the population density
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_EL2017
1.pctnrtax_product_capita2017	-0.2153*** (0.0569)
2.pctnrtax_product_capita2017	-0.0979** (0.0471)
3.pctnrtax_product_capita2017	-0.0257 (0.0423)
4.pctnrtax_product_capita2017	0.0066 (0.0463)
5.pctnrtax_product_capita2017	0.0336 (0.0425)
7.pctnrtax_product_capita2017	0.0857 (0.0536)
8.pctnrtax_product_capita2017	-0.0106 (0.0592)
9.pctnrtax_product_capita2017	0.1108 (0.0725)
10.pctnrtax_product_capita2017	0.1814** (0.0891)
11.pctnrtax_product_capita2017	0.1162 (0.1372)
12.pctnrtax_product_capita2017	-0.3657*** (0.0876)
N	33596

Standard errors in parentheses

Clustered at the departement level

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

I Marginal impact of tax/inhabitants ratio on the central right

I.1 2002



	(1) zshare_CR2002
1.pctnrtax_product_capita2002	0.0508
	(0.0625)
2.pctnrtax_product_capita2002	0.0076
	(0.0573)
3.pctnrtax_product_capita2002	-0.0497
	(0.0418)
4.pctnrtax_product_capita2002	-0.0269
	(0.0500)
5.pctnrtax_product_capita2002	0.0438
	(0.0452)
7.pctnrtax_product_capita2002	-0.0008
	(0.0628)
8.pctnrtax_product_capita2002	0.0841
	(0.0794)
9.pctnrtax_product_capita2002	-0.0108
	(0.0550)
10.pctnrtax_product_capita2002	-0.0905
	(0.0674)
11.pctnrtax_product_capita2002	-0.0002
	(0.0914)
12.pctnrtax_product_capita2002	-0.1911*
	(0.1135)
N	29120

Standard errors in parentheses

Clustered at the departement level

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

I.2 2007


Marginal effect of the tax/inhabitant ratio on the vote for the CR
(leg. T1 2007) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the tax/inhabitant ratio
Standard−deviation of the vote for the CR
−.2
0
.2
.4
.6
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 100
Percentiles of the tax/inhabitant ratio
Without controls
Controlling for tax/inh. ratio
Controlling for tax/inh. ratio and population
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_CR2007
1.pctnrtax_product_capita2007	0.0839
	(0.0752)
2.pctnrtax_product_capita2007	0.0552
	(0.0435)
3.pctnrtax_product_capita2007	0.0554
	(0.0366)
4.pctnrtax_product_capita2007	0.0359
	(0.0349)
5.pctnrtax_product_capita2007	0.0493
	(0.0312)
7.pctnrtax_product_capita2007	0.0635
	(0.0706)
8.pctnrtax_product_capita2007	-0.0453
	(0.0560)
9.pctnrtax_product_capita2007	-0.0108
	(0.0536)
10.pctnrtax_product_capita2007	0.0474
	(0.0600)
11.pctnrtax_product_capita2007	-0.1445
	(0.0965)
12.pctnrtax_product_capita2007	-0.0774
	(0.0755)
N	34650

Standard errors in parentheses

Clustered at the departement level

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

I.3 2012


Marginal effect of the tax/inhabitant ratio on the vote for the CR
(leg. T1 2012) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the tax/inhabitant ratio
Standard−deviation of the vote for the CR
−.2
0
.2
.4
.6
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 100
Percentiles of the tax/inhabitant ratio
Without controls
Controlling for tax/inh. ratio
Controlling for tax/inh. ratio and population
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_CR2012
1.pctnrtax_product_capita2012	0.0692
	(0.0710)
2.pctnrtax_product_capita2012	0.0427
	(0.0625)
3.pctnrtax_product_capita2012	-0.0161
	(0.0544)
4.pctnrtax_product_capita2012	0.0300
	(0.0557)
5.pctnrtax_product_capita2012	0.0120
	(0.0588)
7.pctnrtax_product_capita2012	-0.0057
	(0.0711)
8.pctnrtax_product_capita2012	-0.0423
	(0.0589)
9.pctnrtax_product_capita2012	0.0100
	(0.0879)
10.pctnrtax_product_capita2012	-0.0314
	(0.0950)
11.pctnrtax_product_capita2012	-0.1846**
	(0.0708)
12.pctnrtax_product_capita2012	-0.0601
	(0.1147)
N	31678

Standard errors in parentheses

Clustered at the departement level

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

I.4 2017


Marginal effect of the tax/inhabitant ratio on the vote for the CR
(leg. T1 2017) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the tax/inhabitant ratio
Standard−deviation of the vote for the CR
.5
0
−.5
−1
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 100
Percentiles of the tax/inhabitant ratio
Without controls
Controlling for tax/inh. ratio
Controlling for tax/inh. ratio and population
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_CR2017
1.pctnrtax_product_capita2017	-0.1566** (0.0788)
2.pctnrtax_product_capita2017	-0.1102* (0.0563)
3.pctnrtax_product_capita2017	-0.0893* (0.0499)
4.pctnrtax_product_capita2017	-0.0379 (0.0344)
5.pctnrtax_product_capita2017	-0.0276 (0.0449)
7.pctnrtax_product_capita2017	0.0222 (0.0624)
8.pctnrtax_product_capita2017	0.0313 (0.0833)
9.pctnrtax_product_capita2017	0.0142 (0.0646)
10.pctnrtax_product_capita2017	0.0058 (0.1043)
11.pctnrtax_product_capita2017	-0.0698 (0.1119)
12.pctnrtax_product_capita2017	-0.3578** (0.1756)
N	33596

Standard errors in parentheses

Clustered at the departement level

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

J Marginal impact of tax/inhabitants ratio on the central left

J.1 2002



	(1) zshare_CL2002
1.pctnrtax_product_capita2002	0.0280
	(0.0789)
2.pctnrtax_product_capita2002	0.0128
	(0.0785)
3.pctnrtax_product_capita2002	-0.0011
	(0.0680)
4.pctnrtax_product_capita2002	-0.0305
	(0.0570)
5.pctnrtax_product_capita2002	-0.0029
	(0.0686)
7.pctnrtax_product_capita2002	0.0258
	(0.0566)
8.pctnrtax_product_capita2002	-0.0120
	(0.0524)
9.pctnrtax_product_capita2002	0.0191
	(0.0514)
10.pctnrtax_product_capita2002	0.0535
	(0.0666)
11.pctnrtax_product_capita2002	0.0710
	(0.0780)
12.pctnrtax_product_capita2002	0.0965
	(0.1595)
N	29120

Standard errors in parentheses

Clustered at the departement level

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

J.2 2007


Marginal effect of the tax/inhabitant ratio on the vote for the CL
(leg. T1 2007) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the tax/inhabitant ratio
Standard−deviation of the vote for the CL
−.4
−.2
0
.2
.4
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 100
Percentiles of the tax/inhabitant ratio
Without controls
Controlling for tax/inh. ratio
Controlling for tax/inh. ratio and population
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_CL2007
1.pctnrtax_product_capita2007	0.0333
	(0.0481)
2.pctnrtax_product_capita2007	-0.0056
	(0.0313)
3.pctnrtax_product_capita2007	0.0198
	(0.0298)
4.pctnrtax_product_capita2007	-0.0109
	(0.0245)
5.pctnrtax_product_capita2007	-0.0335
	(0.0291)
7.pctnrtax_product_capita2007	-0.0275
	(0.0388)
8.pctnrtax_product_capita2007	-0.0190
	(0.0458)
9.pctnrtax_product_capita2007	0.0249
	(0.0414)
10.pctnrtax_product_capita2007	0.0329
	(0.0693)
11.pctnrtax_product_capita2007	0.0094
	(0.0647)
12.pctnrtax_product_capita2007	-0.0564
	(0.0926)
N	34650

Standard errors in parentheses

Clustered at the departement level

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

J.3 2012


Marginal effect of the tax/inhabitant ratio on the vote for the CL
(leg. T1 2012) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the tax/inhabitant ratio
Standard−deviation of the vote for the CL
−.4
−.2
0
.2
.4
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 100
Percentiles of the tax/inhabitant ratio
Without controls
Controlling for tax/inh. ratio
Controlling for tax/inh. ratio and population
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_CL2012
1.pctnrtax_product_capita2012	0.0008
	(0.0530)
2.pctnrtax_product_capita2012	-0.0433
	(0.0397)
3.pctnrtax_product_capita2012	0.0107
	(0.0359)
4.pctnrtax_product_capita2012	-0.0368
	(0.0326)
5.pctnrtax_product_capita2012	-0.0342
	(0.0400)
7.pctnrtax_product_capita2012	-0.0119
	(0.0304)
8.pctnrtax_product_capita2012	0.0376
	(0.0390)
9.pctnrtax_product_capita2012	0.1048
	(0.0645)
10.pctnrtax_product_capita2012	0.0725
	(0.0501)
11.pctnrtax_product_capita2012	0.0511
	(0.0733)
12.pctnrtax_product_capita2012	0.0439
	(0.1623)
N	31678

Standard errors in parentheses
Clustered at the departement level
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

J.4 2017


Marginal effect of the tax/inhabitant ratio on the vote for the CL
(leg. T1 2017) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the tax/inhabitant ratio
Standard−deviation of the vote for the CL
−.5
0
.5
1
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 100
Percentiles of the tax/inhabitant ratio
Without controls
Controlling for tax/inh. ratio
Controlling for tax/inh. ratio and population
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_CL2017
1.pctnrtax_product_capita2017	0.0321
	(0.0558)
2.pctnrtax_product_capita2017	-0.0006
	(0.0372)
3.pctnrtax_product_capita2017	0.0009
	(0.0331)
4.pctnrtax_product_capita2017	-0.0213
	(0.0301)
5.pctnrtax_product_capita2017	0.0160
	(0.0382)
7.pctnrtax_product_capita2017	-0.0256
	(0.0444)
8.pctnrtax_product_capita2017	-0.0172
	(0.0809)
9.pctnrtax_product_capita2017	-0.0306
	(0.0420)
10.pctnrtax_product_capita2017	-0.0076
	(0.0599)
11.pctnrtax_product_capita2017	-0.0903**
	(0.0453)
12.pctnrtax_product_capita2017	-0.1123*
	(0.0614)
N	33596

Standard errors in parentheses

Clustered at the departement level

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

K Marginal impact of tax/inhabitants ratio on the right

K.1 2002



	(1) zshare_right2002
1.pctnrtax_product_capita2002	-0.0163
	(0.0743)
2.pctnrtax_product_capita2002	-0.0773
	(0.0619)
3.pctnrtax_product_capita2002	-0.0887*
	(0.0498)
4.pctnrtax_product_capita2002	-0.0766
	(0.0508)
5.pctnrtax_product_capita2002	-0.0675
	(0.0429)
7.pctnrtax_product_capita2002	-0.0525
	(0.0552)
8.pctnrtax_product_capita2002	0.1058
	(0.0714)
9.pctnrtax_product_capita2002	0.0902
	(0.0567)
10.pctnrtax_product_capita2002	0.0394
	(0.0647)
11.pctnrtax_product_capita2002	0.0586
	(0.0727)
12.pctnrtax_product_capita2002	0.3990***
	(0.1349)
N	29120

Standard errors in parentheses

Clustered at the departement level

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

K.2 2007


Marginal effect of the tax/inhabitant ratio on the vote for the right in 2007
(leg. T1 2007) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the tax/inhabitant ratio
Standard−deviation of the vote for the right2007
0
.5
1
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 95
95 to 99
99 to 100
Percentiles of the tax/inhabitant ratio
Without controls
Controlling for the share of univ. grad.
Controlling for the share of univ. grad. and the population density
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_right2007
1.pctnrtax_product_capita2007	0.1264*
	(0.0729)
2.pctnrtax_product_capita2007	0.0171
	(0.0558)
3.pctnrtax_product_capita2007	0.0053
	(0.0480)
4.pctnrtax_product_capita2007	-0.0196
	(0.0446)
5.pctnrtax_product_capita2007	0.0773**
	(0.0387)
7.pctnrtax_product_capita2007	0.0916
	(0.0617)
8.pctnrtax_product_capita2007	0.0496
	(0.0632)
9.pctnrtax_product_capita2007	0.1590**
	(0.0629)
10.pctnrtax_product_capita2007	0.1847**
	(0.0754)
11.pctnrtax_product_capita2007	0.1158
	(0.0915)
12.pctnrtax_product_capita2007	0.6259***
	(0.1553)
N	34650

Standard errors in parentheses
Clustered at the departement level
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

K.3 2012


Marginal effect of the tax/inhabitant ratio on the vote for the right in 2012
(leg. T1 2012) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the tax/inhabitant ratio
Standard−deviation of the vote for the right2012
0
.5
1
1.5
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 95
95 to 99
99 to 100
Percentiles of the tax/inhabitant ratio
Without controls
Controlling for the share of univ. grad.
Controlling for the share of univ. grad. and the population density
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_right2012
1.pctnrtax_product_capita2012	0.1643***
	(0.0622)
2.pctnrtax_product_capita2012	0.0664
	(0.0566)
3.pctnrtax_product_capita2012	0.0243
	(0.0431)
4.pctnrtax_product_capita2012	0.0145
	(0.0421)
5.pctnrtax_product_capita2012	0.0397
	(0.0546)
7.pctnrtax_product_capita2012	-0.0264
	(0.0531)
8.pctnrtax_product_capita2012	-0.0116
	(0.0477)
9.pctnrtax_product_capita2012	0.0347
	(0.0621)
10.pctnrtax_product_capita2012	0.1859**
	(0.0806)
11.pctnrtax_product_capita2012	0.1286
	(0.0951)
12.pctnrtax_product_capita2012	0.7684***
	(0.1037)
N	31678

Standard errors in parentheses

Clustered at the departement level

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

K.4 2017


Marginal effect of the tax/inhabitant ratio on the vote for the right in 2017
(leg. T1 2017) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the tax/inhabitant ratio
Standard−deviation of the vote for the right2017
−.2
0
.2
.4
.6
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 95
95 to 99
99 to 100
Percentiles of the tax/inhabitant ratio
Without controls
Controlling for the share of univ. grad.
Controlling for the share of univ. grad. and the population density
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_right2017
1.pctnrtax_product_capita2017	0.1008
	(0.0734)
2.pctnrtax_product_capita2017	0.0461
	(0.0566)
3.pctnrtax_product_capita2017	-0.0196
	(0.0528)
4.pctnrtax_product_capita2017	-0.0255
	(0.0473)
5.pctnrtax_product_capita2017	0.0141
	(0.0541)
7.pctnrtax_product_capita2017	-0.0383
	(0.0598)
8.pctnrtax_product_capita2017	-0.0376
	(0.0589)
9.pctnrtax_product_capita2017	0.0332
	(0.0600)
10.pctnrtax_product_capita2017	-0.0812
	(0.0900)
11.pctnrtax_product_capita2017	0.0820
	(0.1002)
12.pctnrtax_product_capita2017	0.3531**
	(0.1363)
N	33596

Standard errors in parentheses
Clustered at the departement level
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

L Marginal impact of tax/inhabitants ratio on the left

L.1 2002



	(1) zshare_left2002
1.pctnrtax_product_capita2002	-0.0286
	(0.0714)
2.pctnrtax_product_capita2002	0.0456
	(0.0598)
3.pctnrtax_product_capita2002	0.0719
	(0.0494)
4.pctnrtax_product_capita2002	0.0657
	(0.0532)
5.pctnrtax_product_capita2002	0.0619
	(0.0473)
7.pctnrtax_product_capita2002	0.0650
	(0.0565)
8.pctnrtax_product_capita2002	-0.1142
	(0.0719)
9.pctnrtax_product_capita2002	-0.0941
	(0.0580)
10.pctnrtax_product_capita2002	-0.0465
	(0.0668)
11.pctnrtax_product_capita2002	-0.0466
	(0.0754)
12.pctnrtax_product_capita2002	-0.3943***
	(0.1486)
N	29120

Standard errors in parentheses

Clustered at the departement level

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

L.2 2007


Marginal effect of the tax/inhabitant ratio on the vote for the left in 2007
(leg. T1 2007) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the tax/inhabitant ratio
Standard−deviation of the vote for the left2007
0
−.5
−1
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 95
95 to 99
99 to 100
Percentiles of the tax/inhabitant ratio
Without controls
Controlling for the share of univ. grad.
Controlling for the share of univ. grad. and the population density
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_left2007
1.pctnrtax_product_capita2007	-0.1476**
	(0.0692)
2.pctnrtax_product_capita2007	-0.0267
	(0.0553)
3.pctnrtax_product_capita2007	-0.0124
	(0.0494)
4.pctnrtax_product_capita2007	0.0124
	(0.0457)
5.pctnrtax_product_capita2007	-0.0756*
	(0.0403)
7.pctnrtax_product_capita2007	-0.0926
	(0.0611)
8.pctnrtax_product_capita2007	-0.0458
	(0.0625)
9.pctnrtax_product_capita2007	-0.1591**
	(0.0634)
10.pctnrtax_product_capita2007	-0.1843**
	(0.0784)
11.pctnrtax_product_capita2007	-0.1126
	(0.0916)
12.pctnrtax_product_capita2007	-0.6195***
	(0.1546)
N	34650

Standard errors in parentheses

Clustered at the departement level

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

L.3 2012


Marginal effect of the tax/inhabitant ratio on the vote for the left in 2012
(leg. T1 2012) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the tax/inhabitant ratio
Standard−deviation of the vote for the left2012
0
−.5
−1
−1.5
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 95
95 to 99
99 to 100
Percentiles of the tax/inhabitant ratio
Without controls
Controlling for the share of univ. grad.
Controlling for the share of univ. grad. and the population density
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_left2012
1.pctnrtax_product_capita2012	-0.1547** (0.0613)
2.pctnrtax_product_capita2012	-0.0811 (0.0499)
3.pctnrtax_product_capita2012	-0.0172 (0.0404)
4.pctnrtax_product_capita2012	-0.0018 (0.0400)
5.pctnrtax_product_capita2012	-0.0451 (0.0488)
7.pctnrtax_product_capita2012	0.0192 (0.0531)
8.pctnrtax_product_capita2012	0.0132 (0.0491)
9.pctnrtax_product_capita2012	-0.0263 (0.0642)
10.pctnrtax_product_capita2012	-0.1516* (0.0827)
11.pctnrtax_product_capita2012	-0.1029 (0.0971)
12.pctnrtax_product_capita2012	-0.7562*** (0.1128)
N	31678

Standard errors in parentheses

Clustered at the departement level

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

L.4 2017


Marginal effect of the tax/inhabitant ratio on the vote for the left in 2017
(leg. T1 2017) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the tax/inhabitant ratio
Standard−deviation of the vote for the left2017
.2
0
−.2
−.4
−.6
−.8
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 95
95 to 99
99 to 100
Percentiles of the tax/inhabitant ratio
Without controls
Controlling for the share of univ. grad.
Controlling for the share of univ. grad. and the population density
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_left2017
1.pctnrtax_product_capita2017	-0.0688
	(0.0720)
2.pctnrtax_product_capita2017	0.0000
	(0.0573)
3.pctnrtax_product_capita2017	0.0473
	(0.0506)
4.pctnrtax_product_capita2017	0.0412
	(0.0445)
5.pctnrtax_product_capita2017	0.0135
	(0.0530)
7.pctnrtax_product_capita2017	0.0846
	(0.0610)
8.pctnrtax_product_capita2017	0.0412
	(0.0604)
9.pctnrtax_product_capita2017	-0.0267
	(0.0608)
10.pctnrtax_product_capita2017	0.1128
	(0.0844)
11.pctnrtax_product_capita2017	-0.1016
	(0.1046)
12.pctnrtax_product_capita2017	-0.5189***
	(0.1021)
N	33596

Standard errors in parentheses

Clustered at the departement level

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

M Marginal impact of net average taxable income on the extreme-right

M.1 1993



	(1) zshare_ER1993
1.pctnrfm1993	-0.4625***
	(0.1110)
2.pctnrfm1993	-0.2492***
	(0.0847)
3.pctnrfm1993	-0.1191
	(0.0737)
4.pctnrfm1993	-0.1170
	(0.0868)
5.pctnrfm1993	-0.0238
	(0.0735)
7.pctnrfm1993	0.1696**
	(0.0836)
8.pctnrfm1993	0.2416***
	(0.0594)
9.pctnrfm1993	0.3745***
	(0.0808)
10.pctnrfm1993	0.3829***
	(0.1172)
11.pctnrfm1993	0.1824
	(0.1506)
12.pctnrfm1993	0.3071*
	(0.1837)
N	35940

Standard errors in parentheses
Clustered at the departement level
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

M.2 1997


Marginal effect of the net average income on the vote for the ER in 1997
(leg. T1 1997) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the net average income
Standard−deviation of the vote for the ER1997
.5
0
−.5
−1
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 95
95 to 99
99 to 100
Percentiles of the average net income per city
Without controls
Controlling for the share of the pop. with no degree
Controlling for share of the pop. with no degree and the population density
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_ER1997
1.pctnrfm1997	-0.3084***
	(0.0911)
2.pctnrfm1997	-0.1883**
	(0.0904)
3.pctnrfm1997	-0.1381
	(0.0841)
4.pctnrfm1997	-0.1168
	(0.0844)
5.pctnrfm1997	-0.1196*
	(0.0637)
7.pctnrfm1997	0.0327
	(0.0590)
8.pctnrfm1997	0.1743***
	(0.0594)
9.pctnrfm1997	0.1268
	(0.0817)
10.pctnrfm1997	0.1147
	(0.1123)
11.pctnrfm1997	-0.1444
	(0.1535)
12.pctnrfm1997	-0.0153
	(0.2140)
N	35935

Standard errors in parentheses

Clustered at the departement level

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

M.3 2002


Marginal effect of the average taxable income on the vote for the ER in 2002
(leg. T1 2002) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the average taxable income
Standard−deviation of the vote for the ER2002
.5
0
−.5
−1
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 95
95 to 99
99 to 100
Percentiles of the average taxable income per city
Without controls
Controlling for the share of the pop. with no degree
Controlling for the share of the pop. with no degree and the population density
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_ER2002
1.pctnrfm2002	-0.1344
	(0.1153)
2.pctnrfm2002	-0.1132
	(0.1004)
3.pctnrfm2002	-0.0317
	(0.0971)
4.pctnrfm2002	-0.0945
	(0.0807)
5.pctnrfm2002	-0.1118
	(0.0743)
7.pctnrfm2002	0.0947
	(0.0607)
8.pctnrfm2002	0.1115
	(0.0699)
9.pctnrfm2002	-0.0203
	(0.1031)
10.pctnrfm2002	-0.1589
	(0.1308)
11.pctnrfm2002	-0.2469
	(0.1634)
12.pctnrfm2002	-0.1739
	(0.1860)
N	35872

Standard errors in parentheses
Clustered at the departement level
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

M.4 2007


Marginal effect of the average taxable income on the vote for the ER in 2007
(leg. T1 2007) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the average taxable income
Standard−deviation of the vote for the ER2007
−.4
−.2
0
.2
.4
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 95
95 to 99
99 to 100
Percentiles of the average taxable income per city
Without controls
Controlling for the share of the pop. with no degree
Controlling for the share of the pop. with no degree and the population density
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_ER2007
1.pctnrfm2007	0.0620
	(0.1327)
2.pctnrfm2007	-0.0182
	(0.0716)
3.pctnrfm2007	-0.0773
	(0.0543)
4.pctnrfm2007	-0.0840
	(0.0511)
5.pctnrfm2007	-0.0336
	(0.0433)
7.pctnrfm2007	0.0801**
	(0.0319)
8.pctnrfm2007	0.1455***
	(0.0420)
9.pctnrfm2007	0.0978*
	(0.0566)
10.pctnrfm2007	0.0467
	(0.0785)
11.pctnrfm2007	-0.0062
	(0.0938)
12.pctnrfm2007	-0.0496
	(0.1384)
N	35865

Standard errors in parentheses

Clustered at the departement level

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

M.5 2012


Marginal effect of the average taxable income on the vote for the ER in 2012
(leg. T1 2012) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the average taxable income
Standard−deviation of the vote for the ER2012
.5
0
−.5
−1
−1.5
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 95
95 to 99
99 to 100
Percentiles of the average taxable income per city
Without controls
Controlling for the share of the pop. with no degree
Controlling for the share of the pop. with no degree and the population density
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_ER2012
1.pctnrfm2012	0.0238
	(0.1445)
2.pctnrfm2012	-0.0850
	(0.0922)
3.pctnrfm2012	-0.0482
	(0.0767)
4.pctnrfm2012	-0.1336**
	(0.0622)
5.pctnrfm2012	-0.0235
	(0.0563)
7.pctnrfm2012	0.0470
	(0.0568)
8.pctnrfm2012	0.0870
	(0.0680)
9.pctnrfm2012	-0.0239
	(0.0930)
10.pctnrfm2012	-0.1069
	(0.1276)
11.pctnrfm2012	-0.1121
	(0.1531)
12.pctnrfm2012	0.0575
	(0.1989)
N	34677

Standard errors in parentheses
Clustered at the departement level
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

M.6 2017


Marginal effect of the average taxable income on the vote for the ER in 2017
(leg. T1 2017) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the average taxable income
Standard−deviation of the vote for the ER2017
.5
0
−.5
−1
−1.5
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 95
95 to 99
99 to 100
Percentiles of the average taxable income per city
Without controls
Controlling for the share of the pop. with no degree
Controlling for the share of the pop. with no degree and the population density
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_ER2017
1.pctnrfm2017	0.2856*
	(0.1551)
2.pctnrfm2017	0.0267
	(0.0874)
3.pctnrfm2017	-0.0263
	(0.0755)
4.pctnrfm2017	-0.0595
	(0.0547)
5.pctnrfm2017	-0.0154
	(0.0500)
7.pctnrfm2017	0.0062
	(0.0370)
8.pctnrfm2017	-0.0031
	(0.0520)
9.pctnrfm2017	-0.0946
	(0.0885)
10.pctnrfm2017	-0.2012*
	(0.1088)
11.pctnrfm2017	-0.3578***
	(0.1290)
12.pctnrfm2017	-0.1708
	(0.2030)
N	34667

Standard errors in parentheses
Clustered at the departement level
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

N Marginal impact of net average taxable income on the extreme-left

N.1 1993



	(1) zshare_EL1993
1.pctnrfm1993	0.4727***
	(0.1495)
2.pctnrfm1993	0.3172***
	(0.1126)
3.pctnrfm1993	0.2783***
	(0.0950)
4.pctnrfm1993	0.0482
	(0.0795)
5.pctnrfm1993	0.0084
	(0.0747)
7.pctnrfm1993	-0.1206
	(0.0819)
8.pctnrfm1993	-0.1416*
	(0.0754)
9.pctnrfm1993	-0.3537***
	(0.0957)
10.pctnrfm1993	-0.3192***
	(0.0883)
11.pctnrfm1993	-0.4402***
	(0.1062)
12.pctnrfm1993	-0.3943
	(0.2417)
N	35940

Standard errors in parentheses

Clustered at the departement level

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

N.2 1997


Marginal effect of the net average income on the vote for the EL in 1997
(leg. T1 1997) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the net average income
Standard−deviation of the vote for the EL1997
1
.5
0
−.5
−1
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 95
95 to 99
99 to 100
Percentiles of the average net income per city
Without controls
Controlling for the share of the pop. with no degree
Controlling for share of the pop. with no degree and the population density
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_EL1997
1.pctnrfm1997	0.6053***
	(0.1805)
2.pctnrfm1997	0.3759***
	(0.0980)
3.pctnrfm1997	0.2155**
	(0.0860)
4.pctnrfm1997	0.0287
	(0.0709)
5.pctnrfm1997	0.0050
	(0.0856)
7.pctnrfm1997	-0.1734**
	(0.0721)
8.pctnrfm1997	-0.1901***
	(0.0599)
9.pctnrfm1997	-0.3308***
	(0.0796)
10.pctnrfm1997	-0.4050***
	(0.0943)
11.pctnrfm1997	-0.4871***
	(0.0965)
12.pctnrfm1997	-0.3928
	(0.2739)
N	35935

Standard errors in parentheses

Clustered at the departement level

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

N.3 2002


Marginal effect of the average taxable income on the vote for the EL in 2002
(leg. T1 2002) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the average taxable income
Standard−deviation of the vote for the EL2002
−1
−.5
0
.5
1
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 95
95 to 99
99 to 100
Percentiles of the average taxable income per city
Without controls
Controlling for the share of the pop. with no degree
Controlling for the share of the pop. with no degree and the population density
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_EL2002
1.pctnrfm2002	0.7913***
	(0.1743)
2.pctnrfm2002	0.5113***
	(0.0916)
3.pctnrfm2002	0.1197
	(0.0880)
4.pctnrfm2002	0.1624*
	(0.0977)
5.pctnrfm2002	0.1075
	(0.1102)
7.pctnrfm2002	-0.1020
	(0.0752)
8.pctnrfm2002	-0.2011**
	(0.0858)
9.pctnrfm2002	-0.2438***
	(0.0881)
10.pctnrfm2002	-0.3941***
	(0.1062)
11.pctnrfm2002	-0.4383***
	(0.1346)
12.pctnrfm2002	-0.6135***
	(0.2179)
N	35872

Standard errors in parentheses

Clustered at the departement level

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

N.4 2007


Marginal effect of the average taxable income on the vote for the EL in 2007
(leg. T1 2007) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the average taxable income
Standard−deviation of the vote for the EL2007
−1
−.5
0
.5
1
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 95
95 to 99
99 to 100
Percentiles of the average taxable income per city
Without controls
Controlling for the share of the pop. with no degree
Controlling for the share of the pop. with no degree and the population density
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_EL2007
1.pctnrfm2007	0.8602***
	(0.1479)
2.pctnrfm2007	0.3397***
	(0.0759)
3.pctnrfm2007	0.2505***
	(0.0745)
4.pctnrfm2007	0.1423*
	(0.0800)
5.pctnrfm2007	0.0723
	(0.0726)
7.pctnrfm2007	-0.1210**
	(0.0606)
8.pctnrfm2007	-0.2079***
	(0.0709)
9.pctnrfm2007	-0.3565***
	(0.0726)
10.pctnrfm2007	-0.4592***
	(0.0786)
11.pctnrfm2007	-0.5137***
	(0.0983)
12.pctnrfm2007	-0.7167***
	(0.1224)
N	35865

Standard errors in parentheses
Clustered at the departement level
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

N.5 2012


Marginal effect of the average taxable income on the vote for the EL in 2012
(leg. T1 2012) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the average taxable income
Standard−deviation of the vote for the EL2012
−1
−.5
0
.5
1
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 95
95 to 99
99 to 100
Percentiles of the average taxable income per city
Without controls
Controlling for the share of the pop. with no degree
Controlling for the share of the pop. with no degree and the population density
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_EL2012
1.pctnrfm2012	0.9029***
	(0.1570)
2.pctnrfm2012	0.3745***
	(0.0948)
3.pctnrfm2012	0.2100**
	(0.0988)
4.pctnrfm2012	0.1765***
	(0.0515)
5.pctnrfm2012	0.0930
	(0.0710)
7.pctnrfm2012	-0.2254***
	(0.0717)
8.pctnrfm2012	-0.2628***
	(0.0668)
9.pctnrfm2012	-0.3786***
	(0.0803)
10.pctnrfm2012	-0.5095***
	(0.0782)
11.pctnrfm2012	-0.5320**
	(0.2215)
12.pctnrfm2012	-0.2859
	(0.4025)
N	34677

Standard errors in parentheses

Clustered at the departement level

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

N.6 2017


Marginal effect of the average taxable income on the vote for the EL in 2017
(leg. T1 2017) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the average taxable income
Standard−deviation of the vote for the EL2017
1
.5
0
−.5
−1
−1.5
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 95
95 to 99
99 to 100
Percentiles of the average taxable income per city
Without controls
Controlling for the share of the pop. with no degree
Controlling for the share of the pop. with no degree and the population density
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_EL2017
1.pctnrfm2017	0.8592***
	(0.0782)
2.pctnrfm2017	0.5164***
	(0.0596)
3.pctnrfm2017	0.3983***
	(0.0513)
4.pctnrfm2017	0.2719***
	(0.0435)
5.pctnrfm2017	0.1581***
	(0.0424)
7.pctnrfm2017	-0.1146***
	(0.0337)
8.pctnrfm2017	-0.2156***
	(0.0389)
9.pctnrfm2017	-0.4350***
	(0.0507)
10.pctnrfm2017	-0.5750***
	(0.0839)
11.pctnrfm2017	-0.8125***
	(0.2231)
12.pctnrfm2017	-0.0736
	(0.5554)
N	34667

Standard errors in parentheses

Clustered at the departement level

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

O Marginal impact of net average taxable income on the central right

O.1 1993



	(1) zshare_CR1993
1.pctnrfm1993	-0.0148
	(0.1008)
2.pctnrfm1993	-0.0244
	(0.0865)
3.pctnrfm1993	-0.0256
	(0.0783)
4.pctnrfm1993	-0.0897
	(0.0718)
5.pctnrfm1993	-0.0468
	(0.0728)
7.pctnrfm1993	0.0140
	(0.0718)
8.pctnrfm1993	0.0034
	(0.0720)
9.pctnrfm1993	-0.1197
	(0.0918)
10.pctnrfm1993	-0.0284
	(0.1251)
11.pctnrfm1993	-0.1766
	(0.1644)
12.pctnrfm1993	-0.6934***
	(0.2375)
N	35940

Standard errors in parentheses

Clustered at the departement level

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

O.2 1997


Marginal effect of the net average income on the vote for the CR in 1997
(leg. T1 1997) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the net average income
Standard−deviation of the vote for the CR1997
.5
0
−.5
−1
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 95
95 to 99
99 to 100
Percentiles of the average net income per city
Without controls
Controlling for the share of the pop. with no degree
Controlling for share of the pop. with no degree and the population density
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_CR1997
1.pctnrfm1997	0.0107
	(0.0902)
2.pctnrfm1997	0.0223
	(0.0677)
3.pctnrfm1997	-0.0165
	(0.0720)
4.pctnrfm1997	-0.0054
	(0.0673)
5.pctnrfm1997	0.0379
	(0.0624)
7.pctnrfm1997	0.0828
	(0.0591)
8.pctnrfm1997	-0.0162
	(0.0618)
9.pctnrfm1997	-0.1025
	(0.0815)
10.pctnrfm1997	-0.0280
	(0.0977)
11.pctnrfm1997	-0.1792
	(0.1366)
12.pctnrfm1997	-0.5581**
	(0.2781)
N	35935

Standard errors in parentheses

Clustered at the departement level

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

O.3 2002


Marginal effect of the average taxable income on the vote for the CR in 2002
(leg. T1 2002) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the average taxable income
Standard−deviation of the vote for the CR2002
−.4
−.2
0
.2
.4
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 95
95 to 99
99 to 100
Percentiles of the average taxable income per city
Without controls
Controlling for the share of the pop. with no degree
Controlling for the share of the pop. with no degree and the population density
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_CR2002
1.pctnrfm2002	-0.1207
	(0.0754)
2.pctnrfm2002	-0.1091*
	(0.0631)
3.pctnrfm2002	-0.0714
	(0.0541)
4.pctnrfm2002	-0.0133
	(0.0598)
5.pctnrfm2002	-0.0358
	(0.0690)
7.pctnrfm2002	-0.0995**
	(0.0432)
8.pctnrfm2002	-0.0194
	(0.0588)
9.pctnrfm2002	-0.0338
	(0.0698)
10.pctnrfm2002	0.1026
	(0.0912)
11.pctnrfm2002	0.0710
	(0.1138)
12.pctnrfm2002	-0.0636
	(0.1709)
N	35872

Standard errors in parentheses
Clustered at the departement level
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

O.4 2007



Marginal effect of the average taxable income on the vote for the CR in 2007
(leg. T1 2007) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the average taxable income
Standard−deviation of the vote for the CR2007
−.4
−.2
0
.2
.4
.6
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 95
95 to 99
99 to 100
Percentiles of the average taxable income per city
Without controls
Controlling for the share of the pop. with no degree
Controlling for the share of the pop. with no degree and the population density
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_CR2007
1.pctnrfm2007	-0.1029
	(0.0876)
2.pctnrfm2007	-0.0583
	(0.0666)
3.pctnrfm2007	-0.0767
	(0.0666)
4.pctnrfm2007	-0.1002
	(0.0609)
5.pctnrfm2007	-0.0707
	(0.0484)
7.pctnrfm2007	-0.0778*
	(0.0467)
8.pctnrfm2007	-0.0591
	(0.0551)
9.pctnrfm2007	-0.0945*
	(0.0510)
10.pctnrfm2007	0.0091
	(0.0638)
11.pctnrfm2007	0.0884
	(0.1136)
12.pctnrfm2007	0.1247
	(0.1338)
N	35865

Standard errors in parentheses

Clustered at the departement level

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

O.5 2012


Marginal effect of the average taxable income on the vote for the CR in 2012
(leg. T1 2012) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the average taxable income
Standard−deviation of the vote for the CR2012
.4
.2
0
−.2
−.4
−.6
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 95
95 to 99
99 to 100
Percentiles of the average taxable income per city
Without controls
Controlling for the share of the pop. with no degree
Controlling for the share of the pop. with no degree and the population density
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_CR2012
1.pctnrfm2012	-0.1031
	(0.0920)
2.pctnrfm2012	-0.0888
	(0.0783)
3.pctnrfm2012	-0.0096
	(0.0749)
4.pctnrfm2012	-0.0469
	(0.0577)
5.pctnrfm2012	-0.0389
	(0.0504)
7.pctnrfm2012	-0.0027
	(0.0426)
8.pctnrfm2012	0.0335
	(0.0459)
9.pctnrfm2012	0.0084
	(0.0616)
10.pctnrfm2012	0.1534^{*}
	(0.0864)
11.pctnrfm2012	-0.0782
	(0.1159)
12.pctnrfm2012	-0.2329
	(0.1585)
N	34677

Standard errors in parentheses
Clustered at the departement level
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

O.6 2017


Marginal effect of the average taxable income on the vote for the CR in 2017
(leg. T1 2017) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the average taxable income
Standard−deviation of the vote for the CR2017
1
.5
0
−.5
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 95
95 to 99
99 to 100
Percentiles of the average taxable income per city
Without controls
Controlling for the share of the pop. with no degree
Controlling for the share of the pop. with no degree and the population density
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_CR2017
1.pctnrfm2017	-0.4568***
	(0.0753)
2.pctnrfm2017	-0.2314***
	(0.0756)
3.pctnrfm2017	-0.1961***
	(0.0652)
4.pctnrfm2017	-0.0853
	(0.0572)
5.pctnrfm2017	-0.0590
	(0.0411)
7.pctnrfm2017	0.0969*
	(0.0511)
8.pctnrfm2017	0.0957*
	(0.0540)
9.pctnrfm2017	0.2399***
	(0.0785)
10.pctnrfm2017	0.2383**
	(0.0937)
11.pctnrfm2017	0.2475
	(0.1572)
12.pctnrfm2017	0.1093
	(0.1674)
N	34667

Standard errors in parentheses
Clustered at the departement level
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

P Marginal impact of net average taxable income on the central left

P.1 1993



	(1) zshare_CL1993
1.pctnrfm1993	0.1270*
	(0.0750)
2.pctnrfm1993	0.1500*
	(0.0825)
3.pctnrfm1993	0.1341*
	(0.0678)
4.pctnrfm1993	0.1314*
	(0.0693)
5.pctnrfm1993	0.1524*
	(0.0908)
7.pctnrfm1993	0.0643
	(0.0536)
8.pctnrfm1993	0.1978*
	(0.1136)
9.pctnrfm1993	0.1594**
	(0.0777)
10.pctnrfm1993	0.0430
	(0.0820)
11.pctnrfm1993	0.0665
	(0.1875)
12.pctnrfm1993	-0.0606
	(0.2327)
N	35940

Standard errors in parentheses

Clustered at the departement level

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

P.2 1997



Marginal effect of the net average income on the vote for the CL in 1997
(leg. T1 1997) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the net average income
Standard−deviation of the vote for the CL1997
−.4
−.2
0
.2
.4
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 95
95 to 99
99 to 100
Percentiles of the average net income per city
Without controls
Controlling for the share of the pop. with no degree
Controlling for share of the pop. with no degree and the population density
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_CL1997
1.pctnrfm1997	0.0190
	(0.0713)
2.pctnrfm1997	-0.0018
	(0.0573)
3.pctnrfm1997	-0.0323
	(0.0525)
4.pctnrfm1997	0.0576
	(0.0567)
5.pctnrfm1997	0.0282
	(0.0866)
7.pctnrfm1997	-0.0153
	(0.0495)
8.pctnrfm1997	0.0733
	(0.0742)
9.pctnrfm1997	0.0632
	(0.0708)
10.pctnrfm1997	0.1044
	(0.1112)
11.pctnrfm1997	0.1123
	(0.1751)
12.pctnrfm1997	-0.0753
	(0.1865)
N	35935

Standard errors in parentheses

Clustered at the departement level

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

P.3 2002


Marginal effect of the average taxable income on the vote for the CL in 2002
(leg. T1 2002) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the average taxable income
Standard−deviation of the vote for the CL2002
−.2
0
.2
.4
.6
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 95
95 to 99
99 to 100
Percentiles of the average taxable income per city
Without controls
Controlling for the share of the pop. with no degree
Controlling for the share of the pop. with no degree and the population density
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_CL2002
1.pctnrfm2002	-0.0410
	(0.0621)
2.pctnrfm2002	-0.0041
	(0.0610)
3.pctnrfm2002	0.0019
	(0.0488)
4.pctnrfm2002	0.1152**
	(0.0515)
5.pctnrfm2002	0.0321
	(0.0382)
7.pctnrfm2002	0.0562
	(0.0458)
8.pctnrfm2002	0.0466
	(0.0514)
9.pctnrfm2002	0.0774
	(0.0587)
10.pctnrfm2002	0.0036
	(0.0886)
11.pctnrfm2002	0.1843
	(0.1412)
12.pctnrfm2002	0.1565
	(0.1635)
N	35872

Standard errors in parentheses
Clustered at the departement level
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

P.4 2007


Marginal effect of the average taxable income on the vote for the CL in 2007
(leg. T1 2007) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the average taxable income
Standard−deviation of the vote for the CL2007
−.2
−.1
0
.1
.2
.3
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 95
95 to 99
99 to 100
Percentiles of the average taxable income per city
Without controls
Controlling for the share of the pop. with no degree
Controlling for the share of the pop. with no degree and the population density
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_CL2007
1.pctnrfm2007	-0.0356
	(0.0601)
2.pctnrfm2007	0.0648
	(0.0629)
3.pctnrfm2007	0.0147
	(0.0448)
4.pctnrfm2007	0.0353
	(0.0418)
5.pctnrfm2007	0.0523
	(0.0493)
7.pctnrfm2007	0.0218
	(0.0301)
8.pctnrfm2007	-0.0254
	(0.0401)
9.pctnrfm2007	-0.0150
	(0.0392)
10.pctnrfm2007	-0.0224
	(0.0448)
11.pctnrfm2007	0.0850
	(0.0978)
12.pctnrfm2007	0.0220
	(0.0658)
N	35865

Standard errors in parentheses
Clustered at the departement level
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

P.5 2012


Marginal effect of the average taxable income on the vote for the CL in 2012
(leg. T1 2012) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the average taxable income
Standard−deviation of the vote for the CL2012
.2
0
−.2
−.4
−.6
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 95
95 to 99
99 to 100
Percentiles of the average taxable income per city
Without controls
Controlling for the share of the pop. with no degree
Controlling for the share of the pop. with no degree and the population density
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_CL2012
1.pctnrfm2012	-0.1011
	(0.0757)
2.pctnrfm2012	-0.0126
	(0.0657)
3.pctnrfm2012	-0.0237
	(0.0528)
4.pctnrfm2012	-0.0453
	(0.0537)
5.pctnrfm2012	-0.0251
	(0.0493)
7.pctnrfm2012	-0.0226
	(0.0425)
8.pctnrfm2012	0.0268
	(0.0654)
9.pctnrfm2012	-0.0857
	(0.0600)
10.pctnrfm2012	-0.1018
	(0.0937)
11.pctnrfm2012	-0.1302
	(0.0900)
12.pctnrfm2012	-0.1680
	(0.1986)
N	34677

Standard errors in parentheses

Clustered at the departement level

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

P.6 2017


Marginal effect of the average taxable income on the vote for the CL in 2017
(leg. T1 2017) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the average taxable income
Standard−deviation of the vote for the CL2017
−.1
0
.1
.2
.3
.4
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 95
95 to 99
99 to 100
Percentiles of the average taxable income per city
Without controls
Controlling for the share of the pop. with no degree
Controlling for the share of the pop. with no degree and the population density
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_CL2017
1.pctnrfm2017	0.0304
	(0.0520)
2.pctnrfm2017	0.1206^{*}
	(0.0654)
3.pctnrfm2017	0.1402^{**}
	(0.0633)
4.pctnrfm2017	0.0713^{*}
	(0.0401)
5.pctnrfm2017	0.0466^{*}
	(0.0246)
7.pctnrfm2017	0.0479
	(0.0339)
8.pctnrfm2017	0.0475
	(0.0449)
9.pctnrfm2017	0.0412
	(0.0488)
10.pctnrfm2017	0.0894
	(0.0613)
11.pctnrfm2017	0.1811^{**}
	(0.0851)
12.pctnrfm2017	0.1465^{*}
	(0.0823)
N	34667

Standard errors in parentheses
Clustered at the departement level
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Q Marginal impact of net average taxable income on the right

Q.1 1993



	(1) zshare_right1993
1.pctnrfm1993	-0.5393***
	(0.1208)
2.pctnrfm1993	-0.4347***
	(0.0743)
3.pctnrfm1993	-0.2933***
	(0.0701)
4.pctnrfm1993	-0.2233***
	(0.0685)
5.pctnrfm1993	-0.1439**
	(0.0667)
7.pctnrfm1993	0.0884
	(0.0616)
8.pctnrfm1993	0.1599***
	(0.0548)
9.pctnrfm1993	0.4142***
	(0.0621)
10.pctnrfm1993	0.5043***
	(0.0787)
11.pctnrfm1993	0.5886***
	(0.1323)
12.pctnrfm1993	0.5970
	(0.3830)
N	35940

Standard errors in parentheses

Clustered at the departement level

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Q.2 1997


Marginal effect of the net average income on the vote for the right in 1997
(leg. T1 1997) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the net average income
Standard−deviation of the vote for the right1997
−1
−.5
0
.5
1
1.5
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 95
95 to 99
99 to 100
Percentiles of the average net income per city
Without controls
Controlling for the share of the pop. with no degree
Controlling for share of the pop. with no degree and the population density
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_right1997
1.pctnrfm1997	-0.5623***
	(0.1083)
2.pctnrfm1997	-0.3776***
	(0.0675)
3.pctnrfm1997	-0.2888***
	(0.0671)
4.pctnrfm1997	-0.1953***
	(0.0523)
5.pctnrfm1997	-0.1404***
	(0.0462)
7.pctnrfm1997	0.1314**
	(0.0530)
8.pctnrfm1997	0.2221***
	(0.0383)
9.pctnrfm1997	0.3988***
	(0.0638)
10.pctnrfm1997	0.6120***
	(0.0895)
11.pctnrfm1997	0.7375***
	(0.1199)
12.pctnrfm1997	0.3522
	(0.6034)
N	35935

Standard errors in parentheses

Clustered at the departement level

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Q.3 2002



Marginal effect of the average taxable income on the vote for the right in 2002
(leg. T1 2002) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the average taxable income
Standard−deviation of the vote for the right2002
−1
−.5
0
.5
1
1.5
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 95
95 to 99
99 to 100
Percentiles of the average taxable income per city
Without controls
Controlling for the share of the pop. with no degree
Controlling for the share of the pop. with no degree and the population density
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_right2002
1.pctnrfm2002	-0.7220***
	(0.0884)
2.pctnrfm2002	-0.4724***
	(0.0640)
3.pctnrfm2002	-0.3155***
	(0.0562)
4.pctnrfm2002	-0.2365***
	(0.0552)
5.pctnrfm2002	-0.1993***
	(0.0505)
7.pctnrfm2002	0.0840
	(0.0597)
8.pctnrfm2002	0.2674***
	(0.0499)
9.pctnrfm2002	0.4536***
	(0.0670)
10.pctnrfm2002	0.6481***
	(0.0829)
11.pctnrfm2002	0.7764***
	(0.1206)
12.pctnrfm2002	0.7969**
	(0.3150)
N	35872

Standard errors in parentheses

Clustered at the departement level

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Q.4 2007


Marginal effect of the average taxable income on the vote for the right in 2007
(leg. T1 2007) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the average taxable income
Standard−deviation of the vote for the right2007
−1
−.5
0
.5
1
1.5
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 95
95 to 99
99 to 100
Percentiles of the average taxable income per city
Without controls
Controlling for the share of the pop. with no degree
Controlling for the share of the pop. with no degree and the population density
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_right2007
1.pctnrfm2007	-0.8360***
	(0.0829)
2.pctnrfm2007	-0.4746***
	(0.0632)
3.pctnrfm2007	-0.3550***
	(0.0598)
4.pctnrfm2007	-0.3104***
	(0.0537)
5.pctnrfm2007	-0.1200**
	(0.0518)
7.pctnrfm2007	0.2175***
	(0.0525)
8.pctnrfm2007	0.3694***
	(0.0460)
9.pctnrfm2007	0.5620***
	(0.0605)
10.pctnrfm2007	0.8627***
	(0.0777)
11.pctnrfm2007	1.0519***
	(0.1038)
12.pctnrfm2007	1.3687***
	(0.1417)
N	35865

Standard errors in parentheses

Clustered at the departement level

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Q.5 2012


Marginal effect of the average taxable income on the vote for the right in 2012
(leg. T1 2012) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the average taxable income
Standard−deviation of the vote for the right2012
−1
0
1
2
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 95
95 to 99
99 to 100
Percentiles of the average taxable income per city
Without controls
Controlling for the share of the pop. with no degree
Controlling for the share of the pop. with no degree and the population density
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_right2012
1.pctnrfm2012	-0.8368***
	(0.0715)
2.pctnrfm2012	-0.5471***
	(0.0680)
3.pctnrfm2012	-0.4249***
	(0.0678)
4.pctnrfm2012	-0.3251***
	(0.0521)
5.pctnrfm2012	-0.1581***
	(0.0498)
7.pctnrfm2012	0.2326***
	(0.0451)
8.pctnrfm2012	0.3790***
	(0.0504)
9.pctnrfm2012	0.6197***
	(0.0731)
10.pctnrfm2012	0.9034***
	(0.0984)
11.pctnrfm2012	1.0555***
	(0.2909)
12.pctnrfm2012	0.4790
	(0.6692)
N	34677

Standard errors in parentheses
Clustered at the departement level
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

Q.6 2017


Marginal effect of the average taxable income on the vote for the right in 2017
(leg. T1 2017) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the average taxable income
Standard−deviation of the vote for the right2017
−1
−.5
0
.5
1
1.5
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 95
95 to 99
99 to 100
Percentiles of the average taxable income per city
Without controls
Controlling for the share of the pop. with no degree
Controlling for the share of the pop. with no degree and the population density
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_right2017
1.pctnrfm2017	-0.7989***
	(0.0650)
2.pctnrfm2017	-0.5861***
	(0.0634)
3.pctnrfm2017	-0.4780***
	(0.0550)
4.pctnrfm2017	-0.3664***
	(0.0504)
5.pctnrfm2017	-0.2294***
	(0.0385)
7.pctnrfm2017	0.1201***
	(0.0413)
8.pctnrfm2017	0.2315***
	(0.0469)
9.pctnrfm2017	0.4739***
	(0.0628)
10.pctnrfm2017	0.6436***
	(0.0866)
11.pctnrfm2017	0.8943***
	(0.2008)
12.pctnrfm2017	0.0847
	(0.6195)
N	34667

Standard errors in parentheses
Clustered at the departement level
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

R Marginal impact of net average taxable income on the left

R.1 1993



	(1) zshare_left1993
1.pctnrfm1993	0.4449^{***}
	(0.1173)
2.pctnrfm1993	0.3628^{***}
	(0.0727)
3.pctnrfm1993	0.2401^{***}
	(0.0675)
4.pctnrfm1993	0.1657^{***}
	(0.0574)
5.pctnrfm1993	0.1019^{*}
	(0.0525)
7.pctnrfm1993	-0.0843
	(0.0584)
8.pctnrfm1993	-0.1767^{***}
	(0.0543)
9.pctnrfm1993	-0.3839^{***}
	(0.0624)
10.pctnrfm1993	-0.4624^{***}
	(0.0742)
11.pctnrfm1993	-0.5914^{***}
	(0.0988)
12.pctnrfm1993	-0.5583
	(0.3494)
N	35940

Standard errors in parentheses

Clustered at the departement level

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

R.2 1997


Marginal effect of the net average income on the vote for the left in 1997
(leg. T1 1997) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the net average income
Standard−deviation of the vote for the left1997
1
.5
0
−.5
−1
−1.5
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 95
95 to 99
99 to 100
Percentiles of the average net income per city
Without controls
Controlling for the share of the pop. with no degree
Controlling for share of the pop. with no degree and the population density
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_left1997
1.pctnrfm1997	0.5185***
	(0.1081)
2.pctnrfm1997	0.3529***
	(0.0661)
3.pctnrfm1997	0.2684***
	(0.0665)
4.pctnrfm1997	0.1816***
	(0.0523)
5.pctnrfm1997	0.1392***
	(0.0452)
7.pctnrfm1997	-0.1444***
	(0.0537)
8.pctnrfm1997	-0.2370***
	(0.0431)
9.pctnrfm1997	-0.3893***
	(0.0622)
10.pctnrfm1997	-0.5527***
	(0.0810)
11.pctnrfm1997	-0.6833***
	(0.1092)
12.pctnrfm1997	-0.2715
	(0.5951)
N	35935

Standard errors in parentheses

Clustered at the departement level

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

R.3 2002


Marginal effect of the average taxable income on the vote for the left in 2002
(leg. T1 2002) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the average taxable income
Standard−deviation of the vote for the left2002
1
.5
0
−.5
−1
−1.5
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 95
95 to 99
99 to 100
Percentiles of the average taxable income per city
Without controls
Controlling for the share of the pop. with no degree
Controlling for the share of the pop. with no degree and the population density
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_left2002
1.pctnrfm2002	0.6678^{***}
	(0.0949)
2.pctnrfm2002	0.4318^{***}
	(0.0676)
3.pctnrfm2002	0.2902^{***}
	(0.0591)
4.pctnrfm2002	0.2274^{***}
	(0.0563)
5.pctnrfm2002	0.1926^{***}
	(0.0512)
7.pctnrfm2002	-0.0835
	(0.0635)
8.pctnrfm2002	-0.2503^{***}
	(0.0512)
9.pctnrfm2002	-0.4317^{***}
	(0.0721)
10.pctnrfm2002	-0.6212^{***}
	(0.0906)
11.pctnrfm2002	-0.7862^{***}
	(0.1292)
12.pctnrfm2002	-0.8513^{**}
	(0.3345)
N	35872

Standard errors in parentheses
Clustered at the departement level
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

R.4 2007


Marginal effect of the average taxable income on the vote for the left in 2007
(leg. T1 2007) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the average taxable income
Standard−deviation of the vote for the left2007
1
0
−1
−2
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 95
95 to 99
99 to 100
Percentiles of the average taxable income per city
Without controls
Controlling for the share of the pop. with no degree
Controlling for the share of the pop. with no degree and the population density
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_left2007
1.pctnrfm2007	0.7959***
	(0.0840)
2.pctnrfm2007	0.4578***
	(0.0659)
3.pctnrfm2007	0.3411***
	(0.0615)
4.pctnrfm2007	0.3136***
	(0.0532)
5.pctnrfm2007	0.1143**
	(0.0554)
7.pctnrfm2007	-0.2252***
	(0.0546)
8.pctnrfm2007	-0.3604***
	(0.0468)
9.pctnrfm2007	-0.5403***
	(0.0622)
10.pctnrfm2007	-0.8213***
	(0.0823)
11.pctnrfm2007	-1.0130***
	(0.1064)
12.pctnrfm2007	-1.4279***
	(0.1679)
N	35865

Standard errors in parentheses

Clustered at the departement level

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

R.5 2012


Marginal effect of the average taxable income on the vote for the left in 2012
(leg. T1 2012) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the average taxable income
Standard−deviation of the vote for the left2012
1
0
−1
−2
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 95
95 to 99
99 to 100
Percentiles of the average taxable income per city
Without controls
Controlling for the share of the pop. with no degree
Controlling for the share of the pop. with no degree and the population density
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_left2012
1.pctnrfm2012	0.8386***
	(0.0733)
2.pctnrfm2012	0.5265***
	(0.0673)
3.pctnrfm2012	0.4218***
	(0.0680)
4.pctnrfm2012	0.3110***
	(0.0515)
5.pctnrfm2012	0.1592***
	(0.0459)
7.pctnrfm2012	-0.2380***
	(0.0475)
8.pctnrfm2012	-0.3507***
	(0.0474)
9.pctnrfm2012	-0.5793***
	(0.0702)
10.pctnrfm2012	-0.8552***
	(0.0909)
11.pctnrfm2012	-0.9947***
	(0.2888)
12.pctnrfm2012	-0.4273
	(0.6568)
N	34677

Standard errors in parentheses
Clustered at the departement level
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

R.6 2017


Marginal effect of the average taxable income on the vote for the left in 2017
(leg. T1 2017) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the average taxable income
Standard−deviation of the vote for the left2017
−1.5
−1
−.5
0
.5
1
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 95
95 to 99
99 to 100
Percentiles of the average taxable income per city
Without controls
Controlling for the share of the pop. with no degree
Controlling for the share of the pop. with no degree and the population density
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_left2017
1.pctnrfm2017	0.7960*** (0.0641)
2.pctnrfm2017	0.5913*** (0.0595)
3.pctnrfm2017	0.4751*** (0.0562)
4.pctnrfm2017	0.3365*** (0.0505)
5.pctnrfm2017	0.2093*** (0.0411)
7.pctnrfm2017	-0.1352*** (0.0449)
8.pctnrfm2017	-0.2541*** (0.0471)
9.pctnrfm2017	-0.4998*** (0.0682)
10.pctnrfm2017	-0.6695*** (0.0951)
11.pctnrfm2017	-0.9297*** (0.2074)
12.pctnrfm2017	-0.0835 (0.6257)
N	34667

Standard errors in parentheses
Clustered at the departement level
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

R.7 At the canton level

S Marginal impact of share of university graduates on the right

S.1 1968



	(1) zshare_right1968
1.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1968	0.2284**
	(0.1008)
2.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1968	0.1928
	(0.1212)
3.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1968	0.0820
	(0.0990)
4.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1968	0.0184
	(0.1087)
5.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1968	-0.0594
	(0.0738)
7.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1968	-0.0172
	(0.0881)
8.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1968	0.0584
	(0.0955)
9.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1968	-0.1270
	(0.1336)
10.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1968	0.0408
	(0.1506)
11.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1968	-0.0495
	(0.2294)
12.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1968	-0.0848
	(0.2308)
N	2989

Standard errors in parentheses

Clustered at the departement level

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

S.2 1973



Marginal effect of share of the population with an university degree on the vote for the right in 1973
(leg. T1 1973) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the share of the population with an university degree
Standard−deviation of the vote for the right in 1973
−1
−.5
0
.5
1
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 95
95 to 99
99 to 100
Percentiles of the share of the population with an university degree per canton
Without controls
Controlling for the population density
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_right1973
1.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1973	0.3043***
	(0.0955)
2.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1973	0.1275
	(0.1212)
3.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1973	0.1597*
	(0.0839)
4.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1973	0.0253
	(0.0627)
5.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1973	-0.0997
	(0.0856)
7.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1973	0.0152
	(0.1002)
8.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1973	-0.1623
	(0.1173)
9.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1973	0.0258
	(0.1215)
10.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1973	-0.0271
	(0.1772)
11.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1973	0.0209
	(0.2210)
12.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1973	-0.1534
	(0.2790)
N	2985

Standard errors in parentheses

Clustered at the departement level

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

S.3 1978



Marginal effect of share of the population with an university degree on the vote for the right in 1978
(leg. T1 1978) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the share of the population with an university degree
Standard−deviation of the vote for the right in 1978
−.5
0
.5
1
1.5
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 95
95 to 99
99 to 100
Percentiles of the share of the population with an university degree per canton
Without controls
Controlling for the population density
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_right1978
1.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1978	0.2190
	(0.1345)
2.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1978	0.0238
	(0.1321)
3.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1978	-0.0690
	(0.1216)
4.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1978	-0.0024
	(0.0957)
5.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1978	-0.0639
	(0.1015)
7.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1978	0.1034
	(0.0969)
8.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1978	0.0096
	(0.0927)
9.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1978	0.0381
	(0.0980)
10.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1978	0.2439^{*}
	(0.1440)
11.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1978	0.3125^{*}
	(0.1648)
12.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1978	0.5769^{*}
	(0.3221)
N	3120

Standard errors in parentheses

Clustered at the departement level

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

S.4 1981


Marginal effect of share of the population with an university degree on the vote for the right in 1981
(leg. T1 1981) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the share of the population with an university degree
Standard−deviation of the vote for the right in 1981
−.5
0
.5
1
1.5
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 95
95 to 99
99 to 100
Percentiles of the share of the population with an university degree per canton
Without controls
Controlling for the population density
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_right1981
1.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1981	0.1468 (0.1134)
2.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1981	0.0033 (0.1293)
3.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1981	-0.0463 (0.1322)
4.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1981	-0.0938 (0.0967)
5.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1981	-0.0686 (0.1086)
7.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1981	0.0402 (0.1233)
8.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1981	0.0380 (0.1226)
9.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1981	-0.0475 (0.1148)
10.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1981	0.2609 (0.1777)
11.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1981	0.4247** (0.1972)
12.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1981	1.0107*** (0.3038)
N	3198

Standard errors in parentheses
Clustered at the departement level
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

S.5 1986


Marginal effect of share of the population with an university degree on the vote for the right in 1986
(leg. T1 1986) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the share of the population with an university degree
Standard−deviation of the vote for the right in 1986
−.5
0
.5
1
1.5
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 95
95 to 99
99 to 100
Percentiles of the share of the population with an university degree per canton
Without controls
Controlling for the population density
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_right1986
1.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1986	0.0687
	(0.1681)
2.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1986	0.0175
	(0.1286)
3.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1986	0.1313
	(0.1216)
4.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1986	0.0802
	(0.1002)
5.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1986	0.0515
	(0.0949)
7.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1986	0.2229**
	(0.0895)
8.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1986	0.2514***
	(0.0809)
9.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1986	0.2531**
	(0.0996)
10.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1986	0.5608***
	(0.1417)
11.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1986	0.6991***
	(0.1752)
12.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1986	1.0604***
	(0.2835)
N	3436

Standard errors in parentheses

Clustered at the departement level

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

S.6 1988


Marginal effect of share of the population with an university degree on the vote for the right in 1988
(leg. T1 1988) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the share of the population with an university degree
Standard−deviation of the vote for the right in 1988
−.5
0
.5
1
1.5
2
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 95
95 to 99
99 to 100
Percentiles of the share of the population with an university degree per canton
Without controls
Controlling for the population density
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_right1988
1.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1988	-0.0714
	(0.1486)
2.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1988	-0.1238
	(0.1281)
3.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1988	-0.0110
	(0.0949)
4.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1988	-0.0567
	(0.0905)
5.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1988	0.0521
	(0.1053)
7.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1988	0.1390
	(0.1057)
8.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1988	0.2604**
	(0.1154)
9.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1988	0.2740**
	(0.1244)
10.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1988	0.5871***
	(0.1596)
11.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1988	0.7797***
	(0.2089)
12.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1988	1.1131***
	(0.3724)
N	3404

Standard errors in parentheses

Clustered at the departement level

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

S.7 1993


Marginal effect of share of the population with an university degree on the vote for the right in 1993
(leg. T1 1993) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the share of the population with an university degree
Standard−deviation of the vote for the right in 1993
−.5
0
.5
1
1.5
2
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 95
95 to 99
99 to 100
Percentiles of the share of the population with an university degree per canton
Without controls
Controlling for the population density
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_right1993
1.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1993	-0.2746*
	(0.1628)
2.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1993	-0.0268
	(0.1247)
3.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1993	-0.1612
	(0.1108)
4.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1993	-0.1611*
	(0.0936)
5.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1993	0.0215
	(0.0985)
7.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1993	0.1505
	(0.0945)
8.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1993	0.2440***
	(0.0925)
9.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1993	0.3979***
	(0.1163)
10.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1993	0.6267***
	(0.1532)
11.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1993	0.8287***
	(0.2035)
12.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1993	1.1476***
	(0.3140)
N	3477

Standard errors in parentheses

Clustered at the departement level

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

S.8 1997


Marginal effect of share of the population with an university degree on the vote for the right in 1997
(leg. T1 1997) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the share of the population with an university degree
Standard−deviation of the vote for the right in 1997
−.5
0
.5
1
1.5
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 95
95 to 99
99 to 100
Percentiles of the share of the population with an university degree per canton
Without controls
Controlling for the population density
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_right1997
1.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1997	-0.1998 (0.1435)
2.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1997	-0.1194 (0.1371)
3.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1997	-0.2361* (0.1216)
4.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1997	-0.1938* (0.1124)
5.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1997	-0.1571* (0.0885)
7.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1997	-0.0259 (0.0803)
8.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1997	0.1468 (0.0886)
9.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1997	0.2728** (0.1049)
10.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1997	0.4892*** (0.1520)
11.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1997	0.6187*** (0.1756)
12.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1997	0.9245*** (0.3373)
N	3480

Standard errors in parentheses

Clustered at the departement level

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

S.9 2002


Marginal effect of the share of the population with an university degree on the vote for the right in 2002
(leg. T1 2002) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the share of the population with an university degree
Standard−deviation of the vote for the right in 2002
−1
−.5
0
.5
1
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 95
95 to 99
99 to 100
Percentiles of the share of the population with an university degree per canton
Without controls
Controlling for the population density
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_right2002
1.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2002	0.0039
	(0.1616)
2.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2002	0.0824
	(0.1162)
3.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2002	0.0385
	(0.0967)
4.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2002	-0.0202
	(0.1008)
5.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2002	0.1308*
	(0.0723)
7.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2002	0.0774
	(0.0866)
8.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2002	0.1663*
	(0.0965)
9.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2002	0.0901
	(0.1291)
10.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2002	0.0492
	(0.2053)
11.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2002	-0.2608
	(0.2737)
12.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2002	-0.2337
	(0.2523)
N	3490

Standard errors in parentheses

Clustered at the departement level

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

S.10 2007


Marginal effect of the share of the population with an university degree on the vote for the right in 2007
(leg. T1 2007) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the share of the population with an university degree
Standard−deviation of the vote for the right in 2007
−1
−.5
0
.5
1
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 95
95 to 99
99 to 100
Percentiles of the share of the population with an university degree per canton
Without controls
Controlling for the population density
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_right2007
1.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2007	0.0783
	(0.1497)
2.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2007	0.1624
	(0.1303)
3.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2007	0.0513
	(0.0962)
4.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2007	-0.0347
	(0.1057)
5.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2007	0.0522
	(0.0942)
7.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2007	0.1563
	(0.1005)
8.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2007	0.1330
	(0.0938)
9.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2007	0.0213
	(0.1373)
10.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2007	-0.0213
	(0.2071)
11.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2007	-0.3418
	(0.2514)
12.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2007	-0.0641
	(0.2852)
N	3472

Standard errors in parentheses

Clustered at the departement level

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

S.11 2012


Marginal effect of the share of the population with an university degree on the vote for the right in 2012
(leg. T1 2012) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the share of the population with an university degree
Standard−deviation of the vote for the right in 2012
1
0
−1
−2
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 95
95 to 99
99 to 100
Percentiles of the share of the population with an university degree per canton
Without controls
Controlling for the population density
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_right2012
1.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2012	0.5582*** (0.1472)
2.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2012	0.3309** (0.1279)
3.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2012	0.2619** (0.0998)
4.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2012	0.1559 (0.1001)
5.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2012	0.1497** (0.0724)
7.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2012	-0.0132 (0.0747)
8.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2012	-0.0049 (0.0953)
9.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2012	-0.3520** (0.1379)
10.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2012	-0.5421*** (0.1985)
11.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2012	-1.1094*** (0.2667)
12.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2012	-1.2764*** (0.3006)
N	3491

Standard errors in parentheses
Clustered at the departement level
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

S.12 2017


Marginal effect of the share of the population with an university degree on the vote for the right in 2017
(leg. T1 2017) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the share of the population with an university degree
Standard−deviation of the vote for the right in 2017
.5
0
−.5
−1
−1.5
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 95
95 to 99
99 to 100
Percentiles of the share of the population with an university degree per canton
Without controls
Controlling for the population density
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_right2017
1.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2017	0.3665**
	(0.1738)
2.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2017	0.2527
	(0.1569)
3.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2017	0.2650*
	(0.1428)
4.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2017	0.2190*
	(0.1257)
5.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2017	0.1378
	(0.1426)
7.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2017	0.1364
	(0.1211)
8.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2017	0.0711
	(0.1111)
9.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2017	-0.0411
	(0.1164)
10.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2017	-0.3886*
	(0.2113)
11.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2017	-0.5758***
	(0.2191)
12.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2017	-0.5424
	(0.3507)
N	1873

Standard errors in parentheses

Clustered at the departement level

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

T Marginal impact of share of university graduates on the left

T.1 1968



	(1) zshare_left1968
1.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1968	-0.2250**
	(0.1025)
2.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1968	-0.1865
	(0.1217)
3.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1968	-0.0854
	(0.1008)
4.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1968	-0.0170
	(0.1087)
5.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1968	0.0666
	(0.0744)
7.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1968	-0.0273
	(0.0763)
8.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1968	-0.0828
	(0.0934)
9.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1968	0.0748
	(0.1329)
10.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1968	-0.0502
	(0.1517)
11.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1968	0.0160
	(0.2302)
12.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1968	-0.0859
	(0.2404)
N	2989

Standard errors in parentheses
Clustered at the departement level
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

T.2 1973


Marginal effect of share of the population with an university degree on the vote for the left in 1973
(leg. T1 1973) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the share of the population with an university degree
Standard−deviation of the vote for the left in 1973
−1
−.5
0
.5
1
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 95
95 to 99
99 to 100
Percentiles of the share of the population with an university degree per canton
Without controls
Controlling for the population density
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_left1973
1.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1973	-0.2999*** (0.0956)
2.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1973	-0.1266 (0.1203)
3.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1973	-0.1562* (0.0843)
4.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1973	-0.0184 (0.0627)
5.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1973	0.1049 (0.0856)
7.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1973	-0.0085 (0.1007)
8.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1973	0.1620 (0.1180)
9.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1973	-0.0102 (0.1220)
10.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1973	0.0337 (0.1773)
11.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1973	-0.0024 (0.2213)
12.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1973	0.1535 (0.2801)
N	2985

Standard errors in parentheses

Clustered at the departement level

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

T.3 1978


Marginal effect of share of the population with an university degree on the vote for the left in 1978
(leg. T1 1978) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the share of the population with an university degree
Standard−deviation of the vote for the left in 1978
.5
0
−.5
−1
−1.5
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 95
95 to 99
99 to 100
Percentiles of the share of the population with an university degree per canton
Without controls
Controlling for the population density
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_left1978
1.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1978	-0.2251*
	(0.1307)
2.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1978	-0.0450
	(0.1299)
3.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1978	0.0691
	(0.1210)
4.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1978	0.0119
	(0.0958)
5.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1978	0.0691
	(0.1010)
7.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1978	-0.0827
	(0.0973)
8.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1978	0.0203
	(0.0925)
9.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1978	-0.0364
	(0.0969)
10.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1978	-0.2502*
	(0.1422)
11.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1978	-0.2911*
	(0.1651)
12.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1978	-0.6393**
	(0.3164)
N	3120

Standard errors in parentheses
Clustered at the departement level
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

T.4 1981


Marginal effect of share of the population with an university degree on the vote for the left in 1981
(leg. T1 1981) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the share of the population with an university degree
Standard−deviation of the vote for the left in 1981
.5
0
−.5
−1
−1.5
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 95
95 to 99
99 to 100
Percentiles of the share of the population with an university degree per canton
Without controls
Controlling for the population density
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_left1981
1.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1981	-0.1565
	(0.1136)
2.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1981	-0.0105
	(0.1298)
3.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1981	0.0357
	(0.1332)
4.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1981	0.0846
	(0.0966)
5.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1981	0.0659
	(0.1088)
7.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1981	-0.0448
	(0.1224)
8.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1981	-0.0379
	(0.1217)
9.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1981	0.0437
	(0.1143)
10.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1981	-0.2610
	(0.1779)
11.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1981	-0.4140**
	(0.1949)
12.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1981	-1.0164***
	(0.3005)
N	3198

Standard errors in parentheses

Clustered at the departement level

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

T.5 1986


Marginal effect of share of the population with an university degree on the vote for the left in 1986
(leg. T1 1986) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the share of the population with an university degree
Standard−deviation of the vote for the left in 1986
.5
0
−.5
−1
−1.5
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 95
95 to 99
99 to 100
Percentiles of the share of the population with an university degree per canton
Without controls
Controlling for the population density
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_left1986
1.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1986	-0.0655
	(0.1683)
2.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1986	-0.0048
	(0.1299)
3.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1986	-0.1240
	(0.1210)
4.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1986	-0.0767
	(0.0997)
5.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1986	-0.0512
	(0.0937)
7.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1986	-0.2244**
	(0.0913)
8.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1986	-0.2444***
	(0.0800)
9.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1986	-0.2517**
	(0.0990)
10.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1986	-0.5449***
	(0.1413)
11.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1986	-0.6740***
	(0.1724)
12.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1986	-1.0412***
	(0.2812)
N	3436

Standard errors in parentheses

Clustered at the departement level

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

T.6 1988


Marginal effect of share of the population with an university degree on the vote for the left in 1988
(leg. T1 1988) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the share of the population with an university degree
Standard−deviation of the vote for the left in 1988
.5
0
−.5
−1
−1.5
−2
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 95
95 to 99
99 to 100
Percentiles of the share of the population with an university degree per canton
Without controls
Controlling for the population density
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_left1988
1.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1988	0.0773
	(0.1488)
2.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1988	0.1291
	(0.1282)
3.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1988	0.0254
	(0.0952)
4.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1988	0.0682
	(0.0905)
5.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1988	-0.0380
	(0.1048)
7.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1988	-0.1255
	(0.1078)
8.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1988	-0.2479**
	(0.1163)
9.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1988	-0.2659**
	(0.1248)
10.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1988	-0.5700***
	(0.1610)
11.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1988	-0.7659***
	(0.2115)
12.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1988	-1.0630***
	(0.3749)
N	3404

Standard errors in parentheses
Clustered at the departement level
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

T.7 1993


Marginal effect of share of the population with an university degree on the vote for the left in 1993
(leg. T1 1993) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the share of the population with an university degree
Standard−deviation of the vote for the left in 1993
.5
0
−.5
−1
−1.5
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 95
95 to 99
99 to 100
Percentiles of the share of the population with an university degree per canton
Without controls
Controlling for the population density
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_left1993
1.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1993	0.2090
	(0.1657)
2.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1993	-0.0096
	(0.1332)
3.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1993	0.0480
	(0.1145)
4.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1993	0.1041
	(0.1049)
5.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1993	-0.1022
	(0.1001)
7.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1993	-0.1455
	(0.0923)
8.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1993	-0.2209***
	(0.0839)
9.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1993	-0.3584***
	(0.1109)
10.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1993	-0.5351***
	(0.1556)
11.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1993	-0.6880***
	(0.2005)
12.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1993	-0.9860***
	(0.2969)
N	3477

Standard errors in parentheses

Clustered at the departement level

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

T.8 1997



Marginal effect of share of the population with an university degree on the vote for the left in 1997
(leg. T1 1997) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the share of the population with an university degree
Standard−deviation of the vote for the left in 1997
−1.5
−1
−.5
0
.5
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 95
95 to 99
99 to 100
Percentiles of the share of the population with an university degree per canton
Without controls
Controlling for the population density
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_left1997
1.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1997	0.2085
	(0.1421)
2.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1997	0.1388
	(0.1342)
3.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1997	0.2188^{*}
	(0.1211)
4.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1997	0.1730
	(0.1158)
5.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1997	0.1246
	(0.0895)
7.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1997	-0.0185
	(0.0777)
8.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1997	-0.2158^{**}
	(0.0963)
9.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1997	-0.3098^{***}
	(0.1009)
10.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1997	-0.5114^{***}
	(0.1417)
11.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1997	-0.6609^{***}
	(0.1696)
12.pctnrshare_nber_higherd1997	-0.8355^{**}
	(0.3320)
N	3480

Standard errors in parentheses

Clustered at the departement level

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

T.9 2002


Marginal effect of the share of the population with an university degree on the vote for the left in 2002
(leg. T1 2002) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the share of the population with an university degree
Standard−deviation of the vote for the left in 2002
1
.5
0
−.5
−1
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 95
95 to 99
99 to 100
Percentiles of the share of the population with an university degree per canton
Without controls
Controlling for the population density
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_left2002
1.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2002	-0.0204
	(0.1555)
2.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2002	-0.0846
	(0.1163)
3.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2002	-0.0309
	(0.1048)
4.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2002	0.0136
	(0.0976)
5.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2002	-0.1130
	(0.0725)
7.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2002	-0.0894
	(0.0859)
8.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2002	-0.1685*
	(0.0959)
9.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2002	-0.0168
	(0.1372)
10.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2002	0.0080
	(0.2085)
11.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2002	0.3639
	(0.2943)
12.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2002	0.2669
	(0.2850)
N	3490

Standard errors in parentheses

Clustered at the departement level

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

T.10 2007


Marginal effect of the share of the population with an university degree on the vote for the left in 2007
(leg. T1 2007) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the share of the population with an university degree
Standard−deviation of the vote for the left in 2007
−1
−.5
0
.5
1
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 95
95 to 99
99 to 100
Percentiles of the share of the population with an university degree per canton
Without controls
Controlling for the population density
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_left2007
1.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2007	-0.1296
	(0.1529)
2.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2007	-0.1952
	(0.1314)
3.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2007	-0.0819
	(0.0996)
4.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2007	-0.0150
	(0.0985)
5.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2007	-0.0821
	(0.0882)
7.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2007	-0.1454
	(0.1000)
8.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2007	-0.1298
	(0.0921)
9.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2007	0.0103
	(0.1364)
10.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2007	0.0712
	(0.2098)
11.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2007	0.3883
	(0.2455)
12.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2007	0.1082
	(0.2862)
N	3472

Standard errors in parentheses
Clustered at the departement level
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

T.11 2012


Marginal effect of the share of the population with an university degree on the vote for the left in 2012
(leg. T1 2012) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the share of the population with an university degree
Standard−deviation of the vote for the left in 2012
−.5
0
.5
1
1.5
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 95
95 to 99
99 to 100
Percentiles of the share of the population with an university degree per canton
Without controls
Controlling for the population density
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_left2012
1.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2012	-0.3974**
	(0.1604)
2.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2012	-0.2781**
	(0.1340)
3.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2012	-0.1642
	(0.1094)
4.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2012	-0.0801
	(0.1056)
5.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2012	-0.1235
	(0.0771)
7.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2012	-0.0948
	(0.0993)
8.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2012	-0.0559
	(0.0974)
9.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2012	0.2299
	(0.1421)
10.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2012	0.3400*
	(0.2002)
11.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2012	0.8617***
	(0.2861)
12.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2012	1.0599***
	(0.2917)
N	3491

Standard errors in parentheses

Clustered at the departement level

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

T.12 2017


Marginal effect of the share of the population with an university degree on the vote for the left in 2017
(leg. T1 2017) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the share of the population with an university degree
Standard−deviation of the vote for the left in 2017
−.5
0
.5
1
1.5
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 95
95 to 99
99 to 100
Percentiles of the share of the population with an university degree per canton
Without controls
Controlling for the population density
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1)
	zshare_left2017
1.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2017	-0.2336
	(0.1779)
2.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2017	-0.1392
	(0.1734)
3.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2017	-0.1706
	(0.1525)
4.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2017	-0.1720
	(0.1266)
5.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2017	-0.0747
	(0.1541)
7.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2017	-0.2149*
	(0.1271)
8.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2017	-0.0889
	(0.1092)
9.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2017	-0.0891
	(0.1275)
10.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2017	0.2870
	(0.2214)
11.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2017	0.5155**
	(0.2087)
12.pctnrshare_nber_higherd2017	0.5713*
	(0.3390)
N	1873

Standard errors in parentheses

Clustered at the departement level

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

U Marginal impact of tax/inhabitants ratio on the right

U.1 2002



	(1) zshare_right2002
1.pctnrtax_product_capita2002	0.0458
	(0.1100)
2.pctnrtax_product_capita2002	0.0124
	(0.1013)
3.pctnrtax_product_capita2002	0.0022
	(0.0769)
4.pctnrtax_product_capita2002	0.0072
	(0.0754)
5.pctnrtax_product_capita2002	-0.2120***
	(0.0747)
7.pctnrtax_product_capita2002	-0.0208
	(0.0740)
8.pctnrtax_product_capita2002	-0.0439
	(0.0869)
9.pctnrtax_product_capita2002	-0.0433
	(0.0812)
10.pctnrtax_product_capita2002	-0.0265
	(0.1300)
11.pctnrtax_product_capita2002	0.1502
	(0.1313)
12.pctnrtax_product_capita2002	0.3526**
	(0.1715)
N	3390

Standard errors in parentheses
Clustered at the departement level
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

U.2 2007


Marginal effect of the tax/inhabitant ratio on the vote for the right in 2007
(leg. T1 2007) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the tax/inhabitant ratio
Standard−deviation of the vote for the right2007
−.2
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 95
95 to 99
99 to 100
Percentiles of the tax/inhabitant ratio
Without controls
Controlling for the share. of univ. grad.
Controlling for the share of univ. grad. and the population density
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_right2007
1.pctnrtax_product_capita2007	0.1505
	(0.0908)
2.pctnrtax_product_capita2007	0.1884^{**}
	(0.0923)
3.pctnrtax_product_capita2007	0.0762
	(0.0812)
4.pctnrtax_product_capita2007	0.0065
	(0.0671)
5.pctnrtax_product_capita2007	-0.0027
	(0.0804)
7.pctnrtax_product_capita2007	-0.1003
	(0.0779)
8.pctnrtax_product_capita2007	-0.0412
	(0.0849)
9.pctnrtax_product_capita2007	0.0078
	(0.0828)
10.pctnrtax_product_capita2007	0.1647
	(0.1109)
11.pctnrtax_product_capita2007	0.3034^{*}
	(0.1710)
12.pctnrtax_product_capita2007	0.4372^{*}
	(0.2210)
N	3330

Standard errors in parentheses

Clustered at the departement level

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

U.3 2012


Marginal effect of the tax/inhabitant ratio on the vote for the right in 2012
(leg. T1 2012) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the tax/inhabitant ratio
Standard−deviation of the vote for the right2012
−.2
0
.2
.4
.6
.8
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 95
95 to 99
99 to 100
Percentiles of the tax/inhabitant ratio
Without controls
Controlling for the share. of univ. grad.
Controlling for the share of univ. grad. and the population density
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_right2012
1.pctnrtax_product_capita2012	0.0945
	(0.0829)
2.pctnrtax_product_capita2012	0.1238
	(0.0805)
3.pctnrtax_product_capita2012	0.1681^{*}
	(0.0940)
4.pctnrtax_product_capita2012	0.0204
	(0.0737)
5.pctnrtax_product_capita2012	-0.1139
	(0.0784)
7.pctnrtax_product_capita2012	-0.0136
	(0.0699)
8.pctnrtax_product_capita2012	-0.0538
	(0.0899)
9.pctnrtax_product_capita2012	0.0614
	(0.0962)
10.pctnrtax_product_capita2012	0.0339
	(0.1133)
11.pctnrtax_product_capita2012	0.3260^{**}
	(0.1390)
12.pctnrtax_product_capita2012	0.4634^{**}
	(0.1795)
N	3471

Standard errors in parentheses
Clustered at the departement level
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

U.4 2017


Marginal effect of the tax/inhabitant ratio on the vote for the right in 2017
(leg. T1 2017) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the tax/inhabitant ratio
Standard−deviation of the vote for the right2017
−.4
−.2
0
.2
.4
.6
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 95
95 to 99
99 to 100
Percentiles of the tax/inhabitant ratio
Without controls
Controlling for the share. of univ. grad.
Controlling for the share of univ. grad. and the population density
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_right2017
1.pctnrtax_product_capita2017	-0.0447
	(0.1473)
2.pctnrtax_product_capita2017	-0.0449
	(0.1349)
3.pctnrtax_product_capita2017	0.1922
	(0.1258)
4.pctnrtax_product_capita2017	0.1006
	(0.1304)
5.pctnrtax_product_capita2017	0.2185*
	(0.1232)
7.pctnrtax_product_capita2017	-0.0366
	(0.1231)
8.pctnrtax_product_capita2017	0.1409
	(0.1030)
9.pctnrtax_product_capita2017	0.1185
	(0.1164)
10.pctnrtax_product_capita2017	0.1373
	(0.1496)
11.pctnrtax_product_capita2017	0.2798
	(0.1737)
12.pctnrtax_product_capita2017	0.0250
	(0.2497)
N	1853

Standard errors in parentheses

Clustered at the departement level

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

V Marginal impact of tax/inhabitants ratio on the left

V.1 2002



	(1) zshare_left2002
1.pctnrtax_product_capita2002	-0.0580
	(0.1117)
2.pctnrtax_product_capita2002	-0.0411
	(0.0844)
3.pctnrtax_product_capita2002	-0.0259
	(0.0799)
4.pctnrtax_product_capita2002	-0.0151
	(0.0777)
5.pctnrtax_product_capita2002	0.2295***
	(0.0788)
7.pctnrtax_product_capita2002	0.0130
	(0.0750)
8.pctnrtax_product_capita2002	0.0983
	(0.0959)
9.pctnrtax_product_capita2002	0.0598
	(0.0813)
10.pctnrtax_product_capita2002	0.0926
	(0.1273)
11.pctnrtax_product_capita2002	-0.0846
	(0.1287)
12.pctnrtax_product_capita2002	-0.2873
	(0.1874)
N	3390

Standard errors in parentheses

Clustered at the departement level

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

V.2 2007


Marginal effect of the tax/inhabitant ratio on the vote for the left in 2007
(leg. T1 2007) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the tax/inhabitant ratio
Standard−deviation of the vote for the left2007
−.8
−.6
−.4
−.2
0
.2
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 95
95 to 99
99 to 100
Percentiles of the tax/inhabitant ratio
Without controls
Controlling for the share. of univ. grad.
Controlling for the share of univ. grad. and the population density
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_left2007
1.pctnrtax_product_capita2007	-0.1595*
	(0.0950)
2.pctnrtax_product_capita2007	-0.2126**
	(0.0905)
3.pctnrtax_product_capita2007	-0.1009
	(0.0794)
4.pctnrtax_product_capita2007	0.0126
	(0.0681)
5.pctnrtax_product_capita2007	-0.0377
	(0.0749)
7.pctnrtax_product_capita2007	0.1033
	(0.0748)
8.pctnrtax_product_capita2007	0.0530
	(0.0838)
9.pctnrtax_product_capita2007	-0.0047
	(0.0840)
10.pctnrtax_product_capita2007	-0.1604
	(0.1143)
11.pctnrtax_product_capita2007	-0.3093*
	(0.1788)
12.pctnrtax_product_capita2007	-0.4097*
	(0.2285)
N	3330

Standard errors in parentheses

Clustered at the departement level

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

V.3 2012


Marginal effect of the tax/inhabitant ratio on the vote for the left in 2012
(leg. T1 2012) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the tax/inhabitant ratio
Standard−deviation of the vote for the left2012
−.8
−.6
−.4
−.2
0
.2
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 95
95 to 99
99 to 100
Percentiles of the tax/inhabitant ratio
Without controls
Controlling for the share. of univ. grad.
Controlling for the share of univ. grad. and the population density
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_left2012
1.pctnrtax_product_capita2012	-0.0891 (0.0842)
2.pctnrtax_product_capita2012	-0.1809** (0.0828)
3.pctnrtax_product_capita2012	-0.2467*** (0.0873)
4.pctnrtax_product_capita2012	-0.0566 (0.0794)
5.pctnrtax_product_capita2012	0.0839 (0.0755)
7.pctnrtax_product_capita2012	-0.0628 (0.0700)
8.pctnrtax_product_capita2012	0.0339 (0.0882)
9.pctnrtax_product_capita2012	-0.1331 (0.1054)
10.pctnrtax_product_capita2012	-0.0771 (0.1222)
11.pctnrtax_product_capita2012	-0.3499** (0.1528)
12.pctnrtax_product_capita2012	-0.4786** (0.1982)
N	3471

Standard errors in parentheses

Clustered at the departement level

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

V.4 2017


Marginal effect of the tax/inhabitant ratio on the vote for the left in 2017
(leg. T1 2017) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the tax/inhabitant ratio
Standard−deviation of the vote for the left2017
.5
0
−.5
−1
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 95
95 to 99
99 to 100
Percentiles of the tax/inhabitant ratio
Without controls
Controlling for the share. of univ. grad.
Controlling for the share of univ. grad. and the population density
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_left2017
1.pctnrtax_product_capita2017	-0.0019 (0.1531)
2.pctnrtax_product_capita2017	0.0613 (0.1396)
3.pctnrtax_product_capita2017	-0.1868 (0.1226)
4.pctnrtax_product_capita2017	-0.1200 (0.1256)
5.pctnrtax_product_capita2017	-0.2566* (0.1329)
7.pctnrtax_product_capita2017	0.0294 (0.1329)
8.pctnrtax_product_capita2017	-0.1808* (0.1011)
9.pctnrtax_product_capita2017	-0.1559 (0.1165)
10.pctnrtax_product_capita2017	-0.1950 (0.1485)
11.pctnrtax_product_capita2017	-0.3813** (0.1790)
12.pctnrtax_product_capita2017	-0.0632 (0.2416)
N	1853

Standard errors in parentheses

Clustered at the departement level

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

W Marginal impact of the net average taxable income on the right

W.1 1993



	(1) zshare_right1993
1.pctnrfm1993	-0.0752 (0.1186)
2.pctnrfm1993	-0.0082 (0.0954)
3.pctnrfm1993	-0.0421 (0.0868)
4.pctnrfm1993	-0.0105 (0.0777)
5.pctnrfm1993	0.0180 (0.0728)
7.pctnrfm1993	0.0979 (0.0810)
8.pctnrfm1993	0.1035 (0.0856)
9.pctnrfm1993	0.1416 (0.1229)
10.pctnrfm1993	0.3326*** (0.1091)
11.pctnrfm1993	0.3864*** (0.1350)
12.pctnrfm1993	0.6970*** (0.1875)
N	3477

Standard errors in parentheses

Clustered at the departement level

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

W.2 1997


Marginal effect of the net average income on the vote for the right in 1997
(leg. T1 1997) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the net average income
Standard−deviation of the vote for the right1997
1
.5
0
−.5
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 95
95 to 99
99 to 100
Percentiles of the average net income per canton
Without controls
Controlling for the share of the pop. with no degree
Controlling for the share of the pop. with no degree and the population density
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_right1997
1.pctnrfm1997	-0.1665 (0.1201)
2.pctnrfm1997	-0.2082^{**} (0.1002)
3.pctnrfm1997	-0.1732^{*} (0.0978)
4.pctnrfm1997	-0.0337 (0.0928)
5.pctnrfm1997	0.0046 (0.0980)
7.pctnrfm1997	0.0325 (0.1123)
8.pctnrfm1997	0.1266 (0.1021)
9.pctnrfm1997	0.1579 (0.1325)
10.pctnrfm1997	0.3895^{***} (0.1179)
11.pctnrfm1997	0.5070^{***} (0.1891)
12.pctnrfm1997	0.5351^{**} (0.2192)
N	3480

Standard errors in parentheses
Clustered at the departement level
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

W.3 2002


Marginal effect of the average taxable income on the vote for the right in 2002
(leg. T1 2002) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the average taxable income
Standard−deviation of the vote for the right2002
−1
0
1
2
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 95
95 to 99
99 to 100
Percentiles of the average taxable income per canton
Without controls
Controlling for the share of the pop. with no degree
Controlling for the share of the pop with no degree and the population density
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_right2002
1.pctnrfm2002	-0.6776***
	(0.1495)
2.pctnrfm2002	-0.5847***
	(0.1119)
3.pctnrfm2002	-0.5701***
	(0.1246)
4.pctnrfm2002	-0.3790***
	(0.1033)
5.pctnrfm2002	-0.2822***
	(0.1009)
7.pctnrfm2002	0.0725
	(0.0826)
8.pctnrfm2002	0.3239***
	(0.0964)
9.pctnrfm2002	0.5276***
	(0.1282)
10.pctnrfm2002	0.7239***
	(0.1472)
11.pctnrfm2002	0.9528***
	(0.1682)
12.pctnrfm2002	1.4080***
	(0.2231)
N	3490

Standard errors in parentheses
Clustered at the departement level
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

W.4 2007


Marginal effect of the average taxable income on the vote for the right in 2007
(leg. T1 2007) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the average taxable income
Standard−deviation of the vote for the right2007
−1
0
1
2
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 95
95 to 99
99 to 100
Percentiles of the average taxable income per canton
Without controls
Controlling for the share of the pop. with no degree
Controlling for the share of the pop with no degree and the population density
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_right2007
1.pctnrfm2007	-0.6315*** (0.1444)
2.pctnrfm2007	-0.5194*** (0.1065)
3.pctnrfm2007	-0.3859*** (0.1131)
4.pctnrfm2007	-0.1724* (0.0912)
5.pctnrfm2007	-0.1074 (0.0975)
7.pctnrfm2007	0.1534 (0.1115)
8.pctnrfm2007	0.4008*** (0.0840)
9.pctnrfm2007	0.6356*** (0.1178)
10.pctnrfm2007	0.7742*** (0.1505)
11.pctnrfm2007	1.0308*** (0.2070)
12.pctnrfm2007	1.0215*** (0.3342)
N	3472

Standard errors in parentheses

Clustered at the departement level

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

W.5 2012


Marginal effect of the average taxable income on the vote for the right in 2012
(leg. T1 2012) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the average taxable income
Standard−deviation of the vote for the right2012
−1
0
1
2
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 95
95 to 99
99 to 100
Percentiles of the average taxable income per canton
Without controls
Controlling for the share of the pop. with no degree
Controlling for the share of the pop with no degree and the population density
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_right2012
1.pctnrfm2012	-0.8747***
	(0.1311)
2.pctnrfm2012	-0.6070***
	(0.1152)
3.pctnrfm2012	-0.5075***
	(0.1120)
4.pctnrfm2012	-0.3065***
	(0.1101)
5.pctnrfm2012	-0.1310
	(0.0905)
7.pctnrfm2012	0.1832*
	(0.0964)
8.pctnrfm2012	0.4288***
	(0.0922)
9.pctnrfm2012	0.6882***
	(0.1010)
10.pctnrfm2012	0.7540***
	(0.1626)
11.pctnrfm2012	1.1143***
	(0.1366)
12.pctnrfm2012	1.6873***
	(0.2324)
N	3491

Standard errors in parentheses

Clustered at the departement level

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

W.6 2017


Marginal effect of the average taxable income on the vote for the right in 2017
(leg. T1 2017) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the average taxable income
Standard−deviation of the vote for the right2017
−.5
0
.5
1
1.5
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 95
95 to 99
99 to 100
Percentiles of the average taxable income per canton
Without controls
Controlling for the share of the pop. with no degree
Controlling for the share of the pop with no degree and the population density
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_right2017
1.pctnrfm2017	-0.1155
	(0.1795)
2.pctnrfm2017	-0.0482
	(0.1711)
3.pctnrfm2017	-0.1582
	(0.1361)
4.pctnrfm2017	0.1863
	(0.1521)
5.pctnrfm2017	0.1674
	(0.1618)
7.pctnrfm2017	0.2584*
	(0.1441)
8.pctnrfm2017	0.3400***
	(0.1051)
9.pctnrfm2017	0.4877***
	(0.1040)
10.pctnrfm2017	0.6032***
	(0.1624)
11.pctnrfm2017	0.6782***
	(0.1794)
12.pctnrfm2017	1.1566***
	(0.2748)
N	1873

Standard errors in parentheses
Clustered at the departement level
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

X Marginal impact of the net average taxable income on the left

X.1 1993



	(1) zshare_left1993
1.pctnrfm1993	0.0856 (0.1178)
2.pctnrfm1993	0.0176 (0.0972)
3.pctnrfm1993	0.0423 (0.0861)
4.pctnrfm1993	-0.0107 (0.0756)
5.pctnrfm1993	-0.0313 (0.0736)
7.pctnrfm1993	-0.1550* (0.0869)
8.pctnrfm1993	-0.1919** (0.0818)
9.pctnrfm1993	-0.2118* (0.1144)
10.pctnrfm1993	-0.4615*** (0.1234)
11.pctnrfm1993	-0.4604*** (0.1270)
12.pctnrfm1993	-0.7723*** (0.1858)
N	3477

Standard errors in parentheses
Clustered at the departement level
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

X.2 1997


Marginal effect of the net average income on the vote for the left in 1997
(leg. T1 1997) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the net average income
Standard−deviation of the vote for the left1997
.5
0
−.5
−1
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 95
95 to 99
99 to 100
Percentiles of the average net income per canton
Without controls
Controlling for the share of the pop. with no degree
Controlling for the share of the pop. with no degree and the population density
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_left1997
1.pctnrfm1997	0.1410
	(0.1255)
2.pctnrfm1997	0.1680
	(0.1041)
3.pctnrfm1997	0.1497
	(0.1011)
4.pctnrfm1997	0.0257
	(0.0967)
5.pctnrfm1997	0.0032
	(0.0984)
7.pctnrfm1997	-0.0561
	(0.1146)
8.pctnrfm1997	-0.1687
	(0.1060)
9.pctnrfm1997	-0.1543
	(0.1291)
10.pctnrfm1997	-0.4095***
	(0.1258)
11.pctnrfm1997	-0.4802**
	(0.2017)
12.pctnrfm1997	-0.4427**
	(0.2168)
N	3480

Standard errors in parentheses
Clustered at the departement level
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

X.3 2002


Marginal effect of the average taxable income on the vote for the left in 2002
(leg. T1 2002) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the average taxable income
Standard−deviation of the vote for the left2002
1
0
−1
−2
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 95
95 to 99
99 to 100
Percentiles of the average taxable income per canton
Without controls
Controlling for the share of the pop. with no degree
Controlling for the share of the pop with no degree and the population density
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_left2002
1.pctnrfm2002	0.5751***
	(0.1578)
2.pctnrfm2002	0.5012***
	(0.1129)
3.pctnrfm2002	0.5069***
	(0.1230)
4.pctnrfm2002	0.3452***
	(0.1008)
5.pctnrfm2002	0.2624***
	(0.0936)
7.pctnrfm2002	-0.0423
	(0.0760)
8.pctnrfm2002	-0.2510**
	(0.0981)
9.pctnrfm2002	-0.4505***
	(0.1188)
10.pctnrfm2002	-0.6027***
	(0.1406)
11.pctnrfm2002	-0.8838***
	(0.1844)
12.pctnrfm2002	-1.3120***
	(0.2316)
N	3490

Standard errors in parentheses
Clustered at the departement level
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

X.4 2007


Marginal effect of the average taxable income on the vote for the left in 2007
(leg. T1 2007) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the average taxable income
Standard−deviation of the vote for the left2007
−1.5
−1
−.5
0
.5
1
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 95
95 to 99
99 to 100
Percentiles of the average taxable income per canton
Without controls
Controlling for the share of the pop. with no degree
Controlling for the share of the pop with no degree and the population density
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_left2007
1.pctnrfm2007	0.5537***
	(0.1441)
2.pctnrfm2007	0.4777***
	(0.1074)
3.pctnrfm2007	0.3402***
	(0.1155)
4.pctnrfm2007	0.1543*
	(0.0906)
5.pctnrfm2007	0.1177
	(0.0955)
7.pctnrfm2007	-0.1328
	(0.1110)
8.pctnrfm2007	-0.3829***
	(0.0807)
9.pctnrfm2007	-0.6208***
	(0.1153)
10.pctnrfm2007	-0.6850***
	(0.1438)
11.pctnrfm2007	-0.9152***
	(0.2024)
12.pctnrfm2007	-0.9303***
	(0.3364)
N	3472

Standard errors in parentheses
Clustered at the departement level
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

X.5 2012


Marginal effect of the average taxable income on the vote for the left in 2012
(leg. T1 2012) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the average taxable income
Standard−deviation of the vote for the left2012
1
0
−1
−2
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 95
95 to 99
99 to 100
Percentiles of the average taxable income per canton
Without controls
Controlling for the share of the pop. with no degree
Controlling for the share of the pop with no degree and the population density
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_left2012
1.pctnrfm2012	0.8501***
	(0.1381)
2.pctnrfm2012	0.6215***
	(0.1332)
3.pctnrfm2012	0.4834***
	(0.1225)
4.pctnrfm2012	0.3252**
	(0.1308)
5.pctnrfm2012	0.1939
	(0.1223)
7.pctnrfm2012	-0.1574
	(0.1084)
8.pctnrfm2012	-0.3714***
	(0.0927)
9.pctnrfm2012	-0.6236***
	(0.1006)
10.pctnrfm2012	-0.6728***
	(0.1612)
11.pctnrfm2012	-1.0208***
	(0.1749)
12.pctnrfm2012	-1.6507***
	(0.2377)
N	3491

Standard errors in parentheses
Clustered at the departement level
* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$

X.6 2017


Marginal effect of the average taxable income on the vote for the left in 2017
(leg. T1 2017) relative to the percentiles 50−60 of the average taxable income
Standard−deviation of the vote for the left2017
.5
0
−.5
−1
−1.5
0 to 10
10 to 20
20 to 30
30 to 40
40 to 50
60 to 70
70 to 80
80 to 90
90 to 95
95 to 99
99 to 100
Percentiles of the average taxable income per canton
Without controls
Controlling for the share of the pop. with no degree
Controlling for the share of the pop with no degree and the population density
All control variables
95% Confidence interval

	(1) zshare_left2017
1.pctnrfm2017	0.0355
	(0.1834)
2.pctnrfm2017	-0.0277
	(0.1764)
3.pctnrfm2017	0.1131
	(0.1390)
4.pctnrfm2017	-0.2686*
	(0.1503)
5.pctnrfm2017	-0.2245
	(0.1641)
7.pctnrfm2017	-0.2898*
	(0.1518)
8.pctnrfm2017	-0.4089***
	(0.1161)
9.pctnrfm2017	-0.5159***
	(0.1252)
10.pctnrfm2017	-0.7025***
	(0.1698)
11.pctnrfm2017	-0.8219***
	(0.1900)
12.pctnrfm2017	-1.1096***
	(0.2587)
N	1873

Standard errors in parentheses

Clustered at the departement level

* $p < 0.10$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.01$